Filling the vacuum? The development of the partisan radical left in Germany, France and Italy, 1989-2013

Chiocchetti, Paolo

Awarding institution:
King's College London

Department of European & International Studies

King's College London

FILLING THE VACUUM?

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTISAN RADICAL LEFT IN GERMANY, FRANCE AND ITALY, 1989-2013

Paolo Chiocchetti

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
5 November 2013

RD7 Declaration

Please submit to the Examinations Office with your thesis.

Student name	Paolo Chiocchetti
Student ID number	0947962
School	Arts & Humanities
Intended date of submission	5 November 2013
Word count of thesis	93,502
Title of thesis	Filling the vacuum? The development of the partisan radical left in Germany, France and Italy, 1989-2013

Has your thesis title changed since submission of the RD1: Yes ☐ No x

If you have exceeded the word limit for a thesis, as specified in the regulations, you must obtain a suspension of regulations via the Learning and Teaching Support Office. The examiners may reject a thesis exceeding the prescribed word limit. For further details contact regulations@kcl.ac.uk.

DECLARATION: I confirm that the following thesis does not exceed the word limit prescribed in the College regulations. I further confirm that the work presented in the thesis is my own and all references are cited accordingly.

Student signature	
Date	5 November 2013

Supervisor name	Dr. Jim Wolfreys
Supervisor signature	
Date	5 November 2013

ABSTRACT

This thesis charts the development of the parties of the contemporary European radical left over the period 1989-2013. Its aim is to provide a convincing interpretative framework on the topic and an innovative contribution to the scholarship on comparative party analysis. The discussion will focus on three case studies (Germany, France and Italy), selected for their central importance within the European Union and for the diversity of their starting points and trajectories.

The analysis addresses three main research questions. Firstly, what is the relevance of radical left parties within contemporary political systems and societies (their *societal weight*) and what are the main determinants of their growth and decline? Secondly, how can we make sense of the evolution of their *political nature*, namely the transformations in their ideology, sociology, organisation and strategy? Thirdly, what are the key drivers behind the tendencies to *regroupment and fragmentation*? I answer to these interrogatives by placing the development of the contemporary radical left firmly within the context of a process of neo-liberalisation of Western European societies and of an emerging vacuum of political representation of working-class and welfarist constituencies. Moreover, I show how an aggregate, multi-dimensional and multi-level approach can help to further our understanding of radical left dynamics and contradictions.

The first chapter will provide a theoretical conceptualisation of the radical left as a *political space* defined by representational contents and by its relationship with the moderate left. The second chapter will present an overview of its historical roots (since 1914) and of its broader Western European context. The central chapters (three, four and five) will be devoted to an in-depth analysis of the three country studies. The final chapter will explicitly compare the German, French and Italian trajectories, draw together the main findings and illustrate their broader significance for political research.

Table of contents

List of tables and figures

List of acronyms and abbreviations

ABID	Allgemeiner Behindertenverband in Deutschland
AC!	Agir ensemble contre le chômage
ADF	Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt
ADS	Alternative pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme
AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
ALV	Arbeitslosenverband Deutschland
ANPI	Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia
APEIS	Association pour l'emploi, l'information et la solidarité des chômeurs et des précaires
ARAC	Association republicaine des anciens combattants et victimes de guerre
ARCI	Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana
ARS	Associazione per il Rinnovamento della Sinistra
ATTAC	Association pour une taxation des transations financières pour l'aide aux citoyens [since 2009: Association pour une taxation des transations financières et pour l'action citoyenne]
AWO	Arbeiterwohlfahrt
BdWi	Bund demokratischer Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler
BWL	Bundeswahlleiter
CAGR	Compound Annual Growth Rate
CAP	Convention pour une Alternative Progressiste
CCA	Confederazione Comunisti/e Autorganizzati
CDSP	Centre de Données Socio-politiques
CDU (Germany)	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CDU (Portugal)	Coligação Democrática Unitária [alliance of PCP and PEV]
CEVIPOF	Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po [before 2003 Centre d'études de la vie politique française]
CGIL	Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
CGT	Confédération générale du travail
CIUN	Collectif national d'initiative pour un rassemblement antilibéral de gauche et des candidatures communes
CNL	Confédération Nationale du Logement
COBAS	Cobas per l'Autorganizzazione
COCORECO	Collectif de Coordination des Rénovateurs Communistes [after 1988 MRC, Mouvement des Rénovateurs Communistes]
CP	Confédération paysanne
CNP-M	Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CSA	conseil, sondage et analyse
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
CU	Movimento dei Comunisti Unitari
DAL	Droit au logement
DARES	Direction de l'animation de la recherche, des études et des statistiques
DD!!	Droits devant !!
DESTATIS	Statistisches Bundesamt
DFG-VK	Deutsche Friedengesellschaft – Vereinigte KriegstdienstgegnerInnen
DFU	Deutsche Friedensunion
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
DGRV	Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband
DIDF	Demokratik Işçi Dernekleri Federasyonu
DIE LINKE.	DIE LINKE.
DKP	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei
DL	Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita
DMB	Deutscher Mieterbund
DP	Democrazia Proletaria
DS	Democratici di Sinistra
FASE	Fédération pour une Alternative Sociale et Écologique
FAUD	Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands

FdG	Front de Gauche
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
FdS	Federazione della Sinistra
FED	Federazione dell'Ulivo
FGA	Fédération pour une gauche alternative
FGW	Forschungsgruppe Wahlen
FIOM	Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici
FN	Front national
FNACA	Fédération nationale des anciens combattants en Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie
FNMT	Fédération nationale des mutuelles de travailleurs [after 1986 FMF, Fédération des mutuelles de France]
FO	Confédération générale du travail - Force ouvrière
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany [West Germany]
FSGT	Fédération sportive et gymnique du travail
FSU	Fédération syndicale unitaire
GDF	Göcmen Dernekleri Federasyonu
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic [East Germany]
GISTI	Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés [before 1996 Groupe d'information et de soutien des travailleurs immigrés]
GRÜNE	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
G.U.	Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana
GUE/NGL	Gauche unitaire européenne/Gauche verte nordique [European United Left/Nordic Green Left]
ICTWSS	Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts [database]
IdV	Italia dei Valori
IFOP	Institut français d'opinion publique
IG Metall	Industriegewerkschaft Metall
IMT	International Marxist Tendency
INFAS	Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft
INFRATEST	infratest dimap Gesellschaft für Trend- und Wahlforschung mbH
INSEE	Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques
ISOR	Initiativgemeinschaft zum Schutz der sozialen Rechte ehemaliger Angehöriger bewaffneter Organe und der Zollverwaltung der DDR
IST	International Socialist Tendency
ISTAT	Istituto nazionale di statistica
ITANES	Italian National Election Studies
IU	Izquierda Unida
J.O.R.F.	Journal Official de la République Française
KAPD	Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands
KB	Kommunistischer Bund
KKE	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας [Communist Party of Greece]
KLEMS	EU KLEMS project
KOS	Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosengruppen
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
KPD-O	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands – Opposition
KPD-Ost	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands [1990]
L.PDS	Die Linkspartei.PDS [shorthand: DIE LINKE.PDS]
LCR	Ligue communiste révolutionnaire
LEGACOOP	Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue
LO	Lutte ouvrière
M5S	MoVimento 5 Stelle
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo – Instumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos
MDC	Mouvement des citoyens [after 2003 MRC, Mouvement républicain et citoyen]
MJCF	Mouvement Jeunes Communistes de France
MLPD	Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands
MNCP	Mouvement national des chômeurs et précaires
MoDem	Mouvement démocrate

MpS	Movimento per la Sinistra
MRAP	Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples
MSPD	Mehrheitssozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
MUP	Mouvement Unitaire Progressiste
NPA	Nouveau parti anticapitaliste
OCI	Organisation communiste internationaliste
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OKV	Ostdeutsches Kuratorium von Verbänden
PAC	Parti pour une alternative communiste
PBC	Per il Bene Comune
PC (France)	Parti communiste
PCd'I	Partito Comunista d'Italia
PCF	Parti communiste français
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano
PCI (France)	Parti comuniste internationaliste
PCI M-L	Partito Comunista Italiano Marxista-Leninista
PCL	Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori
PD	Partito Democratico
PdAC	Partito di Alternativa Comunista
PdCI	Partito dei Comunisti Italiani
PDS (Germany)	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus
PDS (Italy)	Partito Democratico della Sinistra
PdUP	Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo
PEL	Party of the European Left
PG	Parti de gauche
PIRATEN	Piratenpartei Deutschland
POI	Parti ouvrier indépendant [before 2008 PT, Parti des travailleurs]
PRC	Partito della Rifondazione Comunista
PSG	Partei für Soziale Gleichheit [before 1997 BSA, Bund Sozialistischer Arbeiter]
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano
PSIUP	Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria
PSOP	Parti socialiste ouvrier et paysan
PSU (France)	Parti socialiste unifié
PSU (Italy)	Partito Socialista Unitario
PSUV	Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
PT	Parti des Travailleurs [after 2008 POI, Parti ouvrier indépendant]
PUP	Parti d'unité prolétarienne
RC	Rivoluzione Civile
RESF	Réseau éducation sans frontières
RMI	Revenu Minimum d'Insertion
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République
RSB	Revolutionär Sozialistischer Bund
RW	Repräsentative Wahlstatistik [Bundeswahlleiter]
SA	La Sinistra – L'Arcobaleno
SAPD	Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands
SC	Sinistra Critica
SD	Sinistra Democratica
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland
SEGA	Solidarité, Écologie, Gauche Alternative
SeL	Sinistra e Libertà
SEL	Sinistra Ecologia Libertà
SFIC	Section française de l'Internationale communiste
SFIO	Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière
SMIC	Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance
SOFRES	Société française d'enquêtes par sondages
Solidaires	Union syndicale Solidaires
SoVD	Sozialverband Deutschland
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SPF	Secours populaire français

SUNIA	Sindacato Unitario Nazionale Inquilini ed Assegnatari
SYRIZA	Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς - Ενωτικό Κοινωνικό Μέτωπο [Coalition of the Radical Left – Unitary Social Front]
Treuhand	Treuhandanstalt
UDF	Union pour la démocratie française
UDI	Unione Donne Italiane [after 2003 Unione Donne in Italia]
UDS	Unione degli Studenti
UDU	Unione degli Universitari
UFF	Union des femmes françaises [after 1998 FS, Femmes solidaires]
UMP	Union pour un mouvement populaire [before 2002 Union pour la majorité présidentielle]
UNEF	Union nationale des étudiants de France
UNRPA	Union Nationale des Retraités et Personnes âgées
USFI	Fourth International
USI-AIT	Unione Sindacale Italiana
USPD	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
VdK	Sozialverband Vdk (Verband der Kriegsbeschädigten, Kriegshinterbliebenen und Sozialrentner Deutschlands)
Ver.Di	Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft
VKSG	Verband der Kleingärtner, Siedler und Grundstücknutzer
VL	Vereinigte Linke
VSP	Vereinigte Sozialistische Partei
WASG	Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative
WEO	World Economic Outlook [database of the International Monetary Fund]

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the help, the encouragement, the patience and the moral and material support of many people: my supervisors Dr. Jim Wolfreys and Dr. Stathis Kouvelakis; my parents Linda and Aldo; my girlfriend Teresa; my grandparents Gisella and Tarcisio; my friends Giulia, Lorenzo P., Lorenzo F., Adam, Marina, Jisun, Simon, Aude, Ffion, Tom and Daniele. To all of you goes my heartfelt thanks.

I'd also like to express my sincere gratitude for their assistance to the following persons and institutions: the King's Continuation Scholarship award; the KCLEURESEARCH group; the academic and administrative staff at the Department of European & International Studies; the Interloans staff; all my interviewees; the DIE LINKE.SDS group in Leipzig; Linda Santilli and Claudio Grassi of the PRC; Giovanni Parrella of the PdCI; Michael Uwe of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung; Lothar Hornbogen and Judith Dellheim of DIE LINKE; Dr. Viola Neu of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; Melanie Kipp of Infratest dimap; Tanja Seel of the Statistisches Bundesamt; Dr. Thierry Choffat; Dr. Dominique Andolfatto; Guy Landais; the Istituto Cattaneo in Bologna; the CDSP in Paris; the APB-Tutzing.

CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION. TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY RADICAL LEFT.

The historic change represented by the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 was famously hailed by the neo-conservative scholar Francis Fukuyama (1989) as representing "the end of history" and as paving the way for a shift toward a de-ideologised, pacified and consensual policy-making built on the cornerstones of free-market capitalism, liberal-democratic institutions and technocratic neo-liberal policies. From the other hand of the political spectrum, social democratic political scientist Herbert Kitschelt (1994) underlined the continuing importance of political competition between left and right on cultural and post-materialist issues but agreed that the success of the welfare state, the constraints of globalisation and the post-industrial shift meant a substantial end of the traditional class and redistributive conflicts.[1]

In the subsequent two decades, however, slow economic growth and attempts by firms and governments to dismantle the achievements of the post-war social compromise have brought the issues of class conflict and alternative developmental models back to the forefront. First, proposed policy reforms have regularly been met with massive social mobilisations, leading in cases like France and Greece to a veritable revival of labour militancy (Kouvelakis, 2007 and 2011). Second, resistance to neo-liberalism has led to the emergence of new waves of social movement activism and connected intellectual efforts: for instance, the French-centred *mouvements des sans* (Mouchard, 2009), the alter-globalist movement (Agricoliansky *et. al.,* 2005; Della

[1] The text is worth an extensive quotation: "traditional social democratic policies *ought no longer* be pursued, because they *cannot* be successfully implemented in the socioeconomic and cultural environment of advanced capitalism" (p. 5); "the new challenges of international market competition and the fragmentation of occupational groups and industrial sector force the parties to give up far-reaching objectives to change economic property rights and income equalization. What remains of social democratic economic leftism is the defence of basic principles of the welfare state [...] Socialist parties, however, are compelled to abandon demands for the nationalization of enterprises or for workers' control of corporate investment decisions in order to remain electorally viable. Instead, social democratic parties will embrace an agenda of economic policies that offers public investments to enhance the capacity of private market participants to compete internationally. [...] In advanced industrial democracies, parties can no longer offer voters stark alternatives on the distributive dimension" (p. 297).

Porta, 2006) or more recent anti-crisis mobilisations of the youth such as the *indignados* and *occupy* (*Current Sociology,* forth.). Thirdly, the diminishing goods and prospects distributed by the mainstream of the political system have led to an important decline of their legitimacy, appeal and electoral support (Mair, 2006) and the rise of political disengagement and anti-establishment challengers.

Within this landscape the parties of the radical left have experienced a certain revival of electoral support and of scholarly attention. On the first account, the post-1989 radical left has remained a medium-small party family weighing between 6% and 7% of the Western European electorate but has proved wrong the widespread expectations of its inevitable demise and, in some countries at least, has experienced significant phases of growth (see chapter 2). On the second account, twenty years ago the topic tended to be viewed as a marginal research object, rather a mere curiosity, relic of the past or anachronism than a subject worthy of the attention of political and social scientists. Progressively, however, interest has been growing and has become embodied in a large of number of scholarly articles, monographs, book chapters and edited volumes.

The attempts at a general synthesis have focused on three main aspects.

First, the initial tendency toward a decline of overall electoral and societal relevance of the radical left, especially as far as traditional communist parties are concerned (Bell, 1993; Bull, 1994 and 1995; Moreau *et al.*, 1998; Ramiro, 2003; Botella & Ramiro, 2003b).

Second, a profound transformation of the identity, ideology, programmes, image, strategy, organisation, sociological profile and systemic role of most parties, either through the mutation of former communist organisations, processes of regroupment and the emergence of new forces (Marantzidis, 2003; March & Mudde, 2005; March, 2008 and 2011).

Third, the tentative emergence, on the ruins of the old communist party family, of a new "radical left" grouping which is certainly less coherent and radical of its predecessor but at the same time reverses the trend toward decline, links up with contemporary social mobilisation and often reaches new peaks of electoral and political influence (Hudson, 2000 and 2012; Callinicos, 2002, 2008 and 2012; Brie & Hildebrandt, 2005 and 2006; Pina, 2005; Backes & Moreau, 2008; March, 2008 and

2011; Hildebrandt & Daiber, 2009; Olsen *et al.*, 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Videt, 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012; Ducange *et al.,* 2013).

I intend to contribute to this body of literature by providing a detailed analysis of the partisan radical left in the period 1989-2013 in three core countries of the European Union: Germany, France and Italy. In the rest of the chapter I will outline my analytical framework and the key theoretical and methodological choices.

1.1 Theoretical approach

A preliminary question needs to be addressed here: is the concept of a "contemporary radical left" meaningful and useful? Are we talking of a coherent party family (Mair & Mudde, 1998) or of a motley crew linked only by the fact of being to the left of the mainstream socialist parties? Many facts seem to militate against the first perspective.

On the one hand, the parties commonly identified under this label seem to present a marked degree of diversity and large ideological, relational and organisational differences. A first symptom of this is the instability of definitions and connotations used by parties and external observers alike[2]. A second problem is the different ideological heritage of the parties, which ranges from left social-democracy to Trotskyism passing through Euro-communism, orthodox Communism, Maoism, eco-socialism and various "new left" traditions. A third problem is the different degrees of radicalism in their goals (from mild reformism to vocal anti-capitalism) and in their parliamentary collocation (from governmental collaboration to anti-systemic opposition). A final problem is the absence of any solid and inclusive form of coordination at the supra-national level beyond the loose "technical" function of the GUE/NGL European parliamentary group[3]. The best summary of this scepticism is provided by Bull (1994): "the erstwhile fragmentation has become separation and […] it will no longer be possible to generalise about these parties as a "family", nor fruitful to study them within the same analytical framework". (p. 211)

On the other hand, there seem to be good arguments for either restricting the use of the term to ideologically anti-capitalist and/or relationally intransigent parties (the

[2] The most common term, "radical left", is rejected by some because it implies an exaggeration of the ideological radicalism of these parties or because of its association with anti-systemic extremism (especially in Germany). Popular alternatives have been "alternative left" (especially during the Nineties) and, increasingly, "left" *tout court*. Other terms tend to focus on a smaller range of organisations, like "post-communist left" or "far left". Finally, some authors see a dichotomy between an "anti-neoliberal (or radical) left" and an "anti-capitalist (or extreme) left" (March, 2011).

[3] The late attempt to follow the lead of other party families by establishing a transnational EPF (European Party Federation) led to the creation in 2004 of the Party of the European Left (PEL). The coordination remains however loose and with a patchy coverage (Dunphy & March, 2012). More stringent forms of cooperation tend to have a very narrow ideological basis and be limited to the various Trotskyist internationals.

Trotskyist far left; orthodox communist parties; radicalised forces from a communist or socialist background), thereby treating the more moderate and institutionalised parties as social democratic satellites, or identifying two distinct party families: an anti-capitalist (or revolutionary, antagonist) left and an anti-neoliberal (reformist, neo-social democratic) left.

My opinion is that a specific and coherent, albeit contradictory, radical left space does in fact exist and over-determines the behaviour of its component organisations, linking them together in a common party family. Four key elements must here be spelled out. Firstly, all radical left parties compete on a very similar political and electoral space and their success is predicated on their ability to provide a credible representation to a set of socio-economic issues which have been deserted by the mainstream political parties (notably by the "new" social democracy). Secondly, they all share the same strategic dilemmas: in particular, the tension between the defence of their anti-neoliberal programme and the desire for a common front against the right (in the terminology of the Italian PRC, the tension between radicality and unity). Thirdly, almost all parties and sensibilities – some to a greater, other to a smaller degree – have indeed tended to converge on a similar mid-term programme (an anti-neoliberal platform focusing on working-class, welfarist and left-libertarian issues), identity (left instead of communist) and organisation (loose, inclusive and pluralist). Fourthly, the diversity of historical traditions, ideological beliefs and practical orientations has tended to coexist within a common organisational framework, either under the form of broad left parties (e.g. PRC, PDS, DIE LINKE) or of semi-structured fronts or alliances (e.g. IU, Syriza, FdG, Respect).[4] Radical left unity tended to be rational and profitable, so far as the diversity of long-term goals was overshadowed by common short-term mobilisations and a collocation in the opposition enabled a large margin of ambiguity; division, on the other hand, tended to resurface only when faced with the hard choices with regards to governmental participation.[5]

---

[4] Indeed, the tendency toward regroupment has involved most of the existing radical left organisation, including the vast majority of Trotskyist groups. The IMT, for instance, has sought (outside Britain) to build Marxist tendencies within post- and neo-communist parties; the IST has generally argued for the establishment of broad left coalitions conceived as "united fronts of a special kind" (Rees, 2002; Callinicos, 2004); the USFI has oscillated between a call for "broad left parties" (Smith, 2003) and that for "broad anti-capitalist proletarian parties" with stricter delimitations (USFI, 2003).

[5] Or when the leading radical left party was unwilling (Greece, Portugal) or unable (France) to provide a reasonable working framework to its potential allies.

The analysis will be based on an understanding of political parties (and, by extension, party families) primarily as *specific tools* enabling collective action and mediating between society and public authoritative decision-making. In this sense, both the role of parties as mechanisms of selection of political personnel and tendency toward autonomisation and self-serving behaviour of specific groups, levels or entire organisations must be considered as by-products of their primary function.[6]

The thesis will focus on three broad research questions/themes.

The first one concerns the *political nature* of radical left parties. This point encompasses the most virulent discussions on their character: anti-neoliberal or anti-capitalist, working-class or post-materialist, conciliatory or intransigent, integrated or anti-systemic, electoral or social, useful or useless, moved by a coherent vision or by passive reactions to their external environment, and so on. The use of a multi-dimensional, multi-level, aggregate and comparative approach will facilitate the identification of provisional answers to these debates which, albeit largely fuelled by legitimate analytical differences, are partly due to a non-declared implicit focus on specific parties, levels and dimensions to the detriment of the larger picture.

The second one concerns the *societal weight* of the radical left and an understanding of its determinants, consequences, potentialities and obstacles.

The third one concerns the *unifying features and contradictions* of the radical left space. The identification of the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies of this space will help to explain the divergent trajectories of the three radical lefts in terms of fragmentation and regroupment: the progressive breakup of the PRC in a myriad of competing organisations in Italy; the preservation of a unitary framework in Germany; an early and persistent competition followed by an abrupt late regroupment in France.

The analytical approach I will employ is characterised by three main characteristics: it is aggregate, multi-dimensional and multi-level.

In contrast with the general tendency of the literature on the topic, I argue for the superiority of an aggregate approach focusing on the *radical left political space* (or

[6] An excellent discussion of political parties as sites of power struggles and the possible ways to theorise power within political parties is provided by the PhD thesis of Danny Rye (forthcoming).

field), within which various party organizations and tendencies (big and small, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) operate and compete, over an ideographic comparison of individual radical left parties. This procedure has two great advantages. On one hand, it enables us to identify the general trends lying behind party-specific idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, it improves the national and international comparability of our findings: that is, with other national party families and between the radical left of one country and those of other countries. For the same reason, the discussion of measures of societal weight (e.g. membership, votes and finances) will eschew from any threshold of relevance.[7] This choice makes little difference in cases of a cohesive radical left (Germany) but greatly improves the results in cases of high fragmentation (France and Italy).

I also stress the *multi-dimensionality* of the analysis. Existing research has tended to focus on one or two dimension of party activity at a time: organisation (Bosco, 2000; Bertolino, 2004; Keith, 2010); electoral results (Ramiro, 2003; March & Rommerskirchen, 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012); ideological evolution (March & Mudde, 2005; March, 2011); governmental participation (Hough & Verge, 2009; Daiber, 2010; Daiber *et al.,* 2010; Olsen *et al.,* 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 2011); role in the party system and political activity *strictu sensu* (most of the case-studies); civil society linkages (Andolfatto, 2008). My work will endeavour to survey all relevant dimensions of party politics and put them in relation with each other.

Finally, the individual radical left parties must necessarily be analysed within a *multi-level framework* reproducing the connections and contradictions between the various internal layers and external constraints of party activity. In particular, it is important to differentiate between the *party-organisation* (e.g. leadership, activists, members, collateral organisations), the *party-constituency* (e.g. financial supporters, sympathising individual and organisations, voters), the *external actors* (potential allies and adversaries) and the *structural environment* (e.g. political system, national societies, international framework).

In the next paragraphs I'll expand on each of these points.

---

[7] Unlike March and Mudde (2005) and March (2009), which set it at 3% of the vote and one seat in at least one parliamentary election, or De Waele and Vieira (2012), which set it at one parliamentary seat.

1.2 The radical left political space

1.2.1 Features and boundaries

At the heart of this research lies the hypothesis of the existence of a *radical left political space* populated by a variety of different partisan organisations. What are its features and boundaries?

Unlike the 20th century communist movement, contemporary radical left parties are not bound together by a strong organisational link (the Comintern in 1919-1943, informal links to the Soviet Union afterwards), identity (Communism) or ideology (Marxism-Leninism). What unites this wide array of forces, ranging from those advocating limited reforms within the capitalist system to those advocating an anti-systemic opposition and the development of anti-capitalist alternatives, is their continuing reference to the *class cleavage* at a time when the social democratic party family has moved elsewhere. More specifically, they are characterised by a broadly similar mid-term *anti-neoliberal programme* which can be summarised by a triple claim: the appeal to a specific representation of wage earners' class interests; the rejection of neo-liberal policies; the advocacy of a more egalitarian social order (hence the key value of "social justice").

This definition gives rise to two problems.
Firstly, is this not the classical definition of the traditional social democracy and, to a less extent, of the left *tout court*? Indeed it is.[8] It is not accidental that most of the parties in question are engaged precisely in an attempt to adopt a broad left posture,

[8] Fülberth (2008: 153), for instance, defines the two functions of social democracy as "the representation within capitalism of the interests of the people exclusively dependent from incomes from wage-labour or from public transfers" and "the stabilisation and flexibilisation of the capitalist system, particularly via infrastructure, social and demand policy and the integration of the lower classes". Anthony Crosland similarly defined social democracy as "political liberalism + mixed economy + welfare state + Keynesian economic policy + commitment to equality" (quoted in Moschonas, 2002: 15).

to rebrand themselves from communist or socialist to "left parties"[9] and to expunge the moderate left from this framework with labels of "neo-liberalism" or "social-liberalism". In this sense we are witnessing a progressive shift of the whole political system to the right, with the radical left taking on the role of a neo-social democracy. Despite this ideological shift, however, two important factors tend to starkly differentiate the post-1989 radical left space from the post-1945 social democratic space, putting contemporary radical left parties in a position which is very different from that of classical social democratic parties and more similar to that of far left organisations. On the one hand, the major mainstream left parties (the German SPD, the Italian DS and the French PS) have largely de-socialdemocratised their outlook and their social base, but have retained some memory of their traditional programme, internal left-wing tendencies, an important working-class electoral support and, crucially, key links with the organised labour movement (Moschonas, 2002; Walter, 2011; Bellucci *et al.,* 2000; Lefebvre and Sawicki, 2006). On the other hand, in the current conjuncture the opposition to neo-liberalism appears to have an almost anti-systemic character (Kouvelakis, 2007).[10] Hence the small size of the partisan radical left vis-a-vis the social and cultural left; hence the dilemma between competition with the moderate left and the politics of united front; hence the appropriateness of the "radical" left label despite the apparent lack of radicalism of many of its components.

Secondly, how should we interpret this refusal of neo-liberal policies, given that many contemporary radical left parties bear some responsibility for their very implementation? In the name of lesser-evilism and damage reduction, some parties have directly participated or externally supported centre-left governments while some others have indirectly facilitated their conquest of a parliamentary majority through

[9] In Germany the Party of Democratic Socialism renamed itself The Left Party (2005) and then The Left (2007); in Italy the Party of Communist Refoundation almost dissolved itself into the Rainbow Left alliance (2008); in France the French Communist Party entered the coalition Left Front (2009). This trend is by no means limited to the less radical parties, as the cases of the Left Bloc in Portugal (1999) or Critical Left in Italy (2007) prove.

[10] Kouvelakis argues that "any serious anti-neoliberal approach, as demanded by the needs of the present conjuncture, any measure which takes on, even partially, the dominant choices and which does not pull back before its consequences, leads out of internal necessity to a general break with capitalism" (p. 292) and that "the elaboration of an effective anti-neoliberal politics constitutes the principal demarcation dividing, at every level, the social, intellectual and political forces in their entirety. Its implementation by a majority popular bloc at the level of existing institutions (including governments) cannot but lead in the short-term to class confrontation of large scope. Confrontations which will inevitably lead to pose the question of the property of the main means of production, exchange and communisation, as well as of the structure of power and of the state apparatuses" (p. 259-260).

electoral alliances or tactics. Should we exclude these conciliatory parties from our definition of the radical left? This does not seem appropriate if we take into consideration that those conjunctures are precisely the ones provoking an electoral and identity crisis in these parties, which are deserted by their social constituency and need to re-assert their autonomy either with a real shift to the opposition or with a verbal shift toward a more confrontational stance. Instead of interpreting this contradiction through the lenses of a *trahison des clercs*, it makes more sense to interpret it as a further reflection of a real contradiction within the radical left constituency, torn between the pursuit of its principles (values, interests) and the pursuit of unity against the right centred on the largest left-of-the-centre party. Here again, the boundaries of the radical left are largely determined by the nature of contemporary social-democracy, which prevents the formation of a clear-cut cleavage between anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist, conciliatory and intransigent forces.

This discussion leads us to the only possible conclusion: the empirical referent of the term "contemporary radical left" is represented by all forces trying to represent left-wing positions outside and to the left of moderate left parties. The concept is not just an empty label but on the contrary delimitates an unstable but coherent political space torn between the rejection of neo-liberalism and the imperatives of centre-left unity. An anti-capitalist pole is active within it but cannot be considered an independent space, as its action is inscribed within the same field of forces and it largely coexist within the a common organisational framework.

What are then the criteria to determine the belonging of a specific organisation to the radical left?

Firstly, it needs to position itself *outside and to the left* of the main moderate left party (the German SPD, the French PS, the Italian PD), i.e. the main left-of-the-centre party characterised by a neo-liberal programmatic and *at the same time* the maintenance of a sizeable left-wing constituency. What about left-wing or Marxist tendencies operating within these parties, though? My choice is to exclude them because, despite the ideological belonging to the non-liberal left, their action responds to a completely different set of constraints and presuppositions; would they succeed to influence the

parties they operate in, they would in fact reconfigure the whole left landscape and permanently either incorporate or marginalise the radical left.

Secondly, it must have as its priority the political representation of wage-workers *as such,* that is with a class appeal. We can thus generally distinguish the radical left from class-less progressive post-materialist organisations (e.g. most ecologist parties), progressive nationalist organisations (e.g. the SNP) and far-right organisations with important working-class support (e.g. the FN or the Lega Nord).

As a consequence the definition encompasses a large variety of organisations, from conciliatory left-socialist parties (such as the Danish SF or the Italian SEL) to revolutionary Marxist groups (such as the French LO and NPA). At the same time, the boundaries are fairly clear-cut and the number of parties with an uncertain collocation is small and mostly transitional.[11]

[11] Uncertaintly boils down to two main groups. On the one hand, parties oscillating between the radical left and the socialist family (e.g. the French MdC) or the green family (e.g. the Dutch GL, the Danish SF, the Catalan ICV). These parties generally choose one way or the other after a brief transitional period. On the other hand, left-wing nationalist parties (e.g. the Basque *abertzale* left and the Irish SF), which have a mixed class/national appeal. They will be generally included in our definition.

1.2.2 Partisan and other components

In his masterly survey of the long-term evolution of the "class left" Bartolini (2012) identifies two main components: a "political channel" (parties) and a "professional channel" (trade unions). March and Mudde (2005), on their part, identify a within the radical left a political component (parties), a civil society component (non-party organisations such as trade unions, associations or social movement networks) and a subcultural component.[12] Raynaud (2006), similarly, explores the French far left from the point of view of both political parties and their broad cultural environment (intellectual production and trends). These welcome remarks remind us of the pervasivity and multi-dimensionality of political engagement, which can be lived in a variety of ways and degrees: from passive reception to activism; from identification with a specific organisation to belonging to a broad subculture; from election-oriented to social or cultural work.

This work will be exclusively concerned with the *partisan component* of the radical left and will examine the other components from the point of view of radical left political parties.

My focus on political parties should not be taken as sanctioning conventional separations between societal domains – the political and the economical, state and civil society, public and private sphere – or as reducing political activity to party politics or, worse still, to electoral and institutional politics.[13] Quite the contrary.

Firstly, political parties have historically made recourse to a large variety of avenues to exert an influence on the political decision-making process: work within representative and executive institutions; electoral mobilisation; cultural/ideological mobilisation; workplace mobilisation; street mobilisation; military action, and so on. Moreover, these activities have mainly targeted the state as a key centre of social power and regulation, but have also often aimed at promoting social change without its

[12] The use of the term by the authors is slightly confusing, as they seem to refer almost exclusively to organised activist networks (the "new fringe"). It would be more appropriate to understand it more traditionally as the broader constituency sharing with the parties specific sets of beliefs, values and practices.

[13] For a rich overview of the "essentially contested" character of politics see Leftwich (2004).

mediation, for instance by directly affecting the functioning of civil society institutions (the company, the church, the family, etc.) or people's ideas and interpersonal behaviour (the promotion of identities and values).

Secondly, the behaviour of non-party organisations (lobbies, professional associations, churches, movement networks), social groups and individuals is directly political and crucially affects the working of the state, whatever claim of apoliticity or autonomy they might advance.

Thirdly, the morphological and teleological difference between political parties, civil society organisations or institutions and informal groups is historically and theoretically very thin; it was only under the impact of state legislation (Barbet, 1991) and growing organisational requirements that a progressive differentiation and specialisation was produced. Still, these different forms of social organisation routinely entertain relations of paternity, interpenetration, division of labour and even indistinction.

One of the interesting features of the parties of the radical left is precisely the fact that they theorise and practice a broad conception of political activity including electoral and non-electoral, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, state-directed and civil society-directed mobilisation, thus forcing us to rethink reductionist views of parties as mere electoral/institutional organisations. As a consequence, the choice of the partisan radical left as the object of this thesis must be conceived as a mere point of entry or perspective to a larger complex web of social activities and relations.

1.3 Political nature

My first research question deals with the *political nature* of the radical left. How does this concept fit in the scholarship on political parties and what are its characteristics?

Political parties have traditionally been analysed according to four key (and often inter-related) dimensions: the *ideological* dimension, the *sociological* dimension, the *organisational* dimension and the *functional* dimension.

The ideological dimension relates to the identity, political culture, goals and programmatic of political parties.

An important line of research has focused on the collocation of parties along a linear and uniform *left-right continuum*. This intuitive yet elusive notion has led to both theoretical inquiries of a philosophical (Bobbio, 2004) and politological (Downs, 1957) kind and empirical efforts of operationalisation and analysis. The *Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project* (MRG/CMP)[14] represents the most advanced attempt to quantify the left-right collocation of OECD parties through an analysis of their party manifestos. This approach, despite its tremendous achievements, suffers from three major flaws. Firstly, the party programmes rarely reflect the real policy options of the parties. This is acknowledged by scholars of the topic, which consider party programmes as a mere theoretical starting point of the analysis. Secondly, the left-right scale is not necessarily a linear, continuous and coherent phenomenon, being often marked by qualitative breaks and problems deriving from the aggregation of unstable or incoherent individual preferences (Arrow, 1950). Thirdly, the left-right divide has been repeatedly proven to be multi-dimensional (Kitschelt, 1994), but the attempts to represent it in a bi-dimensional (e.g. class and religiosity, or economic egalitarianism and cultural libertarianism) or multi-dimensional model only compound the theoretical and geometrical problems of simple the one-dimensional model.

[14] See Klingemann (1994, 2006) and Budge (2001). The database is available at https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/.

Another line of research has instead focused on the identification of a limited number of *party families* (e.g. socialist, communist, Christian-democratic, liberal, ecologist) united by a common name, ideology/policy, origin/sociology or organisational link (Mair & Mudde, 1998).

The sociological dimension relates to the ascriptive characteristics and constructed identities of the different layers of people making up the living organism of a political party. Research has thus focused on groups such as elected representatives, cadres/delegates (Bordandini, 2013b), activists (Subilieau, 1981; Siméant & Sawicki, 2009), party members (Spier *et al.*, 2011) and party voters. The electorate in particular has been the most studied level of party research, producing both single-election post-electoral analyses combining rich survey data and qualitative observation (e.g. ITANES, 2009; Perrineau & Ysmal, 2002; Gabriel *et al.,* 2009)[15] and broader attempts at gauging the long-term patterns of voting behaviour. Particularly interesting to this end is the *cleavage* tradition (Rokkan & Lipset, 1967; Flora, 1999; Bartolini, 2012), which seeks to explain the birth, consolidation, electoral success and patterns of alliances of the different party families (see above) with reference to macro-historical processes, deep-seated societal conflicts of interests and their mobilisation and structuring by political entrepreneurs.

The organisational dimension has been fundamentally approached with the intent of building broad diachronic typologies explaining the long-term change of party systems. The analysis of Duverger (1951: 105-114) saw the 19th and early 20th century process of democratisation and industrialisation reflected in the transition between two party models: the *cadre party* (typically liberal and conservative, based on the caucus, with a decentralised and little articulated structure and characterised by the quality of its support by social notables) and the *mass party* (typically socialist and confessional, based on the branch, with a centralised and articulated structure and characterised by the quantity if its support by the masses). Two additional models, the (typically Communist) *cell-based party* and the (typically Fascist) *militia-based party*, represented on the other hand a sort of developmental dead-end characteristic of the

[15] Post-electoral surveys and electoral panels are regularly conducted by institutions such as ITANES in Italy, CEVIPOF in France and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in Germany.

inter-war period and largely overcome by the post 1945 liberal democratic stabilisation.[16] Kirchheimer (1966) weighted in by interpreting the economic boom, full employment and welfare state expansion of the golden age of capitalism as the cause of a transformation of the mass (social-democratic and Christian-democratic) party into a *catch-all or people's party* (*Volkspartei*), characterised by ideological de-radicalisation and convergence, inter-classism, an increased electoral focus, and a growing autonomy of the leadership from the membership. Panebianco (182:481) pointed out to a further evolution toward the model of *electoral professional party* based on the centrality of hired professionals, weak vertical links, the primacy of a personalised public office leadership and financing through interest groups and public subsidies, although he recorded the survival of some *mass bureaucratic parties* (based on the centrality of party officials, strong vertical links, the primacy of a collegial central office leadership and self-financing through the membership). The growing signs of organisational crisis of all (especially mass) Western parties which emerged since the late Seventies (Ignazi, 1996; Webb 2002: 2-3), however, pushed scholars to move beyond these classical models and to engaged in a frantic search for a new paradigm, resulting in a proliferation of "new" party models. Poguntke (1987)'s *new politics party* is characterised by the organisational flexibility and by the upholding of *basis-democratie* principles. Koole (1995: 298-9)'s *modern cadre party* combines mass (strong vertical links, financing through members, internal democracy) and elitist (small membership, primacy of the parliamentary party and hired professionals, large public financing) elements. Katz and Mair (1995: 50-51) put forward the theory of the *cartel party*, indentified by oligopolistic collusion, the fusion with the state (financing, personnel, access to the media), the primacy of the public office leadership, a stratarchical structure and forms of plebiscitary internal democracy. Hopkin and Paolucci (1999) further develop Panebianco's model into the *business firm party,* created from scratch by political entrepreneurs to further their own personal aims. Heidar and Saglie (2003)'s *network party* underlines the growing tendencies toward organisational flexibility and informality (thematic networks, participation of non-members, teledemocracy). Finally, in Carty (2004)'s *franchise party* organisation is conceived as a franchise between the central party (responsible for the brand, know-

[16] Duverger (1951:113) conceived them as a sub-set of the mass party model tending toward the *elite party* ("the marching wing, the spearhead, the 'most conscious part' [of the masses]").

how and standards) and autonomous local units (responsible for the localisation and marketing of the product), with a resulting high degree of stratarchy and ambiguity.
Attempts to synthesise the richness of this tradition of research into a comprehensive and coherent framework have been made (Wolinetz, 2002; Günther & Diamond, 2003; Krouwel, 2006) but remain discordant and incomplete.

The functional dimension, finally, has been generally understood as the role played by parties in the ensuring the *linkage* between state and society (Lawson, 1980; Poguntke, 2002; Römmele *et al.*, 2005).
Three authors are particularly relevant to this discussion. Neumann (1956) categorised parties according to their position in the conflicts around the broadening and democratisation of the European liberal political systems, thus distinguishing between *individual representation parties* (representing in the parliament the census elites of the liberal age), *democratic integration parties* (integrating the masses in the democratising political system) and the *total integration parties* (integrating the masses *against* the broadening liberal-democratic system).[17] Kirchheimer (1966) identified three main functions of political parties: the selection and circulation of the political class; the aggregation and articulation of popular consent; the democratic participation of citizens. The emergence of the "catch-all (people's) party", which aimed not at the moral integration of the masses but at the mere electoral success in a non-ideological world, was looked upon with concern because, it threatened to restrict the latter and leave an excessive say to the "functional power-holders in army, bureaucracy, industry and labor". Mair (1994) and Katz and Mair (1995), finally, described the historical trajectory of Western political parties as moving from agents of civil society (up to the 1950s), to brokers between civil society and the state (the Fordist period), to agents of the state (after the 1970s).

As I already stated in the section 1.2, my understanding of political parties focuses on their primary function as organisations mediating between society and the state. In order to productively link political parties to their broader social and political environment and to reconcile the above-mentioned dimensions of party research into

[17] The classification mirrors that of Duverger but focuses on functional instead of on organisational aspects.

a unitary framework, I propose to base my functional approach on the notion of the *political nature* of parties.

This concept is defined by the interaction of three main dimensions: the *social constituency;* the *political project;* and the *organisational-strategical mediations.*

The first dimension (social constituency) identifies the specific social groups a party endeavours to offer political representation to. As Bartolini (2012:27) has remarked, this representation has both a normative and an empirical face and, within the later, can be predominantly electoral or predominantly organisational. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between three sub-dimensions: the *ideological interpellation* of parties, their concrete *electoral support* and their *organisational encapsulation.* The interaction between these sub-dimensions defines both the boundaries of the specific coalition of social groups making up the social constituency of a party (e.g. the middle and lower salaried strata) and the more precise internal composition of it (e.g. a popular electorate led by an organisation of intellectuals).

The second dimension (political project) refers to the articulation of the interests of their social constituency in a coherent set of long-term and short-term goals. As a matter of fact, the same social constituency can be mobilised with very different political project: the interests of a national bourgeoisie, for instance, can be legitimately conceived in the framework of both a nationalist and an internationalist developmental model.

The third level (organisational-strategical mediations), finally, refers to type of organisational solutions, means, strategies and tactics employed by parties in the pursuit of the interests of their constituency and of their political vision. These can be more or less coherent and more or less effective.

Some clarifications are here needed. Firstly, the social constituency of political parties can be based on different kinds of appeal: on the traditional cleavages (centre/periphery, state/Church, land/industry, owner/worker) identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967); on "new" post-industrial cleavages, such as materialist/post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977), authoritarian/left-libertarian (Kitschelt, 1988) or globalisation winners/losers (Kriesi *et al.,* 2006); on other socio-cultural (men/women, young/old, natives/immigrants) or socio-economic (private/public sector, big/small enterprise, old/new elite) conflicts; on specific issues (e.g. euro-scepticism); or on less defined and

more fleeting themes (e.g. anti-establishment populism). Secondly, both the constituency and the project can be strongly or weakly structured and tend to shift over time, being a site of struggle and compromise between party layers, social groups and ideological tendencies, each with its own interests, understanding and normative outlook. Thirdly, a political party – as any instrument – can prove more or less efficient in performing its work, leading to innovation, substitution or abandonment. Finally, political parties tend to shape social interests as much as they represent and serve them.

The political nature of the communist movement in the early 20th century was identified by Bartolini (2012: 697-8) as a working-class anti-systemic radicalism which emerged in relatively back-ward or late-coming industrial societies where the class cleavage overlapped with the anti-state and anti-Church conflicts and the perspectives of an integration of the working-class in the liberal-democratic system appeared as little plausible and effective.[18] The post-war construction of a successful welfare state largely blurred the division between anti-systemic and reformist socialism, as the perspectives of a radical break were toned down (Pudal, 2002) and the competition tended to revert on the ability of each organisation to defend and gradually expand the social conquests won within the system. The neo-liberal turnaround of the 1980s, on the contrary, led to a general shift to the right of the political system but at the same time started to de-integrate again the lower and middle sections of salaried strata, which enjoyed diminishing material prospects and became increasingly neglected by their traditional political representatives. What are the characteristics of the political nature of the contemporary radical left? How does it differ from that of its 20th century communist, socialist and far left predecessors? Is it still primarily linked with the class cleavage? These questions will be explored throughout the thesis.

[18] "Communism was the social expression of the combined support of advanced sectors of the industrial working class of economically delayed or backward societies, of an intelligentsia of developing middle classes and of considerable sectors of rural world which resisted or survived their complete transformation in a capitalist commercial direction. This potential basis was *not* able to support a communist split *except* when the socialist movement was characterised by a weak organisation, a weak institutional integration and a weak coalition potential. [...] The ideological radicalism of a communist type did not emerge from the class conflict as such, i.e. from the opposition on the market to the interests of business and bosses, but only when a failed political-institutional integration led to the overlap of this class cleavage (economics) to the anti-state (politics) and often anti-Church (culture) cleavages."

1.4 Societal weight, fragmentation and regroupment

My second research question deals with the *societal weight* of the radical left. The concept refers to the ability of a political party (or group of political parties) to exert an effect on its external environment in all its multifarious dimensions (electoral results, waves of contention, national state policies, social relations of power within institutions and between groups, ideological hegemony, content of international/transnational regimes, and so on). It is therefore the end-result of the activities of parties and their success in developing their internal organisation, their strategies of electoral and social mobilisation, their parliamentary work and their policy of political and social alliances.

The *resources* – raw material preconditions – of societal weight are in principle easily identifiable and open to empirical operationalisation and quantitative measurement. I will therefore collect, standardise, make available (see statistical appendix) and analyse a wide range of statistical data, organised around the three macro-groups: organisational resources (membership, finances, communication, collateral organisations); institutional presence (parliamentary and executive offices); and social constituency (electoral support and organisational linkages).

The assessment of the translation of abstract resources into *concrete influence*, on the other hand, necessarily remains a more subjective and uncertain enterprise.

This caveat notwithstanding, the thesis will chart the evolution of the societal weight of the radical left in the different domains, shed some lights on its determinants and assess the internal and external obstacles to a further growth. Particularly interesting is the question of its success or lack thereof in competing with the moderate left ("filling the vacuum") and/or in exerting an effect on the direction of the political competition ("left-ward pull").

My third question deals with the *centripetal and centrifugal tendencies* leading the processes of fragmentation and regroupment of the radical left. What are the political, organisational and environmental conditions for a unified radical left along the lines of broad left parties (e.g. the Italian PRC or DIE LINKE) or of broad left coalitions (e.g. the

Spanish Izquierda Unida or the French Front de Gauche)? What are, on the contrary, the explanations of an internal split or of the emergence of new external competitors? Again, the analysis of the three case studies will provide some answers to these queries.

1.5 Case studies and time frame

The rationale for the selection of my case studies (Germany, France and Italy) is not the relevance of the radical left in specific European countries: Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, the Netherlands and Denmark would have made an ever better case from this point of view. It is instead the central demographic, economic, political and cultural position of the countries themselves within the European project (the Eurozone and the EU), which lends their radical lefts an objective weight, interest and influence on other countries.[19] Moreover, the choice of Germany, France and Italy will enable me to check for a broad variety of variables which characterise the landscape of the Western European radical left: strong/weak, unified/fragmented, Western/Eastern, national/regional. The three cases, however, do not capture the whole complexity of this cadre[20] and the results are therefore not immediately applicable to the rest of the continent.

The time-scale of the research covers the period from 1989 to 2013. The main characteristics of the contemporary radical left are actually to a large extent the product of processes well anterior to the fall of the Berlin Wall: in particular, the cultural shift expressed by 1968 and by the emergence of the "new" social movements; the post-Fordist and post-industrial shift of advanced capitalist economies (1970s); the erosion of the organisational power and militancy of the working class (late 1970s-early 1980s); the ideological, organisational and electoral decline of the traditional communist parties; the progressive turn of governing parties toward wage restraint and neo-liberal policy solutions. In this sense, 1989 merely acted as an accelerator and detonator of long-term tendencies which had been going on since the 1970s. It is however true that its immediate aftermath determined an historical low

[19] In particular PRC, PDS/DIE LINKE, PCF and LCR/NPA have been among the most discussed "models" and "anti-models" for the European radical left, have played a disproportionate role in trans-national mobilisations (social fora, counter-summits) and theoretical discussions (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung) and have assumed the leadership in the institutional pan-European coordination (GUE-NGL, PEL).

[20] On one hand, the existence of independentist/regionalist (Euskadi, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Spain), minority-based (Latvia, England) and orthodox communist (Greece, Portugal) radical left parties. On the other hand, the peculiar features of Scandinavian and Hellenic parties, rooted in their distinctive national histories and political economies.

point in the radical left influence and forced the communist parties out of their inertia, leading to important ideological and organisational reforms and paving the way for the emergence of new forces and unprecedented processes of regroupment.

As already stated, most of the discussion will centre on the interaction of all radical left forces without discriminating for their parliamentary presence, electoral size or societal relevance. The following table includes instead a list of the most important of these parties, which will be singled out more regularly for a specific discussion of their political nature and societal weight.

TABLE 1.1 Major radical left parties

NAME	SHORTHAND	PERIOD
GERMANY		
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands	*SED*	*1946-1989*
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	PDS	1989-2005
Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative	WASG	2004-2007
Die Linkspartei.PDS	DIE LINKE.PDS	2005-2007
DIE LINKE	DIE LINKE.	2007-2009
ITALY		
Partito Comunista Italiano	*PCI*	*1921-1991*
Democrazia Proletaria	*DP*	*1978-1991*
Partito della Rifondazione Comunista	PRC	1991-present
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani	PdCI	1998-present
Sinistra Ecologia Libertà	SEL	2009-present
FRANCE		
Parti communiste français	PCF	1920-present
Lutte ouvrière	LO	1956-present
Ligue communiste révolutionnaire	LCR	1966-2009
Nouveau parti anticapitaliste	NPA	2009-present
Parti de gauche	PG	2008-present
Front de gauche	FdG	2008-present

Notes: in Italics are mentioned the main pre-1989 predecessors of the contemporary radical left parties.

1.6 Conclusions

The hypothesis of the emergence of a "new" radical left from the twin crisis of the communist movement and of the social democratic left in a conjuncture marked by slow growth and neo-liberal reforms will be tested with reference to the case-studies of Germany, Italy and France.

The purpose of the enquiry is to shed light on the features and contradictions of what I define the *radical left space* and, more precisely, to reach an improved understanding of the *political nature* of these political parties, of the potential and limits of their *societal weight* and of their dynamics of *regroupment and fragmentation.*

The analysis will have a predominantly aggregate, multi-dimensional and multi-level character, thus avoiding the tendency of much of the literature on the topic to generalise conclusions derived from the analysis of a single party, dimension or level.

The work is primarily intended as a contribution to the scholarship on the radical left party family but, hopefully, it will also help to broaden our understanding of Western European politics and of contemporary history.

The organisation of the thesis will be the following.

In the second chapter I will provide a historical and geographical contextualisation of my topic. The development of the radical left in the three countries will be therefore situated in the context of the long-term history of socialism in each nation-state and the broader post-1989 Western European trends.

In the third to fifth chapter I will discuss the trajectory of the German, Italian and French radical lefts, showing the interplay of common dilemmas and nation-specific contexts and characteristics.

In the sixth chapter I will offer a final comparative analysis of the three case studies and spell out the overall findings and open questions.

CHAPTER TWO. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

In order to situate my three case-studies in their historical and geographical context, it may be useful to start my investigation with a discussion of its *long-term roots and precursors* (since 1917) and of the broader landscape of the *contemporary Western European radical left* (since 1989). This chapter will thus serve manifold purposes: to pinpoint the key discontinuities between the old Communist movement and the new radical left galaxy; to illuminate the political, cultural and organisational legacies of the 20th century which continue to reverberate in the parties; to identify the broader trends of success and failure and their objective and subjective determinants.

2.1 A secular overview

The history of European socialism has already been the object of a number of excellent syntheses (Hobsbawm, 1978-1982; Sassoon, 1996 and 2010; Eley, 2002; Bartolini, 2012;). In the present section I will limit myself to a sketch of the features which are *essential* to understand this evolution and which are *relevant* to the discussion of the contemporary radical left.

The analysis of the long-term evolution of the different strands of "class left" (Bartolini, 2012: 27) in Germany, France and Italy will be organised around three broad historical phases, separated by key geo-political breaks (the Second World War in 1939-1945 and the fall of the Eastern bloc in 1989-1991).
The first period (1917-1939) was primarily characterised by the difficult integration of the masses in the framework of industrialising capitalism and mass democratic politics (Azéma & Winock, 1986; Hobsbawn, 1995; Winkler, 1998; Chabod, 2002; Overy, 2007). The second period (1945-1988) was in large part marked the "golden age" of economic development and the concomitant redistribution of the fruits of that growth in the form of growing living and working standards and of the construction of developed welfare states (Ginsborg, 1989; Hobsbawn, 1995; Gildea, 1996; Fülberth, 2007). The third period (1991-present), on the contrary, covers the attempts at a neo-liberal reconfiguration of European societies (Harvey, 2005; Vail, 2010). In each period it is necessary to single out the following elements: the historical context, the main features of the radical left (political nature, societal weight and fragmentation) and the legacies for the present.

First of all, however, I need to clarify how the boundaries of the "radical left" and its relationship with moderate rivals or allies have changed over time.
In contrast with other types of left-leaning parties (of a liberal, Christian democratic or ecologist type), the parties of the socialist left (of social democratic, labour, communist or far left leanings) have long shared a series of important commonalities. First, they trace their organisational or ideal origin in the pre-WWI socialist workers' movement, famously defined by Kautsky (1908) as "merger of the workers' movement and

socialism". Second, until recently they all shared a formal commitment to the long-term goal of some form of socialist society essentially conceived in terms of redistribution, de-commodification, political and socio-economic democratisation. Third, they were the organic expression of a primarily working-class constituency and they maintain to this day key links with the organised labour movement. This commonality of constituency (the handicraft, industrial and later post-industrial proletariat) and of broadly-defined goals (democratic socialism) provided the grounds for the collaboration between different ideological tendencies and, to a large extent, for their coexistence within a common organisational framework (the First International, the parties of the Second International, the socialist trade unions, cooperatives and subcultural mass organisations).

Since WWI, however, the movement has been permanently split in at least two main grouping: mainstream socialist, social democratic and labour parties versus radical communist parties. Smaller intermediate or far left groups have also featured from time to time, although with a limited societal weight.

The initial reasons for the division were the crucial questions of internationalism and socialist revolution. In August 1914 the Second International had crumbled like a house of cards and the vast majority of "reformist" leaders had rallied to the war efforts of their own national aristocracies and bourgeoisies; only the Bolshevik and small "revolutionary" minorities continued to oppose it and worked for "the conversion of the present imperialist war into a civil war" (Lenin, 1915); a growing number of "centrists" took an intermediate position. As the war ended, the conflict shifted on the attitude to be taken vis-a-vis the surge of pre-revolutionary ferment sweeping Europe and the victorious Russian revolution. While the communists argued for the deepening of movement and the replacement of existing state institutions by workers' councils, the socialists tended contain it within the boundaries of partial democratic and social reforms and, in some cases (Germany), did not shy from overt repression against the radicals.

From the 1920s to the 1980s these original reasons maintained their importance but their exact meaning shifted over time. On the first issue, the extent of the accommodation of the socialists with the colonial and military policy of their own nation-state varied, with frequent shifts from pacifist/neutralist to nationalist/Atlanticist tendencies, while the communists increasingly conceived

internationalism as the alignment with the Soviet-led camp of "socialist" states. On the second issue, the need of a stark choice between reforms and revolution became salient only in period of acute crisis and social mobilisation (1919, 1936, 1945, 1968); in "normal" periods the two could in principle be reconciled by a common struggle for immediate or structural reforms. Thus, the relationship between socialists, communists and other minor groupings oscillated between phases of collaboration (the "united front" period in the mid-1920s, the "popular front" period in the 1930s, the anti-fascist coalitions of 1941-1947, the Italian alliance of the 1950s, the French alliance of the 1960s and 1970s) and phases of acute conflict (the "social-fascism" period of 1928-1934, the post-1947 cold war years in Germany and France, the 1970s repression of radicals in Germany and Italy). The "long boom" of 1947-1973 provided the material common ground for an understanding centred on redistributive labour struggles, the expansion of the welfare state and Keynesian macro-economic policies.

Between the 1980s and the 1990s, finally, the relationship between radical and moderate left fundamentally changed its nature. Up to this moment socialist parties had *de facto* become integrated in the mechanism of liberal-democratic capitalism, although many of them had retained a formal long-term commitment to its overcoming; nevertheless, they could be credited with significant efforts in "civilising" it (Sassoon, 1996: 768), improving the working and living conditions of wage workers and accompanying the democratisation of political and social relations. Afterwards, on the other hand, they increasingly moved in the opposite direction. The reforms championed by the modernist and "third way" socialist were more and more *counter*-reforms which, while falling short of dismantling the achievements of the Fordist period, tended to worsen the levels of social protection (labour flexibility, pension reforms, welfare retrenchment, wage containment). The contemporary radical left was thus reconstituted as the haven for all the opponents of this shift, ranging from reform communists to left-wing socialists, Trotskyists, orthodox communists and "new left" social movement activists.

2.1.1 The inter-war period (1917-1939)

The first half of the Twentieth Century was a period of wars, revolutions, social and political upheavals and manifold crises (Hobsbawm, 1995; Carr, 2001; Overy, 2007).

The pre-war socialist workers' movement, which had been developing for decades within a complex but mostly unified cadre, did not survive the shock of WWI. The explosion of the Russian Revolution in 1917 sharpened this differentiation and favoured the crystallisation of a long-term ideological and organisational split of world socialism, with a growing integration of the moderate wings in the institutions of liberal-democratic capitalism and the rallying of the radical wings around the newly-created Third Communist International – the Comintern – and its national sections (Broué, 2003).

The young communist movement hoped to rapidly accomplish the task of a world revolution and medium-sized communist parties were established and consolidated in each country: the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (KPD) in Germany (Mallmann, 1995 and 1996; Weitz, 1997); the *Parti Communiste* (PC) in France (Martelli, 2009 and 2010; Courtois & Lazar, 2000); the *Partito Comunista d'Italia* (PCd'I) in Italy (Agosti, 2000; Vittoria, 2006). However, the post-war revolutionary wave of 1917-1923 abated leaving behind only one surviving proletarian state, Soviet Russia, and its allies pained in adapting to a more long-term perspective of societal transformation.

On the one hand, the contradictions thrown up by the overlapping of class struggle, geo-political conflict, economic crises, mass politics and weak institutions continued to prevent a stabilisation of the new political regimes, but ultimately benefitted not the left but the right, leading to a rising wave of authoritarian and totalitarian right-wing regimes.

On the other hand, the consolidation of a new state-socialist regime under Stalin meant the partial subordination of the communist movement to the changing interests of the Soviet diplomacy, foreshadowing the future competition between a capitalist and a communist international camp.

In the end, these contradictions were solved through another devastating world war (1939-1945). The post-war settlement laid the ground for a radically different Europe and a radically different Communist movement.

Political nature: the revolutionary wing of the workers' movement

The *social constituency* of the inter-war communist parties was firmly anchored in the pre-war socialist subculture and did not differ much from that of their moderate rivals. The industrial proletariat, encompassing skilled and unskilled manual workers active in the modern industry and in the traditional handicraft production, held the hegemony within this coalition. A more subordinate role was played by the rural proletariat, sections of the peasantry (mostly sharecroppers – *mezzadri, métayers, Pächter* – and small peasants) and the numerically small strata of urban non-manual workers, artisans and intellectuals.

The *political projects* of communists and socialists were similar in their broad contours but differed in important respects. Both parties wished to protect the short-term interests of their constituency (working and living conditions, democratic freedoms), were committed to theory of class analysis and a practice of class struggle and held a common long-term commitment to the establishment of socialism. On the contrary, at least four key differences can be identified. First, the precise contours of the future socialist society remained largely fuzzy, as few concrete experiences of prefigurative experimentation and economic and political management were at hand and theoretical reflection was highly abstract and divided. On the political level, however, the communists started to conceive it along Leninist (the replacement of the state machinery by new organs of workers' power, the councils) and then Stalinist (the monopoly of power to the communist parties) lines, while the socialists tended to view it as an extension and reform of existing liberal-democratic institutions. Second, the former saw the question of the revolutionary transformation and of the building of organs of workers' counter-power as an immediate and urgent task, while the latter expounded more modest and gradual short-term goals. Third, the former had a clear internationalist outlook, while the latter wavered on national and colonial questions. Fourth, the moderate and conciliatory stance of the socialist leaders was presented as a more realistic road to socialism, but their readiness to compromise on programmatic and relational grounds often cast doubts on their actual intentions, especially at times

when their stabilising activity seemed to stand in the way of more far-reaching transformations (e.g. Germany 1918-1923 and Italy 1919-1920).

Where the two strands really clashed was at the level of *organisational-strategical mediations.* On the level of strategy, the socialists followed a parliamentary road and were open to cross-class alliances (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 3-38) while the communists were more intransigent on both accounts. In particular, the goal of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" tended to be conceived by the latter in a marked insurrectional and monopolistic mould which, along the Russian example, tended to focus on seizing the correct moment for the armed seizure of power while disregarding the pursuit of an electoral majority and the rights of non-proletarian and non-communist oppositions. On the level of organisation, the communists sought to forge disciplined, centralised, combat organisations strongly anchored in the key industrial and urban centres[21] while the socialists tended to carry on with their pre-war national traditions of more uncoordinated, decentralised, electoral-oriented and pluralistic parties.

Societal weight: medium parties between hopes and marginalisation

In the period 1918-1939 Communist parties managed to emerge in all three countries and to build up a medium (Germany, France) or weak (Italy) level of social influence, but remained everywhere dwarfed by their moderate socialist competitors (see TABLE 2.1).

A series of problems greatly limited their initial success: their emergence from small pre-war radical minorities with weak positions within the recognised leadership of the socialist workers' movement; their failure to win the battle for hegemony within the traditional socialist parties (Germany, Italy) or their inability to retain it (France); their late crystallisation as independent political parties (1920-1921), which took place as the height of the post-war revolutionary wave was already abating. By 1925, when the

[21] The pursuit of efficacy ("democratic centralism") did not necessarily entail authoritarian internal structures and a lack of internal differentiation. On the contrary, the early communist parties were born of a confluence of heterogeneous traditions (revolutionary Marxism, left-wing socialism, syndicalism, anarchism, pacifism) and developed a culture of healthy debate between different strategic and tactical options. In time, however, a tendency toward ideological homogenisation and bureaucratic centralism asserted itself and led to the departure or expulsion of all opponents of the international leadership grouped around Stalin.

social and political situation was largely stabilised, the emerging communist parties represented everywhere a not negligible but clear minority of the socialist camp.

The effects of their modest starting point and of state repression were compounded by a series of disastrous strategic and policy choices: the penchant for adventurist insurrections in Germany[22], sectarian attitudes toward social democrats and anti-fascists (especially the early "ultra-left" course of the Italian and German parties and the "third period" policies of 1928-1935) and narrow and authoritarian party-building methods (e.g. the "Bolshevisation" and "Stalinisation" campaigns).

In the following years, their fortunes oscillated between brief periods of renewed hopes and the threat of marginalisation. In Italy the weak influence of the PCd'I was wiped out early by the fascist dictatorship (1922-1925). In Germany the well-organised KPD was given a second chance after 1929, but was ultimately out-manoeuvred by the National Socialists (1933). In France, finally, the PC experienced an extraordinary revival in the mid-1930s, characterised by the turn toward an organic alliance with the socialist party, the general strike of Mai-June 1936 and the *Front Populaire* governments (1936-1938). Even these progresses, however, were largely obliterated in 1939-1940 by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and by the German invasion.

[22] January 1919 in Berlin, April-May 1919 in Munich, March 1920 in the Ruhr area, March 1921 in Sachsen-Anhalt, October 1923 in Hamburg.

TABLE 2.1 Societal weight, inter-war period (1920-1939)

	GERMANY			FRANCE			ITALY		
	Aver.	Max.	Min.	Aver.	Max.	Min.	Aver.	Max.	Min.
Radical left	**KPD**			**PC**			**PCd'I**		
Votes	11.4%	16.9%	2.1%	11.2%	15.3%	8.3%	4.2%	4.6%	3.7%
	1920-1933	Nov 1932	1920	1924-1936	1936	1932	1921-1924	1921	1924
MPs	11.5%	17.1%	0.9%	5.0%	11.8%	1.6%	3.2%	3.6%	2.8%
	1920-1933	Nov 1932	1920	1924-1936	1936	1932	1921-1924	1924	1921
Members	153,147	282,571	118,661	85,099	269,000	28,825	23,739	42,956	9,000
	1921-1932	1932	1929	1921-1938	1937	1933	1921-1925	1921	1923
Moderate left	**SPD**			**SFIO**			**PSI+PSU**		
Votes	22.9%	29.8%	18.3%	19.6%	20.5%	18.0%	17.8%	24.7%	10.9%
	1920-1933	1928	1933	1924-1936	1932	1928	1921-1924	1921	1924
MPs	23.4%	31.2%	18.5%	20.1%	24.4%	16.5%	18.6%	28.6%	8.6%
	1920-1933	1928	1933	1924-1936	1936	1928	1921-1924	1921	1924
Members	1,001,795	1,261,072	806,268	127,338	286,604	49,174	ca. 160,000	-	-
	1920-1933	1923	1925	1921-1938	1937	1922	1921		

Sources: Votes and MPs: Gonschior; Corbetta and Piretti (2009); France politique. Members: KPD-Sozialgeschichte, SPD-Parteivorstand (2002), Martelli (2010b), Graham (2006: 46), Agosti (2000).

Fragmentation: "centrist" socialists, ultra-leftists and other dissidents

The inter-war period was characterised by a high degree of initial fragmentation on the radical left, which by the mid-1920s was however largely re-absorbed.

On the one hand, the battle for the hegemony within the socialist movement tended to give birth not to two but to three groups: a "reformist" wing, a "revolutionary" wing and an intermediate "centrist" wing. The latter group was supported by considerable sections of the socialist leaders, members and voters: the tendencies of Faure in France (SFIO) and of Serrati in Italy (PSI) maintained the control of the respective socialist parties, while in Germany the pre-war leadership of the SPD (Haase, Kautsky, Bernstein) established a short-lived but very influential autonomous *Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (USDP, 1917-1922)[23]. "Centrist" parties found an international expression in the Vienna International (1921-1923) but their collocation soon proved to be unstable and soon re-joined either the Second or the Third International.

On the other hand, in the very same period significant syndicalist, anarcho-syndicalist and left-communist groups remained active at the flanks or outside of the Comintern (Gianinazzi, 2006; Bock, 1993). Particularly influential were for instance the Italian *Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI-AIT)*, the German *Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands (FAUD)* and the German *Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (KAPD)*.[24] As the previous category, they rapidly lost ground as the post-war crisis abated.

In the following decades several dissident groups emerged from the growing purges of the Communist parties and from the radicalisation of socialist sectors: PUP and PSOP in France, KPD-O and SAPD in Germany, the Trotskyist Fourth International in 1938., However, they always remained marginal grouplets and did not survive the confrontations of WWII.

[23] See Krause (1975). In the immediate post-war years the party almost overtook the reformist (M)SPD, soaring in 1920 to 20.0% of valid votes (1920) and about 750,000 members.

[24] With respectively, at their peak, 500,000 members (1920), 150,000 members (1922) and 80,000 members (1920).

Conclusions

The inter-war period left an important but contradictory legacy. The re-construction of the radical left after the caesura of fascism and war was largely undertaken within a framework dominated by the theoretical and historical references, practices and organisational and biographical continuities with this period: the hatred for the betrayals of social democracy and the desire for unity on common labour or anti-fascist fronts; Leninism and Stalinism; the Russian model of socialism; class versus cross-class alliances; the experience of great social mobilisations (1918-1921, 1936, 1943-45). These elements continued to play a fundamental role well into the 1980s and their re-interpretation still affect the identity and outlook of the contemporary radical left. After the war, however, both the nature and societal weight of communist parties changed dramatically. The following section will explain how.

2.1.2 The welfare-state period (1945-1991)

Unlike its predecessor, the post-WWII settlement paved the way for the most extraordinary period of growth of all history, the so-called "golden age" of capitalism (1948-1973). The Cold War (Hobsbawn, 1995; Gaddis, 2005) repeatedly brought the world on the brink of nuclear catastrophe and fed innumerable conflicts in the periphery; in the countries of the core, however, economic development was accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of living standards, an increase of social equality and mobility and the creation of wide-ranging systems of social insurance and welfare provision (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

The Fordist regime of accumulation started to reach its limits after 1967 (Gordon *et al.*, 1987), as growth slowed down, the international hegemony of the USA was challenged and the national class compromises were shaken by mounting struggles of the industrial working class, of the growing white-collar salaried strata, of students and of every kind of oppressed minority. The Seventies, however, actually represented the peak of the post-war developmental model – mixed economy plus welfare state – and led to a further democratisation of European societies.

The Eighties, on the contrary, marked a turn of the tide. Production shifted toward a post-Fordist and post-industrial regime of accumulation; slow growth, high unemployment and stagnating wages prevailed; and a process of neo-liberalisation started a progressive reconfiguration of systems of regulation and of the state itself, which will become pronounced after 1989 (Harvey, 2005; Brenner, 2006; Brenner *et al.*, 2010; Duménil & Lévy, 2011).

These enormous economic, social and political transformations radically changed the environment within the inter-war workers' movement had developed. While vigorously supporting the state-socialist model in the East and the South, communist parties gave up the perspective of violent revolution in the West and rethought the road to socialism as a long-term process of structural economic, social and political reforms of the existing welfare states. The German KPD was severely affected by the geo-political context: its Eastern wing went on to become the ruler of the GDR under the name of *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED, 1949-1990) while its Western wing was rapidly marginalised (Herbst *et al.*, 1997; Fülberth, 1990). The

Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) in Italy and the *Parti communiste français* (PCF) in France, on the contrary, managed to acquire a mass character and a clear predominance on the left (Lazar, 1992). The three cornerstone of this construction – the cohesion of the industrial working class, the alliance with the new white-collar strata and the indirect influence of the Soviet Union – were however slowly undermined during the Eighties by the changed social and economic environment. With the fall of the Eastern Bloc in 1989-1991 the history of the 20th century communist movement was rapidly brought to an end and a quantitatively and qualitatively different contemporary radical left had to take its relay.

Political nature: the radical wing of welfarism

The *social constituency* of the post-war communist parties was, as in the previous period, overwhelmingly popular. Its internal composition, however, changed significantly over time in response to the broader socio-economic trends: industrial workers remained the most important, although declining, social group and were especially prominent among the membership; the role of peasants rapidly declined after the 1950s; the influence of the white-collar salaried strata rose rapidly in the 1960s and afterwards. Another important trend was the rise of economically non active strata (housewives, pensioners and students), unemployed workers and women.[25] This set-up was quite similar to that of continental or Northern social democratic countries, while the weaker Italian and French socialist parties tended to be rely more on the relatively privileged strata of wage labour (civil servants, teachers, white-collar workers, public sector workers) and on non-salaried groups.[26]

With the renunciation of insurrection, the acceptance of a gradual parliamentary way to socialism and the rethinking of the goal of a Soviet-style socialist society as vague long-term objective, the *political project* of communist parties lost its revolutionary character and morphed into a radical version of welfarist project of the times. The

[25] The latter could not be ignored anymore since the gain of the right to vote (1945 in Italy and France) and their growing participation to the workforce. Communist membership and electorate, however, remained significantly masculine.

[26] On the French PS see Rimbert (1955), Cayrol (1975), Hardouin (1978), Garraud (1978), Saudon (1988), Bergounioux (1989) and Bergounioux and Grunberg (2007).

fundamental fracture of the inter-war period was essentially overcome, as both communist and socialists became the staunchest supporters of the republican-democratic institutions while pursuing short-term ameliorative and mid-term structural reforms (social security, welfare provisions, public services, nationalisations, redistribution, state planning). What divided them in this respect was at most a certain degree of radicalism and willingness to accept compromises, which was however mostly a by-product of the clear-cut refusal of the rest of the political system – under US pressure – to envisage any form of collaboration with the communists. As it was, alliances were frequent at the local and even at the national level (Italy in 1945-1956, France after 1962). Where a fundamental difference persisted was not on domestic but on foreign policy, as the socialists tended to adopt an Atlanticist (and, in France, pro-colonial) stance while the communists distanced themselves from the URSS only at a snail's pace.

Important differences also remained on the level of *organisational mediations,* as the shift toward mass communist parties did not entail a revision of the Stalinian modes of organisations; PCF, PCI, KPD and DKP continued to reject the formalisation of internal pluralism and to expel dissidents. On the level of *strategical mediations,* on the other hand, the parties accepted the need of broad "anti-monopolistic" alliances including socialist, liberal and Christian-democratic forces.

Societal weight: the rise and fall of mass communism

The period 1945-1989 represented the historical peak of European communist parties (see TABLE 2.2). While in countries such as West Germany their influence waned in the early 1950s, in Italy and France they managed to retain a veritable mass influence and a clear hegemony over the workers' movement, assuming a position analogous to that of the central and northern social democracy.

The immediate post-war years determined a qualitative change in the patterns of communist influence, as the parties were the prime beneficiaries of the climate of anti-fascist unity and the popular aspirations of social and democratic renewal. In the years 1944-1947 the PCI, the PCF and KPD all soared at a similar pace, following a path of

exponential growth of their membership, electoral results, organisational linkages and institutional presence[27].

The onset of the Cold War in 1947 represented a first setback. In Germany the division of the country led to a consolidation of a SED-led dictatorship in the East but wiped out the KPD in the West[28] (Fülberth, 1990). In Italy the *Fronte Democratico Popolare* alliance (PCI, PSI and smaller left-wing parties) was severely defeated at the 1948 elections. In France the PCF limited the electoral losses but was permanently excluded from power and lost its potential socialist ally (SFIO), which adopted a course of centrist alliances.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s the parties tended to stagnate, preserving a very important level of support but lacking allies and strategic perspectives. In Italy the Socialist Party broke away from the alliance and slowly moved toward the option of centre-left governments with the Christian Democrats (1956-1963); in France the coming to power of Charles De Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic (1958-1962) led to a significant downsizing of both the PCF and the other left forces, but posed the preconditions for the future unity of the left.

The post-1968 decade, on the contrary, led to a sustained membership (France, Italy) and electoral (Italy) growth of the communist parties, despite their often ambiguous attitude toward the new wave of labour and social militancy. Only the re-established German DKP (1968) failed to break through (Fülberth, 1990). The period also saw the explosion of a significant "new left" of left-socialist (PSU, PSIUP), left-communist (Trotskyists, Maoists, *operaisti*) and movementist type, which was partially re-absorbed by the turn of the decade but left behind a rich cultural, social movement and partisan legacy.

In 1978, finally, a process of more gradual (Italy) or rapid (France) erosion set in. Economic crisis, productive restructuring and social change sapped the strength, militancy and homogeneity of the labour movement; the experiences of communist governmental participation (1976-1979 in Italy, 1981-1984 in France) provoked

[27] As expressed among other things by the communist participation to the early national cabinets in Italy and France (1944-1947) and to many regional governments in Germany (the five Eastern regions, Berlin 1945-1948, Bayern 1945-1946, Bremen 1945-1946 and Niedersachsen 1946-1948).

[28] The KPD failed to enter parliament in 1953 and was outlawed in 1956. In the subsequent years it continued to work illegally behind coalitions such as the *Deutsche Friedensunion* (DFU, 1961-1984) or the *Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt* (1968-1969). It was later re-established under the name of *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* (DKP, 1968-present).

widespread disillusionment; other political forces proved quite effective appealing to the rising upper-middle strata of the white-collar wage-workers (the PS in France, the PSI in Italy) or to the shrinking lower strata of the blue-collar industrial proletariat (the FN in France); the Soviet model, finally, rapidly lost its appeal. At the time of the events of 1989-1991, the German radical left remained utterly marginal and the PCF had been halved. The PCI, on the contrary, had resisted quite well, but was in the midst of a wide-ranging ideological revision which would soon lead it to a complete rejection of its communist nature (Ignazi, 1992; Liguori, 2009).

TABLE 2.2 Societal weight, golden age (1945-1988)

	GERMANY			FRANCE			ITALY		
	Aver.	Max	Min	Aver.	Max	Min	Aver.	Max	Min
Radical left	**KPD/DKP**			**PCF**			**PCI**		
Votes	1.2%	5.7%	0.0%	20.9%	28.3%	9.5%	25.5%	34.4%	15.5%*
	1949-1987	1949		1945-1988	Nov 1946	1986	1946-1987	1976	1948
MPs	0.3%	3.7%	0.0%	14.8%	29.0%	1.7%	26.6%	36.2%	15.9%*
	1949-1987	1949		1945-1988	Nov 1946	1958	1946-1987	1976	1948
Members	63,008	342,000	0	355,955	566,492	220,000	1,768,961	2,252,446	1,462,281
	1945-1988	1947		1945-1988	1978	1952	1945-1988	1947	1988
Moderate left	**SPD**			**SFIO/FGDS/PS**			**PSI**		
Votes	37.7%	45.8%	28.8%	21.3%	36.0%	12.5%	13.3%	20.7%	9.6%
	1949-1987	1972	1953	1945-1988	1981	1962	1946-1987	1946	1972
MPs	39.2%	46.4%	31.0%	24.2%	54.2%	6.9%	13.3%	20.7%	9.0%
	1949-1987	1972	1953	1945-1988	1981	1962	1946-1987	1946	1976
Members	795,400	1,022,000	586,000	164,579	355,000	68,000	581,353	860,300	437,458
	1945-1988	1976	1954	1945-1988	1946	1968	1945-1988	1946	1965

Sources: Votes and MPs: www.bundeswahlleiter.de, www.france-politique.fr, elezionistorico.interno.it. Members: Kailitz (2004), SPD-Parteivorstand (2002), Martelli (2010b), Melchior (1993), Simmons (1969), Ignazi and Ysmal (1998), Istituto Cattaneo.

Notes: * the party ran allied with the PS; the figure reported is half the result of the alliance (the real balance was probably slightly more favourable to the PCI).

Fragmentation: the "new left"

Despite moments of internal disarray and external criticism, the official communist and socialist parties completely dominated the left camp in the first post-war decades.[29] The situation partially changes in the Sixties, as the growing radicalism of different social sectors sought to find new expressions beyond and sometimes against the "old left" parties. In particular, two kinds of "new left" milieus emerged and acquired a small but not negligible societal weight. The first one was represented by left-socialist splinters. In France the *Parti socialiste unifié* (PSU, 1960-1990)[30] opposed the official socialist stance on Algeria and Gaullism and elaborated a radical, libertarian and participatory brand of socialism (*autogestion*), remaining vital until 1981. In Italy the *Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria* (PSIUP, 1964-1972)[31] opposed the new policy of centre-left governments and later split, strengthening both the PCI and the far left. In Germany left-socialist currents were active within and outside the SPD but never coalesced in autonomous political parties (Fichter & Lönnendonker, 1977; Arndt *et al.*, 1990). The second one was represented by the far left grouplets which boomed in the decade 1968-1978 (Bock, 1976; Billi, 2001; Koenen, 2002; Thomas, 2003; Balestrini & Moroni, 2003; Bianchi & Caminiti, 2007-8; Artous *et al.*, 2008). In France they were predominantly Trotskyist: two of them, the *Ligue communiste révolutionnaire* (LCR)[32] and *Lutte ouvrière* (LO)[33], had a long history behind them, survived the subsequent downturn and re-emerged in the Nineties as important components of the contemporary radical left. In Italy a variety of neo-communist and *operaisti* groups populated the field: some of them, as *il Manifesto/Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo* (PdUP, 1969-1984), were in time re-absorbed by the PCI; some other chose an anti-parliamentary path and ended up in experiences of armed struggle (Curcio, 2006) or retreated to the field of social movement activism (Mudu,

[29] Attempts of dissident groups such as the *Partito Comunista Internazionalista* (PCInt, 1943-1952) and the *Movimento della Sinistra Comunista* (1956-1965) in Italy or the *Parti communiste internationaliste* (PCI, 1944-1952), the *Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire* (RDR, 1947-1949) and the *Union Communiste* (UC, 1944-1949) in France to emerge failed miserably.
[30] Tavernier and Cayrol (1969), Kernalegenn *et al.* (2010).
[31] Miniati (1981), Pol (2006).
[32] Turpin (1995), Salles (2005), Filoche (2007).
[33] Choffat (1991).

2012); an intermediate group, *Democrazia Proletaria* (DP, 1975-1991)[34], survived as a parliamentary far left force and in 1991 was one of the founding groups of the PRC. The smaller German far left mostly remained anchored on a movementist stance; some groups followed an insurrectional (Della Porta, 1995) or autonomist path (Schwarzmeier, 2001; Schultze & Gross, 1997) while the rest formed the subculture from which the ecologist party *Die Grünen* would emerge in 1980 (Klein & Falter, 2003).

The "new left", its cultural and social importance notwithstanding, failed to dent the supremacy of the traditional left-wing parties and in the 1980s was largely re-absorbed by them. Anti-authoritarianism, pacifist, feminist, environmental and self-managerial themes were gradually adopted in a selective and de-potentiated form by both the political system and by the logic of social and economic regulation (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005). The radicalism of the educated white-collar strata, on the other hand, soon lost its force and partially reverted to the re-establishment of income, wealth and status differences vis-a-vis the middle and lower sectors of the workforce (late 1970s-early 1980s) and to the acceptance of the subsequent neo-liberal turn.

Conclusions

The contemporary radical left directly takes the cue from the period 1945-1988. Its organisations largely originated in the mass communist parties of the period (SED, PCF and PCI) and in the post-1968 "new left"; the majority of its leaders were socialised politically in the 1960s and 1970s;[35] its programmatic and theoretical references remain firmly rooted in Marxist, welfarist and movementist elaborations of the 1970s.

From the early 1980s onwards, however, all sections of the left entered into a profound electoral, societal and identitarian crisis. The fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 and the reconfiguration of international (unipolarism; European integration; neo-liberal globalisation) and national regimes which followed it provided the basis for a

[34] Billi *et al.* (1996), Gambetta (2010), Pucciarelli (2011).

[35] Fausto Bertinotti (born in 1940), Arlette Laguiller (1940), Lothar Bisky (1941), Oskar Lafontaine (1943), Robert Hue (1946), Gregor Gysi (1949), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (1951), Klaus Ernst (1954), Oliviero Diliberto (1956), Pierre Laurent (1957), Franco Giordano (1957), Nicky Vendola (1958) and Paolo Ferrero (1960). Older (George Marchais, 1920; Armando Cossutta, 1926) and younger (Olivier Besancenot, 1974; Katja Kipping, 1978) generations were rarer.

new dynamic of separation and regroupment, moulding the contemporary radical left as we now know it.

2.1.3 The neo-liberal period (1991-present)

The tendencies toward slower growth, liberalisations and reconfiguration of the welfare state which had emerged in the 1980s experienced a sudden acceleration after the fall of the Soviet bloc, marking the beginning of what we can term the present neo-liberal era.

The notion of neo-liberalism has gained a wide-spread currency in the recent literature but tends to remain poorly defined and ambiguously conceptualised (Mudge, 2008; Thorsen, 2009).[36] Moreover, interpretations of it origin, nature, empirical development and political implications differ strongly (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Harman, 2007; Brenner *et al.,* 2010; Cahill *et al.,* 2012). I find the emphasis of neo-Marxist accounts (Harvey, 2005; Dumenil & Levy, 2011) on neo-liberalism as a *political project* of the capitalist class – in alliance with high-level managerial strata – to restore its power and income share quite convincing. Other contentions of the critical literature, such as the insistence on the "intellectual face" of this project (Austrian economics, German ordo-liberalism, American monetarism) and its association with an alleged "roll back" of the state, are not.

Contrary to the "shock therapies" experienced by many weak countries of the global periphery, the paths to neo-liberalisation in the advanced economies did not aim at a return to a utopian "minimal state"; what was looked for was not so much a retrenchment but rather a *re-configuration* of the state in a context marked by different priorities (the private sector, financial rent, international competitiveness) and external constraints (slow growth, a more liberal and integrated international regime). As Harman (2007) and Bellofiore (2013) have pointed out, states continue to play a fundamental role in the processes of social reproduction and capitalist accumulation. Far from being an ideologically-driven process led by market fundamentalists, neo-liberalisation was a highly pragmatic enterprise. The ideology of the market and of competition was mobilised to drive through large privatisations, to shift the burden of fiscal policies and the targets of state expenditures in favour of

[36] It is true that, as the latter author argues, the "concept has become, in some quarters at least, a generic term of deprecation describing almost any economic and political development deemed to be undesirable" (p. 9).

capital incomes to slow-down of the real growth of wages and welfare provisions; at the same time, states continued to forcefully intervene to boost aggregate demand, to subsidise companies, to improve national competiveness and to rescue ailing corporations and banks, and the overall weight of state revenues and expenditures on the GDP remained at historically peak levels.

In Germany, France and Italy neo-liberalism was fairly successful in shifting the income and wealth distribution upwards and in partially successful in restoring profit rates (which remained lower than the in the Sixties); it was on the other hand incapable of reversing the slowing trajectories of accumulation, growth and global economic ranking. The post-war model of mixed-economy was largely dismantled in Germany and Italy and seriously undermined in France by large-scale privatisations (Mayer, 2006; Christiansen, 2011; Kowalski, 2013). The drive toward pension, welfare and labour reforms, on the other hand, met with significant resistance in all three countries and had more mixed results.

Political nature: the isolated welfarism

In an acceleration of the trends developing since the 1970s, the *social constituency* of the radical left in this period lost much of its homogeneity.

Firstly, the leading weight assumed by a relatively homogeneous industrial working class in previous periods (e.g. the 1920s or the 1950s) vanished and left behind a more heterogeneous coalition of wage workers traversed by stronger distinctions of gender, profession, employment status, sector, education, income, status, age and unionisation.

Secondly, the weight of the economically non-active population rose significantly.

Thirdly, the class composition of the different levels of the parties somewhat reversed its traditional set-up. The old communist parties had a membership with was more "proletarian" (blue-collar workers, active wage workers) than their electorate; the contemporary radical left showed the opposing tendency, with a particularly marked over-representation of pensioners. Similarly, while the former endeavoured with a certain success to ensure a large representation of ordinary workers within in their central and elected office, for instance through developed policies of education and

promotion of the cadres (Pudal, 2002), the latter tend to be dominated by the strata with a high cultural and social capital (teachers and professors, civil servants, professionals, etc.).

As a consequence, the social constituency of the contemporary radical left should be defined rather as *welfarist* than as *working-class,* as it binds together all the social groups having a stake in the defence of the social conquests of the Fordist period ("protected" wage workers in the civil service, public sector and in large private enterprises; pensioners; students) or bearing the brunt of its restructuring (the unemployed; the younger generations).

The *political project* of the contemporary radical left was centred on a mid-term anti-neoliberal programme coupled with a variety of "new left" themes (environmentalism, feminism, minority rights, etc.). Most of the parties[37] maintained a long-term formal commitment to an anti-capitalist future society, but both its features and its link with the former became vaguer. What was crucial, however, was the fact that this welfarist project remained fairly powerless and isolated. While in the previous period the socialist parties and even non-socialist forces stood behind projects of redistribution, social protection and state ownership and planning, in the current period the radical left remained alone to defend the legacies of the past while the consensus veered toward neo-liberal restructuring.

The *organisation-strategical mediations* also changed from the previous period. The (Stalinist) monolithic understanding of pre-1989 communist parties was largely ditched in favour of a pluralist collaboration between different traditions, sensibilities and tendencies – in the form of either broad left parties or broad left alliances. The (social democratic and communist) model of a close integration between party and subcultural mass organisations was also replaced by a more unstable mode of collaboration between autonomous entities. Finally, the weak influence and isolation of the radical left forced it to a strategic rethinking. How could an anti-neoliberal turn be produced? The moderate left, which in the previous phase had represented an actual or potential ally, gradually shifted from being part of the solution to being part of the problem.

[37] But not all of them; see the counter-examples of the SF in Denmark, the WASG in Germany and SEL in Italy.

Societal weight: a medium-sized galaxy in an uneven recovery

The decomposition and re-orientation of the Communist movement following the events of 1989-1991 left behind itself a fragmented and contradictory landscape. Altogether, the societal weight of the radical left parties was at its secular low point (see TABLE 2.3).

The seemingly unstoppable decline of the early 1990s did not lead to the disappearance of the radical left and soon made room for a pattern of stabilisation and limited growth. Determinant to this outcome were three factors: (i) the programmatic right-ward shift and the decreasing capacity of integration of the main socialist, social democratic and post-communist competitors (Vampa, 2009; Marlière, 2012; Nachtwey, 2013); (ii) the shift of seating cabinets toward frontal attacks to the social conquests of the post-war period; (iii) the connected revival of labour and social counter-mobilisation (Kouvelakis, 2007).

This recovery, however, was highly unstable and uneven. From a chronological point of view, phases of success (mid-1990s, mid-2000s) alternated with phases of decline (early-2000s, late-2000s). From a spatial point of view, the upward trajectory of the German left contrasted with a tendential decline of the Italian and French ones. From a dimensional point of view, finally, partial successes on the electoral level coexisted with a continuing decline of membership and organisational linkages.

TABLE 2.3 Societal weight, neoliberal age (1990-2013)

	GERMANY			FRANCE			ITALY		
	Aver.	**Max**	**Min**	**Aver.**	**Max**	**Min**	**Aver.**	**Max**	**Min**
Radical left	**all parties**			**all parties**			**all parties**		
Votes	6.5%	11.9%	2.4%	9.2%	12.1%	7.5%	6.5%	8.6%	4.5%
	1990-2012	2009	1990	1993-2012	1997	2002	1992-2013	1996	2008
MPs	6.3%	12.2%	0.3%	3.5%	5.9%	1.7%	5.1%	9.0%	0.0%
	1990-2012	2009	2002	1993-2012	1997	2012	1992-2013	2006	2008
Members	108,835	305,382	68,885	182,015	355,139	86,184	116,262	136,323	77,448
	1990-2012	1990	2004	1990-2012	1990	2012	1992-2012	2006	2012
Moderate left	**SPD**			**PS**			**PDS-DS-PD**		
Votes	33.2%	40.9%	23.0%	23.8%	29.4%	17.6%	23.4%	33.2%	16.1%
	1990-2013	1998	2009	1993-2012	2012	1993	1992-2013	2008	1992
MPs	35.7%	44.5%	23.5%	31.4%	48.2%	9.5%	28.5%	46.5%	17.0%
	1990-2013	1998	2009	1993-2012	2012	1993	1992-2013	2013	1992
Members	681,649	885,958	489,638	ca.190,000	-	-	652,629	769,944	534,358
	1992-2011	1992	2011	1992-2011			1992-2011	1992	2002

Sources: Votes and MPs: www.bundeswahlleiter.de, www.france-politique.fr, elezionistorico.interno.it. Members: Niedermayer (2013), Martelli (2010b), PS, Videt (2011), PRC, PdCI, SEL, Istituto Cattaneo.

Fragmentation: conciliatory vs. intransigent attitudes

The internal crisis and external decline of the communist movement paved the way for a fundamental reconfiguration of the radical left, which tended to pursue a confluence of different historical traditions and programmatic sensibilities into "broad left" parties opposed to neo-liberalism.

This process of regroupment started in some countries already in the late 1980s (Spain, Greece) and was greatly accelerated by the fall of the Soviet bloc. Both in Italy and in Germany unitary radical left parties were established in 1990-1991; in France a larger coalition was envisaged in the early 1990s but failed to be pursued decisively by the PCF.

In time, however, this model was strained by question of the relationship with the moderate left. As the votes and seats of the radical left became increasingly crucial for the formation of centre-left governmental majorities, the parties tended to explode in competing conciliatory or intransigent faction or to open up the space for alternative challengers. In the case of Germany, this outcome was averted by the strict policy of the SPD against any collaboration with the PDS at the national level. In the case of Italy, the PRC progressively fragmented in a myriad of rival grouplets. In the case of France, the governmental participation of the PCF (1997-2002) led to a rise of the Trotskyist far left and the permanence of a structural fragmentation, which was temporarily resolved only in 2012.

Conclusions

The contemporary radical left regrouped through the confluence of different traditions: neo-communist tendencies, far left grouplets, left-wing socialist splinters and social movement organisations.

This organisational and ideological renewal stopped the tendency toward an inexorable decline which had been exhibited by the communist movement in the 1980s and early 1990s; however, it did not provide the bases for a sustained reconstruction of its societal weight. The radical left remained a mid-sized political area, dwarfed by its moderate rivals and programmatically isolated.

2.2 The Western European landscape

If the previous section has introduced the historical roots of the radical lefts of my three case studies (Germany, France and Italy), I will now situate them within the broader landscape of the Western European radical left.

A full examination of the evolution of the contemporary radical left across Western Europe falls outside the scope of this work. Good surveys and attempts to generalisations from a medium number of cases have already been provided by March (2011), Hudson (2011) and Ducange *et al.* (2013); the more detailed small-N analysis that I undertake in this thesis will serve precisely to illuminate dimensions (e.g. organisational, functional and systemic aspects), mechanisms (e.g party activities, tactics and competition) and nuances that tend to be underestimated by this strand of the literature.

However, in order to understand the significance of my case studies and identify the benchmarks for their comparison it is necessary to relate their specific national trajectories with the international trends of this political area. While a comparison of many dimensions of societal weight is hampered by the availability of quantitative data[38], electoral data are easily exploitable for comparative purposes. I will therefore sketch the main features of the broader Western European context (fifteen countries) relying mainly on an analysis of electoral movements.

[38] For instance, figures on party membership and finances are limited and often unreliable and information on organisation, social linkages and strategies/tactics is hard to operationalise.

Overall electoral trends

Observers of the radical left have strongly disagreed on how to judge the overall direction of its electoral evolution since 1989. Focusing on the results of communist/post-communist parties, the majority of commentators had consistently pronounced their irreversible decline (Bell, 1993; Moreau *et al.,* 1998; Ramiro, 2003). When broadening the analysis to other "new" radical left forces, verdicts of stagnation (March & Mudde, 2005) have coexisted with ones of recovery (March, 2011). The volatility of the results of many radical left forces and marked national differences have thus prompted a variety of appreciations.

The recent contribution of De Waele and Vieira (2012) represents an interesting attempt to define more precisely the overall electoral evolution of the electoral support of the Western European radical left. Their data (10-year averages for legislative elections across the EU-15 countries) tend to relativise the widely-held claim of a decline of this party family. Firstly, the fall from the "golden age" of the 1960s (12.7%) to the trough of the 1990s (7.1%) is indeed significant, but leaves way in the 2000s to a significant recovery (8.0%). Secondly, in most of the countries the entity of the decline is much removed from the nightmare scenarios of the Italian PCI and French PCF, which heavily inform many of the existing assessments. Thirdly, the contemporary radical left remains a significant electoral force – and, in legislative elections, stronger than the ecologist family.

Their methodology, however, is problematic. Firstly, they seem to exclude the countries and elections where the radical left obtained no seats from the calculation. Secondly, they introduce a threshold of significance (the gain of at least one parliamentary seat) which penalises countries with a fragmented radical left or with highly majoritarian electoral systems. Thirdly, they focus on *unweighted* averages, therefore assigning the same weight to countries with extremely large differences in population sizes.[39] The net result is an overestimation of both the overall levels and the extent of the recovery of the 2000s. I will therefore provide my own calculations and interpretation of the results.

[39] Luxembourg (about 185,000 valid votes) and Germany (about 46.8 million valid votes) thus bring the same contribution to the final results.

Methodology

The database of electoral results was built in the following way.

Geographically, it covers traditional fifteen Western European member states of the EU (EU15), excluding later accessions to the European Union (EU27) and other non-EU Western European countries[40]. The comparability of pre-1989 and post-1989 results requires considering slight variations of the sample. While the analysis of post-1989 developments will be conducted on the original panel (series EU15), long-term consistency require the exclusion of the East German regions (series EU15WG). Moreover, because of the disproportionate weight of the pre-1989 Italian Communist Party – around half of the total radical left votes – and its sudden "exit" in 1991 it is important to check the robustness of the results by excluding Italy as well (series EU15WG-ITALY).

Contrary to previous studies (March & Mudde, 2005; March, 2009; March & Rommerskirchen, 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012) I choose to include the results of *all* radical left parties without thresholds of significance, as the exclusion of the votes received by small or extra-parliamentary parties seriously distorts the overall picture.[41] A limited number of borderline cases where the attribution of a party to the radical left or to another (green, regionalist) political family is uncertain do exist. The Danish SF, the Irish SF and the Basque HB have been included, the Dutch GL not.

The data refer to the electoral results of the radical left in national legislative elections. The decision to prefer these over elections for the European Parliament, which have the advantage of being synchronised, derives from their nature of *first-order elections* (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) with the highest stakes – the composition of the parliament and

[40] The first category includes ten former Soviet-bloc states (accessed in 2004 and 2007), one former Yugoslavian country (accessed in 2004), Cyprus and Malta (accessed in 2004). The radical left is here significant only in Cyrpus, East Germany, the Czech Republic and Estonia, while is marginal or absent in all other countries. The second category includes, leaving aside some micro-states, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland; the radical left is significant in the first two cases.

[41] Particularly in countries with significantly restrictive electoral systems (France, UK) and with weak and fragmented radical lefts.

the formation of a governmental majority – and levels of participation. The only problem is presented by France and its peculiar semi-presidential system: legislative election remain the crucial ones from the point of view of policy, but participation is lower than in presidential elections and, especially since the 2002 alignment, their outcome tend to be heavily influenced by the result of the former. I have chosen to use legislative data also in this case; the radical left would fare batter with the opposite choice.

Instead of 10-year averages (De Waele & Vieira, 2012) I use *yearly rolling averages.*[42] That enables a very precise identification of conjunctural movements and turning points, although the fact that legislative elections are not synchronised means that the resulting figures probably lag a couple of years behind the real shifts of public opinion (as they refer in average to elections held about two years before).

Finally, thee main figures will be provided: the total number of votes; the simple average of the shares of valid votes (%); and the aggregate share or weighted average (%).[43] The most appropriate measure for determining the overall development of the radical left is the latter, as it attributes more weight to the largest countries. Attention must nevertheless be paid to cases when the aggregate changes are essentially determined by the trend in one or two large countries: this phenomenon can be gauged by the discrepancy between weighted average and simple average.

[42] On any given year, the average of the 15 countries is calculated on the electoral results of that year or of the nearest past electoral year.

[43] The two definitions are equivalent. The measure can be calculated by dividing the total number of radical left votes by the total number of valid votes (aggregate vote share) or by weighing the national vote shares for the valid votes of each country (weighted average).

Evolution and periodisation

The results are provided in the following tables (FIGURE 2.4 and TABLE 2.5).

TABLE 2.4 Radical left electoral results (EU15 series)



Sources: my calculations from official national results.
Notes: legislative elections, shares of valid votes, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages.

The study of the long-term evolution of the radical left (EU15WG series) points to three well-defined developmental stages.

The first stage (from the late 1970s to the early 1990s) confirms the reality of a generalised decline of the radical left. The weighted average shows a dramatic retrenchment (13.03% in 1979, 9.70% in 1989 and 4.87% in 1993). If we exclude the peculiar case of Italy[44] the tendency is attenuated but remains clear (8.48% in 1979, 5.25% in 1989 and 4.70% in 1993).

[44] The Italian Communist Party followed a totally divergent path from the rest of the Western European radical left: firstly, it preserved an incredibly large electoral constituency, declining only marginally during the 1980s (still 28.24% in the late 1980s, which translated into 56.3% of the aggregate EU15WG radical left vote); secondly, it was the only Western communist party which after 1989 abandoned the radical left party family for the social-democratic one. The two points are of course related, as it was precisely the absence of a large socialist party in Italy which made this course possible (similarly to Eastern Europe and unlike the rest of Western Europe).

TABLE 2.5 Radical left electoral results (all series), selected years

	1979	1989	1993	1999	2004	2007	2012	AVER. 1992-2001	AVER. 2002-2011	AVER. 1992-2013
1a) EU15WG										
Total votes	25,349,775	19,339,863	9,923,355	13,376,827	9,874,737	13,582,427	13,825,368	11,463,371	11,758,431	11,783,176
Simple %	10.51%	8.22%	5.51%	7.38%	6.04%	7.82%	9.03%	6.33%	7.09%	6.93%
Weighted %	13.03%	9.70%	4.87%	6.60%	4.92%	6.71%	6.96%	5.67%	5.88%	5.87%
1b) EU15WG WITHOUT ITALY										
Total votes	13,389,926	8,447,318	7,721,927	10,163,079	7,379,995	10,468,866	12,202,296	8,769,848	9,4888,588	9,364,699
Simple %	8.94%	6.78%	5.50%	7.30%	5.99%	7.80%	9.35%	6.28%	7.17%	6.96%
Weighted %	8.48%	5.25%	4.70%	6.16%	4.51%	6.37%	7.52%	5.34%	5.82%	5.73%
2) EU15										
Total votes			10,950,094	15,467,227	11,381,301	15,935,445	16,102,118	13,197,586	13,841,228	13,705,449
Simple %			5.65%	7.65%	6.23%	8.08%	9.24%	6.56%	7.33%	7.15%
Weighted %			5.12%	7.25%	5.40%	7.50%	7.76%	6.21%	6.61%	6.51%
3) COUNTRIES										
AUSTRIA	0.96%	0.72%	0.55%	0.48%	0.64%	1.06%	0.81%	0.39%	0.83%	0.58%
BELGIUM	3.30%	2.08%	0.67%	0.87%	0.49%	1.43%	1.97%	0.46%	0.96%	1.09%
DENMARK	11.84%	14.45%	9.96%	10.26%	8.77%	15.20%	16.04%	10.12%	11.14%	11.48%
FINLAND	18.00%	9.39%	10.30%	11.77%	11.20%	9.61%	8.56%	11.15%	10.41%	10.44%
FRANCE	23.89%	11.68%	10.96%	12.46%	7.64%	8.03%	7.89%	11.78%	7.84%	9.38%
W. GERMANY	0.44%	0.04%	0.31%	1.13%	1.08%	4.89%	8.30%	0.88%	4.77%	3.20%
GERMANY			2.45%	5.12%	4.00%	8.84%	11.97%	4.30%	8.14%	6.05%
GREECE	12.34%	11.33%	7.65%	15.45%	11.50%	13.93%	31.85%	11.91%	12.51%	15.53%
IRELAND	1.79%	6.79%	5.06%	6.31%	7.71%	8.20%	12.75%	5.68%	7.97%	8.24%
ITALY	32.61%	28.24%	5.61%	8.57%	6.72%	8.16%	4.45%	7.11%	6.47%	6.49%
LUXEMBOURG	4.90%	4.40%	4.40%	3.30%	2.80%	2.80%	4.70%	3.07%	3.75%	3.31%
NETHERLANDS	2.99%	0.57%	0.57%	3.59%	6.37%	16.58%	9.65%	2.15%	9.68%	7.77%
PORTUGAL	23.38%	15.38%	11.19%	12.50%	10.70%	15.27%	14.89%	11.40%	15.13%	13.50%
SPAIN	15.01%	11.97%	10.64%	11.38%	5.04%	5.04%	7.10%	11.16%	4.96%	7.31%
SWEDEN	6.00%	5.84%	4.15%	11.99%	8.50%	5.87%	5.63%	8.17%	7.15%	7.05%
UK	0.26%	0.35%	0.27%	0.67%	1.40%	1.21%	0.82%	0.54%	1.30%	0.84%

Sources: my calculations from official national results.

Notes: legislative elections, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages. Simple % = simple average of shares of valid votes. Weighted % = weighted average of shares of valid votes. EU15WG excludes East Germany and Berlin, EU15 includes them.

The twin electoral and identity crisis affected all countries but was most significant in the traditional strongholds of Western European communism, where existing communist parties either strongly declined (France, Portugal, Finland, Spain and Greece) or altogether abandoned the party family (Italy).

The second stage (mid-to-late 1990s), on the other hand, shows a recovery which is strong and similarly generalised. The trend concerned all countries with only one exception (Denmark) and, in seven cases, went beyond the pre-1989 results. In 1999 the weighted average figure rose to 6.60%, excluding Italy 6.15%. The shock of the fall of the Soviet bloc thus did not ultimately lead to the disappearance of the communist party family but rather to its revival under a new guise.

The third stage (from 2000 onwards), finally, sees a break-down of common trends and a coming to the fore of national specificities and trajectories. The overall development is slightly upwards but present violent oscillations (down to 4.92% in 2004, up to 6.71% in 2007 then stable to 6.96% in 2012). Similarly, national series are extremely volatile, booming to unprecedented peaks (31.85% in Greece, 16.58% in the Netherlands, 16.05% in Denmark, 12.75% in Ireland, 8.29% in Western Germany) and collapsing to unheard-of troughs (3.88% in Spain, 4.45% Italy, 5.63% in Sweden, 7.64% in France).

Altogether, the average 1990-2013 legislative results of the radical left qualify it as a mid-sized political force (5.87%). What in the late 1990s seemed to be a uniform tendency toward growth fragmented into a variety of national trajectories, influenced in particular by the ability of each party in posing as a credible electoral representative of significant social grievances and mobilisations (workers' rights, unemployment, economic crisis, anti-EU mood) and by the constraints of alliance and coalition policies.

The study of series EU15 (including Eastern Germany) shows a very similar dynamics, but with significant higher levels (1993: 5.12%; 2007: 7.50%; 2012: 7.76%; average: 6.51%).

Only if we look at simple averages the setbacks (1999-2004) are attenuated and the growth becomes less cyclical and more powerful (1993: 5.65%; 2007: 8.08%; 2012: 9.24%; average: 7.15%).

Geography

The geography of this new radical left is partially different from that of the old communist left (see TABLE 2.6).

As far as electoral strength is concerned, the contemporary radical left consistently fared well (more than 9%) in five countries – the traditional strongholds Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Finland and France; it remained fairly immaterial (below 2%) in three countries – the traditionally weak Austria, UK and Belgium; and fared in-between in the remaining seven countries. This group embraces the most surprising developments, i.e. the decline of the Spanish and Italian radical lefts and the rise of the German, Dutch and Irish ones. As far as weight is concerned, the absolute dominance of the Italian Communist Party gave place to a more polycentric set-up where the declining Italian, French and Spanish and the rising German, Greek and Dutch radical lefts vied for prominence.

The combined weight of the German, French and Italian radical left declined from an absolute predominance before 1989 (74.32% of the total radical votes in 1979, 71.15% in 1989), to much lower levels in the period 1992-2013 (in average 58.08%). This was the consequence of the decline of the French Communist Party in the 1980s and of the defection of the Italian Communist party in 1991, which were hardly compensated by the subsequent growth of the German PDS/DIE LINKE.

TABLE 2.6 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT

WEIGHT	1979	1989	1993	1999	2004	2007	2012	AVER. 1992-2001	AVER. 2002-2011	AVER. 1992-2013
AUSTRIA	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%
BELGIUM	0.7%	0.7%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.6%	0.6%	0.2%	0.5%	0.4%
DENMARK	1.5%	2.5%	2.9%	2.3%	2.6%	3.3%	3.5%	2.6%	3.0%	2.9%
FINLAND	2.1%	1.4%	2.6%	2.0%	2.7%	1.7%	1.6%	2.3%	2.1%	2.1%
FRANCE	26.5%	14.8%	25.5%	20.4%	17.3%	13.1%	12.7%	22.6%	14.7%	18.0%
GERMANY*	0.7%	0.1%	10.4%	16.3%	16.8%	26.2%	32.2%	15.7%	27.5%	22.5%
GREECE	2.5%	3.9%	4.8%	6.8%	7.1%	6.3%	12.2%	6.1%	6.4%	6.9%
IRELAND	0.1%	0.6%	0.8%	0.7%	1.3%	1.1%	1.8%	0.8%	1.2%	1.1%
ITALY	47.2%	56.3%	20.1%	20.8%	21.8%	19.5%	10.1%	20.4%	16.4%	17.6%
LUXEMBOURG	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
NETHERLANDS	1.0%	0.3%	0.5%	2.0%	5.4%	10.2%	5.7%	1.4%	7.8%	4.8%
PORTUGAL	5.4%	4.4%	5.7%	4.3%	5.0%	5.3%	5.0%	4.8%	5.8%	5.3%
SPAIN	10.6%	12.7%	22.9%	18.4%	12.3%	8.2%	10.9%	18.3%	9.2%	13.4%
SWEDEN	1.3%	1.6%	2.3%	4.1%	3.9%	2.0%	2.1%	3.3%	2.7%	2.9%
UK	0.3%	0.6%	0.8%	1.3%	3.2%	2.1%	1.5%	1.3%	2.3%	1.8%
EU15	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Sources: my calculations from official national results.

Notes: legislative elections, 15 Western European countries, rolling averages. Country's shares of total radical left votes.

Fragmentation

This political area also shows a significant level of fragmentation (see TABLE 2.7), which partly derives from the legacy of historical divisions (e.g. orthodox communists vs. heterodox or new left grouplets) and partly from more actual cleavages (e.g. conciliatory vs. intransigent stances, regionalism, post-materialism).

TABLE 2.7 ELECTORAL FRAGMENTATION (EU15)

COUNTRY	NATIONAL LISTS (MAX.)	SIGNIFICANT PARTIES (>0.50% votes)	EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES (LAAKSO-TAAGEPERA index)			WEIGHT OF LEADING PARTY
			AVER. 1990-2013	MIN.	MAX.	
Austria	2	1 – KPÖ	1.07	1.00 (sev.)	1.28 (2002)	96.81%
Belgium	3	1 - PVDA/PTB	1.88	1.55 (2010)	2.32 (2007)	66.57%
Denmark	2	2 - SF, EL	1.65	1.32 (2007)	1.95 (2011)	72.42%
Finland	4	1 – VAS	1.13	1.03 (1995)	1.26 (2003)	94.01%
France	3	3 – PCF/FdG, LO, LCR/NPA	1.88	1.29 (2012)	2.73 (2007)	72.33%
Germany	1	1 - PDS/L.PDS/DIE LINKE	1.01	1.00 (2002)	1.03 (2005)	99.34%
Greece	9	3 - KKE, KKE(e)/SYN/SYRIZA, DIKKI	2.15	1.09 (1990)	3.09 (1996)	*39.63%
Ireland	3	3 - SF, DL, SP	1.94	1.38 (sev.)	2.95 (1997)	63.86%
Italy	4	3 - PRC, SEL, PdCI	1.47	1.00 (sev.)	2.14 (2013)	*63.79%
Luxembourg	2	2 - DEI LENK, KPL	1.59	1.00 (1999)	1.86 (2004)	*58.14%
the Netherlands	3	1 – SP	1.05	1.00 (sev.)	1.27 (1994)	97.93%
Portugal	4	3 – PCP/CDU, BE, PCTP/MRPP	1.91	1.52 (1991)	2.25 (2011)	64.21%
Spain	4	1 – IU	1.13	1.03 (2004)	1.23 (2000)	93.98%
Sweden	4	1 – V	1.01	1.00 (sev.)	1.03 (2002)	99.65%
United Kingdom	0	1 – SF	2.31	1.34 (1992)	3.19 (2001)	63.57%
AVERAGE	3.20	1.80	1.55	1.17	1.97	76.42%

Notes: "national lists" refers to the maximum number of radical left list present at a legislative election of the period; parties present in less than half of the constituencies are excluded (France and the UK are particularly affected); * indicate that the leading party ran at least one election as part of a coalition (computed separately), the reported share thus being lower than expected. Italy: 1992-2013.

In average, the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) index is 1.55 and the leading party gathers 76.42% of the votes. While in six countries the radical left is represented by one virtually unchallenged party, the remaining nine countries see the competition of two or three viable organisations, often resulting into a whirlwind of splits, mergers, electoral coalitions, new party creations and overtakings.[45]

[45] It is notably the case of three strong (Greece, France, Portugal), two mid-sized (Ireland, Italy) and three weak (the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg) radical lefts. Only in Denmark two radical left parties coexisted for the whole period at a fairly stable ratio.

Political nature

As far as origins, ideology and organisational solutions are concerned, the contemporary radical left shows a much greater pluralism and diversity than the old communist movement (March, 2011). A predominant profile does exist but several parties have preserved more distinctive characteristics.

The majority of forces have their origin in traditional communist parties,[46] have maintained a loose long-term commitment to a post-capitalist future while developing a more modern programmatics centred on a mid-term programme of defence of the welfare state, political representation of wage-workers and promotion of left-libertarian values and have sought to favour the cohabitation under a common organisation of different political traditions and sensibilities, often in the form of semi-permanent electoral coalitions (e.g. IU, SYN/SYRIZA, FdG) or full-fledged mergers (e.g. VAS, PRC, EL, BE, DIE LINKE, SEL).[47]

Explaining growth and decline

Is it possible to identify the main drives of the electoral growth and decline of the radical left?

March and Rommerskirchen (2011:200), on the basis of a tobit regression model, point to the positive influence of "previous representation in parliament; high opposition to the EU; high unemployment; an absence of an electoral threshold; whether the RLP operates in a former communist country; the absence of competing radical right and green parties; higher multipartism and, finally, higher voter turnout". My more limited analysis provides the following results.

---

[46] Others, on the other hand, have a predominantly Trotskyist (BE, LO, LCR/NPA, the Irish SP), Maoist (the Dutch SP, PVDA/PTB, PCTP/MRPP), left social democratic (DIKKI, sections of DIE LINKE and of the FdG) or left nationalist (the Irish SF) background.

[47] Again, many smaller parties have instead maintained a more clear-cut commitment to distinctive ideological mindsets (e.g. the communist KKE, the Trotskyist LO, the Maoist PVDA/PTB and PCTP/MRPP).

Firstly, the increasing involvement of radical left parties into centre-left governmental coalitions proved to be a serious obstacle to their further growth (see TAB 2.8).

TABLE 2.8 GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION OF RADICAL LEFT PARTIES, 1965-2013

COUNTRY	PARTY	PERIOD	TYPE
DENMARK	SF	1966	external support
	SF	1993-2001	external support
	SF	2011-present	governmental participation
	EL	2011-present	external support
FINLAND	SKDL	1966-1971	governmental participation
	SKDL	1975-1982	governmental participation
	VAS	1995-2003	governmental participation
	VAS	2011-present	governmental participation
FRANCE	PCF	1981-1984	governmental participation
	PCF	1997-2002	governmental participation
GREECE	SYN	1989-1990	governmental participation (grand coalition)
IRELAND	DL	1994-1997	governmental participation
ITALY	PCI	1976-1979	external support (grand coalition)
	PRC	1995-1998	external support
	PRC	2006-2008	governmental participation
	PdCI	1998-2001	governmental participation
	PdCI	2006-2008	governmental participation
PORTUGAL	PCP	1974-1976	governmental participation (military cabinets)
	PCP	1976-1978	external support
SPAIN	IU	2004-2008	external support
SWEDEN	V	1998-2006	external support

While before 1989 the governmental involvement of communist or post-communist parties was severely limited by geopolitical and national consideration (five countries, six cases, 21 years), the participation of the parties of the new radical left significantly increased both quantitatively (nine countries, fourteen cases, 52 years) and qualitatively (more instances of direct governmental participation). This change was the product of multiple factors: the loss of salience of anti-communist vetoes; the more competitive nature of many national party systems, where the seats of the radical left often became necessary for the establishment of a centre-left parliamentary majority; the moderate and conciliatory path taken by several radical left parties, which preferred pragmatic "lesser evilism" to an anti-systemic stance. These experiences (Olsen *et al.* , 2010; Bale & Dunphy, 2011), however, were highly damaging and tended to provoke large vote losses, splits and internal crises.[48] Some of them (Italy 2008, France 2002) even turned into a nightmare scenario, where the governing radical left party simultaneously lost votes to its left and to its right. In brief,

[48] In all instances of (direct or external) governmental participation radical left parties declined, with little difference between the two categories. The loss of share of votes was in average 30.58%. The most damaging episodes were those of Italy 2006-2008 (-62.25%), Sweden 1998-2006 (-51.21%) and France 1997-2002 (-50.21%), the least damaging those of Ireland 1992-1997 (-9.71%) and Finland 1995-2003 (-11.02%).

the very electoral success of radical left parties tended to force them to enter into centre-left coalitions, thereby breaking their ascent.

Secondly, however, the lack of governmental involvement did not automatically translate into successes. The adoption of a policy of frontal criticism toward the main social-democratic party currently in office generally tended to increase the vote share of the radical left, but with numerous exceptions[49]. Similarly, the radical left tended to benefit from the left-wing discontent against seating right-wing cabinets, but again with numerous exceptions[50]. Both the greatest increases (e.g. Greece 2012, the Netherlands 2006, Germany 2005, Sweden 1998) and the greatest losses (e.g. Spain 2000, the Netherlands 2010, Portugal 2011) occurred in every kind of governmental constellation. Thus, while governmental participation and external support seem to be to be an unquestionably bad choice for radical left parties, their opposition to great coalitions, centre-left and centre-right cabinets (in this order) does not yield uniform results: although mostly favourable, it leads to strong gains in only a minority of cases and it can sometimes accompany significant losses.

Thirdly, the radical left involvement into wide-ranging social mobilisations (such as strike waves or large anti-governmental campaigns) seems to be one of the main preconditions for big electoral gains. The presence of large general strikes, waves of industrial action and protest movements in the years leading up to the general election appears as a crucial factor in helping to catalyse the popular dissatisfaction toward the radical left, rather than toward other opposition parties. While not always decisive (e.g. Portugal 2011 or France 2007, where large movements were followed by severe defeats or stagnations), it was indeed there in all ten instances of significant radical left surges[51].

Fourthly, the fragmentation of the radical left has a serious impact on its overall social and political impact but not on its electoral results. Large splits which disrupted the organisation, activist base and public perception of a party were regularly followed by short-term losses (e.g. Ireland 1992, Greece 1993, Italy 2001 and Luxembourg 2004). In

[49] Six out of eighteen cases: Finland 2007, Germany 2002, Greece 2000 and 2004, Portugal 2002 and 2011.

[50] Eight out of twenty-six cases: Finland 2011, France 2012, Greece 1993 and 2009, Portugal 1995, Spain 2000 and 2004, Sweden 2010.

[51] Defined by a gain of at least 40% of vote share: the Netherlands 2006, Greece May 2012, Germany 2005 and 2009, Denmark 2007, Ireland 2011, Italy 1996, Portugal 2005, Spain 2011 and Sweden 2008.

the long-term, instead, the competition of several radical left parties (especially if of a minimum size and parliamentary presence) tended to be neutral or even favourable.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis confirms the reality of both a long and almost generalised decline of Western European communism, which set in at the end of the late 1970s and exploded in a terminal electoral and existential crisis with the fall of the Soviet bloc (Ramiro, 2003), and of the new beginning of a transformed radical left from the mid-1990s onwards. The recovery was however limited, unsteady and uneven.

On the first account, weighted average electoral results of the radical left during the entire period 1992-2013 were 5.87% (excluding the former East Germany) or 6.51% (including it), still much lower than the communist scores of the late 1980s (9.70%). Even if we exclude Italy, which plays a disproportionate role in the sample, the results become only barely superior to those before 1989.

On the second account, party-specific and country-specific results remained highly volatile and liable to sudden upturns and downturns[52].

On the third account, the internal geography of the Western European radical left was constantly reconfigured, as many of the countries with the strongest communist traditions continued to slide or stagnate (Spain, France, Italy and Finland), some with weak traditions grew rapidly (Western Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland) and one specific country (Greece) boomed to unprecedented levels.

[52] The average relative standard deviation was 38.86% and reached in some countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Greece, the United Kingdom) more than 50%. From one election to another the result could rise by 160.28% (the Netherlands 2006) or 14.06 percentage points (Greece 2012) and fall by 46.57% (Spain 2000) or 6.76 percentage points (the Netherlands 2010).

2.3 Conclusions

The present chapter has set the stage for the discussion of the specific national trajectories of the contemporary German, French and Italian radical lefts by analysing their historical roots and their broader geographical context.

The exceptional importance that their precursors (SED, PCF and PCI) had in the in post-WWII period was replaced by a more marginal and uncertain role after 1989; nevertheless, the three case studies retained a central position within the landscape of the Western European radical left. Moreover, the electoral recovery of the mid-1990s from the deep crisis of the years 1989-1993 seemed to provide the foundations for a renewal of this political family and its shift toward new features and dynamics.

The following chapters (three, four and five) will see whether this was indeed the case.

CHAPTER THREE. THE GERMAN RADICAL LEFT: A SUCCESS STORY?

3.1 The national context

The developmental path of the contemporary German radical left has aroused considerable interest from commentators and political scientists alike. And, indeed, its history presents many enticing features for a student of contemporary politics.

First, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)[53] was one of the few former Soviet-bloc ruling parties which successfully survived the post-1989 democratic transition as a *radical leftist* parliamentary force. This simple anomaly was transformed into a political enormity by the 1990 incorporation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which thereby transferred a piece of communist history in a country with deep anti-communist traditions.

Second, the developments of the period 2003-2009 remain to this day the clearest example of success of the radical left in a *large* European nation. Against the background of massive discontent toward the policies of the Schröder government, a new splinter movement emerged (the Electoral Alternative Labour and Social Justice, WASG)[54], allied itself with the PDS in the 2005 federal elections and finally merged with the latter in 2007 (The Left, DIE LINKE). The new entity represented the most significant European case of a break-up of the "new" social democracy: while in other European countries the radical left tended to win over only marginal figures and tendencies, in Germany it could count on the leadership of Oskar Lafontaine, the

[53] A legal continuation of the GDR ruling party Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, shorthand SED), it was renamed SED-PDS on December 1989 and then *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (shorthand PDS) on February 1990. It changed again its name in The Left Party.PDS (*Die Linkspartei.PDS,* shorthand Die Linke.PDS) on July 2005. It will be henceforth referred to simply as PDS.

[54] The group was established in July 2004 as an association (*Wahlalternative Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit e.V.*) and transformed in January 2005 in a party (*Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative,* shorthand WASG).

former social democratic candidate for chancellor (1990) and party chairman (1995-1999). Moreover, DIE LINKE managed to establish a foothold in areas where it started almost from scratch (the Western regions of the country) and made large inroads among the general public and in particular among the former social democratic electorate.

Third, this electoral success had the effect of destabilising the overall dynamics of the German party system. Whereas the rise of the Greens in the 1980s had gradually transformed the traditional "two-and-a-half-party system" (Blondel, 1968) into a bipolar competition between centre-right and centre-left coalitions, the emergence of a fifth *relevant* party threatened to prevent both camps from reaching a majority[55], thus ushering in an era of unstable left-right coalitions. The party system has been unravelling ever since, with an ailing SPD facing the stark dilemma between a grand coalition with the CDU (its choice in 2005-2009), permanent exclusion from power or an unprecedented red-red-green experiment, officially rejected but frequently hinted at by pundits and second-line politicians (Jesse, 1997; Neu, 2001; Hirscher, 2001; Spier, 2009; Hough, 2010; Raschke & Tils, 2010).

Fourthly, the German radical left has arguably become a sort of role model for its brother parties across the EU. The PDS has had a central role within both the European Parliament group GUE/NGL and on the establishment of the transnational Party of the European Left (PEL) in 2004; its political foundation *Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung* has become an important site of theoretical debate; the experience of DIE LINKE, finally, has inspired projects of left regroupment in a variety of other countries such as Italy and France.

How can we understand and explain this seemingly unlikely success story?

Historical shocks

The emergence of the post-1989 German radical left cannot be understood but in the context of three major historical "shocks" which destabilised the traditional alignments

[55] The threat became a reality twice, in 2005 and 2013.

between individual citizens, social organisations and political parties and creating fertile grounds for social eruptions and partial de-alignments.

The first shock was the crisis of the GDR in 1989/1990, its rapid incorporation in the FRG and the lasting consequences of reunification.

In the 1980s the GDR regime started to show increasing signs of economic and legitimacy crisis, which rapidly accelerated since 1988 and morphed into a full-fledged political revolution in the autumn of 1989 (Föster & Roski, 1990; Lohmann, 1994; Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2004 and 2006; Segert, 2009; Steiner, 2010). The movement briefly propelled at its helm a variety of predominantly intellectual left-wing civic organisations (*Bürgerbewegungen*) but the mood soon shifted in favour of centre-right forces, which triumphed at the 18 March 1990 Volkskammer elections and paved the way for the subsequent currency union on 1 July and unification on 3 October.

The successive developments, however, did not entirely live up to the hopes of "blossoming landscapes".[56] From a socio-economic point of view, the East German economy was thoroughly de-industrialised and large swathes of its populations were plunged into unemployment, early retirement and internal migration; at the same time, a huge influx of public transfers investments avoided a recession and ensured a large improvement of monetary living standards (Roesler, 1994; Wiesenthal, 2003; Burda, 2013). From a socio-political point of view, the modalities of the unification process elicited a growing dissatisfaction. While the discontent was initially largely limited to the downardly-mobile former bureaucracy, more and more *Ossis* (Easterners) came to resent the "colonisation" by Western institutions and personnel,[57] their status as "second class citizens", the devaluation of their titles and biographies and the disregard for their specific values and interests (Abromeit, 1993; Wollmann, 1996; Bürklin & Rebenstorf, 1997; Wiesenthal, 1998; Fuchs, 1999; Brie, 2000; Neller & Thaidigsmann, 2002; Goedicke, 2003; Kunze, 2008; Hodgin & Pearce, 2011). The former GDR thus came to occupy a peculiar place within the landscape of the new

[56] In German *blühende Landschaften* (Kohl, 1990).

[57] By the mid-1990s Westerners owned 80% of the whole privatised sector and made up more that 40% of the top layer of the elite of the *neue Bundesländer*.

Berlin republic and acquired specific economic, social, political and cultural features which persist to this day.

The extent of the dissatisfaction reached its apex in 1992-1993, when a large wave of industrial and street mobilisation erupted in response to the privatisation of the Eastern state-owned sector by the *Treuhand*, which resulted not in the revitalisation but in the winding-up of much the former state-owned sector (Roesler, 1992; Garms, 1994; Gehrke, 1997). It was in this context that the initially discredited and declining PDS managed to revive its fortunes as a left-wing regional party, claiming the sole representation of East German interests against the "Bonn parties".

The second shock was the return to power of the social democratic party in 1998, after sixteen years of opposition, and the neo-liberal course staunchly pursued by it in its seven years of office (Beck & Scherrer, 2005; Nachtwey, 2013).

The open turn away from traditional values and solutions became soon apparent, as exemplified by the replacement of the Keynesian Oskar Lafontaine as Minister of Finance (1999), the Kosovo military mission (1999), the tax reform (2000) and the pension reform (2001). During the first term, however, dissatisfaction remained confined to left-wing activist circles and did not result in heavy electoral losses. It was only in March 2003, when the re-elected Schröder cabinet unveiled its ambitious plans for a reform of the labour market (AGENDA 2010), that discontent acquired mass dimensions. A rift opened within the traditional constituency of the SPD (members, voters and collateral organisations) and in 2003-2004 the biggest wave of street mobilisations since unification occupied for two years the forefront of the political scene (Rucht & Yang, 2004; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006). Although the movement failed to prevent the implementation of the reform, it provided the backdrop for the formation of a new radical left challenger (WASG) and for the electoral successes of the radical left along the whole 2005-2009 electoral cycle.

The third shock was the great financial crisis of 2008-2009.

While milder than in other European countries, the crisis has further undermined the stability of the German party system. At the electoral level, in 2009 the number of valid votes fell to 69.8% of the electorate and both partners of the outgoing grand coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD) collapsed to their lowest vote share since 1949. The following

period remained characterised by an extreme volatility, with the emergence of new parties (PIRATEN, Alternative für Deutschland) and large oscillations in opinion poll ratings and local election results.[58] Moreover, the country witnessed another impressive wave of contentious politics: the student movement of autumn 2009 (Himpele, 2009; Sergan, 2009); the huge environmental mobilisations of 2009-2011 (Roose, 2010; Schlager, 2010; Rucht, 2010); and a variety of smaller movements (Hildebrandt & Tügel, 2010).

Was the radical left able to seize the opportunities offered by these historic turns to embark on a path of renewal and growth?

Radical left responses

The starting situation of the 1980s was not favourable to the emergence of a strong radical left. In the West communist and far left groups had always been quite marginal; the extra-parliamentary left largely collapsed in 1989-1990[59] while the left-wing tendencies in the SPD (Walter, 2007) and Greens (Klein & Falter, 2003) also lost weight. In the East socialist ideas remained monopolised by the authoritarian practices of the SED while oppositional groups remained small and isolated.

The crisis of 1989-90 had the unlikely outcome of leading to the convergence of many of these groups around a reformed rump of the SED, the PDS (Bortfeldt, 1992; Gerner, 1993).[60] The pressure from the streets forced the SED through a rapid process of adaptation. After a long internal battle, the new organisation opted for an interesting mix of continuities and discontinuities couched around a radical-democratic version of "democratic socialism". The legacy of the past made the party unpalatable in the West and little appealing in the East; however, its gain of parliamentary representation and

[58] See http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm.

[59] See Fülberth (1990) on the orthodox *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* (DKP), Steffen (2002) on the Maoist *Kommunistischer Bund* (KB); Jünke (2001) on the Trotskyist/Maoist *Vereinigte Sozialistische Partei* (VSP); Schultze and Gross (1997) and Schwarzmeier (2001) on the *Autonomen*.

[60] See also the stimulating witness accounts of Gysi and Falkner (1990), Eckhoff (2005) and Segert (2008).

the efforts of its new modernising leadership transformed it into a key future point of reference for all kinds of disaffected left-wingers. In the following years (1991-1998) the PDS consolidated as a sizeable force in the East (Brie *et al.,* 1995; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996; Barker, 1998; Brie & Woderich, 2000; Oswald, 2002; Gerth, 2002). The party survived the initial attempts of political and economic strangulation[61] and, by 1992, experienced a turnaround in its electoral fortunes, intercepting the disparate grievances of large sectors of the Eastern population. It thus embarked on a path of constant growth which brought it from 2.4% of valid votes in 1990 (East 11.1%, West 0.3%)[62] to 5.1% in 1998 (East 21.6%, West 1.2%). The former Stalinist ruling party had become a successful regional socialist party.

The PDS, however, was not able to fully profit from the tensions produced by the neo-liberal orientation of the Schröder government (Olsen; 2002; Hough, 2002; Bortfeldt, 2003; Brie, 2003; Meuche-Mäker, 2005; Thompson, 2005). Despite promising gains in the preceding European and regional elections, in 2002 it collapsed to 4.0% (East 16.9%, West 1.1%) and its representation was reduced to only two MPs. The outcome was unexpected and was largely the product of a last-minute swing toward the SPD in response to extraordinary circumstances (Stöss & Neugebauer, 2002).[63] Moreover, its disastrous governmental experiences in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1998-2006) and Berlin (2001-2011) weakened the local branches and tarnished the global image of the party as an alternative and consequently anti-neoliberal force.

The tide turned again with the 2003-2004 wave of social mobilisation, which led to the resurgence of the PDS the East and the rise of a new potential challenger or ally in the West: the WASG. Sagely, the initially competitive relationship between the two radical left groups was rapidly steered toward an electoral alliance in Spring 2005 and a full-blown merger in June 2007 (Brie *et al.,* 2005 and 2007; Heunemann, 2006; Hübner & Strohschneider, 2007; Spier *et al.*, 2007; Hough *et al.,* 2007; Fülberth, 2008; Jesse & Lang, 2008; Patton, 2011).

61

62 When not otherwise stated, in this chapter the terms will be used with reference to the former Federal Republic of Germany territory plus West Berlin (West) and the former German Democratic Republic plus East Berlin (East) – and not to the division between old and new *Länder* of the FRG.

63 The key factor was probably the sudden rise of the popularity of Schröder in the East following its opposition to the Iraq war and its skilful management of the Elbe floods. The temporary retreat of Gysi from the political scene is also likely to have had an important impact.

The new party, DIE LINKE, was able to capitalise the wave of revulsion toward the SPD and boomed to unprecedented levels, reaching 8.7% in 2005 (East 25.4%, West 4.9%) and 11.9% in 2009 (East 28.5%, West 8.3%).

The largest capitalist crisis since 1929, finally, did not favour DIE LINKE. Firstly, Merkel's CDU strongly increased its consent thanks to the quick economic recovery and a cautious and non-divisive style of governance. Secondly, the return of the SPD to the opposition changed the patterns of political competition and enabled it to recover some of the consent it had lost while in government. Thirdly, the lack of tangible short-term results and strategic perspectives of the radical left led to a demobilisation of its electorate and its defection to mainstream or alternative "protest" options (Piraten, Green and AfD). Fourthly, labour and anti-crisis protests were quickly superseded by mobilisations on "post-materialist" themes (e.g. environmental problems). Finally, internal infighting around the issue of governmental participation and the retreat of Oskar Lafontaine from the political frontline compounded the above-mentioned problems. Since 2011 the party has been credited by pollsters with a mere 6-8% of the voting intentions, ultimately winning 8.6% of votes (East 22.7%, West 5.6%).

Outline

The present chapter will analyse in more detail this trajectory.

In section 3.2 I will map out the contours of the German radical left over the last 25 years. First of all, I will track the evolution of its societal weight and the imbalances between electoral growth, organisational decline and lack of governmental weight. Secondly, I will underline the remarkably low level of fragmentation of this political area and its capacity to initiate significant processes of regroupment, such as the shift from regional (PDS) to all-German (DIE LINKE) foundations. Thirdly, I will examine the transformation of its political nature, as the initial national specificities (e.g. the roots of the PDS within the milieu of former East German communist cadres and bureaucrats) were gradually watered down and the typical features of the contemporary Western European radical left came to the forefront.

In section 3.3 I will discuss the validity of the "vacuum thesis" with reference to the German case. Did the neo-liberal shift of the mainstream parties and their turn away from their traditional welfarist policies and values open up a political space which new parties could reasonably hope to fill? What potentialities and limitations did this situation create for the growth of the radical left?

In section 3.4 I will identify the factors which favoured the cohesion and regroupment of the German radical left parties and which prevented its fragmentation in competing organisations.

In section 3.5 I will try to determine if the "strategy of left-ward pull" of the German radical left was at all successful in influencing the dynamics of competition within the party system and in counterbalancing or reversing the right-ward shift of its main competitors (SPD and Greens).

In section 3.6, finally, I will offer summarise the main findings and offer some concluding remarks.

3.2 The making of a new German radical left

3.2.1 Societal weight

The evolution of the societal weight of the German radical left in its various key dimensions is summarised below (TABLE 3.1 and FIGURE 3.2). The almost entirety of the totals is attributable to one subject only: the PDS up to 2005; the PDS-WASG alliance in 2005-2006; DIE LINKE from 2007 onwards. The weight of other far left organisations (mainly DKP, MLPD and PSG) always remained extremely marginal.

TABLE 3.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT

	AVERAGE 1990-2013	PERIOD I 1990-2004	PEROD II 2005-2013
ELECTORAL WEIGHT			
NATIONAL	2,916,005 votes 6.32%	1,914,888 votes 4.00%	4,584,534 votes 10.21%
REGIONAL	1,971,500 votes 5.22%	1,567,769 votes 3.96%	2,644,386 votes 7.30%
EUROPEAN (1994-2013)	1,727,074 votes 6.14%	1,631,884 votes 5.39%	1,843,417 votes 7.06%
PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT			
NATIONAL	38 seats 6.04%	23 seats 3.38%	65 seats 10.47%
REGIONAL	145 seats 5.18%	126 seats 4.34%	178 seats 6.58%
GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT			
NATIONAL	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
REGIONAL	4.28%	3.96%	4.81%
ORGANISATIONAL WEIGHT			
MEMBERSHIP (1990-2012)	108,835 6.18%	124,616 6.46%	79,246 5.65%
YEARLY INCOMES (1991-2010)	24,743,971 euro 5.32%	24,222,835 euro 5.15%	25,959,954 euro 5.69%
MEDIA OUTREACH	Weak	Weak	Weak
ORGANISATIONAL LINKAGES	Weak	Weak	Weak

Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, total party members, total party incomes). Averages: rolling figures calculated on all years. Regional: weighted by regional population. Governmental involvement: time in government (participation or external support); at least one radical left party. National: Bundestag. Yearly incomes: real 2010 euro.

FIGURE 3.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT



Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values. Shares of total valid votes, total seats (weighted), total party members, total party incomes, total population administered.

The overall picture is one of a medium-small player within the national political system, with all but one quantifiable dimensions of oscillating around average values ranging between 4.3% and 6.5%. The German radical left did reasonably well and followed a growth path at the electoral, parliamentary and financial level; it struggled more on the other levels.

The electoral dimension was without doubt the most successful and followed a general trajectory of growth mirroring two of the three above-mentioned shocks: the post-reunification crisis (1993-1999), when the PDS consolidated itself as an Eastern regional party, and the post-Hartz IV reforms period (2003-2009), when DIE LINKE established itself as a national force making inroads in the traditional social democratic constituency. From 1990 to 2013 the electoral weight of the radical left grew in absolute terms from 1,138,174 to 3,784,482 votes and in relative terms, from 2.45% to 8.65% of valid votes.

The parliamentary dimension roughly mirrored the previous one, with a presence slightly inferior but fairly proportional to the electoral results. The radical left enjoyed at all times a presence in the national parliament, although in the period 2002-2005 it was reduced to only two MPs. The presence in regional parliaments was geographically highly differentiated. The PDS has a strong anchoring in the East but always failed to gain a foothold in the West. DIE LINKE did better and since 2009 has had an intermittent presence in many of the Western parliaments, being represented at its peak (2011) in seven of the ten regions.

The governmental dimension points to a very weak presence of the German radical left in governmental majorities and executives, in a very interesting deviation from the pattern of its Italian and French counterparts.

Neither the PDS nor DIE LINKE was ever involved in parliamentary coalitions at the national level, despite some willingness on the part of their leadership to open discussions for an external support to a red-red-green majority. The refusal of SPD and Greens has so far been adamant and whenever the left support was vital to form a "red-red-green" majority (2005) the social democratic party preferred to it a "grand coalition" with the CDU/CSU.

At the regional level the picture was somewhat different. While still limited to few and little populous regions (in average just 4.3% of the German population), experiments of external support (*Tolerierung*) and direct governmental participation have indeed taken place in the Eastern regions. Three cases belong to the first group: the majority SPD cabinet in Brandenburg (1994-1999), the minority SPD-Greens then SPD cabinets in Sachsen-Anhalt (1994-2002) and the transitional minority SPD-Greens cabinet in

Berlin (2001). Three cases fall under the second group: the SPD-PDS/DIE LINKE cabinets in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1998-2006), Berlin (2002-2011) and Brandenburg (2009-present).

The progressive electoral rise of the PDS and of DIE LINKE has however made the problem of crafting viable parliamentary centre-left coalitions more and more acute. In the East the party tends to be vital in the majority of cases; the SPD has here progressively evolved toward a fairly open attitude, but continues to consider as its preferred option a grand coalition with the CDU. In the West the issue has emerged only after 2007 and the response of centre-left parties has been so far quite reluctant.[64]

The organisational dimension, finally, did not match the electoral successes and tended to follow a stagnating or declining path.

Membership levels, which can be tracked with precision, followed a rapidly declining trajectory - with the exception of the period 2005-2009. The transition from SED to PDS (1988-1990) meant a loss of almost 90% of members, from 2.3 million to 280,882. This was followed by another three years (1990-1993) of heavy losses, which halved the membership to 131,406. In the subsequent eleven years (1993-2004) the PDS continued on a path of slower but sustained decline, halving again to a historical low point of 61,385. The establishment of the WASG and then of DIE LINKE led to a period of expansion, as the further losses in the East were more than compensated by an impetuous growth in the West; by 2009 the party had reached a peak of 78,046 members. The revival was however short-lived and by 2011 the membership had fallen back to 69,458 members. The decline was less accentuated in terms of shares of all party members (11.7% in 1990, 6.6% in 1993, 4.0% in 2004, 5.6% in 2009 and 5.2% in 2011) but meant a shift from a membership-heavy to a membership-light party, with the index of encapsulation (M/V) falling from the incredibly high levels of 1990 (24.7%)

[64] In the five cases when the support of DIE LINKE was needed, its potential partners chose to "get creative" three times (CDU-Greens, CDU-FDP-Greens and CDU-SPD coalitions) and the remaining two times built short-lived minority SPD-Green coalitions: the one in Hessen failed to obtain the required majority, due to SPD dissidents, and never entered into office; the one in Nordrhein-Westfalen (2010-2012) refused to reach a programmatic agreement with DIE LINKE and was seated thanks to its unrequited abstention, later looking for variable majorities on a case-by-case basis. DIE LINKE abstained on the 2010 and 2011 budgets and voted against on the 2012 one, thereby triggering early elections.

to medium-low (6.0% in 1994, 3.7% in 1998 and 2002) and very low (1.8% in 2005, 1.5% in 2009) levels.

From a financial point of view, the initial period of crisis linked to the seizure of SED assets (1990-1993)[65] was followed by a very stable situation, with real annual incomes oscillating around 24 million euro, around 5.3% of the total income of parliamentary parties.

The two remaining sub-dimensions cannot be quantified with precision.

As far as the media outreach was concerned, party-controlled forms of communication (e.g. membership-based campaigning, party-owned media, broadcasting of parliamentary debates, paid advertising) had a significant impact in the Eastern regions but remained sporadic in the West. The mass media, on the other hand, tended to provide a hostile and weak (Hansen *et al.*, 2010; Jandura, 2011) coverage of the PDS and DIE LINKE, which tended to be treated as irrelevant forces or as a danger for democracy.

As far as organisational linkages were concerned, the parties of the German radical left pained at translating their growing electoral appeal into more stable forms of indirect influence. Altogether, the influence was confined to the organisations representing the interests of the former bureaucracy (e.g. the *Ostdeutsches Kuratorium von Verbänden,* OKV), the far left scene (e.g. squatter, anti-fascist, communist, Turkish and Kurdish groups), the pacifist movement and the alter-globalist milieu (e.g. ATTAC, *Sozialforum in Deutschland*). The presence among the cadres and leaders of the dense German civil society (trade unions, associations, churches, charities), with the exception of sections of the East German associationism, remained on the other hand quite small: the relationship warmed up, moments of collaboration took place, but the political allegiance of mass organisations remained firmly, if critically, aligned with their traditional subcultural representatives (SPD, CDU and, to a lesser extent, Greens).

[65] Nominal incomes collapsed from 816.5 million DM (first half 1990) to 72.9 million DM (second half 1990) and 22.5 million DM (1992), before rising to 34.3 million DM in 1994. The net assets inherited from the SED and not voluntarily given up amounted in 1990 to 1,277 million DM but were administered by a state commission (UKPV); in the end they were almost entirely seized, leaving in 1994 a net wealth of just 20 million DM. For a discussion of the legal, practical and ethical issues surrounding the fate of the SED assets inherited by the PDS see the opposite views of Behrend (2006) and Bräutigam (2010).

3.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation

Unlike its French and Italian counterparts, the German radical left presents a remarkably small degree of organisational fragmentation (see TABLE 3.3).

TABLE 3.3 FRAGMENTATION

Votes	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**AVER.**
PDS	99.2%	99.4%	99.5%	99.9%	-	-	66.4%
L.PDS/DIE LINKE	-	-	-	-	98.5%	99.3%	33.0%
Others	0.8%	0.6%	0.4%	0.1%	1.5%	0.7%	0.7%
Members	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**AVER.**
PDS/L.PDS	96.1%	92.5%	90.4%	90.2%	74.9%	-	74.0%
WASG	-	-	-	-	15.6%	-	2.6%
DIE LINKE	-	-	-	-	-	91.8%	15.3%
Others	3.9%	7.5%	9.6%	9.8%	9.5%	8.2%	8.1%
MPs	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**AVER.**
PDS/L.PDS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	77.8%	-	79.6%
WASG	-	-	-	-	22.2%	-	3.7%
DIE LINKE	-	-	-	-	-	100.0%	16.7%
Fragmentation index	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**AVER.**
Votes	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.03	1.01	1.01
Members	1.08	1.16	1.21	1.21	1.68	1.18	1.25
MPs	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.53	1.00	1.09

The moment of potential crisis actually abounded: in 1989-1990 the SED seemed briefly oriented toward dissolving itself and paving the way for the establishment of several left-wing parties (Gysi & Falkner, 1990; Bortfeldt, 1992; Segert, 2008); in 2002-2003 the clash between left-wing and right-wing tendencies of the PDS menaced to split it along ideological lines (Behrend, 2006); in 2004-2005 the emergence of the WASG seemed to announce a period of destructive competition and the subsequent process of alliance and full-blown merger (2005-2007) was repeatedly threatened by local incidents[66] (Heunemann, 2006; Spier *et al.,* 2007; Hough *et al,* 2007); in 2010-2012 the clash between Western radicals around Oskar Lafontaine and Eastern pragmatists around Dietmar Bartsch again prompted many to claim that the merger had not worked and that each side should go its separate way.

In the end, however, the party not only never split, but also managed to co-opt or marginalise potential external challenges and to become the centre of successive waves of radical left regroupment. In 1990 the Linke Liste/PDS project (Meuche-

[66] In particular, the local WASG branches in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern decided to run against the PDS in the 2006 regional elections.

Mäker, 2005: 15-16; Eckhoff, 2005; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996: 46) was an electoral failure but succeeded in co-opting significant sections of the existing far left groups in the East (VL, Die Nelken) and West (DKP, KB, VSP). In 2004-2007, then, the alliance with the WASG enabled it to finally set a solid foothold in the western side of the country.

The far left groups which refused to join the PDS and DIE LINKE (e.g. DKP, MLPD, KPD-Ost, PSG and RSB) remained tiny and little influential. Their total membership has been oscillating since 1993 between 7,000 and 10,000 members; their total electorate reached, at its peak in 2005, just 60,843 votes (0.10%).[67]

[67] Kailitz (2004), BdI (1991-2012).

3.2.3 Political nature

The political nature of German radical left parties was characterised, as in the rest of Western Europe, by the transition from the legacies of the 20th century communist movement to the dilemmas and possibilities of the contemporary radical left landscape. In the case of Germany, the origins of the PDS in a former ruling party of the Soviet bloc provided for marked specificities vis-à-vis its French and Italian counterparts.

Ideologically, the German radical left was quick in ditching the legacy of the bureaucratic socialism represented by the GDR in favour of an eclectic "radical left" programmatic.

Within the SED, socialism was conceived as a state-led process of accumulation and redistribution through the means of state ownership, economic planning and party dictatorship (Roesler, 1992; Dale, 2004; Steiner, 2010). When this model unravelled in 1989-1990 under the impact of an economic, political and geo-political crisis, it was not clear which left-wing vision might replace it. Both the civic movements (*Bürgerbewegungen*) and the PDS initially advanced the idea of a reformed socialist GDR (Kamenitsa, 1998; Riegel, 2002; Segert, 2009), but the extent and type of reforms to be undertaken remained vague and controversial. After the victory of right-wing pro-unification forces in the March 1990 *Volkskammer* election, these debates were swept away and East Germany swiftly proceeded toward a quick and thorough adaptation to the institutional realities of the FRG (Abromeit, 1993; Wollmann, 1996).

The response of the PDS was an original theorisation of "modern socialism" or "democratic socialism" (Land & Possekel, 1995; Klein & Brie, 2007; Segert, 2008; Land, 2010). This was conceived as a "third way" between market capitalism and state socialism characterised by: (a) a wide-ranging democratisation of both state and the economy; (b) a mixed economy with a multiplicity of property forms (private, state, cooperative). The vision was appealing but rather indeterminate, as the relative weight of the three theoretical poles of state intervention, market competition and (workers' and users') self-management was not spelled out in detail. It could lend itself to a variety of interpretations, as the internal debates of the PDS would soon amply

demonstrate (Land, 1995b; Brie, 2000; Chrapa, 2000; Sturm, 2000; Behrend, 2006; Prinz, 2010).

De facto, the programmatic of the PDS focused on two key areas: on the one hand, a broad anti-neoliberal catalogue of progressive measures mixing welfarist, left-Keynesian and post-materialist themes; on the other hand, a particular attention to the defence of cross-class Eastern interests against the perceived economic, political and cultural marginalisation of the area in the new German republic (PDS, 1990b, 1993 and 2003).

The WASG avoided any commitment to a post-capitalist future but its short-term socio-economic programme overlapped with that of the PDS and even had a more radical edge (WASG, 2005). The party sought to work toward a "new alternative social bloc of labour and knowledge" (Krämer, 2005) against the intellectual hegemony of neo-liberalism and came up with a coherent programme of welfarist and left-Keynesian reforms.

DIE LINKE, finally, worked toward a synthesis of the main concerns of the two constituent parties: working and living conditions, the expansion of the welfare state, democratisation, socio-ecological restructuring, pacifism, Eastern interests and the long-term aim of democratic socialism (PDS, 2007 and 2011).

Sociologically, the German radical left has until recently significantly diverged from the Western European norm (see TABLE 3.4 and TABLE 3.5). Most contemporary radical left parties tend to have a quite heterogeneous social composition, encompassing in various proportions employed wage workers, pensioners and other inactives, students, unemployed and professionals. Moreover, the organic links with the organised workers' movement tend to follow a declining parable. Nevertheless, employed blue-collar and white-collar tend to remain largely over-represented among their ranks and the main target of their organising efforts.

The PDS, on the contrary, had from the start a different core constituency: the highly-educated but downward-mobile sections of the former GDR elite. The party never managed to gain a stable foothold in the Western regions, which made up at most less than 5% of its members and less than 22% of its voters. As a consequence of its nature of successor party of the SED, it also elicited a strong initial hostility from blue-collar workers, which had been among the key protagonists of the 1989-90 revolution

(Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006). This gap was partially mended through the role of the party in the 1992-1993 wave of industrial struggle but never entirely disappeared. Altogether, PDS members remained overwhelmingly over-60 pensioners with a bureaucratic or intellectual background, while PDS voters represented a fairly balanced cross-section of the Eastern population (except for blue-collar workers) with the addition of a small Western appendix (skewed toward wage workers and unemployed).

The post-2005 shift has significantly changed this situation, partially re-aligning the sociology of DIE LINKE with the broader radical left standards. The Western regions, although still much weaker than the Eastern ones, have seen their weight rise to 37.9% of the members and 55.5% of the voters (2009). The new Western members were predominantly employed wage workers or unemployed and thus rejuvenated the overall profile of the party. Blue-collar workers became more likely to vote for DIE LINKE than the rest of the population. These developments, however, were mostly determined by the dynamism in the West; indeed, the party remains a largely *dual* entity. In the West it represents a development of the WASG: a dynamic point of attraction for broad left forces (former SPD, PDS, Greens and far left supporters), dominated by men of the central age cohorts, with an over-representation of lower-class backgrounds. In the East it remains a renamed PDS, with a declining membership dominated by gender-balanced and aging former SED members and a composite electorate mirroring the local population.

TABLE 3.4 SOCIOLOGY OF MEMBERS

	PDS 1991	PDS 1998	PDS 2000	DIE LINKE 2009
N.	**172,579**	**94,627**	**83,478**	**78,046**
GENDER	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**
Male	56.1%	54.0%	54.4%	62.8%
Female	43.9%	46.0%	45.6%	37.2%
AREA	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**
East	99.7%	96.7%	95.1%	62.0%
West	0.3%	3.1%	4.7%	37.9%
Other	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
AGE	**poll**	**poll**	**adm**	**poll**
18-30	10.6%		1.8%	
31-60	49.7%		31.2%	
61+	39.7%		67.0%	
18-34		2%		7%
35-49		13%		17%
50-64		25%		30%
65-79		52%		31%
80+		8%		16%
EDUCATION	**poll**	**poll**	**poll**	**poll**
Below 10 years	32.2%	40%	30.3%	37%
Secondary	5.1%	5%	4.2%	17%
University	62.7%	54%	65.3%	46%
PROFESSION	**poll**	**poll**	**poll**	**poll**
Active population			24.5%	
Employed wage worker	19.3%	21.2%		28.9%
Blue-collar	4.4%	3.9%		6.5%
White-collar	14.5%	6.9%		10.9%
Civil servant	0.4%	10.4%		11.6%
Unemployed and assimilated	26.9%	5.0%	6.5%	8.0%
Independent	7.2%	1.9%		5.5%
Employer and self-employed	3.4%	1.4%		4.1%
Professional	3.8%	0.5%		1.4%
Inactive	46.6%	73.0%	68.9%	58.0%
Pensioner	41.3%	70.0%	63.8%	53.0%
Student	-	1.0%	2.8%	4.0%
Other	5.3%	2.0%	2.3%	1.0%
RELIGION		**poll**		**poll**
Catholic		1%		7%
Protestant		2%		11%
Other		1%		3%
None		97%		79%
ACTIVISM (subjective)		**poll**		**poll**
Very active		4%		8%
Fairly active		28%		28%
Little active		52%		48%
Not active		16%		16%

Sources: my elaboration from ISDA (1991), Chrapa and Wittich (2001), Spier *et al.* (2011) and Niedermayer (2012).
Notes: adm: administrative data. Poll: poll data.

TABLE 3.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (COMPOSITION)

	PDS 1990	PDS 1994	PDS 1998	PDS 2002	L.PDS 2005	DIE LINKE 2009
N.	1,129,578	2,066,176	2,515,454	1,916,702	4,118,194	5,155,933
GENDER	**poll**	**poll**	**poll**	**rw**	**rw**	**rw**
Male	56.1%	49.9%	50.0%	51.6%	54.5%	54.2%
Female	43.9%	50.1%	50.0%	46.4%	45.5%	45.8%
AREA	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**	**adm**
East	90.3%	83.7%	83.0%	78.5%	56.4%	44.5%
West	9.7%	12.3%	17.0%	21.5%	43.6%	55.5%
AGE	**poll**	**poll**	**poll**	**rw**	**rw**	**rw**
18-24	16.7%					
25-29	12.9%					
30-39	21.6%					
40-49	17.0%					
50-59	12.4%					
60+	19.4%					
18-24		12.0%	11.0%	7.5%	7.3%	7.0%
25-34		22.8%	18.0%	11.2%	10.5%	10.3%
35-44		19.7%	24.0%	20.0%	20.4%	16.0%
45-59		24.7%	26.0%	28.8%	33.3%	36.5%
60+		20.8%	21.0%	32.5%	28.6%	30.2%
EDUCATION				**poll**	**poll**	**poll**
Below 10 years				58.3%	66.7%	64.9%
Secondary				16.7%	15.6%	19.1%
University				25.0%	17.7%	16.0%
PROFESSION			**poll**	**poll**	**poll**	**poll**
Active population						
Employed wage worker			49.9%	48.4%	52.6%	50.9%
Blue-collar			17.9%	19.3%	23.5%	22.5%
White-collar			29.4%	25.7%	26.6%	25.7%
Civil servant			2.6%	3.5%	2.5%	2.6%
Unemployed			12.0%	11.6%	16.1%	8.0%
Independent			5.1%	5.3%	3.7%	5.1%
Inactive			33.0%	34.7%	27.6%	36.0%
Pensioner			21.0%	26.3%		20.0%
Other			12.0%	8.4%		16.0%
RELIGION	**poll**			**poll**	**poll**	**poll**
Catholic	6.6%			7.3%	13.7%	18.7%
Protestant	14.4%			20.8%	26.3%	30.8%
None	79.0%			71.9%	60.0%	50.5%

Sources: my elaboration from BWL (2002, 2005, 2009) and FGW (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009).
Notes: adm: administrative data. Poll: poll data. Rw: representative Wahlstatistik.

Organisationally, the PDS and DIE LINKE are exemplary models of the shifts undertaken by most European radical left parties: a complete overhaul of internal democracy and pluralism; the winding-up of workplace-based forms of organisation; the loss of members and membership density; the move from a hegemonic toward a collaborative attitude toward social movements and civil society organisations; the consolidation of the influence of the party in public office *vis-à-vis* that in central office.

The key features of the SED organisation (Herbst *et al*., 1997) were quickly dismantled in the immediate post-1989 years, leaving behind a largely transformed party (Gerner, 1994; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996). The PDS was re-organised along the principles of delegate democracy, with regular competitive selections of congress delegates (every two years) and electoral candidates by the members, plus elements of direct (binding referenda) and network (thematic groups, non-members participation) democracy. It also adopted a "broad left" model aimed at integrating the widest possible spectrum of traditions and sensibilities, chose to privilege pluralism and tolerance over political coherence and institutionalised wide-ranging rights of individual members and of political or thematic tendencies. It dissolved paramilitary and workplace cells and replaced them with neighbourhood-based territorial cells.

These changes, both a spontaneous reaction to the oppressive nature of Stalinist bureaucratic centralism and a necessary adaptation to the West German laws and practices, largely failed to make the party attractive as a place of activist engagement: most young and middle-aged members left in the 1990-1993 crisis; the remaining membership was dominated old cadres – now mostly pensioners – organised in close-knit cells which proved remarkably unsuitable for new recruits. For the same reason, the party was largely cut off from any meaningful avenue of trade union and workplace intervention. At the same time, the discipline, commitment and local embeddedness of its remaining activists made them a fundamental resource for the electoral, institutional and societal representation of the diffuse interests of the East German population.

The establishment of DIE LINKE represented in this sense a qualitative shift: the party finally managed to gain the (thin) coverage of the Western regions which had eluded its predecessor; its Western structures, based not on local cells but on district branches, were less active and effective but more welcoming to new recruits; the links

with trade unions and social movements were strengthened. This notwithstanding, the balance between electoral and social rootedness became more and more skewed toward the former, as membership growth remained small and did not keep up the huge gains in votes.

Strategically, the politics of the PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE were all predicated on the idea of contributing to the establishment of a large anti-neoliberal counter-hegemonic coalition which, through a combination of electoral, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures, would in the mid-term pull the mainstream centre-left parties (SPD and Greens) to the left and create the conditions for a new progressive centre-left alliance and a "change of direction" (*Richtungswechsel*) in socio-economic and foreign policy (Brie, 2000, 2003 and 2007; Krämer, 2004). This strategy was confronted with the familiar dilemma of the contemporary European radical left. On the one hand, the strengthening of the radical left was primarily dependent on a direct competition with the (right-ward moving) moderate left over its traditional left-wing supporters: i.e. on "filling the vacuum" left by its adaptation to neo-liberalism, first by gaining the confidence of the East German population and then by encroaching on the Western working-class and post-materialist constituencies. On the other hand, this risked either to benefit the "greater evil" of the right (if no centre-left alliance could be established) or to dent the anti-neoliberal credentials of the radical left (if the latter agreed to support centre-left governments which did not move toward a more progressive path).

In the case of Germany, the parties of the radical left have largely been shielded from the need to make the kind of hard tactical and strategic choices which have so damaged their Italian and French counterparts. Up to 1998 the PDS mainly presented itself as a lone opposition against the Western-dominated, neo-liberal and militaristic policies embraced by the mainstream parties. At the same time, it was careful to minimise the pressure of an anti-right tactical voting by claiming that a growth of the party was the best way to ensure a "pressure from the left" on the political system (PDS, 1994 and 1998) and by hinting that, if the situation would require it, it would not

stand in the way of a minority SPD-Green governmental alternative.[68] From 1998 to 2009 PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE had a relatively easy game in pointing out the "betrayals" of the SPD leadership and exploiting the dissatisfaction against its most unpopular decisions. Only after 2009 the terrain became more delicate, as the tension between hostility toward the SPD and the aspiration toward a common front of the centre-left became more acute.

The dual image of a party of coherent yet non sectarian anti-neoliberal opposition, providing a useful left-ward pull on the mainstream left, was preserved by two lucky factors. First, the national SPD always remained adamant in its refusal to seat to the bargaining table with the PDS and DIE LINKE for the purpose of the establishment of a red-red-green governmental majority. Second, the radical left never actually proved determinant to form a centre-left governmental majority, with one exception. Although they rarely won a majority of the valid votes (with the exception of 1990), both the centre-right bloc (1994 and 2009) and the centre-left one (1998 and 2002) generally managed to win an independent parliamentary majority, thanks to a combination of the effects of the 5% electoral threshold and of the possibility of obtaining overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*) through the constituency vote.[69] The only situation when the support of the radical left was mathematically needed to form a centre-left majority obtained in 2005: this possibility, however, was quickly ruled out by the SPD which went on to form a grand coalition with its conservative rival CDU-CSU. Thus, PDS and DIE LINKE were prevented from ever being sucked into actual experiences of governmental participation at the national level, which proved so destructive for its French (1981-1984 and 1997-2002) and Italian (1997-2001 and 2006-2008) counterparts, while at the same time being able to shift the blame for the failed cooperation on the stubbornness of the SPD.

[68] The often employed formula was that a change will "not fail because of us" (*an uns nicht scheitern*), signalling a readiness to provide an initial external support; for one of the earliest instances see *Spiegel* (28.03.1994).

[69] The latter mechanism was declared inconstitutional and removed before the 2013 election.

3.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of the radical left mobilisation

The hopes of the German radical left, as elsewhere in Europe, were pinned on the so-called "vacuum thesis" (Abromeit, 1992 and 1993; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1998, 1999, 2002; Brie, 2000 and 2007; Patton, 2006; Nachtwey & Spier, 2007; Nachtwey, 2009).

The general political, social and intellectual climate had been unfavourable to the left since the late-1970s and the aftershocks of the crisis and collapse of the Soviet bloc had accentuated this condition, affecting to various degrees both the established communist parties and the non-Stalinist far left. The roots of this long-term decline are to be found in the defeat and recuperation of the post-1968 wave of labour militancy and in the inability of the left to respond effectively to the concomitant restructuring of the productive system.

This notwithstanding, the mid-1990s seemed to pave the way for a recovery based on the brutality of neo-liberal reforms, growing discontent and resistance against them and a quick right-ward shift of the established centre-left parties, which allegedly left a political vacuum of political representation of traditional left-wing themes and constituencies. In the German context several themes seemed to lend themselves to a mobilisation on the part of the radical left, as the discrepancy between significant popular interest and disregard by the mainstream political system presented potential "representation gaps" (*Vertretungslücken*) to be exploited.

The first one was the issue of East German interests. As Heidrun Abromeit (1992 and 1993) has convincingly shown, the mechanics of the 1990 unification led to a structural disregard for the peculiar problems and concerns of the population of those regions, which could hardly find a voice through the ("Bonn") mainstream parties. A regional left-wing party such as the PDS could provide a logical corrective to this situation (Neller & Thaidigsmann, 2002).

The second one was social justice. This was the traditional core issue of the SPD, encompassing both working-class interests and broader welfare state provisions. As the party sharply turned to the right after the first year in office (1999) and again after

the 2002 electoral victory, this could provide the opportunity for the establishment of a significant radical left force in the Western regions.

Finally, the issue of pacifism was deeply felt on both sides of the country and the post-1990 turn toward an activist military politics (in particular the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2001-present Afghanistan war) represented another promising area to win over disaffected ecologist and social democratic supporters.

How did the German radical left fare in this respect? Did the vacuum theory make sense? To what extent and why were the parties able to fill the relevant representation gaps? What were the limits of this strategy?

The present section will explore these questions by discussing the empirical contours of the alleged vacuum on the left (paragraph 3.3.1) and the results of the electoral (paragraph 3.3.2) and organisational (paragraph 3.3.3) mobilisation of the parties of the German radical left.

3.3.1 Contours of the vacuum

There is no doubt on the fact that the German political system, as its main European counterparts, has been evolving since the 1980s in a clear right-ward direction.

Firstly, state-owned corporations – always comparatively weaker than in Italy or France – were gradually dismantled and/or aligned with shareholder models of corporate governance (Rösler, 1994; Mayer, 2006; Beyer & Höpner, 2003) while the number of state employees was significantly reduced.

The process of privatisation of state-owned companies was started in the mid-1980s by the centre-right (VEBA, Volkswagen and Lufthansa). The 1990 unification led to its sudden acceleration. In the East, the *Treuhandanstalt* oversaw in four years the restructuring and privatisation of the near-totality of the local industrial sector; its follow-up organisms (BvS, TLG and BVVG), carried on with the gradual sale of Eastern real estate and agricultural land. In the West, centre-right and centre-left governments went on to partially or entirely privatise most of the remaining state-owned enterprises, including the key service providers Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom. Since the late 2000s only one large enterprise remains under full state ownership (Deutsche Bahn)[70]; minority participations exist in other important companies (KfW, Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom). The role of regional and local governments, however, remains strong in the banking sector, with *Landesbanken* and *Sparkassen* retaining about a third of the market share.

More generally, since unification the public sector employment has also been drastically reduced. This number reached its peak in 1990, when the two German states employed more than 7 million people, but was cut to 5.4 million in 1995 and 4.6 million in 2005, stabilising afterwards (DESTATIS, 2013).

Secondly, welfare state reform followed a path of "managed austerity" (Vail, 2010) involving both a preservation of overall state provisions and their selective rationalisation and neo-liberal recalibration. Key measures were the pension reforms of 1992, 2000 and 2006 and the labour market reforms of 2003-2005 (*Agenda 2010*). It

[70] The 1994 railway reform transferred most of the personnel of the sector from public to private employment contracts, but the new company (Deutsche Bahn AG) remained 100% controlled by the state. The planned privatisation was shelved in 2008 due to the adverse financial climate.

is notable that all but the first were drafted by social democratic ministers, either in centre-left or in grand coalition cabinets (Beck & Scherrer, 2005; Nachtwey, 2013).

Thirdly, the traditional restraint of the country in military foreign policy was reversed in the early 1990s by a more assertive stance (Meiers, 2010), which led to the participation to a series of minor NATO operations and to two full-fledged armed conflicts (Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan from 2001 onwards). Both the SPD in 1992 and the Greens in 1998 abandoned their previous opposition to out-of-area military missions – in the second case by breaching one of their founding values, pacifism.

Fourthly, and most importantly, existing political parties have been less and less able to rely on the main promise of the German market economy, i.e. the fact that an embedded liberal capitalism could be harnessed to distribute the benefits of the economic growth to all sectors of the population.

The issue of mass unemployment, which skyrocketed for the first time with the 1982 crisis, was never satisfactorily tackled. The unemployment rate rose to 7-8% of the active population in the 1980s and to 9-12% in the following fifteen years. Only after 2006 it started to significantly improve.[71]

GDP growth continued to slow down from the very high levels of the 1960s and 1970s to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.7% in the business cycle 1982-1993, 1.5% in 1993-2003 and 0.7% in 2003-2009. Wages did worse, moving from slow growth in the first two periods (CAGR 1.1% and 0.7%) to stagnation/decline after 2003 (-0.2%).

Overall, the unbalances of the reunification, high unemployment and deregulating labour market reforms led to a sharp decline of the share of wages on the GDP, a tendential stagnation of average labour incomes, a growth of real and perceived inequalities (Glatzer, 2009) and a dualisation of the labour market, with an enormous expansion of low-wage and precarious employment (Eichhorst & Marx, 2009).

Core left-wing themes – social justice, state regulation, pacifism – were increasingly neglected, rejected or redefined in the propaganda of the SPD and Greens (Walter, 2007; Klein & Falter, 2003; Nachtwey, 2013); the traditional social democratic constituencies – industrial workers, lower-middle social strata – did not seem to gain much from their term in office; the East bore the brunt of mass unemployment and

[71] Largely because of the shift of many former unemployed toward a mix of irregular jobs and welfare subsidies.

labour market reforms. This seemed indeed to be a fertile terrain for the emergence of new left-wing challengers.

A shift of the political system, however, does not necessarily create a representation gap. On the one hand, the change might simply reflect or accompany a similar shift in public opinion – in our case, the strengthening of a new neo-liberal hegemony. On the other hand, it might result in a passive acquiescence of the population, which either sees the developments as inevitable or cannot envisage meaningful ways to counter it. Existing electoral and opinion poll data seem to indicate that, in fact, the disconnection between sectors of the German population and the party system did grow and was at least in part due to a growing dissatisfaction "on the left".

Firstly, the support for "establishment" parties (CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP) has been constantly eroding since the early 1980s, with particularly steep declines in the periods 1983-1993 and 2005-2009 (TABLE 3.6). Their share of the total electorate fell from 86.0% in 1980 to 49.8% in 2009, to the benefit of abstentions and of new parties, while their capacity to develop a feeling of identification (GESIS poll data) followed the same trend, from 78.8% in 1980 to 47.5% in 2011.

FIGURE 3.6 SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES



Sources: my elaboration from Bundeswahlleiter and GESIS.
Notes: share of total electorate.

Secondly, the weight of traditional left-wing beliefs, far from decreasing, was rather on the rise (TABLE 3.7 and 3.8).

FIGURE 3.7 LEFT-WING OPINION, SIZE



Sources: my elaboration from GESIS.

FIGURE 3.8 LEFT-WING OPINION, NET BALANCE



Sources: my elaboration from GESIS.
Notes: positive minus negative responses.

The difference between people identifying as left-of-the-centre and their opponents shifted from negative values in the 1980s (1983: -8.0%) to positive values afterwards (2006: +12.4%). Germans became more and more likely to consider existing social differences as unfair rather than fair (1984: +3.2%; 2008: +45.2%) and socialism as "a good idea badly implemented" rather than a bad idea (1992: -11%; 2007: +22%). Crucially, the difference between those supporting an expansion of the welfare state and those wishing its cut-back tended to be largely positive (1990-2007 average: +13.4%), with the only exception in the period 2000-2004. Other questions of the

ALLBUS[72] survey point out to a post-1989 trend toward growing perceptions of social injustice and conflicts of interests, criticism of capitalism and support for welfarist and redistributive measures (Petersen 2007; Glatzer, 2009; Köcher, 2012).
Both developments reached an extremely pronounced extent in the former-GDR area, as social grievances overlapped with regional ones.

Thus, a growing area of dissatisfaction around socio-economic grievances could be identified among the middle-lower strata of German society. It was up to the radical left to offer them a credible perspective, winning them over from either a traditional support for the status quo or political disengagement.

[72] Questions V150, V155, V156, V160, V163, V175, V176, V177, V178, V179, V180, V181, V211.

3.3.2 Electoral mobilisation

Should the attempt of the German radical left to fill the *electoral* dimension of the vacuum be classified as successful or as unsuccessful?

Successes...

Over the whole period 1990-2009 the main parties of the radical left (PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE) followed a path of sustained growth, soaring from 1,129,578 votes (2.4% of valid votes; 1.9% of the total electorate) to 5,155,933 votes (11.9% and 8.3%). It is easy to show that this happened precisely because they managed to partially fill "representation gaps" which had opened between the established parliamentary parties and specific sectors of the population: the East/West conflict and the issue of social justice (Brie, 2000 and 2007).

Schematically, this development followed two distinct phases. In the 1990s the PDS recovered a mass support in the East, benefitting from the adverse consequences of the CDU-led reunification process. In the 2000s, on the other hand, the PDS-WASG alliance and then DIE LINKE managed to win a mid-sized support in the West, exploiting the rift of Schröder's SPD with its traditional working-class constituency (FIGURE 3.9).

In the first phase (1990-1998) the gains of the PDS were concentrated on the former GDR territory, where the party doubled its December 1990 votes and became a well-rooted political force; in the West its influence remained very small (Meuche-Mäker, 2005).

At the first free *Volkskammer* elections on 18 March 1990 the party obtained 16.4% of valid votes. While facing a marked hostility from most social categories – especially from the industrial working class, which had been at the forefront of the anti-SED revolution (Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006) – it could still muster the support of large sections of the former bureaucracy and of former SED members, which had

benefitted from the old regime and viewed its downfall as a threat of severe downward social mobility (Jung, 1990; Solga, 1995; Goedicke, 2003).

FIGURE 3.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS, EAST/WEST



Sources: Bundeswahlleiter.
Notes: shares of valid votes and absolute number of votes. V1990: votes obtained in the March 1990 *Volkskammer* election (GDR).

The after-shocks of the local revolutionary process and the prospect of unification seemed to doom the party to a quick disappearance. In the following months its share of votes slid to 14.6% on 9 May (local elections), 12.7% in October-December (regional elections) and 11.1% on 2 December (*Bundestag* election). Since 1992, however, the fortunes of the party revived. It recovered its support among the former bureaucracy (now active in white-collar professions, early-retired or unemployed), which was indeed being significantly discriminated against in the new republic. It also managed to

reach out to broader layers of the Eastern population, which started to feel deceived by the contrast between the early promises of a rapid socio-economic improvement and the realities of a permanently under-developed area. In particular, the involvement of the PDS in the massive 1992-1993 wave of workplace and public outcry against the policies of the *Treuhand* (Garms, 1994; Gehrke, 1997) markedly improved its image, partially mending its antagonistic relationship with the local working class. By 1998 the party reached its temporary high point (2,054,773 votes, 21.6%), recovering the early losses to the SPD and scoring significant gains from CDU-CSU and new voters.

In the second phase (1998-2009), on the other hand, the gains of the radical left were concentrated in the West, among traditional SPD voters.

Despite promising conditions, the PDS initially failed to profit from the right-ward shift of the seating centre-left cabinet and actually suffered a heavy set-back in the 2002 elections. The subsequent events, however, changed this situation. The labour market reforms of the second Schröder cabinet provoked a rift between the SPD leadership and its traditional working-class constituency, which found its expression in vigorous public criticism, a cycle of mass street mobilisation and the establishment of a new left-wing splinter party, the WASG. The PDS-WASG electoral alliance, led by Oskar Lafontaine, massively profited from this climate and soared to 4,118,194 votes (8.7%) in the 2005 elections. This upward trend continued during the following legislature, when the merger of the two groups into a new party (DIE LINKE) could boast its role as the only "social" opposition against the policies of the CDU-SPD grand coalition and further rose to 5,155,933 votes (11.9%).

This represented a qualitative shift for the German radical left. Firstly, the East/West imbalance persisted but was largely attenuated and DIE LINKE became a small but real political alternative to the SPD in the Western regions. Secondly, the atypical social profile of the PDS was replaced by a more typical radical left one, with strong results among blue-collar workers and incredible scores among the unemployed (TABLE 3.10).

FIGURE 3.10 ELECTORAL RESULTS, SELECTED SOCIAL GROUPS



Sources: my elaboration from FGW (1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009).

Thirdly, the main electoral competitor switched from the CDU to the SPD, again aligning with a more typical European pattern of intra-left competition. In the period 2002-2009, for instance, the net electoral exchange between PDS/DIE LINKE and SPD marked a shift of almost 2.1 million voters toward the former (TABLE 3.11).

In 2013, however, DIE LINKE fell back roughly to the levels of 2005 with 3,755,699 votes (8.6%).

TABLE 3.11 NET ELECTORAL FLUXES

	PDS V1990	PDS 1990	PDS 1994	PDS 1998	PDS 2002	L.PDS 2005	DIE LINKE 2009	CHANGE 1990-2009
Votes	1,892,329	1,129,578	2,066,176	2,515,454	1,916,702	4,118,194	5,155,933	+4,026,355
GERMANY								
SPD		-241,000	236,000	80,000	-290,000	970,000	1,100,000	2,096,000
Greens		6,000	110,000	40,000	0	240,000	140,000	530,000
CDU-CSU		-46,000	183,000	90,000	-50,000	280,000	40,000	543,000
FDP		-66,000	109,000	10,000	-20,000	100,000	-20,000	179,000
Other		6,000	77,000	-50,000	20,000	90,000	0	137,000
VOTERS		-341,000	715,000	170,000	-340,000	1,680,000	1,260,000	3,485,000
Abstention		-440,000	153,000	190,000	-260,000	430,000	-300,000	213,000
Replacement		46,000	69,000	60,000	-40,000	80,000	30,000	199,000
Migration		-28,000	2,000	10,000	-10,000	10,000	30,000	42,000
NON VOTERS		-422,000	224,000	260,000	-310,000	520,000	-240,000	454,000
TOTAL		-763,000	939,000	430,000	-650,000	2,200,000	1,020,000	3,939,000
EAST								
SPD		-253,000	178,000	50,000	-310,000	380,000	320,000	618 000
Greens		-61,000	76,000	30,000	-10,000	30,000	30,000	156 000
CDU-CSU		-47,000	163,000	130,000	-40,000	100,000	-30,000	323 000
FDP		-69,000	94,000	10,000	-20,000	30,000	-10,000	104 000
Other		12,000	41,000	-40,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	31 000
VOTERS		-418,000	552,000	180,000	-370,000	550,000	320,000	1 232 000
Abstention		-446,000	112,000	160,000	-160,000	200,000	-330,000	- 18 000
Replacement		15,000	49,000	20,000	-50,000	20,000	-30,000	9 000
Migration		-30,000	-2,000	-20,000	-30,000	0	10,000	- 42 000
NON VOTERS		-461,000	159,000	160,000	-240,000	220,000	-350,000	- 51 000
TOTAL		-879,000	711,000	340,000	-610,000	770,000	-30,000	1 181 000
WEST								
SPD		12,000	58,000	30,000	20,000	590,000	780,000	1 478 000
Greens		67,000	34,000	10,000	10,000	210,000	110,000	374 000
CDU-CSU		1,000	20,000	-40,000	-10,000	180,000	70,000	220 000
FDP		3,000	15,000	0	0	70,000	-10,000	75 000
Other		-6,000	36,000	-10,000	10,000	80,000	-10,000	106 000
VOTERS		77,000	163,000	-10,000	30,000	1,130,000	940,000	2 253 000
Abstention		6,000	41,000	30,000	-100,000	230,000	30,000	231 000
Replacement		31,000	20,000	40,000	10,000	60,000	60,000	190 000
Migration		2,000	4,000	30,000	20,000	10,000	20,000	84 000
NON VOTERS		39,000	65,000	100,000	-70,000	300,000	110,000	505 000
TOTAL		116,000	228,000	90,000	-40,000	1,430,000	1,050,000	2 758 000

Source: My elaboration from INFAS (1990, 1994), INFRATEST DIMAP (2002, 2005, 2009).

... and limitations

Despite these undeniable successes, the radical left managed to tap only a small portion of the theoretical vacuum opened-up by the right-ward shift of the SPD. Three sets of data hint to this.

The first option is to compare of the total results of DIE LINKE to a variety of indicators for left-wing opinion. In 2009 the party obtained 5.2 million of votes, 8.3% of the total electorate (including abstentions and invalid votes). This share remained slightly lower than that of people identifying as far left or left-wing (10.6%) and less than a third of that of people supporting an expansion of the welfare state (26.5%).

The second clue is provided by an analysis of the net electoral fluxes of the SPD in the period 1998-2009 (TABLE 3.11). During that decade the SPD lost 10.2 million votes, more than half of its initial total. Only 17.6% of the losses accrued to DIE LINKE; the large majority went instead to the parties of the right (35.5%), to abstentions (24.2%), to the Greens (14.8%) and to other kinds of change (7.8%).

The third possibility is to look at the sociological composition of the radical left electorate (FIGURE 3.10). Despite the gains of the period the "natural" target constituency of the left, i.e. employed wage workers, became only marginally more likely than the rest of the population to support the radical left; the success among blue-collar workers, in particular, was not matched by the results among white-collar workers (which remained slightly below-average) and civil servants (which became more and more hostile).

All indicators suggest that the potential electoral constituency of the party remained much larger than its actual voters, particularly among people oscillating between a centre-left vote (SPD and Greens) and abstentionism.

Intepretation

The interpretation of the electoral evolution of the German radical left is fairly straightforward. The PDS first and DIE LINKE at a later stage succeeded in exploiting two representation gaps which the establishment parties were less and less able to cover: first, regionalised social cleavage in the East around the issues of socio-economic marginalisation of the former bureaucracy and of large sectors of the employed and welfare-dependent population (1990-1998); later, a nationalised social cleavage across the country around the issues of social justice and defence of the welfare state (1998-2009). Despite its limitations, it managed to expand its electoral influence and grow from a small-sized regional force to a medium-sized national challenger of the SPD.

The pre-conditions of this growth were largely not of its own making.

The gaps depended on a series of external factors over which radical left parties had no influence: German unification, general trends in political economy and the "neo-liberal" turn of the SPD after 1998. The growing socio-economic grievances of both East Germans and the Western working class were largely the result of the slow rates of economic growth of the period, a hasty unification process, deliberate state policies geared at containing wages and turning away from full-employment and redistributive aims and an overall weakness of the workers' response. The party which was best placed to benefit from these developments was the SPD, the traditional party of the working-class and of socio-economic redistribution. And, indeed, it initially did so, gaining over the period 1990-1998 4.6 million votes (7.5 percentage points) – with particularly hefty gains in the former GDR territory –and coming to power in 1998. It was only through its long period in office (1998-2009) that the party gradually squandered its left-wing credentials and alienated large sections of its lower- and middle- class support, thereby creating a significant space for the rise of other left-wing competitors.

Given their fundamental socio-economic choices, there was little that either the CDU-CSU or the SPD could do to relieve the plight of the social groups which were deserting them. Nevertheless, the extent of their losses could have been reduced by more skilful

policies. The SPD, in particular, repeatedly missed the chance of neutralising the rising competition on its left. In 1990 large sections of the SED/PDS were ready to join hands with the Eastern social democrats (SDP/SPD), but the refusal of the latter to accept former SED members prevented the further disarticulation of the newly-born PDS and provided the basis for its subsequent consolidation. In 2003-2005 the party proved excessively intransigent in its defence of the Agenda 2010 in face of a growing public opposition, thus giving the WASG an ample breathing space to emerge and consolidate. The key mistake, however, was made in 2005: instead of reviving its left-wing credential through a spell in the opposition it went on to form a grand coalition with the CDU, which resulted four years later in its lowest score ever (23.0%).

The fact that the radical left did manage to exploit, at least in part, these openings was the outcome of the interplay of both external and internal factors. Part of it depended on the behaviour of the SPD: in particular, the dogged refusal of the latter to envisage any collaboration with it at the national level helped to preserve the social and oppositional credentials of the party while minimising the blame for the failed cooperation. Part of it was the result of the 29 September 1990 sentence of the Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 82, 322) which, by introducing a temporary exception to the 5% electoral threshold (to be calculated separately for the East and for the West), enabled the PDS to acquire the crucial advantage of a representation in the national parliament. On the other hand, the core leadership group of the PDS (in particular Gregor Gysi, Lothar Bisky and the Brie brothers) can claim a significant amount of credit for this success, as it proved capable to ensure the survival of the party during the 1989-90 transition, endow it with an attractive broad left programme, preserve its unity (1990-91, 2003, 2010-2012), develop constructive relationship with the social movements (1992-1993, 2003-2005) and invest its resources in broader projects of left regroupment (1990, 2005-2007).

What prevented the German radical left from exploiting more fully the disillusionment with the traditional mass parties and, in particular, from replacing the SPD as the main left-wing party?

A first factor was the nature of the PDS as the legal successor of the SED, which inevitably connected it with the historical legacy of that discredited authoritarian

regime.[73] While the efforts of the party to critically assess the GDR experience and to distance itself from its negative aspects were sustained and broadly sincere, its opponents had an easy task in pointing out to the continuities in the biographies of party leaders and members (notably, the issue of past contacts with the Stasi) and to its tight relations with the milieu of the former bureaucracy. Although attempts to mobilise anti-communist biases against the PDS fell flat in the East they remained quite effective in the West, contributing to its highly negative image among the population (see FIGURE 3.12).[74]

A second factor was the lack of roots of the PDS in the West (Neu, 2000; Meuche-Mäker, 2005). This proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for the party which, by failing to attract any significant number of Western members and activists, always remained "spiritually, politically and socially a foreign body" in the region (Brie, 2000: 12), reaching at its peak in 1998 just 442,136 votes (1.2%). This was by no means a small achievement, as it went well beyond anything that the West German far left had done since the mid-1960s; it represented however an upper ceiling which proved impossible to break and which left little hope of benefitting from the emergence of disaffected SPD or Green voters. The creation of the WASG (2004) and the merger in DIE LINKE (2007) for the first time enabled the radical left to appear as a small but credible political force in the Western regions, and this shift led to growing electoral successes in the period 2005-2009: in general elections the party soared to almost 3 million votes (8.3%) while in regional elections it managed to cross the 5%-threshold in six of the ten Western regional parliaments. The roots of the new party, however, remained tenuous, exposing it to rapid changes in the behaviour of its little-attached recent supporters.

[73] This dimension is eviscerated at length in a highly hostile strand of scholarly (Moreau *et al.*, 1994; Moreau, 1998; Lang, 2003; Neu, 2004; Jesse & Lang, 2008) and popular (Knabe, 2008) literature.

[74] In the East, negative opinions of the party rapidly fell from 61.3% in 1991 to 43.6% in 1994, stabilising afterwards; in the West, they never fell under 62% (2008). Similarly, positive opinions of the party reached around 40% in the East (since 1994) but in the West never exceeded 11% for the PDS (2001) and 19.8% for DIE LINKE (2008). The high levels of extremely negative opinions point to the fact that the much of this rejection was not so much programmatic but rather of a more fundamental and emotive nature.

FIGURE 3.12 PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PDS, EAST/WEST



Source: my elaboration from GESIS.
Notes: opinion polls.

The key element, however, was probably what I would "weight of tradition". Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were the first to point out to the tendential "freezing" of European party systems around the cleavage structure of the 1920s; subsequent research (Rose & Urwin, 1970; Mair, 1993; Drummond, 2006) has discussed the hypothesis of a "de-freezing" since the 1980s, while confirming that "old" parties are generally fairly successful in adapting to new circumstances and that radical change does not occur but in exceptional moments of social and political crisis (e.g. the 1992-1994 crisis in Italy). In the German case, we should point out to three factors counterweighing the tendency toward the decline of the traditional parties.

First, a natural wariness of people to give up long-lasting political allegiances forged in the formative period and consolidated by the subsequent experience of an effective ideal and material representation. While undeniably little effective in securing economic growth and social welfare in the neo-liberal era, traditional parties can nevertheless still draw much delayed benefit, especially among the older age cohorts[75], from their past policies and their long-term effects.

Second, the dense networks of subcultural organisations and clienteles which the major parties created over decades are without doubt rapidly losing their political coherence, size and influence but nevertheless remain a brake against change. In the case of the SPD, the fact that almost the entirety of the leadership of the traditional workers' movement (the trade union DGB, the mass organisations AWO, VdK, SoVD, KOS and DMB, part of the cooperative umbrella DGRV) stood by the party during its recent crisis – albeit in an often critical manner – is of a great immediate and perspective political importance, as it provides a good foundation for a future recovery.

Third, by virtue of their position and resources the two main parties (CDU-CSU and SPD) are still partially able to "polarise" the competition as a choice between only two realistic programmes and candidates for chancellor, thereby rallying around them a large number of wavering potential supporters which just want to bar the way to the larger evil. Moreover, while the scope for consolidating their support while in office

[75] The share of valid votes of CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP fell by 27.7 percentage points between 1972 and 2009 (99.1% to 71.4%). The decline is however stronger among the younger generations and weaker among the older ones: -39.5 points among voters aged 18-25 (99.1% to 59.6%), -31.6 points among voters aged 45-60 (98.8% to 67.2%), -17.0 points among over-60 voters (98.9% to 81.9%).

with redistributive policies is decreasing, the parties are still able to regain part of the lost votes through a shift to the opposition. True, the emergence of stable (FDP, Greens) or potential (PDS/DIE LINKE) allies has gradually reduced their room for manoeuvre in this sense, as disaffected voters may now opt for a smaller alternative without the risk of favouring the rival camp. However, a veritable collapse of their electorates obtained only in 2005-2009, when they de-emphasised the left-right divide by entering a grand coalition. The subsequent restoration of the traditional pattern of competition is likely to at least in part make up for the lost ground.

So long as it remains a minor player with shallow civil society roots, therefore, the German radical left will be exposed to the danger of swift oscillations of its support toward the SPD (tactical voting) or toward abstentionism (disengagement). The improvement of 1990-1998 among these two categories, for instance, was almost entirely wiped out in 2002; the gains of the period 2002-2009, similarly, were partially reversed by the 2013 setback.

3.3.3 Organisational mobilisation

While the German radical left was fairly successful in expanding in the electoral dimension of the vacuum which opened up among the deceived traditional constituencies the SPD and, in the Eastern regions of the country, of the CDU (Eastern blue collar workers), the same cannot be said for the organisational dimension of the vacuum. The dense societal linkages of the German mass parties (*Volksparteien*) have been eroding more rapidly than their own electorate; this notwithstanding, the German radical left has failed to provide a solid alternative. The present paragraph is devoted to the discussion of the two key facets of this issue, party membership and social linkages.

Party membership

Like their counterparts in Western Europe, the German mass parties have suffered a strong long-term decline in their membership levels which set in during the 1980s, continued in the 1990s (with the brief exception of 1990, due to the massive influx of new Eastern members) and accelerated after 1999 (FIGURE 3.13). Over the period 1990-2011, for instance, the CDU-CSU lost 34.4% of its members and the SPD 48.1%.
Unlike the Greens, the PDS/DIE LINKE did not benefit from this situation and did even worse than its rivals, falling in absolute terms by 75.3% (from 280,882 members in 1990 to 69,458 in 2011). In terms of penetration ratios (members over voters, M/V), they thus shifted from a membership-dense (1990: 24.9%) to an intermediate (2002: 3.7%) and thin (2009: 1.5%) kind of party formation. Other radical left organisations, such as the orthodox DKP, followed the same trend.[76]

[76] According to intelligence data (Kailitz, 2004; BdI, 1991-2012), the fairly large DKP membership of the late 1980s (42,000 in 1986, 34,000 in 1989) melted away after during fall of the Soviet bloc, leaving behind only 8,000 members in 1992. After that year the decline continued at a slower but relentless pace to 3,500 in 2013.

FIGURE 3.13 MEMBERSHIP LEVELS



Source: Niedermayer (2012).

The root of these problems lay in the origins of the PDS in the mass communist party *par excellence,* the SED, which in 1988 encompassed 2.3 million members, around 18.5% of the GDR population. The initial choice to renew the party instead of dissolving it enabled the PDS to preserve a core of dedicated activists, but was followed only by a small fraction of its predecessor's members (280,882 in 1990; 131,406 in 1993). As it was, the remaining members were overwhelmingly over-50 pensioners or inactives coming from the former mid-ranking intelligentsia or bureaucracy; ordinary members deserted the party and never came back. Since 1993, thus, the main factor of the decline has been the natural process of aging and death of its initial membership. Simultaneously, their replacement with new members has been hindered by a series of factors: on the one hand, the general reluctance of the new generations of the Western European population to join political parties, which are seen as an outmoded form of political engagement and do not confer anymore the ideational (sense of purpose and community) and material (policies, patronage) benefits of the past; on the other hand, the distinctive organisational (tightly-knit small

"cells"), sociological (aged former bureaucrats) and geographical (overwhelmingly Eastern) set-up of the party, which are little welcoming and interesting for newcomers.
A very important additional factor in decline has been the existence of widespread institutionalised and informal practices of discrimination, whereby retaining or acquiring the membership of an "extreme" party such as the PDS could be highly detrimental for one's private life and career prospects. In the West, far left members were thoroughly purged from civil service by the *Radikalenerlass* of 1972 (Braunthal, 1990) and political vetting of new applicants and existing civil servants, albeit gradually loosened after 1995, remains in place in many public institutions. In the East, after the reunification the 2.1 million state employees were similarly vetted for the role they played in the fallen regime (Keller & Henneberger, 1992; McAdams, 2001; Crossley-Frolick, 2007). Although the number of people explicitly fired on political grounds, because of past collaborations with the Stasi, appears to be small – only 42,062 cases according to McAdams (2001) –, card-carrying PDS civil servants were singled-out in the waves of lay-offs, outsourcings and early retirements which rapidly downsized the Eastern public sector workforce to 1,592,546 (1991), 861,155 (2001) and 722,602 (2008) employees.[77] More generally, the party continued to be categorised as borderline "extremist" by the state authorities and therefore subjected to a constant surveillance by the federal and regional political intelligence agencies (*Verfassungsschutz*).

Despite serious efforts, these drawbacks proved to be insurmountable.
Even at times when PDS sympathisers and voters grew rapidly (1993-2001, 2003-2007), its Eastern members continued to follow an inexorable decline.
The Western branches of the radical left parties were less burdened by the legacy of the SED and did experience a general trend of modest membership growth,[78] peaking at 4,708 members (2002) in the PDS, 11,250 members (2005) in the WASG and 29,551 members (2009) in DIE LINKE. The former mostly recruited among a small and scattered far left milieu; the latter for the first time managed to create a thin layer of structures covering almost all Western administrative districts and to become attractive for significant numbers of far leftists, social movement activists and

[77] DESTATIS (2011), excluding people employed in Berlin.
[78] With the exception of the periods 2003-2004 and 2010-2012.

disaffected social democratic and green voters. The "successes", however, were of an altogether limited magnitude. First, while being more dynamic both in size and in socio-demographic composition, Western branches organised a much lower ratio of voters (PDS 1998: 0.68%; DIE LINKE 2009: 1.00%) than their Eastern counterparts. Second, their growth was generally not strong enough to compensate the decline of the rest of the party. As a consequence, total party membership increased only in 2004-2009 (from 61,385 of the PDS to 78,046 of DIE LINKE) and decline set in again afterwards, wiping out almost the entire gains of the period (64,761 members in 2012).

Societal linkages

The crisis of the traditional mass parties was not restricted to their membership decline, but also entailed a deep crisis of their traditional subcultural networks of collateral and friendly organisations (von Winter, 2007).

This process had three dimensions: (i) a *loss of members* and supporters of the party-near mass organisations; (ii) their progressive *autonomisation vis-à-vis* their traditional political references, leading to a less partisan and politicised public discourse; (iii) a *loosening of their ties* with their own memberships, reflected in their decreased capacity to command identification and to orient behaviour.

A good example is provided by the SPD-near trade union confederation. On the first account the DGB, after a momentary revival in 1991 when millions of Eastern workers swelled its ranks, suffered a dramatic membership decline, falling from 11.8 million (1991) to 6.1 million (2010) members in absolute terms and from 35.5% to 18.3% of the employed workforce in relative terms.[79] On the second account, in 2002 the confederation discontinued the traditional practice of offering an explicit voting advice for the SPD and at times (e.g. in 2003-2004) assumed fairly critical attitudes toward the latter. On the third account, the capacity of union leaders to mobilise their followers also seems to be declining. On the industrial front, in 2003 the metalworkers' union

[79] Visser (2013). As 15-20% of union members are *not* employed wage-workers (e.g. unemployed, pensioners and students), the actual share should be even lower.

suffered the first defeat in a strike in fifty years (Schmidt, 2003). On the political front, while the vast majority of union leaders and cadres are still card-carrying SPD members the same cannot be said of union members, which since 1998 have left the social democratic electorate at a faster pace than the rest of the population (from 56% in 1998 to 33.5% in 2009).

The same dynamics have been at play in the array of SPD-near charities (AWO), specialised associations (VdK, SoVD, DMB, KOS), companies (part of the DGRV cooperative movement, the party press) and other friendly networks and organisations – which encompass several hundred thousands of professional and semi-professional collaborators and several million members.

The German radical left, despite its electoral surge, was not able to expand its positions within civil society and social movement organisations and to become a serious competitor of the SPD in this domain. The network of organisational linkages of the PDS was largely destroyed in 1989-1991; subsequent efforts at strengthening the ties with existing or new civil society organisations had real but limited positive results.

The gigantic network of mass organisations controlled by the SED largely dissolved itself or merged with their Western counterparts, completely escaping to the influence of the PDS and aligning with the new dominant parties CDU and SPD. In particular, the influence of the party among the organised labour movement was shattered by the consequences of revolution and of unification (Wilke & Müller, 1991; Loeding & Rosenthal, 2001). The only notable exception was the charity Volkssolidarität (Winkler, 2010), which adopted a cross-party stance but remained politically quite close to the PDS. Although rapidly declining (853,000 members in 1991; 538,000 in 1994; 276,000 in 2009), the organisation remained a social and economic powerhouse and gradually came to dominate the German confederation of non-confessional charities (Der Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband, DPW).

The PDS did manage to forge close links with a series of new organisations created to represent the interests and ideals of the former socialist bureaucracy (e.g. the ISOR), which were strategically important for their dense legal and cultural work but never gathered more than 40,000 members. Outside this milieu, the efforts of the party

tended to fall flat. Friendly Eastern civil society organisations[80] remained fairly small and little influential. Networks set up by the party to spearhead specific mobilisations also tended to be little successful and failed to institutionalise themselves into significant social movement organisations. In 1992 the party created together with a group of political and social notables the *Komitees für Gerechtigkeit* to protest against the socio-economic plight of the former GDR, but the organisation was wound up before the end of the year (Fieber & Reichmann, 1995). In 1997 personalities from various strands of the German left (SPD, Greens, PDS, DKP and independents) came together to sign the *Erfurter Erklärung,* calling for a united front of all left-wing parties, a common left-Keynesian programme and a strong extra-parliamentary movement (Dahn, 1997). The declaration gathered 45,000 signatures and led to the establishment of a DGB-linked coordination (*Aufstehen für eine andere Politik*) and to the organisation of a mid-sized demonstration in Berlin (60,000 participants); the momentum, however, did not survive the 1998 election and the coming to power of the centre-left. Finally, the influence of the party within the old West German (now all-German) civil society organisations remained very low. In particular, the sharp rise of the sympathy of Eastern unionised workers toward the party after 1992 did not translate into significant gains within the union apparatus, which remained solidly controlled by the SPD. Only in Thüringen was the PDS able to win the confidence of some high-level union cadres[81].

The emergence of the WASG represented a gain of a significant number of trade union, social movement and political activists. However, their influence was largely limited to the smallish alter-globalisation galaxy.[82] The WASG played a key role in the various coordinating bodies of the 2003-2004 protests against the Agenda 2010, but these failed to coalesce into permanent social movement organisations. Within the trade union movement, supporters of the new party remained fairly isolated and limited to low- or mid- ranking positions. Within other SPD-near organisations, which in the

[80] Such as the city gardening association VKSG, the unemployed association ALV and the handicapped association ABID.

[81] Such as the DGB chairman Frank Spieth (1992-2006) and the HBV chairman Bodo Ramelow (1992-1999).

[82] ATTAC Deutschland, for instance, had only 14,001 members in March 2004. While refusing to formally align itself with the new party, the organisation maintained a strong informal proximity to the WASG (ATTAC, 2005; Speth, 2006: 96). Other alter-globalist organisations which became quite close to the WASG or the PDS (the pacifist DFG-VK, the academic BdWI, the far left Turkish/Kurdish GDF and DIDF) had altogether less than that number of members.

period 2003-2009 showed heavy signs of dissatisfaction toward the party (SoVD, VdK, DMB), the WASG made practically no inroads.

DIE LINKE inherited the organisational linkages of its predecessors and experienced a certain growth of its civil society roots. However, its influence among the leaders and cadres of mass organisations still remains feeble, much weaker than its electoral influence and much smaller than that of the SPD, which continued to command the (more or less critical) allegiance of large majority of left-leaning civil society organisations. The example of the trade union movement is indicative. While 17.1% of trade union members voted for DIE LINKE in 2009 (32.1% in the East, ahead of the CDU and SPD), the 1,805 union cadres who signed the appeal "*Wir wählen links!*" almost exclusively consisted of low-ranking officials[83] and the doors of top union organs remained closed to card-carrying LINKE supporters[84]. As far as social movement networks were concerned, the party played a central role in the 2007 G8 counter-summit at Heiligendamm and in the post-2009 anti-crisis protests (*Wir zahlen nicht für eure Krise!* in 2009-2010 and *Blockupy* in 2012-2013) but, as for previous experiments, no notable organisational legacy was left once the movement ebbed.

[83] The only high-ranking figures were Renate Licht (secretary of the DGB sub-district of Thüringen) and two retired unionists: Horst Schmitthenner, for two decades member of the IG-Metall executive (1989-2009), and Sybille Stamm, secretary of the Ver.di district of Baden-Württenberg (2001-2007).

[84] The 5-person DBG executive, for instance, was composed by three SPD, one CDU and one Green member. The larger executives of individual trade unions did not include any single LINKE member either, although Hans-Jürgen Urban of the IG-Metall was broadly sympathetic toward the party.

3.3.4 Conclusions

The German radical left was fairly successful in filling the electoral vacuum left by the neo-liberal shift of traditional mass parties (SPD and CDU-CSU).

In the 1990s the PDS consolidated its support among the downward-mobile former Eastern bureaucracy, markedly improved its image and results among other Eastern social strata (workers, inactives, employees) and saturated the small Western far left opinion. A key obstacle preventing it from becoming a credible contender to the SPD, i.e. the lack of any organisational root in the West, was removed in the period 2003-2007. The unpopularity of Schröder's labour market reforms and the massive wave of protest which followed them provoked the emergence of a small but significant new radical left group (the WASG) and the defection of important social democratic figures (Oskar Lafontaine). The alliance (2005) and subsequent merger (2007) of the two parties in DIE LINKE created the best possible conditions for filling the representation gap between mainstream parties and their traditional working-class and welfarist constituencies, and the results met or even exceeded the expectations.

Altogether, in the period 1990-2009 the German radical left gained more than four million votes, soaring from 1.9% to 8.3% of the total electorate and from 2.4% to 11.9% of valid votes. Although this rise did not fully compensate for the post-1998 collapse of the SPD and was somewhat fragile, as the 2002 and 2013 setbacks clearly proved, the electoral balance-sheet was nothing short of extraordinary.

However, the gains obtained at the levels of generic sympathy and voting behaviour did not spill over to the level of organised social strength (FIGURE 3.14).

The overall membership of the PDS/DIE LINKE collapsed up to 2004 and barely grew afterwards, as the gains in the West were largely wiped out by the continued decline in the East. The radical left thus remained dwarfed by the SPD which, while in crisis, still organised more than half a million members.

FIGURE 3.14 INDICATORS OF influence



Notes: share of the total electorate. Sympathisers: people declaring a proximity with the party (GESIS polls).

The influence among civil society organisations and social movements experienced a moderate growth since the historical trough of 1990-1991, when the PDS was faced with an overwhelming hostility outside the milieu of the former GDR bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the sympathy won among left-wing activists in the 1990s and above all in the 2000s remained limited to small radical circles (e.g. the pacifist and alter-globalist movement) and little influential currents (e.g. strands of the union left), while the bulk of civil society and social movement cadres tended to confirm an (albeit critical) allegiance to the traditional parties (SPD, CDU and to a less extent Greens).

3.4 Explaining radical left regroupment

As already remarked, one of the peculiarity of the development of the German radical left was its organisational unity. Instead of suffering from a destructive competition between different organisations (as in France) or from successive debilitating splits (as in Italy), the PDS managed to preserve its hegemonic status on the radical left spectrum and even to initiate significant waves of radical left regroupment, absorbing important far left and left-social democratic currents. How was this possible?

This achievement can be explained by the interplay of a series of socio-political, institutional, relational and subjective factors.

The pre-conditions for the processes of regroupment of the German radical left were provided by a series of socio-political factors: (i) the post-1989 crisis of the radical left, which reduced the salience of many of the old dividing lines, favoured processes of opening and renewal and encouraged the pooling together of strengths and resources; (ii) the neo-liberal transformation of the SPD, which left increasing sectors of its traditional intellectual, working-class and welfarist constituencies in search of alternatives; (iii) the dynamics of left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisation which, unlike in most European countries, reached their peak in a protracted wave of protest on social issues and against a seating centre-left government (2003-2005).

Further incentives to radical left regroupment and safeguards against party splits were provided by institutional and relational factors: (iv) the electoral system, which discouraged splits and new party formations and encouraged the collaboration of disparate currents to overcome the 5% electoral threshold; (v) the attitude of potential allies; by excluding the PDS from the participation to national cabinets and limiting its involvement at the regional level, the SPD defused the conflict between conciliatory and intransigent tendencies and helped to preserve the anti-neoliberal credential of the PDS in the eyes of its core electorate.

A final subjective factor was nevertheless crucial: (vi) the non-sectarian and farsighted attitude of the major player, the PDS, which proved capable to create a working framework ensuring to prospective allies large political autonomy and generous material incentives.

The first two factors are common to the all Western European countries and constitute the main drivers of the general tendency to craft, from the ruins of the 20th century orthodox, euro-communist and far left organisations, new "broad left" formations[85] able to appeal to the traditional communist constituency, to the disaffected social democratic supporters and to newly-politicised layers of the population. In this matter the German case has no claim to exceptionality.

The third factor, on the other hand, played a vital role in provoking the break-away *to* the radical left of a small number of former social democratic cadres[86] and the emergence of the WASG. Although the contemporary radical left has assiduously courted left-wing social democratic tendencies, results have tended to be little forthcoming. The case of the WASG remains to this day one of the few examples, and arguably the most successful one, of left-ward splits of the European social democratic party family.[87] The explanation of this outcome lies precisely in the fact that discontent toward the neo-liberal turn of the SPD was magnified and accompanied by a long cycle of public protest and mass mobilisation against its policies in government, while in other countries anti-neoliberal protests have tended to flare up against right-wing cabinets and abate when the left is in office.

The lack of any significant split *from* the radical left, both to its left and to its right, and the non-emergence of notable competitors had on the other hand much to do with the effect of institutional factors.

---

[85] The most important examples of this pattern are the Spanish Izquierda Unida (1986), the Greek Synaspismos, the Dutch GroenLinks, the Danish Enhedslisten and the German Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (1989), the Swedish Vänsterpartiet and the Finnish Vasemmistoliitto (1990), the Italian Partito della Rifondazione Comunista and Partito Democratico della Sinistra (1991), the Dutch Socialistische Partij (1990s), the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda (1999), the Greek SYRIZA (2004), the German DIE LINKE (2007) and the French Front de Gauche (2009). A few of them (Dutch GL and Italian PDS) later abandoned the radical left party family.

[86] Oskar Lafontaine and some second- and third- rank politicians and unionists (Ulrich Maurer, Frank Spieth, Klaus Ernst, Thomas Händel).

[87] Other examples are the French MDC/MRC (1993), the Greek DIKKI (1995), the French PG (2009), the shift of former PASOK politicians to SYRIZA (2012) and the shift of former PDS politicians to the PRC (all along); in the latter case, however, all forces involved (Lucio Magri, Pietro Ingrao, Aldo Tortorella, Piero Folena, Cesare Salvi) had a communist background.

The political isolation to which the SPD subjected the PDS first and DIE LINKE later helped to cement its cohesion and hegemony on the radical left. Right-leaning tendencies could hardly hope to find a welcoming environment within the traditional centre-left parties, where justified hostility toward the SED, more questionable anti-communist instincts and competitive rivalries ran deep.[88] Left-leaning tendencies, on the other hand, for the same reason lacked serious political reasons to leave. As the PDS and DIE LINKE appeared to support a radical and coherent anti-neoliberal programmatic and their involvement in experiences of governmental participation was limited to a few regions, the establishment of a more radical competitor would necessarily appear as incomprehensible to both voters and activists, as electoral results repeatedly proved.[89] Moreover, the fact that the party was never posed in front of the hard choice of supporting a minority centre-left government at the national level (in 2005 the SPD ruled out this option and in all other elections its votes were never needed) further helped to minimise the possibility of defections and splits.

The effects of the electoral system, similarly, provided a large incentive to pool together the strength of each organisation and sensibility with the aim of overcoming the 5%-threshold and obtaining parliamentary representation. In fact, through the alliance with the PDS even tiny radical left groups could hope to obtain national, regional and local elected representatives[90]; conversely, by going alone the chances were near to nil. This represented the most important factor in explaining the magnetic pull of the PDS on other radical left forces, the success of the alliance and merger with the WASG and the absence of any significant party split.

Finally, the central leadership of the PDS proved remarkably flexible and skilful in encouraging the coexistence of different tendencies within a unified framework and enticing potential partners to join.

---

[88] The initial refusal of the Eastern SDP (the initial name of the social democratic party of the GDR) to accept former SED members, and notably the important PDS faction of Wolfgang Berghofer, marked the tone of the relationship. While a few high-profile PDS politicians later switched to the SPD (Angela Marquardt in 2008, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann in 2009), they did it individually and with meagre personal and political rewards.

[89] Both orthodox and movementist challenges to the party had desultory electoral outcomes. The situation could be different at the local level, when radical challenges to unpopular SPD-PDS regional governments had more space to emerge. The dissident Berlin branch of the WASG, for instance, obtained a decent 2.9% of valid votes in 2006.

[90] This applied both to Western leftists (e.g. Ulla Jelpke, Winfried Wolf and Eva Bulling-Schröter) in the period 1990-2002 and to former WASG members in the post-2005 period.

First of all, the ideological and organisational renewal of the party was organised from the start on open, pluralistic and tolerant "broad left" bases which were conducive to the coexistence and integration of the widest possible spectrum of different political traditions and sensibilities. Organised factions[91] and thematic groups[92] were allowed official recognition and granted political and financial resources; formal and informal tendencies[93] were involved inclusively in the decision-making process and in the allocation of internal and public offices; individual and group dissent[94] was amply tolerated. As the party provided a favourable living and working environment to a wide range of positions, it reduced the incentives to split and formed a powerful pole of attraction toward smaller (mainly far left) organisations and (former far left, SPD or Green members) individuals. Secondly, each internal crisis (in 1989-91, around the dissolution of the SED; in 2002-2003 and in 2010-12 around the relationship with the SPD; in 2006, around governmental participation in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) or problem (the drawn-out conflict with the neo-Stalinist KPF in 1993-2003) was ultimately settled with compromise solutions which discouraged the departure of the defeated wing. Thirdly, the party was prepared to make enormous concessions to prospective partners. Although the Linke Liste/PDS project (Meuche-Mäker, 2005: 15-16; Eckhoff, 2005; Neugebauer & Stöss, 1996: 46) in 1990 was an abysmal failure, the Western leftists who subsequently joined the PDS were raised to positions absolutely disproportionate to their weight on the ground. In 2005-2007, the alliance and merger with the WASG (Heunemann, 2006; Spier *et al.,* 2007; Olsen, 2007;

[91] In the PDS, formalised factions (*Plattformen*) tended to emerge only during periods of heated internal battle and disband or lose significance afterwards: *Plattform 3. Weg, Plattform WF, Plattform Demokratischer Sozialismus, Sozialdemokratische Plattform* and *Kommunistische Plattform* in the period 1989-1991; *Geraer Dialog* (GD)*, Forum Zweite Erneuerung* (F2E) and *Netzwerk ReformLinke* (NRL) in the period 2002-2003. In DIE LINKE, on the other hand, old and new factions – *Kommunistische Plattform* (KPF)*, Sozialistische Linke* (SL)*, Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus* (FDS) – assumed a permanent character and a more central place.

[92] Thematic groups (*Zusammenschlüsse,* also called *Arbeitsgemeinschaften, AG*) reached the maximum number of 31 in the PDS (2004) and 20 in DIE LINKE (2012).

[93] Beyond the above-mentioned formal factions, many looser sensibilities existed. Within the PDS, Brie (1995, 2000) identified four main groupings (reformist socialists; reformist pragmatics; orthodox socialists and radical democrats) while Behrend (2006) focused on the conflict between a leadership-based "right-wing", a membership-based "centre" and a fragmented "left" (KPF, Marxistisches Forum, Western leftists). Within DIE LINKE, internal debate was structured around formal and semi-formal – *Antikapitalistische Linke* (AKL), *Netzwerk ReformLinke* (NRL) and *Emanzipatorische Linke* (Ema.Li.) – factions and other informal groupings (e.g. former PDS vs. former WASG, Western radicals vs. Eastern moderates).

[94] From 1999 to 2012, for instance, only three expulsions of members were ever confirmed by the internal arbitration court. Similarly, the presence of outspoken oppositional groups (e.g. the orthodox KPF or Trotskyist entryist organisations) was sometimes attacked but ultimately always accepted.

Hough *et al.,* 2007; Lees *et al.,* 2010; Ernst *et al.,* 2012; Patton, 2013) was similarly eased by an array of safeguards which boosted the influence of the smaller partner and gave it a long-term equal say in the life of the future party.

In conclusion, so long as DIE LINKE will remain in the comfortable position of being a parliamentary party excluded from national government, no significant change in the level of radical left fragmentation is to be expected. On the other hand, a change in the attitude of the SPD would inevitably expose it to the key dilemma of the contemporary radical left and fuel the kind of relational-based fragmentation between conciliatory and intransigent currents which is typical of other European countries (most evidently in France, Italy and Denmark).

3.5 The strategy of left-ward pull

In the previous section I have dissected in detail some key elements of the evolution of the contemporary German radical left: the development of the different dimensions of its societal weight; the success of a strategy of growth based on the exploitation of the representation gaps opening between traditional parties and growing sections of their social constituencies; the preservation of its cohesion and the results of successive waves of regroupment. The final missing element of the analysis is an assessment of the strategy connecting immediate activity, mid-term anti-neoliberal and long-term anti-capitalist goals.

The German radical left chose to follow, particularly since the mid-1990s, a variant of what I define as a *strategy of mixed left-ward pull,* which can be schematically summarised in three steps.[95] In the short term, party activity was geared to a double aim: sustaining the growth of their overall societal weight and affecting the broader social and ideological balance of forces. In the mid-term, this combination of friendly and hostile, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures was supposed to affect the course of the moderate left parties (SPD and Greens) and force them to undertake a left turn. This would create the conditions for the establishment of a progressive centre-left alliance, its electoral victory and a policy shift away from neo-liberalism (*Politikwechsel*). In the long-term, the successful incremental implementation of progressive reforms would lead the way toward a deeper kind of social transformation toward a democratic socialist society.

Was this strategy coherent, and what were its results?

[95] For clear formulations see the late programmes of the parties (PDS, 2003; DIE LINKE, 2005, 2007 and 2011) and the reflections of the party-near thinkers Michael Brie (2000, 2003 and 2007) and Ralf Krämer (2004).

3.5.1 Party efforts

Several kinds of pressure can be analytically distinguished in the activity of the parties of the German radical left.

The first element was the pressure on the political system exerted by the electoral growth of the party and its possible influence on the "direction of competition" (Sartori, 1976). As I have already shown in section 3.3, the German radical left did follow an overall path of electoral growth. Until 2004, however, the threat was limited by the medium-small size of the PDS, by its inability to expand in the Western areas of the country and by the composition of its gains (which damaged the centre-right parties equally or more than the centre-left ones). It was only after that date that DIE LINKE came to represent a direct and serious competitor for the SPD.

The second element was the pressure on prospective allies exerted by means of electoral, parliamentary and governmental alliances. The overview in section 3.2 has clarified that this tool, while often being a distinct eventuality in the run-up of general elections (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2013), became relevant only once, during the 2005-2009 legislature. Since 2005, however, the electoral growth of DIE LINKE drastically reduced the chances of the traditional centre-left parties (SPD and Greens) to ever obtain an autonomous parliamentary majority, increasing the urgency of a rethinking of their coalition policy (Switek, 2010; Raschke & Tils, 2010). Moreover, while insisting on its primarily oppositional outlook, the German radical left consistently signalled its openness to bargain its support in exchange for policy concessions, thus further impelling its potential allies to change.

The third element was the broader pressure exerted by public debate, alliance-building and extra-parliamentary activities on the ideological and social balance of forces. While the radical left was fairly isolated within the party system, it could find several allies on specific issues and social mobilisations, notably East German interests, pacifism and the defence of the welfare state.

A direct dialogue with the internal left-wing tendencies of the SPD and of the Greens was repeatedly undertaken, concretising in intellectual collaborations such as the first *Crossover* project (1993-1999), the *Erfurter Erklärung* and its follow-ups (1997-2000), the second *Crossover* debate (2007-2009) and the *Institut Solidarische Moderne* (2010-present).[96] This kind of activity had however little political repercussions.

The experiences of local governmental collaboration also helped to improve the acceptance of the party and the quality of the left-left dialogue, but proved to be a double-edged sword. Given the relative strength of radical and moderate left and the institutional and budgetary constraints of regions and communes, more often than not this kind of cooperation tended to de-radicalise the former rather than to radicalise the latter. In particular, the red-red coalitions in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and in Berlin significantly damaged the credibility of the PDS as a coherent anti-neoliberal force, as they forced it to accept significant cuts of the local welfare and to enable the approval of significant counter-reforms in the *Bundesrat*.[97]

The involvement within social mobilisations, on the other hand, was more significant. Although neither the PDS and the WASG nor DIE LINKE had the capabilities to initiate or sustain large-scale protests and campaigns, as they lacked both a mass membership and the proximity of mass civil society and social movement organisations (see section 3.3.3), they did play an important role in three of the five major cycles of contentious politics which have emerged in the country over the period 1989-2012 (1992-1993; 1997-1998; 2002-2005), in other important contentious events (e.g. the 2007 G8 counter-summit at Heiligendamm) and in a multiplicity of less prominent struggles and campaigns.

The latter element is worth a more detailed discussion.

The first and most important wave was the 1989-1990 peaceful revolution in the German Democratic Republic (Lohmann, 1994; Gehrke & Hürtgen, 2001; Dale, 2006). The mobilisation of millions of citizens in gigantic demonstrations, direct actions and labour conflicts dealt a death blow to the ruling Communist regime, forcing it to sweeping reforms and ultimately forcing its removal from office. The PDS played here

[96] See http://www.sf-rheinland.de/crossover and http://www.solidarische-moderne.de/.
[97] Behrend (2006: 96-118), Hildebrandt and Brie (2006).

an ambiguous role, being both the main target of the protesters and an actor of renewal, which self-reformed and accompanied the process of democratic transition (Gysi & Falkner, 1990; Segert, 2008 and 2009). Altogether, these efforts were mainly perceived as insincere and the outcome of the revolution left the party in tatters, enfeebled and politically isolated.

The second wave was the 1992-1993 movement against the negative repercussions of the unification process (Abromeit, 1992; Roesler, 1994; Garms, 1994; Fieber & Reichmann, 1995; Gehrke, 1997). Mass unemployment and the de-industrialisation policy of the *Treuhandanstalt* came particularly under fire, resulting in a proliferation of local strikes, occupations, demonstrations and hunger strikes. Some attempts to coordinate the protests were made (the *Komitees für Gerechtigkeit* and the *Ostdeutsche Initiative der Betriebs- und Personalräte*) but the movement failed to gain the support of mainstream parties and trade unions and slowly died out in a swarm of localised defeats or settlements. While little successful in industrial terms, the movement had a significant impact on the political climate, contributing to a long-lasting shift of the East German electorate away from the CDU and toward the PDS and SPD.

The third (and smaller) wave was represented by the disparate anti-Kohl mobilisations of unemployed, students, leftists and trade unionists in 1997-1998 (Dahn, 1997; Brandt, 1998; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; Himpele, 2009). Often explicitly conceived as or bent to the needs of the upcoming electoral campaign, the protests were smallish and little effective but offered an important contribution to the subsequent victory of the centre-left coalition and to the acceptance of the PDS as a peculiar but viable left-wing corrective.

The fourth wave covered the years 2002-2005 and was characterised by a generalised revival of social movements. The most important struggle was the one against the AGENDA 2010/HARTZ IV labour market reform of the Schröder government, which brought to the streets hundreds of thousands of people for a whole summer of decentralised "Monday demonstrations", several central marches and a host of smaller protest actions (Rucht & Yang, 2004; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; Rink & Phillips, 2007; De Grazia *et al.*, 2007; Burger, 2008). But labour (Schmidt, 2003), pacifist (Walgrave & Rucht, 2010) and alter-globalist (Rucht & Roth, 2008) struggles were prominent as well. Despite their sometimes impressive proportions all mobilisations

ended without tangible results but had a large political resonance, providing the foundations for the rapid electoral growth of the radical left (Nachtwey & Spier, 2007) and for a significant shift to the left of the public opinion.

The fifth and final wave covered on the period 2009-2011 and was opened by anti-crisis and student protests (Hildebrandt & Tügel, 2010; Kolisang, 2013) and continued with massive environmental mobilisations (Rose, 2010; Schlager, 2010; Brettschneider & Schuster, 2013). Unlike most of their predecessors, these were partially successful, leading for instance to the abolition of university tuition fees in all but one region and to a confirmation of the phasing out of nuclear energy by 2022. While DIE LINKE benefitted from the early phase of the cycle, its late phase favoured on the other hand Greens and SPD.

To sum up, most of the period of this analysis (1992-2009) was characterised by medium-sized social mobilisations developing on favourite radical left issues. This fact helped the PDS, the WASG and DIE LINKE to enhance their public profile and electoral influence of the radical left, thereby raising the pressure on the moderate left parties to modify its policy outlook.

It is therefore clear from the above-mentioned discussion that the various kinds of pressure exerted by the radical left on the German political system were significant but limited, becoming truly worrying only after 2004. It was only in this latter period that the radical left managed to break through the boundaries of the former German Democratic Republic, to acquire a mid-sized electoral and extra-parliamentary weight, to turn into an attractive alternative for the centre-left electorate and to become a key player for the success of a left parliamentary alternation.

3.5.2 Systemic effects

Did the pressures of the radical left succeed in exerting a left-ward pull on German politics and society? Three kinds of effects must be distinguished: (i) effects on non-governmental actors; (ii) effects on official governmental policies; (iii) effects on the programmatic outlook of political parties, in particular the moderate left ones (SPD and Greens).

On the first account, the activity of the radical left had practically no effect. Within the workplaces, for instance, radical left activists were few, devoid of a coherent strategy of intervention and little influential. Thus, the growth of the sympathy toward the radical left failed to produce positive effects on the terrain of unmediated class struggle: labour militancy remained very low, union density continued to fall and working conditions (wages, contracts, unemployment and precarious jobs) significantly worsened.

On the second account, the pressures of the radical left had little direct effect but may have had some indirect one. What is certain is that its mobilisation failed to prevent implementation of the key counter-reforms of the period (e.g. the privatisations of the early 1990s and the AGENDA 2010 labour market reform), did not produce any explicit policy concession and did not stop or reverse the overall trend toward neo-liberalisation. On the other hand, it may have contributed to prevent heavier setbacks and produce more covert forms of compensation.

On the third account, finally, the growth of the radical left had some repercussion on the broader political debate, raising the profile of its core issues, but has so failed to produce a clear turn to the left of the party system. The SPD, in particular, continues to cling to the legacy of the Schröder government and to reject the idea of a broad centre-left coalition with the Greens and DIE LINKE. While the electoral defeat of 2005 did not bring about any change of course, the much larger defeat of 2009 did however produce some rethinking and repositioning, strengthening the weight of the internal left and leading to the adoption of some minimal but clear left-wing proposals (such as a € 8,50 minimum wage).

Altogether, the idea of a wide-ranging turn of the moderate left from neo-liberal to neo-Keynesian policies appears as a far-fetched and uncertain prospect. There are two possible explanations for this outcome.

The first one is grounded on the insufficient level of the radical left pressures. At its peak in 1998, the PDS represented only about 5% of the valid votes and a mere hypothetical threat to the governmental prospects of the SPD, which could reasonably

hope to see it miss the electoral threshold (as it indeed happened in 2002) or to offset the losses by winning new centrist votes. Since 2005, when DIE LINKE turned into a much more insidious competitor, tangible results remained scarce but some doubts and cracks in the outlook of the mainstream parties began to appear. It is therefore certainly possible that the failure was due to a lack of electoral and extra-parliamentary weight and that, though a further growth, the outcome would be different.

The evidence, however, also points to an extreme reluctance of the SPD and more in general of the Western European "new" social democracy to effectively renege on their current policy outlook. The roots of their neo-liberal shift seem to run much deeper than mere electoral expediency, having become constitutive to the nature of those parties and very resistant to any prospect of "re-socialdemocratisation". The testing of such a hypothesis lies beyond the scope of the present research; the case of Greece however lends it a significant *prima facie* credibility, as even the combination of a huge electoral shift to the left (with the radical left soaring 31.9% of valid votes and the PASOK collapsing to 12.2%) and unprecedented social mobilisations has so far failed to produce a fundamental turnaround within the Greek socialist party.

3.5.3 Conclusions

Despite a successful intensification of its pressure on the German political system, the radical left has so far failed to move closer to the intermediate step of its strategy – breaking the hegemony of neo-liberalism and paving the way for a political change of direction. Its activity remains predominantly propagandistic and incapable to overcome the threshold of effectiveness, winning tangible concessions for its own core constituency and proving its usefulness in the eyes of broader social layers.

3.6 Conclusions

The post-1989 evolution of the German radical left represents a fairly successful example within the Western European panorama. Its careful analysis, however, reveal a more nuanced picture of lights and shades.

On the positive side, this political area followed a trajectory of almost uninterrupted electoral growth which pushed it from 1.1 million (1990) to 5.2 million (2009) valid votes. It preserved its organisational cohesion and successfully aggregated around the PDS successive layers of far left activists, new and non-voters and disgruntled centre-left supporters. And it enriched the terms of the public debate, providing a visible political representation to themes (the specificity of the Eastern regions, social justice, pacifism, critique of capitalism) and interests (the former GDR bureaucracy, unemployed and employed wage workers, the strata benefitting most from the welfare state) which had tended to become increasingly neglected by the mainstream parties.

On the negative side, however, it proved unable to translate this growth into tighter and more effective forms of allegiance and mobilisation. Its activists and members continued to shrink, its influence within civil society and social movement organisations remained low and its capacity to launch or steer significant extra-parliamentary campaigns was limited. Moreover, its attempts to exert a left-ward pull on the political system yielded little tangible results. Finally, its electoral gains did make up only a small section of the losses of the moderate left parties and remained vulnerable to the dangers of de-mobilisation and tactical voting, as the deceiving results of the 2002 and 2013 general elections clearly proved.

In a nutshell, both the growth potential and the capacity of influence of the radical left seem to ultimately run up against insurmountable ceilings, linked to internal (organisational, strategic and political) shortcomings and external (material and ideological) constraints. Neoliberal policies are increasingly questioned and contested, but no credible perspective of an alternative is on the agenda. The "new" SPD is weakened, but its electoral, institutional and extra-parliamentary hegemony on the

left remains solid. The radical left is an effective thermometer of these trends, but is not yet able to become the protagonist of their reversal.

CHAPTER FOUR. THE ITALIAN RADICAL LEFT: THE STORY OF A FAILURE?

4.1 The national context

The contemporary Italian radical left can boast exceptionally strong historical roots and its post-1989 development made it a far from marginal force within Italian and European politics. On the one hand its electoral and parliamentary weight, although fluctuating around mid-range levels well below the successes of other Western European counterparts (e.g. Greece, Portugal and France), was big enough to make it a vital element for the formation of centre-left majorities and entrusted it with a disproportionate amount of governmental weight at both regional and national levels. On the other hand its major party, the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC), has played a key role for the reorientation of the European radical left, both as a role model and as a liaison agent.[98]

Despite its promising beginnings, however, the Italian radical left has failed to consolidate its positions and has progressively fallen prey to strategic helplessness, damaging splits, growing fragmentation and a recent (post-2008) severe drop in support and overall influence.

In the present chapter I will chart the evolution of the parties of the Italian radical left and explain the reasons of their weaknesses and of ultimate failure.

[98] For instance, in the establishment of the transnational Party of the European Left (2004) and in the coordination of the alter-globalist movement (1999-2004). In particular, the PRC was the only political party in the world to be allowed to sign the final declaration of the first World Social Forum in 2001 and was instrumental in organising its largest European mobilisations (the Genoa counter-summit in 2001 and the Florence European Social Forum in 2002).

Historical challenges

The societal context of the period 1989-2012 was marked by a series of wide-ranging shifts and turbulences, to which the Italian radical left struggled to respond adequately. A detailed analysis of the socio-economic, institutional and political transformations of the last 25 years will be carried out in SECTION 4.3. The four main developments were the progressive degradation of the productive/macroeconomic conditions of Italian capitalism, the neo-liberalisation of the state and of public policies, the crisis and reconfiguration of the political system and the shift of the majority of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from Eurocommunism toward a peculiar variation of the "new" or "market" social democracy.

Economically, the country suffered and proved unable to measure up to the challenges of global competition, European integration and the progressive weakening of its traditional competitive advantages and support mechanisms (low wages, state ownership and subsidies, deficit-spending, currency devaluations). Real gross domestic product growth declined from the high levels of the 1960s and 1970s to paltry ones in the 1990s and 2000s and collapsed after 2008. Most large companies, with the partial exception of the banking system and of the "pocket multinationals" (Colli, 2002), struggled to withstand international competition and were often forced to downsize or to sell to foreign groups. Who suffered most was the Italian working class: in the period 1993-2009 unemployment remained high (9.1%); real wages stagnated (yearly +0.2%); large swathes of the young and not-so-young potential workforce had to resort to the precarious conditions of informal employment and of the new atypical contracts introduced by labour market reforms; welfare provisions for the unemployed and for the poor remained patchy and mostly delegated to the support of the enlarged family.

At the level of the political system, the early Nineties swept away the established actors, rules and patterns of competition of the so-called "First Republic" (1945-1992)

and gave way to the unstable set-up of the so-called "Second Republic" (1994-2011).[99] The traditional mass political parties were superseded by new ones with shallower social roots; the existing non-selective proportional representation was replaced by an electoral system with strong elements of disproportionality and incentives to the establishment of pre-electoral governmental coalitions; the regime of blocked competition (a permanent centrist majority of the DC and its allies) gave way to a prevailing pattern of bi-polar alternation between broad centre-left and right-wing alliances (with frequent interludes of transitional technocratic cabinets)[100]. In the early 2010s, however, the system teetered again on the brink of collapse, perhaps anticipating the transition to a new "Third Republic".

This political transition was accompanied by a deeper transformation of the role of the state from dirigisme to neo-liberalism. As in other Western European countries, this adjustment did not mean a significant *reduction* of the economic centrality of the state within capitalist reproduction[101] but rather the retreat from a direct productive role and a change of the means and goals of its intervention. This shift, however, represented a veritable earthquake which largely dismantled the large state-owned sector (privatisations and liberalisations), revolutionised the labour market, public services and welfare provisions (especially pensions) and entrenched important elements of free-market competition, budgetary restraint, financialisation and commodification.

The Italian Communist Party, finally, set on a course of wide-ranging modernisation and progressive drift to the right. In the early 1990s it renamed itself Party of the Democratic Left (PDS), joined the Socialist International, aggressively supported the majoritarian reform of the electoral law and unsuccessfully sought to come to power at the head of a broad *left-wing* alliance. After 1995 it cut a deal with large sections of the old establishment, joined a broad *centre-left* alliance and became the main actor

[99] See Gundle and Parker (1996) and Grilli di Cortona (2007). Unlike in France, the definition does not indicate a wide-ranging constitutional change. The shift of 1992-1994 interested the electoral legislation, the units of the political system (parties) and the dynamics of competition but the formal constitutional framework, the form of state and the form of government did not change.
[100] Amato I (1992-1993), Ciampi (1993-1994), Dini (1995-1996), Monti (2011-2012).
[101] In the period 1993-2009 state revenues (45.2% of GDP), expenditures (49.1% of GDP) and gross debt (110.8% of GDP) remained at historical peak levels.

and supporter of the pro-European neo-liberal modernisation of the country; it also merged with smaller left-wing forces in the Left Democrats (DS). In the mid-2000s, finally, it merged with its Christian democratic and centrist allies into generic centre-left vessels: the Olive Tree Federation (FED) in 2004 and the Democratic Party (PD) in 2007 (Bordandini *et al.,* 2008).

Radical left responses

All these developments represented dramatic setbacks for the traditional interests, values and projects of the left-wing constituency. At the same time, the swift right-ward drift of the political system could reasonably be expected to create a sizeable political vacuum on the left, offering interesting opportunities of recovery and expansion to renewed radical left partisan organisations. As I will show in section 4.3, these hopes were not entirely unfounded but at the same time proved to be overly optimistic. The attempts of the radical left to fill the gap of political representation of working-class/welfarist interests had to face a long series of structural and subjective obstacles and ultimately failed, plunging this party family in a state of organisational fragmentation, political disarray and unprecedented societal weakness (2008-present).

Unlike the parties of other communist strongholds (France, Portugal and Finland), the Italian Communist Party (PCI)[102] had withstood the Eighties with relative grace. While in decline from its historical climax in 1976 (12,616,650 votes - 34.4% of valid votes - and 1,814,154 members), by 1987 it could still boast an impressive number of voters (10,250,644 votes, 26.6%) and members (1,508,140), local governmental presence and friendly mass organisations (the trade-union CGIL, the Legacoop cooperative movement, the ARCI recreational network). Its crisis, rather than a material one, was one of identity. As the Berlin Wall fell, the party went through a process of wide-ranging renewal which led it to abandon the communist party family for the social-

[102] *Partito Comunista Italiano.*

democratic one, changing its name to Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)[103] and becoming a modern, moderate and coalitionable left-of-the-centre party (Ignazi, 1992; Bellucci, Maraffi & Segatti, 2000; Liguori, 2009; Magri, 2009).

The Italian far left had also the strongest in Europe. Despite the decline of the number and impact of its activists, a large number of local groups remained active on the ground and its electoral expression, Proletarian Democracy (DP)[104], maintained a non-negligible electoral support (1987: 1.7%) and above all an independent parliamentary representation (Billi *et al.,* 1996; Balestrini & Moroni, 2003; Gambetta, 2010; Pucciarelli, 2011).

Against this background, in 1991 a large variety of sensibilities *on* the left and *to* the left of the old PCI which opposed its change of name and nature decided to give birth to a new neo-communist force, the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC). This experiment, which promised to offer an original solution to the crisis of 20th century communism, was unique in Western Europe[105] as it was the only successful radical left party to emerge through a split from a former Communist party.

The new party proved to be a significant political player. It was however immediately faced with a key dilemma which would determine its entire subsequent evolution: what attitude was it supposed to take toward the emerging centre-left pole of the new bi-polar competition of the so-called "second republic"? Should it accept or reject its integration within the centre-left camp, including the need to support externally or directly participate to centre-left governments? The PRC has proved incapable to cope with this problem, as the choice of the latter option has regularly produced large defections of its elected representatives and damaging right-wing splits (1995, 1998 and 2009) while the choice of the former one has invariably shattered its anti-neoliberal credibility and demobilised its voters and members. Thus, the party failed to consolidate its hegemony over the Italian radical left and progressively fragmented in a variety of competing organisations (see FIGURE 4.1).

---

[103] *Partito Democratico della Sinistra*. In 1998 it fused with smaller progressive groups in the Left Democrats (*Democratici di Sinistra*) and in 2007 it merged with most remaining centre-left forces (notably the Christian-Democrats of DL) to form the Democratic Party (*Partito Democratico*).

[104] *Democrazia Proletaria.* In 1991 it dissolved and contributed to the birth of the PRC.

[105] Some parallels exist only in Eastern Europe.

FIGURE 4.1 ITALIAN RADICAL LEFT PARTIES



The Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC)[106] is relatively well studied and has been the object of a number of historiographical and politological monographs (Dormagen, 1996; Valentini, 2000; Dalmasso, 2002; Bertolino, 2004; Cannavò, 2009; Favilli, 2011).

Two other radical left parties have since survived and played a significant role in the national political system. The Party of Italian Communists (PdCI)[107] was established in 1998 as a break-away PRC faction which refused to withdraw its support to the Prodi I government. The party still lacks a complete history, but interesting analyses are provided by Cossu (2004) and Bordandini and Di Virgilio (2005 and 2007). Left Ecology Freedom (SEL)[108], on the other hand, was created in 2009 by the merger of various left-wing splinter groups determined to reconcile different cultures (neo-communism,

[106] *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista.*
[107] *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani*.
[108] *Sinistra Ecologia Libertà.*

left socialism, environmentalism) in a common organisation freed from the communist label and firmly positioned within a broader centre-left alliance. Its recent history has been well analysed by Romano (2009), Damiani (2011) and Bordandini (2013).
All other right-wing (CU) and left-wing (COBAS, CCA, PdAC, PCL and SC) splits of the PRC have been short-lived and devoid of a veritable societal weight.

In short, the initial emergence and consolidation of the "new" Italian radical left (1992-1996) has gradually given way to a long period of roller-coaster oscillations (1996-2008) followed by an unprecedented phase of crisis and helplessness (2008-present). How and why did this happen?

A tentative answer to these interrogatives will be provided in the rest of the chapter, following the narrative and analytical structure already employed in the previous one.
In section 3.2 I will illustrate the trajectory of the Italian radical left along its three key dimensions (societal weight, fragmentation and regroupment and political nature) over the period 1992-2012.
In section 3.3 I will discuss the validity of the "vacuum thesis" with reference to the Italian case. Why did the PRC and its successor parties ultimately fail to profit from the ideological de-radicalisation, political neo-liberalisation, centrist alliances and electoral failures of the PDS/DS/PD?
In section 3.4 I will identify the factors which determined the progressive fragmentation of this party family and the failure of the counter-processes of regroupment.
In section 3.5, finally, I will draw a balance sheet of the efforts of the radical left in influencing the course of Italian politics and society; in particular, the failure of its "strategy of left-ward pull" to affect the political evolution of the moderate left competitors.

4.2 The making of a new Italian radical left

4.2.1 Societal weight

The following tables (TABLE 4.2 and FIGURE 4.3) provide a good overview of the different dimensions of the overall societal weight of the parties of the Italian radical left over the period 1991-2013. Three parties account for the vast majority of the totals: the PRC (1991-present), the PdCI (1999-present) and SEL (2010-present). Pre-1989 data for their communist and far left predecessors (PCI and DP) are also included for reference.

TABLE 4.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT

	AVERAGE 1991-2013	REF: PCI+DP late 1980s	PERIOD I 1991-2007	PERIOD II 2008-2013
ELECTORAL WEIGHT				
NATIONAL (1992-2013)	2,451,164 votes 6.55%	10,892,545 votes 28.24%	2,741,280 votes 7.26%	1,677,521 votes 5.09%**
REGIONAL (1995-2013)	2,113,952 votes 7.06%	8,594,207 votes 22.19%	2,256,445 votes 7.41%	1,805,219 votes 6.31% **
EUROPEAN (1994-2013)	2,219,866 votes 6.69%	10,048,008 votes 28.87%	2,202,061 votes 6.85%	2,261,411 votes 7.29% **
PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT				
NATIONAL	25.7 seats 4.09%	185 seats 29.37%	32.6 seats 5.18%	6.2 seats 0.98%
REGIONAL	55.5 seats 5.27%	248 seats 24.43%	55.5 seats 5.34%	55.5 seats 5.06%
GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT				
NATIONAL	34.8%	0.0%	47.1%	0.0%
REGIONAL	29.8%	14.6%	26.7%	38.7%
ORGANISATIONAL WEIGHT				
MEMBERSHIP (1991-2012)	116,262 6.3%*	1,472,591 35.2%	121,942 6.7%*	96,951 5.0%*
YEARLY INCOMES (1997-2011)	€ 14,536,222	-	€ 15,393,065	€ 12,179,902
MEDIA OUTREACH	Weak	Strong	Weak	Weak
ORGANISATIONAL LINKAGES	Weak	Strong	Weak	Weak

Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, party members, party incomes). Averages: rolling figures calculated on all years. Regional: weighted by regional population. Governmental involvement: time in government (participation or external support); at least one radical left party. National: Camera dei Deputati. Yearly incomes: real 2010 euro; central level only. REF: national 1987; regional 1990; European 1989; membership 1988.
* = indicative figures (unreliable data) ** = the radical left ran lists together with non radical organisations (Verdi, IdV, PSI); the resulting levels are therefore somewhat inflated.

FIGURE 4.3 SOCIETAL WEIGHT



Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values. Shares of total valid votes, total seats (weighted), total party members, total population administered.

The Italian radical left initially inherited only a small fraction of the strength of its main predecessor, the Italian Communist Party: one tenth of its membership, one fourth of its voters, one fifth of its parliamentary weight, and very little of its institutionalised influence within mass civil society organisations. From 1992 to 2008 it nevertheless managed to develop into a mid-sized political area, with most quantifiable variables averaging between 5% and 7% and a key role for the purposes of government formation. The devastating electoral defeat of 2008, however, for the first time

excluded it from parliament and determined a sharp drop in all indicators, threatening its long-term significance and perspectives. The most recent period, despite some timid countertrends, remains marked by a state of crisis and disarray.[109] I will briefly review each dimension below.

The electoral weight of the radical left was mid-sized: in average 2,541,164 votes (6.6% of valid votes) in parliamentary elections and of a similar magnitude in other kinds of elections.

The peaks were reached in 1996 (8.6%) and 2007 (8.2%), the troughs in 1992 (5.6%), 2001 (6.7%), 2008 (4.5%) and 2013 (5.7%). In the latter two cases the real weight of the radical left was even lower, as the parties ran within electoral list including non-radical partners.[110]

The share of the PRC steadily declined from 100.0% (1996) to 71.6% (2006) to less than a third of the total (2013)[111], to the benefit of its own successive right-wing and left-wing splits. Geographically the results were fairly well distributed across the national territory, with strongholds in Toscana, Umbria, Marche and eastern Liguria (but not Emilia Romagna) and an extreme weakness in the North-East and in Sicilia[112].

The aforementioned level of electoral support translated into a still mid-sized but significantly lower share of seats within the first chamber of parliament (4.1%) and regional assemblies (5.3%).

This squeeze was due to the highly negative working of the electoral legislation (4% electoral threshold; first-past-the post constituency seats; majority premiums) on smaller and non-aligned forces; it was however mitigated by a general policy of centre-left alliances which avoided a much worse outcome. The values peaked in 2006-2007

[109] The 2009 European elections marked a vigorous electoral recovery but no representation, as both main lists failed to overcome the 4%-threshold. In 2013, on the contrary, the radical left managed to re-gain a sizeable representation in the national parliament (37 seats), thanks SEL's choice of centre-left alliance, but its electoral results barely improved compared to 2008 (from 4.5% to 5.7%).

[110] The Greens in 2008, the Greens and Di Pietro's crumbling IdV in 2013.

[111] In 2008 the PRC ceased to run for office independently and chose instead to participate in short-lived broad left electoral fronts: the Rainbow Left (SA) in 2008; the Federation of the Left (FdS) in 2009-2012; Civil Revolution (RC) in 2013. It is therefore not possible to ascertain its precise electoral weight as a party; the weight of the fronts has fallen from 69.3% in 2008 to just 39.2% in 2013.

[112] Since 2008, however, the parties have lost ground in the whole Centre-North and recovered only in the Centre-South.

(national 9.0%; regional 7.3%) and had their troughs in 2001-2002 (national 3.3%; regional 6.0%) and 2010-2012 (national 0.0%; regional 4.1%).
Radical left elected representatives tended to be more moderate than the party memberships and quite undisciplined, repeatedly providing the backbone of large right-wing splits (1995, 1998, 2009).
A major event was the defeat of 2008, when the SA electoral list failed to overcome the 4%-threshold and therefore the entry into parliament. This trauma had wide-ranging effects, as it drastically reduced the visibility and financial resources of the member-parties and rippled over on all other indicators.

The electoral and parliamentary weight of the radical left assumed a disproportionate importance in the context of the tight bipolar competition, providing an indispensable contribution to the formation of centre-left governmental majorities at the national and regional level. While large sections of the radical left were sceptical toward an organic alliance with the centre-left, considered to be subservient to neo-liberal ideologies, centrist parties and the socio-economic establishment, its evolution followed a path of growing governmental involvement.
At the national level, the radical left contributed to the survival of six cabinets (about the third of the total time): Dini in 1995-1996 (CU); Prodi I in 1996-1998 (PRC); D'Alema I, D'Alema II and Amato II in 1998-2001 (PdCI); Prodi II in 2006-2008 (PRC, PdCI, SD, SC). The degree of involvement also steadily increased over time, beginning with an external support of PRC dissidents in 1995 and ending with a full governmental participation of all major parties in 2006-2008.
At the regional level, the evolution was even more impressive: the radical left supported (directly or externally) regional cabinets administering 29.8% of the national population, with an incredible peak of 65.4% in 2005-2007 which included the presidency of one region (Puglia with Nichi Vendola, PRC).

The organisational dimension, finally, is more difficult to quantify but oscillated between medium and low values.
The membership of radical left parties was in average 116,262 members or around 6.3% of total party membership, with peaks in 1997 (130,509) and 2006 (136,323) and troughs in 1991 (112,835), 2002 (115,824) and 2012 (77,448). The figure was broadly

proportional to and synchronised with the electoral weight and remained remarkably stable until 2006, as the general contemporary tendency of European parties to decline and age was counterbalanced by a continuous influx of new and young members; the subsequent events (governmental participation, fragmentation, electoral losses), however, initiated a stark decline which continues to this day.

Finances experienced a much larger oscillation. The central accounts of the parties had in average a real yearly income of €14,536,222, with a peak of €28,896,969 in 2007 and a trough of just €3,640,874 in 2011.[113] The financial "bubble" of the mid 2000s, fuelled by perfectly proportional and increasing amounts of state financing, had important political side-effects, as it tended to create a dependency and encourage an atrophy of the fund-raising and militant capabilities of the party membership. The dramatic fall after 2008, on the other hand, was mainly the result of an introduction of high thresholds for the public financing of general and European elections which the parties failed to overcome.

Media outreach tended to be weak. The PRC daily newspaper *Liberazione* (1995-2011), for instance, sold in average only around 10,000 copies, represented a heavy financial burden for the party and was finally closed down in 2012. Other forms of direct party propaganda were significant but tended to be progressively disorganised by the continuous splits and defections of popular leaders and cadres. The main channel of political communication of the parties gradually became the mass media, where charismatic leaders (Fausto Bertinotti, Nichi Vendola) often enjoyed a large coverage but were also exposed to the hidden agendas of the media owners.

Paradoxically, the presence within civil society and social movement organisations was one of the weakest points of the radical left parties. True, the PRC was a key protagonist of the coalitions behind the alter-globalist mobilisations of 1999-2004, the anti-war movement in the same period and of several other popular campaigns (e.g. the 1995, 2003 and 2011 referendums). However, the party and its successive splits failed to consolidate their influence within the activists and apparatuses of mass civil society organisations and to transform a generic sympathy into a close collaboration. Mass civil society organisations (e.g. the CGIL trade union) remained solidly, albeit somewhat critically, aligned with the PDS/DS/PD; their left-wing tendencies stagnated;

[113] The data are not comparable internationally, as they exclude the accounts of all local instances of the parties.

and smaller and more radical organisations (e.g. the independent trade union confederations or the *centri sociali*) remained weak and restive.

In conclusion, the dynamics of radical left societal weight can be usefully divided in three distinct sequences.

A *fist ascending period (1991-1997)* covered the emergence of the PRC under the "first republic" and its consolidation under the "second republic". The party cultivated an image of externality and antagonism toward the rest of the political system while duly participating to broad left (1994) and centre-left (1996) electoral alliances geared at defeating the right. The victory of the latter and the creation of the first organic centre-left cabinet of the second republic (Prodi I, 1996-2001), which the PRC supported externally, rapidly highlighted the ambiguity of the party's positioning and increased the centrifugal pressures on it, leading to the crisis of 1998 and opening a new phase.

The *second period (1998-2007)* was characterised by a significant organisational fragmentation, a pro-cyclical oscillation at high levels and a growing integration of the parties within the centre-left. The radical left space was now occupied by two main organisations (PRC and PdCI), which lost weight while in office and almost entirely recovered while in opposition to centre-right governments. The PdCI was from the start a loyal partner of the centre-left. The PRC, despite the apparent radical turn of 1998-2003, did not resist the political and material incentives provided by a tactics of centre-left alliances and was also increasingly involved in local and national governmental participations. Attempts of radical left regroupment all failed on strategic or organisational issues.

The *third period (2008-present),* finally, was characterised by an overall lack of influence and existential uncertainty. The inevitable consequences of the governmental experience (an unprecedented level of disillusionment and of strategic and organisational division) traumatised the radical left, leading to heavy electoral losses and to the exclusion from parliament (2008). The further loss of resources, visibility, members and presence on the national territory made a recovery very difficult. Two rival projects of regroupment emerged: on the one hand SEL, on the other hand the Left Federation (FdS). Both, however, remained weak and essentially dependent on alliances with the PD for their survival. SEL progressively drifted toward

the role of semi-external appendage of the latter while PRC and PdCI suffered a progressive marginalisation.

4.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation

Contrary to Germany, in Italy the initial organisational regroupment of disparate radical left forces within a unified radical left party (the PRC) gradually left place to a situation of a growing fragmentation.

As TABLE 4.4 clearly shows, the panorama of the radical left thus became increasingly complex as time went by: from the initial predominance of one "big church" neo-communist organisation in 1991-1997 (PRC); to the limited competition between a more radical and a more moderate neo-communist force in 1998-2006 (PRC and PdCI); to the explosion of the PRC into several fragments after 2006 (PRC, PdCI, SEL, PCL, SC and other minor groups) and the failure of all subsequent attempts to regroup the weakened surviving forces.

TABLE 4.4 FRAGMENTATION

Votes	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**	**AVER.**
PRC	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	74.9%	71.6%	-	-	63.8%
PdCI	-	-	-	24.9%	28.4%	-	-	7.6%
SA (cartel)	-	-	-	-	-	69.3%	-	9.9%
RC (cartel)	-	-	-	-	-	-	39.2%	5.6%
SEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	55.9%	8.0%
FAR LEFT	-	-	-	0.2%	-	30.7%	4.9%	5.1%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Members	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**2012**	**AVER.**
PRC	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	77.8%	68.4%	69.5%	40.7%	79.5%
PdCI	-	-	-	22.2%	31.6%	28.6%	16.1%	14.1%
SEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	42.0%	6.0%
Far left	-	-	-	-	-	2.0%	1.3%	0.5%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
MPs	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**	**AVER.**
PRC	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	55.0%	71.9%	-	-	65.4%
PdCI	-	-	-	45.0%	28.1%	-	-	14.6%
SEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0%	20.0%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Fragmentation index	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**	**AVER.**
Votes	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.61	1.69	1.95	2.14	1.48
Members	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.53	1.76	1.77	2.72	1.54
MPs	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.98	1.68	-	1.00	1.28

Notes: shares of radical left votes, members, MPs (Camera); Laakso-Taagepera index.

In all cases, the increase of the fragmentation was due to splits of the PRC around the issue of the relationship to be had with the moderate left and, notably, of governmental participation at the national level. The position of the PRC within the radical left space thus declined from absolutely hegemonic (until 1997) to clearly minoritarian (since 2009). Every time that the party seemed to refuse an alliance, right-wing minorities broke away and formed their own short-lived (CU, 1995) or long-lasting organisations (PdCI, 1998; MpS[114] and its successor SEL in 2008-2009); every time that the party came to support a centre-left cabinet, smaller left-wing minorities did the same (CCA, 1998; PCL, PdAC and SC, 2006-2007). The former were unquestionably more damaging, with particularly heavy losses of elected representatives and high-ranking cadres, while the latter tended to be non-starters or to wither away after a short wave of enthusiasm.

Fragmentation was not necessarily damaging from the point of view of overall (e.g. electoral) results, but tended to limit the external influence and bargaining power of each individual actor.

Thus, a series of regroupment schemes were devised over time to counter-act the dispersion of forces and reach over to other potential allies (left-wing currents of the PDS/DS; the ecologists; social movement activists). All early attempts to build a broad "radical left pole" failed to materialise; the belated experiment of 2008, when all radical left parties came together in the Rainbow Left (SA) electoral cartel, led to a catastrophic defeat. A very high level of fragmentation has persisted in the subsequent years: the more conciliatory elements have merged into a new non-communist organisations (SEL) and drifted toward the PD; the PRC and PdCI have oscillated between alternative projects of regroupment (the FdS federation in 2008-2012; the RC electoral front in 2013), hopes of autonomous recovery and an increasing marginalisation; the far left groups have rapidly declined but not disappeared.

[114] Nichi Vendola's Movement for the Left (*Movimento per la Sinistra*) split after the 2008 congress and became one of the major partners of the SEL project.

4.2.3 Political nature

The analysis of the political nature of the Italian radical left requires a separate treatment of each main dimension: ideology, sociology, organisation and strategy.

Ideology

The parties of the Italian radical left all moved in that field of similar ideological coordinates which characterises most of the contemporary Western European radical left.

Firstly, the theoretical, cultural and identitarian references of the parties have tended to oscillate between traditionalism and innovation, the appeal to the history of 20th century communism and the search for a broader and more modern radical left identity.

The legacy of Italian communism in its multi-faceted complexity had been at the core of the establishment of the PRC in 1991 (Dormagen, 1996 and 1998) and this reference continued to retain a strong emotional power in the following decades (Cossu, 2004; De Nardis, 2009). At the same time, the parties were conscious that their success required a creative re-interpretation and innovation of that tradition (Bertolino, 2004; Transform!, 2004). Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s the PRC claimed to be working, as its name indicated, at a refoundation of Communism leading to "a new mass communist party, a new workers' movement and a new alternative political alliance" (PRC, 2011). In fact, this task was rarely taken seriously and was soon degraded to a weapon for the internal factional battle, while the day-to-day practice of the party was dominated by issues of tactical positioning and electoral alliances. Moreover, it gradually became clear that this communist identity represented more an obstacle than a resource in the dialogue with other critical cultures (ecologism, feminism, third-worldism, left Catholicism, alter-globalism, pacifism, post-operaism, movementism) and in the attempts to forge an enlarged radical left pole with potential partisan and civil society allies.

In the end, these two opposing tendencies reached an impasse. On the one hand the aspirations to refound communism failed to arrive at a concrete synthesis and the PRC, instead of being nourished by these endeavours, progressively fragmented in a variety of organisations, each carrier of a different kind of communist identity: modernist and conciliatory in the case of the CU and SEL; traditionalist and conciliatory in the case of the PdCI; elusive in the late PRC; intransigent in the case of the far left splits, which remained nevertheless divided by very specific ideological interpretations (Trotskyist, movementist, orthodox and so on).

Secondly, the long-term goals of the parties have until recently all maintained a clear reference to the overcoming of capitalism and to the attainment of a future socialist or communist society in their statutes and programmatic documents. For the PRC this involved "the transformation of capitalist society in order to achieve the liberation of women and men through the establishment of a communist society" (PRC, 2011); for the PdCI the "fight for socialism and communism" (PdCI, 2011); for the PCL the "achievement of communism as a superior form of civilisation" (PCL, 2011). Only the most recent creation, SEL, has carefully avoided any such mention and claimed to work toward a generic "alternative to modern capitalism" (SEL, 2010).
However, as in most of the contemporary radical left thinking, the exact contours of this project and its links with day-to-day political activity remained unclear. Politically, the substitution of the Soviet model with references to democracy, pluralism and self-management fell short of a model of social decision-making clearly alternative to liberal-democracy. Economically, the key question of the socialisation of the means of production and of the ways to avoid the pitfalls of bureaucratic planning and state capitalism were rarely addressed. Strategically, the assertion of the failure of both Stalinism and social democracy in transforming capitalism did not lead to a serious reflection on the features and problems of a realistic path toward a post-capitalist future[115].

Thirdly, the mid-term programmatic of all parties – what the PRC called the "alternative of society" (PRC, 2002) – focused on an eclectic yet coherent assemblage

[115] More specifically, the generic rhetoric on democratisation replaced the need to take a reasoned stand on the classic issues of parliamentarism, revolutionary violence and grassroots self-organisation.

of contemporary radical left themes depicting a break with neo-liberalism: the protection of the immediate interests of the salaried population (employment, salaries, working time, pensions, job security); the defence and expansion of the welfare state; a renewed economic intervention of the public hand to further industrial growth and redistribution, curb rents and unproductive expenses and encourage sustainability; the reform of the international order (peace, solidarity, a social Europe); the expansion of democracy (proportional representation, industrial democracy, civic participation) and minority rights (women, LGBT, migrants). In this field, what distinguished the parties was not so much real programmatic disagreement but rather their closeness to power: while groups which were comfortable with waging a long-term opposition (PCL, SC, at times the PRC) could push for the whole package of radical reforms, including nationalisations, groups which wanted to be accepted as loyal partners of the centre-left (PdCI, SEL, the PRC at other times) were forced to moderate or fudge their demands, turning them into generic values or nebulous pleas.

Sociology

From a sociological point of view, the Italian radical left had a profile quite similar to most of its European counterparts and was mainly characterised by the following points: a strong decline of the weight of the industrial proletariat to the benefit of non-industrial workers, the unemployed and the inactive population; a lingering over-representation of the employed and unemployed salaried strata, in particularly the lowest ones; a weak penetration among employers and self-employed, over-60 and housewives; excellent results among the non-religious and weak ones among the practicing Catholics and other practicing believers; a slightly masculine profile.

The analysis of the radical left electorate (TABLES 4.5 and 4.6) returns both similarities and differences with that of the Italian Communist Party of the late 1980s.

The first difference is the strong decline of blue-collar workers, whose weight almost halved in the in the early 1990s as a result of employment trends and political disengagement and who represented in average less than 20% of the contemporary

radical left voters. The weight of all employed and unemployed wage workers remained on the other hand stable around 48.8%, a very low level compared with international standards and a reflection of the historical weakness of Italian capitalism. The second divergence is a loss of influence in the "red area" of central Italy to the benefit of the centre-south. The third dissimilarity is a strong process of rejuvenation and strong gains among students and young people. The fourth contrast is a reversal of the educational composition, with excellent results among university graduates and low ones among voters with little or no education. The fifth change is a doubling of the weight of non-believers.

The analysis of the radical left membership is instead hampered by the lack of frequent and complete data for all parties (Chiocchetti, 2013). Altogether, the profile seems to be fairly similar to that of the electorate: a geographical concentration in the "red regions" and the centre-south, with a growing predominance of the latter since the late 1990s; a good presence of the under-35 (around 30%); a "popular" educational profile (secondary and primary certificate holders predominate) which, while decreasing over time, sets these parties apart from the profile of their German and French counterparts; a cross-class sociological composition with small deviations from the general population (except for the over-representation of students); a weak feminine presence (20-30%).

TABLE 4.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (composition)

	RL 1987	RL 1996	RL 2001	RL 2006	RL 2008	AVERAGE 1996-2008
N.	10,892,545	3,213,748	2,494,762	3,113,591	1,623,072	
GENDER	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
Male	58.1%	54.9%	60.6%	56.4%	66.0%	59.5%
Female	41.9%	45.1%	39.4%	43.6%	34.0%	40.5%
AREA	**Adm**	**Adm**	**Adm**	**Adm**	**Adm**	
North-West	26.6%	26.8%	28.8%	26.5%	27.6%	27.4%
North-East	8.0%	7.8%	9.0%	8.1%	9.8%	8.7%
Red area	29.1%	23.1%	23.1%	22.0%	21.4%	22.4%
Centre-South	36.3%	42.3%	39.1%	43.4%	41.2%	41.5%
AGE	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
18-24	13.8%	20.6%	14.2%	15.8%	20.2%	17.7%
25-64	71.9%	74.3%	73.3%	71.3%	69.1%	72.0%
>64	14.3%	5.1%	12.5%	12.9%	10.6%	10.3%
EDUCATION	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
5 years	57.4%	22.9%	20.5%	22.8%	8.5%	18.6%
8 years	25.9%	45.1%	37.5%	24.8%	43.6%	37.8%
13 years	13.9%	25.1%	31.1%	40.6%	30.9%	32.0%
University	2.8%	6.9%	10.8%	11.9%	17.0%	11.6%
PROFESSION	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
Employer and self-employed	10.2%	6.9%	8.0%	9.0%	7.4%	7.8%
Manager	0.9%	2.3%	2.9%	5.0%	1.1%	2.8%
Employed wage worker	44.7%	41.1%	41.1%	36.0%	40.4%	39.7%
Blue-collar	34.0%	18.9%	23.4%	17.0%	19.1%	20.1%
White-collar	10.7%	22.3%	17.7%	19.0%	21.3%	19.6%
Unemployed and atypical	3.7%	7.4%	7.9%	10.0%	11.7%	9.1%
Inactive	40.5%	42.3%	40.6%	40.0%	39.4%	40.6%
Student	1.9%	16.0%	10.9%	9.0%	17.0%	13.2%
Pensioner	22.8%	12.0%	22.9%	21.0%	17.0%	9.1%
Other	15.8%	14.3%	6.9%	10.0%	5.3%	18.2%
"WORKING CLASS"	48.4%	48.6%	48.6%	46.0%	52.1%	48.8%
RELIGION	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
Practicing Catholic	31.9%	30.8%	30.2%	33.3%	21.5%	29.0%
Semi-practicing Catholic	38.1%	32.5%	26.2%	29.4%	14.0%	25.5%
Non-practicing Catholic	19.5%	8.9%	20.9%	24.5%	30.1%	21.1%
Other religion	1.0%	2.4%	7.0%	4.9%	3.2%	4.4%
Non Believer	9.5%	25.4%	15.7%	7.8%	31.2%	20.0%

Source: my elaboration ITANES (1987, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008).
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.

TABLE 4.6 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (penetration)

	RL 1987	RL 1996	RL 2001	RL 2006	RL 2008	AVERAGE 1996-2008
RESULT	28.2%	8.6%	6.7%	8.2%	4.5%	7.0%
GENDER	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
Male	30.6%	8.7%	8.0%	9.1%	5.6%	7.8%
Female	25.5%	8.4%	5.4%	7.2%	3.2%	6.1%
AREA	**Adm**	**Adm**	**Adm**	**Adm**	**Adm**	
North-West	27.2%	8.3%	7.2%	8.0%	4.6%	7.0%
North-East	18.9%	5.5%	5.1%	5.4%	3.6%	4.9%
Red area	43.6%	10.7%	8.5%	9.8%	5.2%	8.5%
Centre-South	24.7%	8.7%	6.2%	8.3%	4.3%	6.9%
AGE	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
18-24	34.2%	12.4%	9.1%	10.9%	8.8%	10.3%
25-64	28.0%	8.6%	7.0%	8.2%	4.6%	7.1%
>64	25.1%	3.7%	4.5%	6.0%	2.0%	4.1%
EDUCATION	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
5 years	33.6%	6.4%	5.9%	10.7%	2.6%	6.4%
8 years	27.0%	9.9%	7.2%	5.9%	4.4%	6.8%
13 years	19.3%	8.1%	6.4%	8.9%	4.6%	7.0%
University	18.2%	17.0%	8.1%	9.1%	6.2%	10.1%
PROFESSION	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
Self-employed	20.1%	4.3%	4.0%	5.4%	3.2%	4.3%
Manager	19.5%	6.6%	8.4%	16.1%	2.0%	8.3%
Employed wage worker	34.4%	11.2%	9.0%	8.9%	5.8%	8.7%
White-collar	20.0%	10.9%	7.0%	7.7%	4.7%	7.6%
Blue-collar	44.5%	11.6%	11.3%	10.8%	7.8%	10.4%
Unemployed and atypical	35.5%	8.7%	6.9%	9.6%	8.2%	8.4%
Inactive	25.6%	8.1%	5.9%	7.7%	3.5%	6.3%
Student	30.0%	13.6%	10.4%	11.0%	8.7%	10.9%
Pensioner	25.7%	5.1%	6.1%	7.8%	2.7%	5.4%
Other	24.9%	8.4%	3.3%	5.9%	1.8%	4.8%
"*WORKING CLASS*"	34.5%	10.7%	8.6%	9.1%	6.2%	8.7%
RELIGION	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	**Poll**	
Practicing Catholic	15.9%	4.7%	4.0%	5.4%	1.8%	4.0%
Semi-practicing Catholic	39.3%	9.9%	6.5%	8.2%	2.9%	6.9%
Non-practicing Catholic	54.0%	10.9%	9.1%	15.0%	8.8%	11.0%
Other religion	65.8%	24.5%	17.5%	13.5%	4.4%	15.0%
Non Believer	50.6%	26.1%	27.2%	14.6%	17.3%	21.3%

Source: my elaboration from ITANES (1987, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008).
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.

Organisation

Created in the early 1990s by the merger of disparate neo-communist factions, the PRC inherited little of the organisational legacies of the Italian Communist Party and therefore by-passed most of the features and tendencies of the 20th century mass party model.

The mixed territorial branch/workplace cell organisation was almost entirely superseded by a territorial model; bureaucratic centralism was replaced by a strong membership-based internal democracy; centralisation of resources and decision-making within a homogeneous central apparatus gave way to a decentralised and stratarchical organisation, leaving large autonomy to each territorial and hierarchical level, to the party in public office and to organised internal factions; the leadership became less collegial/bureaucratic and more personalised/charismatic (Calise, 2006; Newell, 2010; Gerbaudo, 2011; Damiani, 2013); the parties became highly dependent from external actors, from the state (party financing and other perks) to professional consultants and the mass media.

This had both positive and negative long-term consequences.

On the positive side, the organisational models of the Italian radical left remained flexible, adaptable and capable of renewal, as attested by their ability to of each party to attract a large initial membership (PRC in 1991, PdCI in 1999 and SEL in 2009), to continuously renew their ranks (many young people and few pensioners) and to respond efficiently to favourable external conditions. In particular, they escaped the common tendency of former communist parties to shrink and age.

On the negative side, the parties remained comparatively fragile, little disciplined and with a declining penetration of their party-constituency. The membership density index (M/V), a useful synthetic expression of the strength of the organisational linkage between party-organisation and party-constituency, points to medium-weak and declining values: in average 4.87% for the whole radical left, 4.58% for the PRC, 4.05% for the PdCI, 3.02% for SEL and 0.63% of the far left groups. While parties have been able to recover rapidly from the organisational crisis of 1998, the defeats of 2008-2009

have instead plunged them into a state of disarray from which no recovery is yet in sight.

More detailed party-specific analyses are already available for the PRC (Bertolino, 2004; Transform!, 2004; PRC, 2007; Calossi, 2007), the PdCI (Bordandini & Di Virgilio, 2005 and 2007; Calossi, 2007) and SEL (Romano, 2009; Bordandini, 2013; Damiani, 2013).

Strategy

The major divergence between the individual parties of the Italian radical left can be found at the level of their strategic elaboration and politics of alliances.

All parties shared a similar analysis of the conjuncture, characterised by an unfavourable balance of forces between classes, the predominance of neo-liberal policies and a rapid right-ward shift of the Italian political system. They also observed that the transformation of the PDS/DS/PD offered an important opportunity for the radical left, which could expect to find a large audience by filling the vacuum and by reclaiming the traditional redistributive and welfarist themes of once expounded by its competitor. Finally, they all believed that the appropriate mix of parliamentary, electoral and extra-parliamentary pressures, alone and in alliance with other social and political forces, could exert a left-ward pull on the political system and pave the road to the successful implementation of their mid-term anti-neoliberal programme.

The identification of the correct strategy required to reach their common goal, however, produced disagreements and differentiations. The most radical groups and tendencies considered the moderate left as a direct adversary and obstacle which had irreversibly sold out to the camp of the bourgeoisie and therefore insisted on the establishment of an autonomous anti-capitalist pole and a *strategy of anti-capitalist alternative*; all other groups (most of the PRC, SEL and the PdCI), while moderately or strongly critical of the centre-left, nevertheless believed that a *strategy of left-ward pressure* could in due time influence the latter and lead to its re-socialdemocratisation, thereby turning it into a useful ally.

Moreover, the parties differed in their readiness to accept tactical compromises in the short term. The far left currents had a fairly *intransigent attitude,* refusing most hypotheses of governmental participation and electoral alliance with the centre-left[116]; the right-wing ones had a *conciliatory attitude,* believing that an organic alliance with the centre-left was inevitable to defeat the right and to prevent a greater evil; the centrist ones oscillated between the two perspectives.

The majority group of the PRC was particularly affected by the dilemma between the need to emphasise its autonomy and the desire not to antagonise its future potential allies, trying to steer a middle course of "radicality and unity" (PRC, 1996): radicality in the anti-neoliberal demands and image; unity with the centre-left to defeat the right. At the practical level this entailed convoluted tactics involving, for instance, offering an electoral but not a governmental alliance (1996, 2001, 2013), providing external support to a centre-left government but being prepared to topple it if demands were not met (1996-1998) or compensating an hostile relation at the national level by strengthening or preserving the local ones (1998-2004; 2008-2013). Only in the period 2004-2008 the party turned toward a policy of generalised alliances with the centre-left, justifying it with over-optimistic arguments on the strength and influence of the social movements (PRC, 2005).

The position of the PRC was an attempt to respond to the deep-seated contradictory tendencies present within the (actual and potential) radical left constituency. It was however hard to sustain and soon degenerated into an incoherent succession of abrupt tactical shifts and internal lacerations. Every time that the moment arrived when a clear choice between supporting and toppling a centre-left government was required (1995; 1996-8; 2006-2008), the unity of the party exploded and large sections of its electorate scattered in the direction of abstentionism, lesser-evilism and protest.

[116] The national congresses of the PRC were dominated by these issues. The various far left motions all rejected organic alliances with the centre-left, but were often more pragmatic on softer forms of indirect assistance (such as the unilateral withdrawal in key constituencies). The *Sinistra Critica* tendency, in particular, strongly attacked the *Unione* alliance (2004-2008) but its few MPs did not have the heart to topple the Prodi II government, deploying for two years all kind of parliamentary strategems to mark their public dissent while ensuring the cabinet's survival. The events are well documented – albeit with some positive spin – by one of their protagonists (Cannavò, 2009).

The successive left-wing and right-wing splits of the PRC tried to cut the Gordian knot by choosing one or the other possible options: to wage a vocal opposition of principle or to become a loyal and responsible, albeit critical, left of government. Neither was however very successful. The organisations choosing the former option (COBAS, CCA, PdAC, PCL and SC) were invariably quickly marginalised. Those opting for the latter possibility (CU, PdCI and SEL), however, never went beyond deceiving electoral scores (2-3%); in the long-term, they were either absorbed by the moderate left or forced to re-radicalise. SEL currently finds itself precisely in this situation, torn between the constraints of its organic alliance with the PD (and the hypothesis of a merger) and its objective collocation as the largest left-wing opposition to the "grand coalition" cabinets of Mario Monti and Enrico Letta (2011-2013).

4.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of radical left mobilisation

As in Germany, the political and economic trends of the post-1989 decades sketched a worrying picture for the radical left but simultaneously offered important chances of revival and growth.

The growing economic problems of the country, which hit heavily the medium-low salaried strata and the new generations, shook the popular confidence in the ability of Italian capitalism to ensure an adequate growth and a wide distribution of material welfare. The policy responses of the state, marked by a mix of austerity (deficit control, pension reforms, wage containment) and neo-liberal solutions (privatisations, liberalisations, labour market flexibility), were primarily shouldered by the same categories and failed to counteract the decline. Finally, the crisis of the party system of the "first republic" and the rapid right-ward shift of the majority of the former Italian Communist Party created the legitimate expectation that a representation gap had emerged and was waiting for the radical left to fill it.

The present section will analyse more in detail the contours of the problem, the response of the radical left and the results of its electoral and organisational mobilisation.

4.3.1 Economic stagnation and neo-liberal shift

The underlying weaknesses of Italian capitalism (little concentration and centralisation of capital, low productivity and innovation, focus on low-intermediate segments of the productive ladder, inefficient state) were masked from 1970 to 1992 by a massive increase of deficit spending and by frequent currency devaluations. In the 1990s, as these policy tools were gradually neutralised by the participation of the country to the process of further European integration, the country was thus plunged into a prolonged economic stagnation.

TABLE 4.7 MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

	REF 1982-1993	1993-2003	2003-2009	1993-2009
Real GDP annual growth (CAGR)	2.2%	1.7%	-0.1%	1.0%
Real wages annual growth (CAGR)	1.1%	-0.1%	0.6%	0.2%
Wage share of GDP (average)	49.2%	45.1%	45.4%	45.2%
Unemployment rate (average)	11.0%	10.2%	7.2%	9.1%
Current account balance/GDP (average)	-0.9%	1.1%	-1.5%	0.1%
		1993	**2003**	**2009**
Italy's share of global GDP (average)		4.1%	4.0%	3.7%
Gross public debt/GDP (average)		115.0%	104.1%	116.4%

Sources: my elaborations from WEO (2013 April), ISTAT, KLEMS.
Notes: Periodisation according to the economic cycles (trough to through). CAGR: compound annual growth rate.

The selected macro-economic indicators summarised in TABLE 4.7 are telling. Growth rates progressively deteriorated and came to a standstill after 2003. The gains of the feeble expansions (2004-2007, 2010) were completely wiped-out by severe recessions (2008-2009, 2012); public debt soared; the loss of international competitiveness and de-industrialisation advanced (Gallino, 2006; De Cecco, 2007). The biggest losers of these trends were the different sections of the Italian working class.

Employed wage workers were severely hit by the tripartite July Agreements of 1992-1993, which abolished the existing wage indexation mechanism and replaced it with a formalised corporatism (*concertazione*) geared toward wage restraints (Simoni, 2010). The effect was two decades of real wage stagnation (+0.2% yearly growth) and a significant fall of aggregate wages and income equality.

The rate of unemployment, which had exploded from around 5% in the 1960s to 12.0% in 1989, remained high throughout the 1990s and declined in the 2000s only thanks to a shift toward precarious employment. At the same time, the rate of inactivity rarely dropped below 50% of the working-age population. As the traditionally patchy coverage of welfare provisions in this domain was never expanded, these categories of unemployed, semi-employed and discouraged workers remained largely bereft of public safety nets and had to rely on alternative forms of support to survive (the enlarged family, the informal economy, private charities).

The most penalised, however, were the youngest generations of the workforce, which were disproportionally hit by unemployment, labour precarisation and the long-term effects of pension reforms.

The effects of the faltering growth were accentuated by the brutal shift of the Italian state from a (crony) *dirigiste* welfare state toward austerity and neoliberalisation (Barca, 1997; Amyot, 2003). Under the pressure of the fiscal and currency crisis of 1992, the old post-war settlement was progressively dismantled in the decade 1992-2002 and the readjustment proceeded with up and downs to this day.

Firstly, a large process of privatisations and liberalisations led to the dismissal of much of the state-owned industrial and financial corporations, which had previously controlled a majority share of the national economy (Mediobanca, 2000; Valle, 2002; Mucchetti, 2003; Barucci & Pierobon, 2007). Privatisations helped to fuel the speculative stock exchange bubble of the 1990s but did little to improve the efficiency of Italian capitalism; in fact, the only successful "national champions" which emerged from the process were paradoxically groups where public or quasi-public subjects retained a controlling share (ENI, ENEL, Finmeccanica, Unicredit, Intesa Sanpaolo), while many other important industrial companies failed to survive the end of state support and often ended up being sold to their foreign competitors.

Secondly, the growth of public employment – both a traditional source of patronage and an important outlet for university graduates – stopped and inverted its course, leading to a loss of almost 9% of the workforce in the period 1998-2010.

Thirdly, wide-ranging reforms and budgetary cuts curbed the upward trend of social security and welfare expenditures and planned drastic reductions of services for the long term. The main area of welfare retrenchment was that of pensions, where a series of reforms[117] steeply increased the retirement age and decreased future contributions (Ferrara & Jessoula, 2007; Aben, 2011). While partially safeguarding rights of existing pensioners and older workers, these measures will have disturbing effect on the retirement age and levels of treatment of the central and youngest generations of the workforce.

Fourthly, labour market reforms[118] steeply increased the precariousness of employment and working conditions (Accornero, 2006; Gallino, 2007; Choi & Mattoni, 2010).

---

[117] One was withdrawn (Maroni in 1994) and six were successfully implemented (Amato in 1992, Dini in 1995, Prodi in 1997, Maroni in 2004, Prodi in 2007 and Fornero in 2011).

[118] Major changes were notably introduced by Ciampi (1995), Treu (1996-1997), Maroni (2003) and Fornero (2012).

Finally, a policy of tight money and fiscal discipline was introduced and institutionalised through EU instruments (the Maastricht criteria of 1992, the delegation of monetary creation to the European Central Bank in 1999, the Fiscal Compact of 2012). While failing to address the long-term Italian debt problem[119], these measures compounded the economic and social difficulties of the country.

The neo-liberal shift produces important changes also outside the strict socio-economic field.

At the level of democratic institutions, the constitutional framework of the "First Republic" survived almost intact but was partially subverted by a hosts of transformations: the wide-ranging changes in the electoral legislation, which forced a bipolar straightjacket on the fragmented partisan landscape and strongly penalised smaller and non-aligned parties; the replacement of the traditional political ideologies (Christian democracy, communism, socialism, republicanism, liberalism) with vaguer post-modern identities (reformism, populism, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, localism/secessionism); the permanent conflict between the leader of one of the main governing coalitions, Silvio Berlusconi, and the judiciary; moves toward regionalisation.

At the level of international relations, the end of the cold war order was the occasion for a turn toward a more activist foreign policy (Ignazi *et. al.,* 2012). While Italy had been prevented to deploy troops abroad until 1970 by the Paris Treaty of 1947 and had started participating to peace-keeping missions only in 1982, since 1990 the country has intervened in a long series of foreign military interventions (Iraq in 1990; Somalia in 1992-1993; Albania, 1997; Kosovo, 1999; Afghanistan, 2001-ongoing; Iraq, 2003-2006; Libya, 2011). Constitutional constraints (De Fiores, 2003) and the wide-spread pacifist sentiment among the population (Roccato & Fedi, 2007) failed to act as significant brakes on this new military activism.

[119] From its peak of 121.1% in 1994 the gross debt/GDP was slowly reduced to 103.9% in 2003 but then stagnated and rose again during the global financial crisis, reaching 120.1% in 2011.

4.3.2 The "Second Republic" and the potential representation gaps

The neo-liberal transformation of the country was accompanied by veritable earthquakes at the level of political representation.

Firstly, the dominant party blocks were twice discredited by corruption scandals, severe economic crises and unpopular policies, suffering veritable electoral and organisational collapses to the benefit of new anti-establishment parties and political disengagement (see FIGURE 4.8).
In the first case (1992-1994) the old centrist ruling coalition (*pentapartito*) completely fell apart, fuelling the rise of a new regroupment of right-wing forces headed by Silvio Berlusconi (Waters, 1994; Bartolini & D'Alimonte, 1995; Nelken, 1996; Revelli, 1996; Gundle & Parker, 1996; Ginsborg, 2001). In the second case (2006-2013) the two centre-left and right-wing blocs of the existing bipolar alternation entered into a severe crisis and a new uncertain period of partisan reconfiguration opened up – so far, mainly to the benefit of the populist 5 Star Movement (M5S)[120] (De Sio *et al.,* 2013; Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013).

Secondly, even during the period of relative electoral and systemic consolidation of the "Second Republic" (1994-2006) the support for governmental forces remained somewhat shaky.
The winning coalition of each general election always stopped short of 50% of valid votes and 41% of the total electorate; these values further plummeted to their lowest point of the 2013 elections, when the plurality obtained by the centre-left coalition consisted in just 29.5% of valid votes and 21.4% of the total electorate. Moreover, an important section of the support for both centre-left and centre-right coalitions was motivated merely by mutual hatred (not political identification or policy agreement) and evaporated as soon the enemy was defeated; thus, Italian governments always lost the subsequent general election and were often toppled mid-term by internal defections (1995, 2001, 2008 and 2011).

[120] *MoVimento 5 Stelle*.

TABLE 4.8 ELECTORAL RESULTS BY POLE AND IDEOLOGY



Sources: my elaborations from Ministero degli Interni.
Notes: share of the total electorate, Camera. First figure: aggregation by actual electoral coalitions. Second figure: aggregation by party ideology.

The shallow social roots of the new party system are revealed even more forcefully by the figures on party membership.[121] The crisis of the old parties in the early Nineties was accompanied by a collapse of the number of total party members, which fell from 4.4 million in 1990 to just 1.5 million in 1996. The data for the following years are fairly unreliable but indicate, at best, a small recovery to 1.7-1.8 million members.

[121] Data on total party membership are fairly reliable up to 1992, less so until 2003 and largely inconsistent afterwards, in particular after 2006. The figures provided in the text are my estimated based on the data of the Istituto Cattaneo and other sources.

To sum up, the traditional ruling parties of the "First Republic" lost their popular support and legitimacy almost overnight but the new parties of the "Second Republic" failed to adequately replace them and after a while, under the impact of the global depression, entered in turn into a deep systemic crisis.

From the point of view of the radical left this situation represented, *in abstracto*, an unprecedented opportunity of electoral and social growth.

Firstly, the collapse of the dominant centrist bloc in 1992-1994 might have been expected to benefit the forces emerged from the traditional main opposition (the Italian Communist Party): the PDS and the PRC. This was however not the case, as the left-wing alliance of the *Progressisti* was thrashed at the 1994 general election by the alliance of new right-wing populist forces: the neo-regionalist Northern League[122], the post-fascist National Alliance[123] and Berlusconi's Forward Italy[124] (Bartolini & D'Alimonte, 1994).

Secondly, the electoral rise of the right-wing bloc did not consolidate into a long-term dominance of the country; on the contrary, each right-wing cabinet had to face a revitalised left-wing constituency, large-scale protests and swiftly declining approval ratings. Several waves of left-leaning contentious politics came into being.[125] The first and second Berlusconi government, in particular, were confronted by veritable mass movements involving oceanic demonstrations and general strikes (1994-1995, 2001-2004); the contestation of the third Berlusconi government was more dispersed but nevertheless included important student and anti-governmental mobilisations (2008-2009). The radical left was in a good position to exploit this discontent, due to its clear programmatic stance on the salient themes (welfare reform, economic policy, globalisation, peace) and its prominent involvement in the movements.

Thirdly, the rapid right-ward shift of the moderate left also offered a promising avenue of growth. At a symbolical level, the choice of the majority wing of the Italian

[122] *Lega Nord*.
[123] *Alleanza Nazionale.*
[124] *Forza Italia.*
[125] Baccaro (2003), Della Porta *et al.* (2003, 2006), Mirra (2005), Roccato and Fedi (2007), Ferrara and Jessoula (2007), Ghezzi and Guiducci (2007), Della Porta and Piazza (2008), Andruccioli (2008), Ceri (2009), Newell (2009), Fusaro and Hansen (2010), De Cindio and Peraboni (2010).

Communist Party to abandon any reference to communism (1991), ally with its former socialist and Christian democratic adversaries (1993-1996) and ultimately merge with them into generic centre-left subjects (2004-2007) was troubling for the old communist constituency (Bordandini *et al.,* 2008). More importantly, the rapid transition of the PDS/DS/PD from Eurocommunism to a Blairite "new" social democracy and a US-style left-of-the-centre force reversed all the traditional policy positions of the party and turned it into the strongest supporter of the neo-liberal modernisation of the country. Ironically, the main actors of the dismantlement of the post-war Italian social model were not the right-wing cabinets but centrist/technocratic governments supported by the post-communist left (1993-1994, 1995, 2011-2013) or proper centre-left governments (1996-2001 and 2006-2008).[126] While the wild neo-liberal rhetoric of the right often concealed political actors incapable or unwilling to undertake major policy reforms, the agency of the moderate left and its collateral trade union CGIL were vital for the implementation of most of the transformations of the period: wage restraint, welfare retrenchment, labour market flexibilisation, fiscal rigour, privatisations, electoral and constitutional reform, EU integration, foreign wars. The radical left, thus, could reasonably hope to benefit from progressively picking up those traditional left-wing themes that the Left Democrats were progressively discarding.

Was the radical left able to fill the gap of representation of labour/welfarist interests opened up by the crisis or right-ward shift of the traditional political parties? If not, why?

[126] The first group includes the cabinets Ciampi, Dini and Monti, the second group the cabinets Prodi I, D'Alema I and II, Amato II, Prodi II. The cabinet Amato I (1992-1993) was formally opposed by the PDS but with little conviction, as the left-wing trade-union confederation failed to mobilise against its austerity measures and lent a grudging support to Amato's economic policy and industrial relations reform (the July 1992 agreement). A few years later Amato was co-opted as one of the main leaders of the centre-left coalition.

4.3.3 Electoral mobilisation

The assessment of radical left mobilisation at the electoral level reveals both partial successes and important limitations.

Successes....

The best way to gauge with precision the electoral success of the radical is the study of results in all kinds of elections (lower chamber, regional, European) over a territory where data are comparable (13 regions representing 80.8% of the total Italian electorate)[127]. The evolution is reported in the figure below (FIGURE 4.9).

In complex, the Italian radical left enjoyed a mid-sized electoral support (average 7.1%, standard deviation 1.3%) with cyclical oscillations around a slightly parabolic central trend. The electoral development can be subdivided in three main phases.

In the first period (1991-1994) the left-wing currents which refused the dissolution of the Italian Communist Party and gave birth to the PRC managed to emerge and consolidate as a force weighing 6.3% of the valid votes (s.d. 0.4%). This new radical left electorate was just about a fifth of the old communist one but the development can nevertheless be regarded as a first important success.

In the second period (1995-2007) the parties of the radical left were forced to adapt to the socio-political landscape of the new "Second Republic" and its system of bi-polar competition. There is no doubt that this produced significant, albeit unstable, further gains. Average results rose to 7.9% (s.d. 0.9%), with frequent peaks around 8-9% of the valid votes (1995-1997; 2002-2006). Even in the period of relative crisis following the experience of the Prodi I government and the split of the PdCI (1998-2001) results remained higher than in the previous phase.

[127] The regions are those holding synchronised regional elections. The resulting values for the radical left are slightly higher than the real results.

FIGURE 4.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS (13 REGIONS)



Sources: my elaboration from Ministero dell'Interno.
Notes: 13 regions: Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria.

In the third period (2007-present), on the contrary, the radical left collapsed to its historical low point. The average results (5.8%, s.d. 1.1%) were only slightly inferior to the initial ones but represented a significantly smaller own electorate, as the radical left parties regularly ran within composite electoral lists including significant partners with different origins and orientations (Verdi always; the PSI in 2009; the IDV in 2013). The 2008 general election was particularly destructive, with the total plunging to 4.5% and the forces involved in supporting the Prodi II government (the Rainbow Left list) gathering just 3.1% of valid votes; the subsequent recovery was altogether weak and unstable.

The graph already provides several indications with regards to the reasons for the growth and decline of the radical left.

Firstly, the evolution appears to be strongly linked with choices of political positioning. On the one hand, the radical left slowly grows while in opposition (1992-1996; 2001-2006; 2008-2009) and is severely punished while in government (1996-1999; 2006-2008). On the other hand, however, its best results are generally obtained when running as part of a centre-left coalition (1995-1996; 2005-2006) while a choice of isolation (PRC in 1999-2001; FDS/RC in 2009-2013) tends to produce sub-standard results. Altogether, the movement shows an impressive parallelism with that of the

centre-left as a whole, with the hopes built during periods of right-wing government regularly betrayed after the electoral victory.
Secondly, the curve also appears to be related to trends in social mobilisation, with electoral peaks (1995-1996; 2004-2006) neatly following the aftermath of large left-wing contentious movements.

The electoral results of the radical left by social category presented above (TABLE 4.6) also show a certain capacity to fare well among the sectors at the receiving end of the stick of neo-liberal reforms: between 1996 and 2006, in average, it won the vote of 11.2% of blue-collar workers, 11.7% of students and 10.8% of under-25 people (but only 8.6% of white-collar workers and 8.4% of the unemployed).

A final element of interpretation is offered by the study of electoral fluxes (TABLE 4.10 and TABLE 4.11). Unfortunately, the data are incomplete and not very reliable; they may suggest some tendencies but cannot provide safe conclusions.[128] With these caveats in mind, it seems possible to confirm that the votes from and toward the radical left followed two main directions: on the one hand, the former Italian Communist party and its successors (PCI/PDS/DS/FED/PD); on the other hand, abstentionism. In 1992, around 86% of the votes of the PRC came from the former. In the period 1994-2006, the radical left gained 1.3 million votes from the PDS/DS and lost 0.4 million to abstentions. In 2008, finally, the electoral defeat was overwhelmingly due to heavy losses in both directions: 0.7 million votes toward the PD and 0.6 million votes toward abstentions.

[128] The source data of the ITANES post-electoral surveys mislabel the radical left in 1994 (it is not possible to distinguish between PRC and PDS voters) and returns a very small sample in 1992 (22 radical left voters). In 2008 the question makes reference exclusively to the Rainbow Left list but, as far left respondents did not have an alternative choice and are likely to have selected that option (the poll results of SA are unusually high compared to the real ones), results can be here cautiously interpreted as referring to the whole area. The data for 2013 have not yet been made public. The figures reported are my own estimates; due to statistical error, the large discrepancy between survey data and effective results and the need to introduce many hypotheses in the elaboration their value is only indicative.

TABLE 4.10 NET ELECTORAL FLUXES

	1987	1992	1994	1996
PARTY	**DP**	**RL**	**RL**	**RL**
Real votes	641,901	2,201,428	2,343,946	3,213,748
Net flux:				
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD		1,659,528		603,620
Other parties		-218,625		147,059
Abstention		118,902		119,123
Total		1,599,528		869,802
	2001	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**
PARTY	**RL**	**RL**	**RL**	**RL**
Real votes	2,494,762	3,113,591	1,623,072	1,949,768
Net flux:				
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD	309,282	-159,067	-688,388	
Other parties	-702,192	734,894	-203,766	
Abstention	-331,319	43,003	-598,366	
Total	-724,229	618,830	-1,490,520	

Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006).

TABLE 4.11 ORIGIN OF VOTES

	1987	1992	1994	1996
PARTY	**DP**	**RL**	**RL**	**RL**
Real votes	641,901	2,201,428	2,343,946	3,213,748
Origin:				
Radical left		4.5%		58.7%
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD		86.4%		20.3%
Other parties		0.0%		12.8%
Abstention		9.1%		8.2%
Total		100.0%		100.0%
	2001	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**
PARTY	**RL**	**RL**	**RL**	**RL**
Votes	2,494,762	3,113,591	1,623,072	1,949,768
Origin:				
Radical left	70.4%	47.4%	70.4%	
PCI/PDS/DS/Ulivo/PD	20.3%	20.2%	9.9%	
Other parties	5.7%	19.9%	11.1%	
Abstention	3.5%	12.5%	8.6%	
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006).

From the above-mentioned elements it is therefore possible to conclude that, in its best moments (1991-1993[129]; 1995-1996; 2004-2006), the Italian radical left did manage to expand its support; it also predominantly fished among the former communist electorate, the industrial working class and the precarised youth. These

[129] After its initial success at the 1992 general election (5.6%), the local elections of 1993 hinted to a further strong upward tendency, especially in the big cities (e.g. 14.6% in Torino, 11.4% in Milano, 8.9% in Napoli, 8.6% in Genova, 7.0% in Roma). The expected growth, however, did not materialise at the subsequent 1994 general election (6.1%).

dates coincide with periods of opposition to unpopular centre-right or centrist governments, strong left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations and a visible shift to the left of public opinion[130].

...limitations...

This success had however very clear limits.

Firstly, all post-1992 gains were cyclically wiped out by sudden negative swings (1993-1994, 1997-1999, 2007-20008) and, after 2009, left place to a slow but continuous decline.

Secondly, both in terms of absolute levels and of relative gains these results were comparatively weak by European standards. The electoral peak of 1996 (8.6% of valid votes, +2.5 percentage points) is not very impressive if compared to the best results of the radical left of other countries (Greece 2012: 31.9%, +19.0% points; Netherlands 2006: 16.6%, +10.2 points; Denmark 2007: 15.2%, +5.8 points; Portugal 2002-2009: 19.3%, +8.6 points; Germany 2002-2009: 12.0%, +8.0% points).

Thirdly, the votes of the radical left were well below its potential. I have already shown (TABLE 4.10) that the net gains from disaffected PDS/DS/PD voters were significant in the early 1990s but practically ceased after 1998. More generally, the radical left conquered only a small fraction of the total left potential: 15%-30% of the old communist electorate[131]; 23%-29% of the total vote for left parties; 23%-31% of all people positioning themselves on the left (FIGURE 4.12).

[130] The average self-positioning of voters (1=left, 10=right), which otherwise gravitates around the perfect middle of the political spectrum (5.50), jerked to 4.74 in 1996 and 5.07 in 2006 (see ITANES surveys).

[131] A question of the 2001 ITANES survey provides a further interesting glimpse on the patter. People declaring to have voted for the PCI at least once in the past (38% of the sample) had the following voting behaviour in 2001: PRC 12.1%; PdCI 3.6%; DS 37.8%; DL 11.4%; FI 18.3%; other parties 7.2%; abstained 9.6%.

FIGURE 4.12 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION



Source: Ministero dell'Interno; my elaboration from ITANES (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008)
Notes: RADICAL LEFT = PRC, PdCI and SA. LEFT = the above plus PDS/DS. SELF-POSITIONING: 1-10 left-right scale, included no responses; radical left = 1; left = 1-3. COMMUNIST VOTE OF 1987: PCI + DP.

The period 2001-2006 was particularly deceiving. Radical left parties played a prominent role in the extra-parliamentary movements of those years; their trademark issues (peace, alter-globalism, labour rights) acquired a large visibility; public participation to left-leaning mobilisations reached unheard-of levels. Just to mention a few examples: in 2003 almost a fifth of the electorate actively participated to anti-war protests[132] and 10.5 million people (about 28% of a typical general election electorate) voted yes to the unsuccessful referendum on the extension of safeguards against dismissal for workers of companies below fifteen employees. In both cases, the radical left was the main protagonist of the mobilisation, supported by small political allies (Verdi, IdV, DS-left) and important sections of the left-leaning and Christian associationism (CGIL, ARCI, Rete Lilliput, etc.) but in opposition to the official line of the moderate left parties (DS and DL). The majority of pacifist and labour-near voters, however, chose *not* to vote the radical left in the subsequent 2006 general election and the results of the latter remained below those of 1996.

[132] 20.4% declared to have hung out a peace flag from their balcony and 16.5% to have walked in anti-war demonstrations (Roccato & Fedi, 2007).

... and explanation

Where did the strategy of exploiting the symbolic (communist identity) and political (neo-liberal policies and centrist or conservative alliances) vacuum created by the right-ward drift of the moderate left go wrong? The answer is likely to depend on three kinds of reasons.

Firstly, the population seems to a great extent to have followed or accompanied the political-ideological shift to the right of the political system. In terms of ideological self-positioning, the overall trend of the Italian electorate is cyclical but clearly tends to the right (TABLE 4.12). The voters of the PDS/DS/PD, in particular, after some initial uneasiness have followed the cue of their party and moved to the right in synch with it (TABLE 4.13).

TABLE 4.13 EVOLUTION OF POST-COMMUNIST SELF-IDENTIFICATION AND PERCEPTION

	1994	1996	2001	2006	2008
SELF-POSITIONING					
ALL VOTERS		4.74	5.48	5.07	5.46
PDS VOTERS		2.53	3.10	-	3.68
PRC VOTERS		1.80	2.12	2.05	2.37
POSITIONING PDS					
ALL VOTERS		2.50	2.89	2.78	3.95
PDS VOTERS		2.62	2.83	-	3.68
PRC VOTERS		3.10	3.44	2.95	4.43

Source: my elaboration from ITANES (1996, 2001, 2006, 2008).
Notes: 1-10 left-right scale (1=left)

In terms of actual voting, the periodic dissatisfaction toward both old (*pentapartito*) and new (bi-polar coalitions) political system has indeed fed strong anti-establishment swings, but right-wing (Northern League, Forward Italy, National Alliance) or generic (Five Star Movement) populism benefitted much more than any left-wing variety of it.

Secondly, as the main left-of-the-centre political force and the heir of an organisation with a long tradition and strong social roots, the PDS/DS/PD successfully deployed a variety of mechanisms to retain the allegiance of a majority of the left-wing electorate. Some (especially in the 1990s) remained out of traditionalism and loyalty for the glorious communist past. Some others were convinced by the ability of the party to project a "differentiated image" to each specific segment of the electorate (e.g.

appearing as a reasonable organisation promoting wage restraint and budgetary discipline to the moderates while remaining the friend of the CGIL and of the anti-fascist partisans to the radicals). Another group stayed thanks to the pull of the weakened but still imposing network of ex-communist collateral organisations, which continued to offer an outspoken albeit critical support to the party: notably, the CGIL trade union confederation, the cooperative movement (Legacoop) and the ARCI associationism. A final group was made up of leftists fearing the victory of the right-wing bloc and willing to vote tactically for the lesser evil challenger most likely to defeat it. The working of bipolarism and anti-Berlusconism favoured the moderate left all along the period 1994-2008 but the effect of tactical voting was particularly visible in the 2008 election, when 55.9% of self-identified radical left voters preferred the avowedly centrist Democratic Party to other more coherent options (ITANES, 2008)

Thirdly, the radical left failed to fully exploit the opportunities which presented themselves to it.

The big problem was here the growing enmeshing of the parties in the dynamics of bipolar competition and their participation to centre-left governmental coalitions. The general weakness of the centre-left camp meant that the help of the radical left was generally indispensable to win the elections and to form a governmental majority. Programmatically, there was little ground of agreement between the two sides. A long list of important reasons, however, pushed in this direction: the strongly-felt rejection of the right among the radical left members and voters; the fear to be squeezed by an anti-right tactical voting in case of the choice an excessively intransigent stance (which, indeed, in part explains the defeat of the SA in 2008); the pressure of radical left elected representatives, many of whom owed their parliamentary seats and governmental or other offices to a policy of alliances and who were often prepared to jump ship to retain them (as indeed happened in 1995, 1998 and 2009); an over-optimistic view of the possibility to influence the centre-left landscape from the inside. In the end, the conciliatory line progressively gained ground.

This had two consequences. On the one hand, the radical left greatly undermined its long-term credibility in campaigning against neo-liberal reforms (for the implementation of which it was partially responsible) and precluded itself the chance of growing through an aggressive campaign against both centre-left and centre-right

poles (which the 1992-1994 and 2008-2013 conjunctures might have offered). On the other hand, the gains made during periods of ferment and extra-parliamentary mobilisation against right-wing governments (1996; 2006) were regularly wiped out after its participation to centre-left majorities (1998; 2008).

Could different tactical and strategic choices have yielded different results?

The answer to this question remains uncertain. On the one hand, it can be argued that the unprecedented level of governmental involvement of the parties in the years 2006-2008 (direct participation to the national cabinet and to the cabinets of 14 regions, ruling over 65.4% of the Italian population) was the main cause of the subsequent collapse in 2008. A more radical stance of anti-systemic opposition might have put the radical left in a better position to exploit the fallouts of the global financial crisis and the rise of anti-establishment revulsion against both traditional blocs.

On the other hand, it is not sure that this course was actually viable. All attempts to create a more radical alternative to the left of the PRC (1996-1998; 2006-2009) were short-lived and of little consequence. The choice of running alone and outside of a centre-left alliance might lead to some mid-term gains (as the 1998-2003 course of the PRC suggests) but meant the immediate short-term forfeiture of the voters most sensible to the need to defeat the right and inevitable organisational splits. Finally, the squeeze due to an anti-right useful vote proved to be serious enough in 2001, 2008 and 2013 but would have probably been much stronger after periods of unpopular right-wing government, threatening the ability of the parties to gain parliamentary representation.

In conclusion, it seems that the Italian radical left was both the victim of an unfavourable political environment and an agent of its own demise. Its main weak point was its inability to pursue a coherent politics of alliances, which progressively disoriented its own constituency and led to a growing organisational fragmentation (Cannavò, 2009). The scope for an autonomous stance, however, was significantly narrowed by the post-1993 electoral laws (with its 4%-threshold, its pre-electoral coalition formation and its majoritarian incentives) and the strong polarisation of the political competition.

4.3.4 Organisational mobilisation

The results of radical left mobilisation at the organisational level were largely inferior to the electoral ones. Like the rest of the European radical left, the Italian parties were incapable to respond effectively to the crisis of the Fordist organisational models and to turn a vague popular sympathy toward their political programmes into more intense forms of attachment and activism.

The results in terms of membership were lukewarm.

As already remarked, the total number of members of Italian political parties suffered a veritable collapse in the early Nineties (from 4.5 million members in 1990 to 1.5 million in 1995) but somewhat recovered afterwards (between 1.7 and 2.0 million). In the case of the PCI/PDS/DS/PD, the party halved from 1990 (1,273 thousand) to 1993 (690 thousand) and continued a slower decline to this day (2012: 505 thousand), with the exception of an extraordinary but short-lived bout of enthusiasm provoked by the establishment of the Democratic Party in 2007. Despite this opportunity (see FIGURE 4.14) the parties of the radical left gained very little until 2007 and drastically declined afterwards.

FIGURE 4.14 MEMBERSHIP OF POST-COMMUNIST PARTIES



On the positive side, the radical left membership avoided the early decline and aging typical of all traditional and post-communist parties (including the DS) and remained fairly responsive to changes in its electoral influence, growing in 1991-1993, 1996-1997 and 2002-2006 and declining in 1994, 1998-2000 and 2007-present.
On the negative side, it remained dwarfed by its post-communist competitor and (with the exception of the founding period in 1991-1992) it failed to attract significant numbers of its disaffected members and activists.

The results in terms of organisational linkages were as well not particularly positive.
In Italy the networks of collateral mass civil society organisations did not generally follow the collapse of their traditional political referents and usually managed to reinvent themselves as less politicised interest groups and service providers. This is notably the case of the trade union confederations CGIL, CISL and UIL, which lost following and legitimacy in the workplaces but compensated for it by growing in absolute terms, thanks to the massive influx of pensioners, and by preserving or expanding their role in the system of industrial relations.[133] In this context, the influence of the PRC started from weak initial positions and tended to stagnate or wane over time.
Within the main left-wing trade union confederation CGIL, the PRC had at its moment of maximum influence in 1996 the support of 13.7% of union members and no secretariat members; conversely, the PDS could boast 44.9% of the former and 75% of the latter.[134] The trade union left, which embraced cadres loyal to the radical left, the PDS-left and other extra-parliamentary groups, remained relatively weak (10-25% of congress votes), fragmented in rival tendencies[135] and jealous of its autonomy from any partisan intervention (Cremaschi, 2000; Ghezzi & Guiducci, 2007; Andruccioli,

[133] The ICTWSS database (Visser, 2013) estimates a drop of "net" union density from a peak of 50.5% in 1976 to 38.8% in 1990 and 33.2% in 2006, followed by a small recovery in the following period of economic crisis. In absolute terms, however, the three major confederations (CGIL, CISL, UIL) grew from 8.2 million members in 1976 to 10.1 million in 1990 and 12.2 million in 2010.
[134] The secretariat did generally include at least one member of the minority left-wing tendency, but this tended to be either a member of the DS left (1991-1996) or an independent (1998-2007; 2010-present). Dalmasso (2002: 66) also reports a figure of 470 card-carrying PRC officials of the CGIL in 1997 (2.9% of the total 16 thousand).
[135] The main groups were the following: Fausto Bertinotti's *Essere Sindacato* (1991-1996), Gianpaolo Patta's *Alternativa Sindacale* (1996-2000) and *Lavoro Società* (2000-2007), Ferruccio Danini's *Area dei Comunisti* (1996-2000), Giorgio Cremaschi's *Rete28Aprile* (2005-present), and the left-wing majority of the FIOM (1997-present).

2008; Lacoppola, 2010). The parties, in turn, failed to define a coherent union policy and to launch with their union allies effective industrial or political mobilisations.

The situation was similar in other sectors. On the one hand, the former ancillary organisations of the PCI, the pacifist and environmental movement, the world of charities and NGOs remained largely dominated by bureaucracies faithful to the moderate left parties (PDS/DS, DL and PD). On the other hand, the more radical galaxy of post-operaist grass-roots trade unions and *centri sociali* (Mudu, 2004 and 2012; Choi & Mattoni, 2010) was friendlier but numerically limited, fragmented and easily alienated.[136] The only field where the PRC did make a breakthrough was the alter-globalist and pacifist movement: here the party managed to play a dominant role and to win a large sympathy among the activist community (Della Porta *et al*., 2003 and 2006)[137]. Even in this case, however, the success was short-lived. The party member Vittorio Agnoletto was indeed selected as spokesperson of the Genova Social Forum (2001) and of the Italian Social Forum (2002-2004), two loose consensus-based national coordinating bodies which encompassed most of the centre-left spectrum of Italian civil society. The individual member organisations however (most of whom dominated by the DS or DL) never relinquished much control to it and, as the movement ebbed in 2004-2005, the centrality of the radical left rapidly evaporated leaving behind little traces.

In a nutshell, the radical left failed to exploit the crisis of the mass parties of the "first republic". Its membership levels and organisational linkages remained medium-weak and no match for its post-communist rival.

As for the electoral dimension the radical left failed to offer a convincing solution to the wide-spread dissatisfaction of the "people of the left" which, instead of radicalising, turned to lesser-evilism or resignation and disengagement. The good relations of sympathy and collaboration developed at the peak of the alter-globalist and pacifist movement with mass organisations (FIOM, CGIL, ARCI, UDS/UDU), thematic networks (*Genova Social Forum* and *Italian Social Forum*, *Tavola della Pace*,

[136] Several groups were quite friendly to the PRC in the early 1990s and early 2000s but broke with it during its periods of governmental participation: e.g. the leadership teams of the grass-roots unions SLAI COBAS, RdB/USB and Conf. COBAS.

[137] A survey conducted during the Genova counter-summit, for instance, returned a strong proximity of respondents with the PRC (63.5%) and a low one for the DS (10.2%).

Forum del Terzo Settore) and party-political groups (the left-wing tendencies of DS and DL) could not trump traditional post-communist and Christian-democratic allegiances and the call of anti-Berlusconism: at every critical juncture both apparatuses and members either refused to jump ship, falling back to the Left Democrats and the Democratic Party[138], or left disillusioned.[139] The radical left thus remained weakly rooted in the strategic sites of class struggle (notably, the workplaces and the trade unions), incapable of igniting mass mobilisations against the centre-left governments (whereas the CGIL continued to be able to undermine right-wing ones) and prisoner of big and small autonomous civil society bureaucracies.

4.3.5 Conclusion

The "Bolognina turn" of 1989-1991 (Ignazi, 1992; Liguori, 2009) marked the end of the history of 20th century communism in Italy, one of the countries where this tradition had obtained the largest societal weight and the best policy results.

The neo-communist currents which came together in 1991 to form the PRC managed to carve up a medium-small political area from its ruins; in the medium-long term, however, they failed to revive the prospects of an anti-capitalist alternative and to profit from a series of negative but potentially favourable developments: the collapse of the traditional political parties (1991-1995); the transformation of their post-communist cousins (1991-2007); the renewed crisis of the party system (2008-present); a context marked by economic stagnation and neo-liberal reforms.

[138] The example of the CGIL is indicative. In 1989 four out of seven communist members of the secretariat were against the Bolognina turn and close to the left-wing Ingrao minority, but none joined the PRC in 1991. In 2006, again, four out of nine DS members of the secretariat sympathised with the left-wing Mussi minority, but by 2008 no member of *Sinistra Democratica* remained.

[139] The two classic examples are the end of the PCI in 1989-1993 (at least 600,000 members were lost and did not continue to be active either in the PDS or in the PRC) and the revulsion against concertative line of the official trade unions in 1992-1995 (these lost hundreds of thousands of active members but very few switched over to the radical grass-roots unions).

As indicated in FIGURE 4.15, the societal weight of the radical left followed a pattern of very moderate growth until 2006 but suffered a serious setback afterwards[140]. This is unlikely to change in the short term.

FIGURE 4.15 INDICATORS OF influence



Notes: share of the total electorate

[140] It must be here reminded again that the electoral data for the last two elections are somewhat overstated, as the list computed included non-communist allies (Greens in 2008; Greens and IdV in 2013).

4.4 Explaining rising fragmentation and failed regroupment

The Italian radical left followed a trajectory which brought it from an initial period of regroupment and hegemony of the PRC (1991-1994) to a progressively growing organisational fragmentation (1995-2013). How can this development be explained?

Like their European counterparts, the Italian radical parties were faced by one major and one minor dilemma.

The first dilemma was the relationship to be taken toward the centre-left camp. Should the radical left embrace a clear-cut attitude, choosing to be strategically independent and alternative or on the contrary to be a constituent part of it? Should it instead pragmatically choose on a case-by-case basis, oscillating between tactical alliances and temporary breaks? Politically, the gulf between the anti-neoliberal or anti-capitalist aspirations of the former and the modernisation project of the latter was huge and never ceased to grow, projecting a farcical light on the idea of a programmatic alliance. Radical and moderate left advanced diametrically opposite solutions to all major policy choices faced by the country: state economic intervention vs. disengagement; wage push vs. restraint; welfare expansion vs. retrenchment; military neutralism vs. intervention. Attempts to reach a substantial compromise and govern together (1995-2001; 2006-2008) were inevitably marred by continuous frictions and ambiguities and only survived thanks to the choice of sections of the radical left to give up their demands, engage in degrading efforts to mitigate or spin the scope and pace of neo-liberal reforms and resign themselves to support the "lesser evil". On the other hand, good political reasons pushed for some sort of alliance: a) the determination to defeat the right-wing coalition which, because of its history, ideological positions and social foundations, elicited a widespread and fierce rejection among the left-wing constituency; b) the desire not to cut one's ties with those important sections of the centre-left constituency which shared some or many anti-neoliberal values; c) the hope (or wishful thinking) in one's ability to outmanoeuvre the

leadership of the moderate left and pressure it into significant concessions.[141] This issue was the source of most internal conflicts between radical left tendencies and organisations.

The second dilemma was represented by the tension between ideological and organisational self-sufficiency and radical left regroupment. Was the PRC and its project to "refound communism" adequate to hegemonise the political space of the radical left and to exploit the emerging gaps of political representation on the left of the centre-left bloc? Or, on the contrary, did a further expansion and regroupment of the radical left necessitate a broader image and a front with other political cultures and organisations, including the downplaying or abandonment of its communist identity? From the point of view of a mid-term anti-neoliberal programme the communist characterisation was fairly insubstantial and proved to represent an obstacle to the dialogue with potential allies. At the same time, it was a key and emotionally-charged element of symbolic identification for an organisation born in the fire of the battle against the change of name of the Italian Communist Party in 1989-1991.

What made these dilemmas particularly intractable was the tremendous pressure (unusual in other European countries) exerted by the new post-1993 political system.

On the one hand, the new electoral laws[142] which replaced the previous system of almost perfect proportional representation severely punished smaller non-aligned forces and strongly encouraged the establishment of a bi-polar competition between heterogeneous centre-left and centre-right alliances. Key elements of the lower chamber legislation were the following: a medium-sized electoral threshold (4%) for independent parties; the possibility to establish pre-electoral alliances; large majoritarian incentives to the "winning" coalition at the constituency (1994-2005) or

[141] For instance through parliamentary blackmail, an alliance with social movements and the DS-left or, more recently, the tool of open primary elections.

[142] For general elections see L. 276.1993 and L. 277/1993 (*Mattarellum*) and L. 270/2005 (*Porcellum*). The reformed laws on regional (L. 43/1995) and local (L. 81/1993) elections also introduced majoritarian and pro-coalition mechanisms.

national (2006-present) level[143]; strong incentives to small parties to join one of these coalitions[144]; a strong moral pressure on the same not to play the part of the "spoiler". On the other hand the weakness of the left, *in primis* the post-communist DS, made the contribution of both centrist forces (DL, RI, UDEUR) and of the radical left vital for the electoral victory and parliamentary survival of centre-left governing coalitions. The radical left, therefore, could not afford itself the luxury of abstaining from the main bi-polar competition and carry on a frontal opposition to both centre-right and centre-left cabinets: this choice was possible, but it would have automatically implied a long-term political hegemony of Berlusconi's right-wing coalition.

The PRC sought to respond to this situation by devising complex tactics which could make the victory of the centre-left possible while maintaining a degree of political independence and alternative profile. One option was to reach merely technical pre-electoral alliances, such as mutual (*desistenza,* 1996) or unilateral (*non-belligeranza,* 2001) standing-down agreements in the constituency seats; this possibility was scrapped by the electoral reform of 2005 and, anyway, in case of an electoral victory of the centre-left a subsequent parliamentary support was still likely to be required to build a viable governmental majority. Another option was not to join the centre-left cabinets directly but to support them externally on a case-by-case basis (CU in 1995, PRC in 1996-1998, PRC rebels in 2006-2008); this fiction, however, had sooner or later to give way to the hard choice between voting unpalatable policies, thus demoralising its own constituency (e.g. the PRC in 1996-1998 and 2006-2008), or toppling the government, thus exposing itself to a public outcry and the charge of letting the right-wing back in power (e.g. the PRC in 1998 or SC in 2007-2008).

In the end, the centrifugal pressures originating within the radical left constituency and in the broader political environment produced their inevitable outcome: painful right-

[143] The *Mattarellum* attributed 75% of the seats to first-past-the-post single-member constituencies; the *Porcellum* had instead a more proportional framework with a variable coalition premium at the national (*Camera*) or regional (*Senato*) level. Depending on the electoral results, this could oscillate from low to very high levels: it amounted to 5.3% of first chamber seats in 2006, 8.3% in 2008 and 29.7% in 2013.

[144] The *Mattarellum* offered the opportunity to bargain with the potential partners and be granted "safe" constituency seats. The *Porcellum,* on the other hand, offered to parties within a coalition lower and more accessible electoral thresholds (2% of valid votes; in addition, the "best loser" of each coalition was granted representation regardless of its results) and the proportional sharing-out of the majority premium.

wing or left-wing organisational splits at every crucial turn (1995, 1996, 1998, 2006 and 2008) and a progressive separation of the different sensibilities, which in other countries managed to pull off a more or less civil coexistence (e.g. Germany with DIE LINKE or more recently France with the *Front de Gauche*), in rival parties and grouplets.

The unfortunate fate of the various projects of regroupment was also largely tributary of the above-mentioned centrifugal pressures. Time and time again attempts were made to unite the PRC and other radical left tendencies (its own dissidences, the DS left, the Greens and various civil society and social movement actors) under a common organisational framework. The most important were the following: (i) the *Costituente per l'Alternativa* (1993) promoted by the recent PDS defectors Pietro Ingrao and Fausto Bertinotti together with *il Manifesto* newspaper; (ii) the 1999 talks between *il Manifesto,* the PRC and other recent DS runaways (Lucio Magri, the ARS of Aldo Tortorella and Giuseppe Chiarante), which led to the establishment of the journal of debate *Rivista del Manifesto* (1999-2004); (iii) the half-hearted attempts (2001-2004) of Vittorio Agnoletto, Luca Casarini and Fausto Bertinotti to transform the alter-globalisation movement into a full-fledged political subject; (iv) the attempt of the *Lavoro e Libertà* association (2003), promoted by Tortorella (ARS), Gian Paolo Patta (CGIL left), Gianni Rinaldini (FIOM) and Cesare Salvi (DS left), to give a political outlet to the labour mobilisations of the period; (v) the *Forum Programmatico per una Alternativa di Governo* (2003-2004), promoted by Gian Paolo Patta (CGIL left), which sought to federate PRC, PdCI, Verdi and DS-left; (vi) the *Camera di Consultazione della Sinistra* (2004-2005), promoted by the ex-DS professor Alberto Asor Rosa, which had the same goal; (vii) the *Sezione italiana della Sinistra Europea* (2004-2007), promoted by Fausto Bertinotti (PRC), which sought to combine PRC, the group of Pietro Folena (DS left) and social movement activists; (viii) the *Costituente della Sinistra* (2007-2008), promoted by the *girotondino* professor Paul Ginsborg, which again aimed at regrouping all radical left parties in a joint electoral cartel; (ix) the *Sinistra Arcobaleno* (2008), which for the first time succeeded in regrouping all above-mentioned subjects under a common electoral cartel but resoundingly crashed at the general election and fell apart soon afterwards.

While the programmatic commonalities between these groups were large, an agreed-upon strategic line proved to be elusive. The main stumbling block to unity was, of course, the question of its collocation *vis-à-vis* the centre-left coalition.

In the period 1998-2003 few groups were tempted by an alliance with the PRC, locked in an attitude of hostility toward the national centre-left. It was only after its decision to re-join the alliance (2004-2008) that the projects of cooperation could become more credible and concrete, ultimately leading to the (short-lived) experience of the Rainbow Left electoral coalition. After 2008, finally, the division between more "conciliatory" and more "intransigent" wings resurfaced with force both between and within each party, contributing to the general organisational crisis of the area.

Cannavò (2009) correctly underlines the responsibility of the leadership of the PRC in sabotaging all attempts of the second period and in agreeing to the alliance too late and at the worst possible moment, when a favourable external mood had already given way to a the climate of disillusionment toward the Prodi II government (2006-2008). A united radical left coalition between 2004 and 2006 might indeed have experienced a stronger growth of electoral weight and influence; the collapse at the subsequent 2008 election, however, would have been equally likely.

4.5 The strategy of left-ward pull

The final topic I wish to analyse is the success of the radical left in exerting an actual influence of Italian politics and society. Were the party successful in creating the conditions for an implementation of their mid-term anti-neoliberal and long-term anti-capitalist goals?

As elsewhere in Europe most of the parties (PRC, PdCI, SEL) followed a *strategy of left-ward pull*, attempting to use a growth of their support and a broadening of their alliances to influence the political line of the moderate left and gradually push it to revert to its traditional post-war social constituency, values and policy planks. Only the small far left grouplets tended to envisage a *strategy of anti-capitalist alternative* where working-class self-organisation and mobilisation would by-pass the centre-left and lead to the conquest of power and a rupture with capitalism.

As I already showed in section 4.2.3, each party adopted a distinctive vision of the kinds of pressures and devices most likely to lead to the wished-for aim. Under the leadership of Fausto Bertinotti, the PRC followed a path of *dynamic left-ward pull* which foresaw sharp tactical turns, moments of alliance followed by moments of contraposition and a strong reliance on extra-parliamentary mobilisations (Cannavò, 2009). It was also fairly optimistic on the possibility of reversing the right-ward shift and alliances of the DS, bringing about a "new reform course" (PRC, 1996) and the first elements of an "alternative of society" (PRC, 2005) and paving the way for the subsequent stage of the "transformation of capitalist society" (PRC, 2005). The PdCI, on the contrary, followed a rather pessimistic strategy of *conciliatory left-ward pressure,* convinced of the inescapable necessity of a long-term support to the centre-left as a "trench" (PdCI, 2008) against the greater evil and as the most advanced political landscape for the pursuit of realistic compromises. SEL, finally, shared a similar strategic view but for most of its existence gambled on a *friendly leveraged buy-out* of the centre-left through the participation of its popular leader Nichi Vendola and other party-near personalities to the mechanism of open primary elections (Venturino, 2007; Damiani, 2011; Fiorini & Venturino, 2011; Corbetta & Vignati, 2013).

Unfortunately, none of the parties managed to turn its mobilisation into tangible political influence. The post-communist "cousins" of the PDS, far from being pulled to the left by their more radical allies and competitors, have continued on a steady right-ward trajectory which has included not only the support of neo-liberal governments (1993, 1995, 1996-2001, 2006-2008) and an alliance with centrist and technocratic forces but sometimes went as far as embracing the model of "grand coalition" with the opposing right-wing camp (the *Bicamerale* commission of 1997-1998, the Monti and Letta cabinets of 2011-2013). The activity of the radical left parties within the successive governing coalition has failed to achieve any significant policy turn and has on the contrary eroded the credibility and support of their proponents; at the same time, the choice of a more radical stance of opposition to centre-left cabinets (COBAS and CCA in 1996-1998; PRC in 1998-2001; PCL and PdAC in 2006-2008) has not yielded better results in the short-term, as the exertion of effective extra-parliamentary pressures was paralysed by the fear of the trade union apparatuses and even of many radical activists to weaken "their" governments. The hypothesis of the conquest of the centre-left through the mechanism of the open primaries, finally, has failed to produce significant results at the national level.[145]

What was the reason of this generalised failure?

Clearly, the most important explanatory factor is the insufficient amount of electoral, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressure that the radical left parties were able to deploy.

With an average of 6.6% and a peak of 8.6% of valid votes (general elections), their electoral results were unpleasant for the centre-left but never threatened its position. The PDS/DS in particular realised that, first, the weight of its radical allies always remained inferior to that of its centrist ones and, second, the losses to its left could be fairly easily compensated by gains on its right. Unlike some of its European

[145] In 2005 Fausto Bertinotti (PRC) stopped at 631,592 votes (14.7%); in 2012 Nichi Vendola (SEL) stopped at 485,689 votes (15.6%). At the local level, where stakes, participation and controls were lower, radical left and other "outsider" personalities did better: Nichi Vendola (PRC then SEL) won twice the primary for the presidency of the Puglia region in 2005 and 2010 and the primaries for big cities mayoralties in 2011 returned a few surprise victories for candidates close to SEL (Cagliari, Milano, Genova).

counterparts, the Italian radical left never managed to feed on the corpse of a discredited centre-left (e.g. forcefully opposing unpopular left-leaning governments) but rather tended to rise and fall together with it.

The use of electoral and parliamentary tactics seemed a more promising avenue, as the radical left effectively played the role of one of the kingmakers of the centre-left coalition and its support was indispensable for the victory and survival of centre-left governments. This card, however, was partially undermined by the extreme reluctance in its ranks to push the bargaining up to a point of rupture. Whenever the PRC leadership chose to topple a centre-left cabinet (Dini in 1995 and Prodi in 1998), dissidents within its parliamentary group broke ranks, ensured its survival and formed a break-away organisation. Moreover, the fear to be perceived as the "spoiler" and be squeezed by tactical voting (up to the loss of parliamentary representation) was exaggerated but not without grounds.

Extra-parliamentary pressures, finally, proved to be effective in influencing the political agenda only when they managed to involve the trade unions in large-scale mobilisations against seating right-wing governments. Two cases of this kind stand out: 1994, when the three confederations forced the Berlusconi I cabinet to backtrack on a proposed pension reform and ultimately led to its downfall few months later (Ferrera & Jessoula, 2007), and 2002-2003, when the CGIL effectively stopped a reform of the safeguards against unfair dismissal.[146] When the unions were not on board, however, the movements tended to be absent or ineffective. And this was precisely the biggest problem for the radical left as the CGIL, tightly controlled by a DS-near leadership, always refused to mobilise against seating centre-left/centrist governments and gave its consent to all their landmark neo-liberal policies: in particular, the highly damaging and unpopular July Agreements of 1992-1993, pension reforms of 1995, 2007 and 2011 and labour market reforms of 1997 and 2012. While the radical parties loudly complained against these developments, they did not have the means to transform the widespread unease on the ground into organised resistance.[147]

---

[146] The article 18 of the Workers' Statute (L. 300/1970). An experimental 3-years reform was agreed in principle by the government with the rival trade union confederations (*Patto per l'Italia*, 5 July 2002) but never implemented in practice.

[147] The contestation against the official trade union policies peaked in the period 1992-1995, when union leaders were regularly hit by missiles during public rallies and union referenda returned a minority yet quite strong opposition (26.1% in 1993; 37.5% in 1995). However, the two natural outlets of this left-

More specifically, the Italian radical left has been incapable to contribute to the renewal and revival of class struggle at the point of production, retreating toward the easier but less effective terrains of electoral, institutional, cultural and street mobilisation.

Following the defeats of the late 1970s-early 1980s workplace conflict has continued its long-term downward trend (see FIGURE 4.16).

FIGURE 4.16 LABOUR CONFLICT



Source: my elaboration from ISTAT.
Notes: index, 1976 = 100.

According to ISTAT data[148] the average yearly number of working hours lost for strikes has collapsed over the last three decades: from 162.8 million (1969-1976) and 86.9 million (1977-1983) to 24.7 million (1984-1990) and just 6.6 million (1991-2009). While the traditional forms of organisation and conflict within medium-large industrial companies have gradually lost their strength, the diffuse and fragmented workforce of

wing dissatisfaction (the new grass-roots trade unions and the left tendencies of the CGIL) both failed to fully benefit from the conjuncture and ultimately remained fragmented and confined to small fringes of the workforce. The latter never got more than a quarter of the votes at the CGIL national congresses. The former encompassed in 2011-2012 in their stronghold, the public services, only 2.4% of union members and 3.9% of voters in professional elections (RSU works councils).

[148] The methodology is known to exclude political conflicts and to strongly underreport the overall levels of conflict. The bias is also likely to have grown over time. The general trend, however, is not in question.

small companies, of the tertiary sector and with atypical employment contracts has yet to find effective ways to pursue its collective interests (Choi & Mattoni, 2010).Until these trends will be reversed, there is little hope of a significant left-ward shift of either the social or the political relations of force. The contribution of the radical left to this task, however, has been limited and of decreasing value.

4.6 Conclusions

The analysis of the contemporary Italian radical left has highlighted the large breaks which separate its member parties from its pre-1989 predecessors.

The transformations of advanced capitalist economies and societies, the crisis and collapse of the Soviet model of state socialism, the defeats and fragmentation of the traditional labour movement and the shift to the right of the political-ideological climate have had important consequences. Following a different path in each Western European country, a "new" radical left has tentatively emerged from the ruins of the 20th century left of communist, socialist and *gauchiste* persuasion. The discontinuities – ideological, sociological, organisational, strategic and systemic – have generally been stronger than the elements of continuity.

From the point of view of their political nature, the parties of the Italian radical left can be characterised as predominantly *anti-neoliberal parties.*

Until recently all parties have re-affirmed their communist and anti-capitalist identity (with the exception of SEL, whose links with this party family are gradually loosening and who might soon join the European Socialist Party). This choice, however, has rarely had much concrete bearing on their political activity, which has essentially focused on reconciling two kinds of appeal: the representation of the interests of broad salaried strata in the defence and expansion of the legacies of the post-war Fordist-welfarist compromise and the promotion of post-1968 left-libertarian values (feminism, environmentalism, minority rights and solidarity). This mid-term anti-neoliberal programme was broadly confirmed by the parties' socio-demographic composition, which attracted a broad spectrum of social groups but saw an over-proportional weight of the social categories which were supposed to benefit most from their proposals: traditional manual workers and state employees, students and the precarious youth and university graduates. The parties have however showed a marked difficulty in reaching out to the fragmented workforce of the post-Fordist small enterprise, to the long-term unemployed and to women.

From the point of view of their *societal weight,* the balance sheet of more than two decades of political activity is mixed. The Italian radical left has gravitated, with cyclical oscillations, around a roughly parabolic trajectory: from an initial phase of growth (until 1996) to one of stagnation and finally of decline (after 2006). The gains won during periods of parliamentary opposition *and* large social mobilisation against the right (1992-3, 1994-1996, 2001-2004) have been regularly wiped out by the bewilderment which followed its support to centre-left governments. The electoral and organisational supremacy of the other post-communist organisation (PDS/DS/PD) on the left camp has never been seriously threatened or dented. Their overall weight (electoral, parliamentary, governmental and organisational) has never gone beyond that of a medium-small political area.

From the point of view of *fragmentation,* the initial regroupment of different tendencies around the PRC has gradually given way to a fragmentation in a variety of rival organisations separated by strategic, ideological and material disagreement and whose regroupment is unlikely to take place anytime soon.

The efforts to fill the vacuum created by the right-ward shift of the main left-of-the-centre party (PDS/DS/PD) and of the rest of the political system have been rewarded by some limited short-term success but have failed in the long term. Why?

The analysis of section 3.3 clearly reveals that two factors have an immediate influence on the success of the radical left: the presence of strong (especially labour-based) left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations plays a positive role while the involvement in centre-left governmental coalition plays a negative one. On these certain foundations it is possible to develop a broader, albeit more conjectural, interpretation of its historical trajectory.

On the one hand, the weakest point of the Italian radical left has clearly been its increasing cooptation within the centre-left pole of the new bi-polar competition. This development, in particular the ever growing involvement in the external support or direct participation to national and local centre-left governmental coalition, has undermined the credibility of its cultural-political battles in favour of the defence and expansion of the traditional welfare state and its anti-establishment profile, leading to a long-term loss of political profile and popular support.

Although this outcome is in part the result of strategic mistakes of the leadership of the different parties, which have underestimated the strength of the neo-liberal drive and overestimated their capacity of exerting an influence on state policies, it was also largely over-determined by the constraints and incentives of the post-1994 political system.

The experience of other European countries shows that leading a radical opposition against an unpopular centre-left government can – under certain conditions – help to consolidate the radical left and increase its electoral support. The problem in Italy was that a left victory might have never occurred without the contribution of the more radical forces and that these were exposed to stronger environmental pressures and had less room for manoeuvre than most of their Western European counterparts. The fundamental dilemma between programmatic coherence and anti-right unity could not be defused or fudged; the centre-left coalition always required their electoral and parliamentary support if it wanted to have any chance of coming to power (unlike France) and in general actively requested it, thus laying the blame for an eventual defeat squarely at their door (unlike Germany). Moreover, the majoritarian electoral system placed a heavy material price on an eventual isolationist choice, including the risk of losing its parliamentary representation. Finally the appeal of anti-Berlusconism, which was very strong among its actual and potential constituency, further pulled it toward a conciliatory strategy.

The immediate roots of the current crisis of the Italian radical left are clearly related to its unprecedented level of governmental involvement in the mid-2000s, both at the national (Prodi II cabinet, 2006-2008) and at the regional level. In the public perception it thus became fully responsible for the deceiving policies of the centre-left and part of the political establishment, with the effect of demobilising its own constituency and paving the way for the emergence of new populist parties. The leadership of the PRC bears heavy responsibilities for this outcome; its progressive return toward a politics of centre-left alliances after the break of 1998-1999 (in 2000 at the local level and in 2003-2004 at the national level) prevented a consolidation of the party on a line of radical opposition to both main poles. It cannot be stated for certain, however, if an

intransigent strategy would have been actually viable at that time, when the pressures toward left unity and the threat of the "useful vote" were at their strongest.[149]

On the other hand, the radical left has not been able to channel the non-negligible degree of dissatisfaction against the neo-liberal transition into effective forms of collective resistance.

At an electoral-parliamentary level, both conciliatory and intransigent strategies seemed incapable to exert any meaningful influence on the pace and direction of the reforms (the latter more than the former). At the level of *political* extra-parliamentary mobilisations, the trade union movement repeatedly proved to be the only social subject which could wage large-scale and successful campaigns (1994-1995, 2002-2003). However, the hold of the PDS over its collateral trade union confederation CGIL meant that the latter showed militancy under right-wing cabinets but was glad to accept demoralising compromises under centre-left or centrist ones. Radical unionists proved entirely powerless in contrasting this moderate course (in particular, the 1992-1993 turn toward wage moderation). At the level of *immediate* class conflicts, neither the moderate nor the radical trade unionists managed to find a way to reach out to the fragmented workforce of the small industry and tertiary services, focusing on minimising the damages for their core constituency in the big companies and in the public sector. The brief flares of left-wing contestation of neo-liberalism thus tended to rapidly turn not toward radicalisation but rather toward demoralisation, disengagement, diminishing expectations and, in the worst cases, the pursuit of populist scapegoats (Southerners, migrants, politicians).

Again, it is probable that a different outcome was out of the reach of the small forces of the radical left, depending as it does on structural features of advanced capitalist development and the long-term effects of the labour defeats of the late 1970s. Could a stronger emphasis on workplace politics and a clearer trade union strategy have helped the parties to act as a break to some negative tendencies? Their progressive shift of focus away from labour activism and the fragmentation and indiscipline of their

[149] The movements of 2001-2004 had induced a widespread rejection of the seating right-wing government but had generally failed to obtain concrete results and to provoke its downfall; all expectations were therefore pinned on an electoral alternation. The new electoral law of 2005 (*Porcellum*), moreover, was explicitly designed to encourage broad alliances and to punish non-aligned forces.

trade unionists certainly did not help. A unique window of opportunity was probably represented by the years 1992-1995, when the large grass-roots opposition to wage and pension reforms might have led to important organisational developments. In this occasion the union left proved to be indecisive and divided[150] and the dissent was quickly controlled and neutralised (Baccaro, 2006; Leonardi, 2013).

In conclusion, the efforts of the Italian radical left to survive, to thrive and to exert a left-ward pull on the political and social relations of force proved self-defeating. Despite some limited and short-lived successes, this political area failed to become a serious competitor of the moderate left and ultimately followed it on its course of societal weakening, identity crisis and political moderation. In 2008, after almost two decades of existence, it ceased to be a medium-small but relevant national political player and drifted toward fragmentation and marginality. It does not seem in a condition to recover its role anytime soon.

[150] In particular, the division between supporters of the emerging radical grass-roots unions and those who chose to fight a factional battle within the CGIL (*Essere Sindacato*) proved extremely damaging.
.

CHAPTER FIVE. THE FRENCH RADICAL LEFT: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

5.1 The national context

The French radical left is simultaneously the strongest and the most fragmented of the three case studies.

Orthodox communism and its heterodox variants have left a deep mark on the electoral, social and intellectual history of the country (*Cahiers Leon Trotsky,* 79/2002; Becker & Candar, 2005; Martelli, 2009 and 2010). While the golden age of 1936-1979, with its mass influence and defining moments (the Popular Front, the Resistance, May 1968), gave way to a steep crisis and decline during the 1980s, the post-1989 developments nevertheless remain the object of much interest and of an immense bibliography.[151] This attention is not entirely unwarranted, as the radical left has repeatedly proven to retain an important weight in electoral and institutional politics, in the intellectual debate and in extra-parliamentary mobilisations.

Despite the absence of a clear organisational break in the period 1989-1991, the face of the contemporary French radical left has steadily changed over time.
The hold of the French Communist Party (PCF)[152] over this political area has progressively waned to the benefit of far left and other alternative organisations (Courtois & Lazar, 1995; Lavabre & Platone, 2003; Andolfatto, 2005; Pudal, 2007; Martelli 2010 and 2012).

[151] See Souillard and Carreau (2011) for the PCF and Lanuque *et al.* (2011) for the Trotskyist far left.
[152] *Parti communiste français*.

The party has mainly suffered from the growing competition by a series of Trotskyist groups: Workers' Struggle (LO)[153] (Ubbiali, 2002; Barcia, 2003; Choffat, 1991 and 2012); the Communist Revolutionary League (LCR) and later the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA)[154] (Turpin, 1997; Johsua, 2004 and 2013; Krivine, 2006; Filoche, 2007; Bonnemaison, 2012); to a less extent, the organisations of Lambertist tendency[155] (Landais, 2004).

Less important electorally but more influential within representative institutions is a second group of heterogeneous radical left organisations: an "eco-socialist" milieu mainly composed of former PSU and PCF activists[156]; the communist, ex-communist and left-independentist parties of the overseas territories[157]; and left-wing socialist dissidences, in particular Jean-Pierre Chevènement's now moribund Citizens' Movement (MDC)[158] (Verrier, 2003) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon's more recent Left Party (PG)[159] (Alemagna & Alliès, 2012; Escalona & Vieira, 2012).

The evolution of this complicated landscape is made more interesting by it external socio-political context, which was characterised by an unparalleled resistance to neo-liberalism (Wolfreys, 2003, 2006 and 2008; Kouvelakis, 2007). On the one hand public sector workers, students and to a less extent private sector workers and marginalised

---

[153] *Lutte ouvrière*.

[154] *Ligue communiste rèvolutionnaire* (until 2009) and *Nouveau parti anticapitaliste* (since 2009).

[155] The current repeatedly changed its name: from OCI (*Organisation communiste internationaliste*) in 1965 to PCI (*Parti communiste internationaliste*) in 1981, MPPT (*Mouvement pour un parti des travailleurs*) in 1985, PT (*Parti des travailleurs*) in 1991 and POI (*Parti ouvrier indépendant*) in 2008. Despite its electoral weakness (never more than 0.5% of valid votes), it has sometimes had a significant influence within mass organisations such as the student union UNEF-US/UNEF-ID and the trade union FO.

[156] The *Parti socialiste unifié* formally dissolved in 1990. Among the most important organisations of this area, all very small from the point of view of membership and voters, the following must be mentioned: Pierre Juquin's *Nouvelle gauche* (NG) in 1988-1989; the *Alternative rouge et verte* (AREV) in 1989-1998 then *Les alternatifs* (1998-present); the *Convention pour une alternative progressiste* (CAP) in 1994-2012; the *Fédération pour une alternative sociale et écologique* (FASE) since 2008.

[157] Notably, the *Parti communiste réunionnais* (PCR), *Parti communiste guadeloupéen* (PCG), *Parti progressiste démocratique guadeloupéen* (PPDG), *Mouvement indépendantiste martiniquais* (MIM), *Parti communiste martiniquais* (PCM) and *Mouvement de décolonisation et émancipation sociale* (MDES). Once close allies of the PCF, the "colonial" communist parties have drifted away during the 1980s in an intermediate position between PCF and Socialist Party. Despite their often very relevant local presence (PCR and MIM are at times the biggest parties of their respective islands), these parties remain very little studied, with the exception of Gauvin (2000).

[158] *Mouvement des citoyens* (1993-2002). Born as a left-wing dissidence of the socialist party, it later oscillated between PS, radical left and "neither left nor right" nationalism and fragmented in a variety of smaller groups.

[159] *Parti de gauche* (2008-present).

strata (the unemployed, the poor, migrants, post-colonial citizens) were at the forefront of large-scale extra-parliamentary mobilisations which contested proposed reforms or advanced alternative demands (1986-1988, 1993-1995, 2002-2003, 2005-2006, 2009-2010). On the other hand the critique of neo-liberalism had a strong influence on the political climate, leading to the "no" victory in the 2005 European Constitution referendum (Crespy, 2008; Dufour, 2010) and a significant shift in mainstream discourses, if not policies (Wolfreys, 2008; Crespy, 2010; Desbos & Royall, 2011).

The present chapter will therefore offer the opportunity to chart the development of the French radical left parties within a very interesting environment. Section 5.2 will provide an overview of the evolution of their key dimensions: societal weight, regroupment and fragmentation and political nature. Section 5.3 will place them in the context of the shift from the post-war social settlement to the era of neo-liberal transformation and assess the successes and limitations of their electoral and organisational mobilisation. Section 5.4 will analyse the reasons behind the trend toward increasing fragmentation during the 1990s and 2000s and the partial regroupment in the early 2010s within the Left Front (FdG) alliance[160]. Section 5.5, finally, will discuss their effort to exert a left-ward pull on French politics and society.

[160] *Front de gauche.*

5.2 The making of a new French radical left

France was one of the few Western European countries where the landscape of the partisan radical left was not radically transformed by the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991. Only one player of the previous historical period disbanded (the left-socialist PSU). The parties of the French radical left active in the 1990s and 2000s had thus all a long history and tradition behind themselves: the French Communist Party (PCF) had been established in 1920 as the French section of the Communist International (Courtois & Lazar, 1995; Martelli, 2012); Workers' Struggle (LO) traced its roots to the Trotskyist group founded in 1939 by Barta and had an uninterrupted organisational existence since 1956 (Ubbiali, 2002; Barcia, 2003); the Communist Revolutionary League (LCR) assumed its current name in 1974 but its predecessors went back in time to at least 1944 (Filoche, 1996; Salles, 2005; Krivine, 2006).

Despite this formal continuity, the 1980s and early 1990s brought about wide-ranging discontinuities at all levels: societal weight, fragmentation, ideology, sociology, organisation, strategy... The "new" radical left of the contemporary neo-liberal period was thus quite different from the "old" communist and far left of the 1970s, although elements of continuity lingered. This chapter will provide an overview of the most relevant features and trends.

5.2.1 Societal weight

The different dimensions of societal weight of the French radical left for the period 1990-2012 are summarised in the following tables (TABLE 5.1 and FIGURE 5.2). They define a political area with a medium-sized electoral weight (10%-12% of valid votes), a rather strong organisation and governmental involvement and a weaker parliamentary presence.

TABLE 5.1 SOCIETAL WEIGHT

	REF: 1978	REF: 1988	RADICAL LEFT 1990-2012	PCF 1990-2012	LO + LCR/NPA 1990-2012
ELECTORAL WEIGHT					
PRESIDENTIAL	-	3,417,919 votes 11.24%	3,808,463 votes 12.20%	1,610,693 votes 5.25%	1,699,475 votes 5.46%
LEGISLATIVE	6,709,191 votes 23.88%	2,854,826 votes 11.68%	2,516,377 votes 9.89%	1,871,707 votes 7.38%	460,657 votes 1.79%
REGIONAL	-	3,188,680 votes 11.47%	1,872,963 votes 7.90% *	1,109,968 votes 4.56% *	657,499 votes 2.88%
EUROPEAN	4,777,705 votes 23.60%	1,843,684 votes 10.16%	1,914,418 votes 10.68%	1,209,053 votes 6.72%	617,836 votes 3.48%
PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT					
NATIONAL	86 seats 17.52%	25 seats 4.33%	24 seats 4.20%	24 seats 4.20%	0 seats 0.0%
REGIONAL	-	155 seats 8.74%	158 seats 8.99%	148 seats 8.39%	6.0 seats 0.34%
GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT					
NATIONAL	0.0%	0.0%	21.7%	21.7%	0.0%
REGIONAL	-	8.2%	48.1%	46.8%	0.0%
ORGANISATIONAL WEIGHT					
MEMBERSHIP	569,942	378,387	182,015	172,056	ca. 8,000
YEARLY INCOMES (2003-2010)	-	-	€ 41,479,693 19.40%	€ 35,544,391 16.60%	€ 5,935,302 2.81%
MEDIA OUTREACH	strong	strong	medium	medium	weak
ORGANISATIONAL LINKAGES	strong	strong	medium	medium	weak

Notes - Absolute figures and shares (of valid votes, total seats, total population, party members, party incomes). Averages: rolling figures calculated on all years. Regional results are weighted by regional population. Electoral results refer to the whole national territory (including overseas regions). Governmental involvement: time in government (participation or external support); at least one radical left party. Membership: PCF, LO, LCR, PG. National: Assemblée Nationale. Yearly incomes: real 2010 euro. REF 1978: European 1979. REF: 1988: European 1989. FdG: legislative and European votes attributed to the PCF, presidential votes not. * = figures are lowered by the frequent choice of the PCF to run within centre-left lists.

FIGURE 5.2 SOCIETAL WEIGHT



Notes: rolling averages of national and regional values (electoral: legislative and presidential). Shares of total valid votes, total seats (weighted), total party incomes, total population administered.

From the analysis of these data a few striking elements immediately emerge.

First, the timing of the decline of the old communist left was relatively precocious. The French radical left suffered an early electoral collapse in the period 1979-1986 but stabilised afterwards. Indeed, the shock of 1989 did have little impact in this respect, with the contemporary values being roughly equivalent to those of the late 1980s.

Second, the results in each category are quite uneven. The positive legacies of the past determined extraordinary levels of membership and income; in those categories the PCF played in the same league as the major mainstream parties of the left (PS) and the right (RPR/UMP). Governmental involvement at the regional level was also extremely high. Parliamentary weight, on the contrary, was weak. The divergence between

national and sub-national levels is particularly interesting. If the radical left was fairly marginal in the national government (only one spell in 1997-2002), the presence of the PCF within sub-national executive organs (regional and local governments, mayors) was quite significant.

Third, the role of the PCF was also very unbalanced: an overwhelming predominance in most categories was contrasted by difficulties at the electoral level. Here the party progressively lost the capacity to represent the radical left milieu to the benefit of other candidates (Arlette Laguiller, Olivier Besançenot, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and others) and organisations (LO, LCR/NPA, PG). In presidential elections, the most extreme case, it dropped from a healthy 8.6% of valid votes in 1995 (Robert Hue) to 3.4% in 2002 (Robert Hue) and 1.9% in 2007 (Marie-George Buffet). This rapid and irreversible electoral weakening was the foundation for the 2008 turn and the creation of a loose coalition with other political forces, the Left Front (FdG). Conversely, far left (LO, LCR/NPA) and other radical left (PG) organisations were often successful from an electoral point of view but remained weak or negligible in all other respects.

A more detailed analysis of each dimension provides further elements for the assessment of the overall evolution of the French radical left.

From an electoral point of view the French radical left has hovered at fairly high levels (in average, around 10.7% of valid votes), experiencing cyclical oscillations around a slight downward trend (see FIGURE 5.3).[161]

[161] The results of the MdC and the overseas communist or post-communist parties are included only when explicitly allied with the PCF. Their overall impact is generally minimal, with the exceptions of the MdC in the 1994 European election (2.54%) and 2002 Presidential election (5.33%); both results have not been included.

FIGURE 5.3 ELECTORAL RESULTS



Sources: Ministère de l'Intérieur

Notes: shares of valid votes. Regional elections after 1992 have been excluded as the results of the PCF cannot be separated by those of the broad centre-left lists it often participated to.

The radical left obtained its single best result in the 1995 presidential election (4,248,012 votes, 13.9% of valid votes) and its worst one in the 2002 legislative election (1,974,711 votes, 7.6%). In general, presidential scores (average: 12.2%) were clearly better than those in other kinds of electoral competition.[162] The very weak results in regional elections were largely due to the tactical choices of the PCF, which often forwent the presentation of autonomous lists and chose instead to participate to left unity lists with the socialists, greens and radicals, thereby maximising the chance to increase its parliamentary weight and governmental influence.[163]

The periodization and interpretation of this trajectory is pretty straightforward: a negative underlying long-term tendency (the weakening of the communist subculture) and temporary adverse factors (governmental participations, the squeeze of anti-right tactical voting) were periodically balanced-out by favourable factors (the opposition to unpopular centre-right cabinets and large left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisations). The first period of stability at high levels (1986-1988) was probably the product of a lull in the crisis of the PCF provided by the unpopularity of the seating centre-right cabinet of Jacques Chirac and the successful social mobilisations against it. The second period of decline (1988-1992) reflected the shock of the fall of the Soviet bloc but was remarkably small and short. The third period of surge (1992-1995) was produced by the growing opposition to the centre-right cabinet of Balladour and a radicalisation of the public opinion, which would anticipate and prepare the great strike wave of autumn 1995. The stability at high levels of the fourth period (1995-2002) hid an enormous internal shift from the PCF, whose governmental participation was destructive, to the far left, which benefitted from challenging it.
The shock of 21 April 2002 (Perrineau & Ysmal, 2003) marked the beginning of the fifth period (2002-2007). The elimination of the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin from the second round of the 2002 presidential election, which turned into a duel between the

[162] The first round of presidential elections offers an extraordinary campaigning platform to organisations with strong ideas and personalities but weak national roots, and the small far left groups have managed to exploit this opportunity to the full.
[163] This happened in all 22 metropolitan regions in 1998, in 14 regions in 2004 (61.2% of the potential electorate) and in 8 regions in 2010 (28.5% of the potential electorate). It is also a frequent practice in municipal elections.

right-wing incumbent Jacques Chirac and the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, was partially due to an unprecedented dispersion of the total left vote on a variety of far left, radical left and moderate left candidates. The unintended consequences of their voting behaviour pushed a significant number of radical left voters to adopt a new attitude and tactically converge from the first round on the socialist candidate. The radical left thus suffered a tight squeeze which almost halved its scores, prevented it to benefit from the significant extra-parliamentary campaigns of the period and produced a long stagnation at unusually low levels.

In the sixth and final period (2009-present), at last, the dynamism generated by mass mobilisations and two competing projects of radical left regroupment – Besancenot's NPA and Mélenchon's FdG – finally paved the way for an electoral recovery, but the results of the 2012 legislative elections indicate that the memory of 2002 have not yet been completely effaced.

Looking at the results of individual parties, the PCF more or less held its own until 1997 but collapsed during the period of participation to the Jospin government (1997-2002) and proved incapable to recover afterwards. The far left organisations, on the contrary, started out from a small capital of support (1-2%) carried over from their golden age in the 1970s but experienced an unparalleled period of growth between 1993 and 2009; the main beneficiary was LO up to 2002 and the LCR/NPA after 2002. Other forces have generally remained fairly marginal - with the recent exception of Mélenchon's PG, whose independent electoral weight was never properly tested but can be estimated at least at 2% (Chiocchetti, 2010). Since 2009, finally, the Left Front has gradually but steadily hegemonised the radical left landscape, incorporating the vast majority of the players of the previous period and marginalising the rest (LO and the intransigent wings of the NPA).

If the electoral results of the French radical left have been the best of all three countries, their translation into parliamentary weight has been quite complicated. Shares of total seats have remained much lower than the shares of valid votes: 4.2% in legislative, 9.0% in regional and 7.9% in European assemblies.

The effects of the electoral legislation were here determinant. In legislative and departmental elections, the two-round majoritarian system tended to strongly depress the representation of the radical left to the benefit of the socialist party; only the

presence of localised historical strongholds where the PCF remained the strongest left party (mostly in Ile-de-France, Nord, PACA, Picardie, Auvergne, Haute-Normandie and Centre) prevented a complete wipe-out and preserved a reduced contingent of communist MPs. In European, regional and municipal elections, on the other hand, the very high electoral thresholds (5% to 10%) tended to waste the almost totality of far left votes and part of the communist ones; these losses were however partially compensated, especially in regional election, by parallel gains of the PCF.

Altogether, far left organisations have been virtually denied any kind of parliamentary representation[164] while the PCF has had to counter the negative effects of the electoral legislation through a variety of electoral tactics: in sub-national elections, frequent common lists with the PS from the first round; in legislative elections, some limited experiments of constituency-sharing with other left parties and the reliance on the local rootedness and personal popularity of "red notables" (generally mayors).

Despite its parliamentary weakness, the governmental involvement of the French radical left was far from marginal.

The far left, as already remarked, was generally absent from legislative assemblies and, when present, generally chose to remain in the opposition and defy both centre-right and centre-left governments.[165]

The situation of the PCF, on the contrary, was very different. The once famous "municipal communism" (Martelli, 2010) was weakened but not destroyed; across the period the party continued to lead in average 878 communes (4.2 million people, 7.2% of the French population) and two or three departments (4.0%).[166] Moreover, its policy of centre-left governmental alliances led to a growing presence in coalition governments at a regional level: from 2 regions in 1992 (8.2% of the French population) to 18 in 2004 (86.9%). At the national level, finally, it fully participated to the Jospin cabinet (1997-2002) while it maintained an intermediate attitude of case-

[164] The only exceptions are a handful of regional deputies in 1998 (LO 20, LCR 2) and 2010 (NPA, 2), European deputies in 1999 (LO 3, LCR 2) and municipal councillors throughout the period (peaking at 79 LO councillors in 2008).

[165] Rare exceptions can be found at the municipal level, where some far left councillors did contribute to centre-left majorities (e.g. LO in 2008-2013).

[166] Val-de-Marne (always), Seine-Saint-Denis (until 2008) and Allier (1998-2001 and 2008-present)

by-case support toward the minority socialist cabinets of Rocard, Cresson and Beregovoy (1988-1993) and the majority cabinet of Ayrault (2012-present).[167]

The organisational level offered the most contradictory developments.

The average figure of 182,015 radical left members represents a very large share of the total party membership, which in France has always been quite low.[168] The evolution in absolute terms was however strongly negative. The PCF continued its steep and inexorable decline from 355,139 members in 1990 to 86,184 in 2012. Other radical left parties, on the other hand, grew but not enough to compensate the communist decline.

Coherent financial data are available only after 2003. Surprisingly, this appears to be the strongest dimension of the radical left, with yearly incomes averaging 41,479,693 real 2010 euro (19.40% of all party incomes). This feat was the result of large albeit selective influxes of state financing[169] and, above all, a strong capacity of self-financing through membership fees, contributions of elected representatives, public fundraising and commercial activities (e.g. literature sales or organisation of festivals).

The evolution of the parties' media outreach was also uneven. The reach of the communist press steeply declined over time: the PCF daily newspaper *l'Humanité,* for instance, had in the 2000s a distribution of around 49,000 copies (against 107,000 in 1986) while its network of local and specialised press was largely wound down in the 1980s and early 1990s. The decline of membership levels also reduced the potential for daily face-to-face propaganda. On the other hand, the parties continued to be able to directly reach significant sections of the population in a more intermittent form: for instance through the PCF's yearly festival (*Fête de l'Humanité*) and LO's network of bi-

[167] In the two periods the party escaped a neat classification into majority or opposition

[168] French membership figures are notoriously unreliable. An excellent series for the PCF can be reconstructed on the basis of the contribution of Martelli (2009) and, after 2000, figures on due-paying members (the number of declared members was artificially kept stable). A good series on the LCR is also available (Videt, 2011). All other parties – including LO – provide only selective and largely inflated numbers. Depending on the estimates, the PCF alone might encompass between a quarter and a third of the total.

[169] The matter is mainly regulated by the *Loi 88-227;* for good overviews see Clift and Fischer (2004) and Lehingue (2008). The thresholds of access are quite low: for general party financing, at least 1% of votes in at least 50 legislative constituencies; for the full reimbursement of campaign costs, 3% of votes in European elections and 5% in other kinds of elections. The distribution of funds is however significantly non-proportional, as 50% of the general financing is reserved for parliamentary parties only and allocated proportionally to their number of MPs.

weekly workplace leaflets (*bulletins d'entreprise*), both of which have a declared reach of around half a million people, and with electoral campaign activities (posters, leafleting, public rallies, etc.). The coverage of the mainstream press and television was highly skewed toward the two major governmental parties but offered from time to time a large audience to radical left forces, especially during presidential campaigns.

The strength of the organisational linkages of radical left parties, finally, suffered a drawn-out but very profound decline.

The PCF could once boast a massive network of collateral or friendly mass organisations for all major social categories and interests, which embraced several million communist and non-communist members.[170] The electoral decline of the party during the 1980s was accompanied by a crisis of these organisations, which first saw their members leave and drift toward the socialist party or the right and then went ahead with a delayed adaptation to the new political realities, reducing their links with the PCF and depoliticising their activities. The best example of this process is provided by the CGT, the largest French trade union confederation. Between 1978 and 1995 the union suffered a veritable haemorrhage, plunging from 1.3 million to a mere 480 thousand members (-64.6%). Simultaneously, support for communist presidential candidates among its members collapsed from 57% (1981) to 49% (1998), 35% (1995), 18% (2002) and 7% (2007). As a reaction, in the decade 1993-2002 its leaders Louis Viannet and Bernard Thibault undertook a slow but decisive process of autonomisation from their former political patron (Andolfatto, 1997, 2003 and 2005). The union has since almost entirely ceased to act as a relay for radical left policies and identification, although many of its leaders and officials (including all its general secretaries) are still card-carrying PCF members.

The decline of this traditional working-class subculture was not compensated by the development of new radical left subcultures, such as the *milieu* of the "new social movements" or of alter-globalism.[171] On the one hand, the new organisations have

[170] The most important ones organised wage-workers (the trade union confederation CGT and the teachers' union FSU), sportspeople (FSGT), veterans (ARAC, FNACA), volunteers (SPF), pensioners (UNRPA), tenants (CNL), women (UFF) and the youth (MJCF). In-depth analyses are provided by Mouriaux (1985 and 2008), Borrel (1999), Fayolle (2005), Mischi (2010), Andolfatto and Labbé (2011), Brodiez (2013) and Bellanger and Mischi (2013).

[171] Good representatives of this world are the organisations focusing on migration and racism (GISTI, MRAP and RESF), unemployment (APEIS, MNCP, AC!), housing rights and exclusion (DAL, DD!!), HIV/AIDS (ACT UP), anti-fascism (RAS L'FRONT) and alter-globalism (ATTAC) or the new radical trade unions

generally remained weakly and informally structured, devoid of veritable mass roots and unable to exert much influence beyond a small stratum of highly educated and highly politicised citizens.[172] On the other hand, the relationship between radical left parties and sympathetic civil society organisation has followed a different pattern: despite many concrete ideological and personal links, the fragmentation of interests and causes and organisational pride tended to prevail over an overarching sense of identification in a common purpose and movement.

(Solidaires, CP). The bibliography on the topic is extremely rich: see in particular Siméant (1993), Mouchard (2002, 2002b and 2009), Ancelovici (2002 and 2008), Sommier (2003), Monzat (2003), Cadiou (2004), Ubbiali (2004), Agrikoliansky *et al.* (2005), Pechu (2006), McNevin (2006), Waters (2006), Crettiez & Sommier (2006), Boumaza & Hamman (2007), Mathieu (2007 and 2012), Poliak (2008) and Morena (2013).

[172] At its peak in 2008 the alternative union Solidaires had about 80,000 members; still a dwarf compared to the weakened formerly communist union CGT in the same year (620,000). Figures for other organisations are even lower: ATTAC had at most 30,000 members (2003); the CP around 10,000; AC!, RAS L'FRONT and DD!! were informal networks of local collectives without a clearly defined membership. At another level, the poor performance of Josè Bové in the 2007 presidential elections (483,008 votes, 1.32%) was an eloquent reflection of the limits of the alter-globalist movement.

5.2.2 Regroupment and fragmentation

The trajectory of the French radical left was characterised by a movement from medium-low initial levels of organisational fragmentation to a progressive pulverisation in the period 1997-2007, followed by a partially successful process of regroupment in the subsequent years (TABLE 5.4).

TABLE 5.4 FRAGMENTATION

Votes (presidential)	**1988**		**1995**		**2002**	**2007**	**2012**	**AVER 90-12**
N.	3,417,919		4,248,012		3,933,773	3,300,254	4,598,832	4,020,218
PCF	60.2%		62.0%		24.4%	21.4%	0.0%	26.95%
LO	17.7%		38.0%		41.4%	14.8%	4.4%	24.66%
LCR/NPA	0.0%		0.0%		30.8%	45.4%	8.9%	21.28%
FdG	0.0%		0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	86.7%	21.66%
Other	22.1%		0.0%		3.4%	18.4%	0.0%	5.44%
Votes (legislative)	**1988**	**1993**		**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**	**AVER 90-12**
N.	2,854,826	2,788,058		3,156,698	1,974,711	2,091,084	2,046,578	2,411,426
PCF	96.9%	80.8%		77.2%	62.7%	53.4%	87.6%	72.33%
LO	0.0%	8.1%		13.4%	15.4%	10.4%	6.2%	10.70%
LCR/NPA	0.0%	1.2%		2.3%	16.2%	25.6%	6.2%	10.29%
FdG	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.00%
Other	3.1%	9.9%		7.2%	5.7%	10.6%	0.0%	6.69%
Members	**1988**	**1993**	**1995**	**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**	**AVER 90-12**
N.	378,387	302,423	282,519	233,435	121,971	95,686	86,184	187,036
PCF	99.2%	98.9%	97.1%	96.6%	93.0%	89.4%	74.5%	91.58%
LO	0.4%	0.7%	2.5%	3.0%	5.7%	7.8%	8.1%	4.65%
LCR/NPA	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	1.2%	2.8%	3.5%	1.45%
FdG	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.00%
Other	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	13.9%	2.32%
MPs	**1988**	**1993**		**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**	**AVER 90-12**
N.	25	23		35	22	18	10	21.6
PCF	100.0%	95.7%		94.3%	90.9%	83.3%	70.0%	86.84%
LO	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.00%
LCR/NPA	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.00%
FdG	0.0%	0.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.00%
Other	0.0%	4.3%		5.7%	9.1%	16.7%	30.0%	13.16%
Fragmentation index	**1988**	**1993**	**1995**	**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**	**AVER 90-12**
Votes (presidential)	2.33		1.89		3.06	3.37	1.31	2.41
Votes (legislative)	1.06	1.50		1.62	2.25	2.69	1.29	1.87
Members	1.02	1.02	1.06	1.07	1.15	1.24	1.72	1.21
MPs	1.00	1.09	0.00	1.12	1.20	1.38	1.72	1.09

Notes: shares of radical left votes, members, MPs (*Assemblée Nationale*); Laakso-Taagepera index.

The PCF had always held an absolutely hegemonic position within this area, although the party had been challenged since the 1970s by small but not negligible far left and alternative (PSU) organisations. The decline of the 1980s did not affect its position in terms of members and elected representatives but depressed its share of votes in presidential elections, where far left (Arlette Laguiller) and dissident (Pierre Juquin) candidates rose to around 40% of the total. The further decline which followed its governmental turn in 1997 increased the levels of radical left fragmentation to unheard-of peaks: by 2007 the weight of the party had plunged to 21.4% in presidential and to 53.4% in legislative elections. None of the competitors, however, managed to decisively impose itself and replace the PCF as the dominant player: on the one hand, they remained a plurality of competing organisations; on the other hand, the soaring popularity and presidential support of their figureheads, Arlette Laguiller (LO) and Olivier Besancenot (LCR), was not matched by parallel gains of members, parliamentary influence and organisational linkages.

Faced with this problematic situation, calls emerged in favour of processes of broader radical left regroupment.

Up to 1994 the debate remained mainly academic. The PCF was determined to ignore both the challenge of the far left and the successive dissidences of the *communistes critiques, rénovateurs, reconstructeurs* and *réfondateurs* (Dreyfus, 1990; Mermat, 2005). LO, similarly, was adamant in its rejection of any alliance which fell short of a possible "pole of revolutionaries" including only explicitly Trotskyist organisations. The LCR was the only national organisation interested in crafting a "pole of anti-capitalist alternative" beyond the PS and PCF, but all attempts in this sense never concretised, failed or were rapidly absorbed by the moderate left parties (Greens and PS).[173]

The results of the 1995 presidential election and the great social movement of 1995 changed the situation on the ground. LO sought to capitalise its electoral scores and

[173] The following must be mentioned: (i) the debate on the "anti-capitalist alternative" in 1984-86 (with PSU, FGA, PAC and Verts); (ii) the participation to the Juquin committees in 1988 (with COCORECO, PSU, FGA, PAC); (iii) the experience of the *Convention pour une Alternative Progressiste* (CAP) in 1994-1997 (with the Communist *réfondateurs*, ADS and others).

turn into a veritable mass party. The *réfondateur* minority of the PCF launched the idea of regrouping the whole radical left, other political partners (MDC, Greens) and social movement organisations into a "pole of radicalism" (*pôle de radicalité*) which could act as a counter-weight within the centre-left alliance on the making (*gauche plurielle*). Pierre Bourdieu and other social movement activists, finally, pushed for a regroupment of the social component of the radical left with uncertain political implications (Laguiller, 1995; Bell, 1998; Poulet, 1999; Mermat, 2005; Martelli, 2012). Again, little came out of these projects. The new reforming leadership of the PCF under Robert Hue embraced the idea of regroupment but continued to believe that this could be achieved as a simple enlargement of the PCF into a renewed and more open neo-communist organisation.

The term of the Jospin cabinet (1997-2002) exacerbated the split between conciliatory organisations, which fully participated to it, and intransigent ones, which led an increasingly vocal extra-parliamentary opposition. The idea of a PCF-centred radical left regroupment was overshadowed by the electoral surge of anti-governmental far left forces (LO and LCR). These oscillated between the temptation of a "pole of revolutionaries" in the 1999 European elections and their own separate ways in the 2001 municipal, 2002 presidential and legislative elections (Kouvelakis, 2007).

The subsequent period of renewed opposition (2002-2007) contained both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. On the one hand, a chastened PCF was tempted to repudiate its governmental mistakes and to work with more humility toward a veritable regroupment of the radical left. On the other hand, the various organisations remained strongly divided on political questions (notably, the politics of alliances with the PS at the national and local level) and organisational jealousies (who was to take the lead of a possible coalition). The project of a "pole of revolutionaries" remained controversial but was put to test again in the 2004 regional and European elections; it proved to be a failure, as the shock of 21 April 2002 and the growing anti-right mood provoked a massive swing in favour of the Socialist Party and its allies. This was followed by the project of a broader "anti-liberal regroupment" unifying the whole radical left around a common candidate for the 2007 presidential elections. Pushed by the successful campaign for a "left no" to the 2005 European referendum and by the pressure of intellectuals and grass-roots collectives (*Fondation Copernic, Collectifs du 29 Mai,* CIUN), the process could not withstand the internal tensions and ultimately

broke down, leaving the PS-left and LO aside and producing not one but three presidential candidates: Oliver Besancenot (LCR), Marie-George Buffet (PCF) and José Bové (Crespy, 2008; Geay & Willemez, 2008; Kouvelakis, 2012; Martelli, 2012).

The aftermath of this abysmal failure, where both the radical left and the PCF obtained their lowest presidential scores ever, paved the way for the successful period of regroupment (Coustal, 2009; Chiocchetti, 2010; Bonnemaison, 2012; Kouvelakis, 2012; Martelli, 2012; Grond, 2012; Escalona & Vieira, 2012; Salles, 2012; Marlière, 2012b). The LCR launched the process of its self-dissolution into the NPA (2008-2009) but failed to convince potential organised partners and, after some initial encouraging signs, entered a spiral of decline and marginalisation. A crucial role was played instead by the left-wing socialist Jean-Luc Mélenchon who in the same period, in a sort of replay of the German example of Oskar Lafontaine, belatedly split from the PS, created its own organisation (the *Parti de Gauche*), convinced the PCF to forge a balanced mid-term alliance under (the *Front the gauche*) and won its endorsement as future presidential candidate. The FdG progressively out-manoeuvred the NPA, won over its more unitary tendencies and other smaller groups[174] and soared from the mediocre results of the 2009-2010 election cycle (slightly above 6%) to the triumph of the Mélenchon's 2012 presidential campaign (11.1%).

The success of the FdG effectively led to a sharp drop in the electoral fragmentation of the French radical left, reconciling the former communist, far left and alternative electorates under a common roof and marginalising the far left, which plunged well below the levels of the 1980s. The question of its future prospects of consolidation, however, remains open. The member-organisations have so far failed to move toward a merger and even to institutionalise their decision-making processes, which remain dominated by the PCF. The unity of the coalition, moreover, is severely put to test every time that the electoral legislation and the lure of power (regional, departmental, municipal, to a less extent legislative elections) provide strong incentives to broad centre-left alliances.

[174] The LCR/NPA lost to it important sections of its historic leaders and cadres: the *Gauche Unitaire* (March 2009), *Convergences & Alternatives* (February 2011) and the *Gauche Anticapitaliste* (July 2012). Other groups which joined included the FASE (ex-PCF), R&S (ex-MDC), the Maoist PCOF and the eco-socialist Alternatifs.

5.2.3 Political nature

As in the rest of Western Europe, the contemporary French radical left is characterised by a significant break with the characteristic features of the 20th century communist movement and a – still unachieved – effort of renewal and reconfiguration.

Ideology

The PCF radically modernised its ideological outlook in the period 1994-2002, marked by Robert Hue's "mutation" (*mutation*) (Andolfatto, 2001 and 2005; Pudal, 2002; Mermat, 2005).

The long-term goals remained rooted in an anti-capitalist vision centred around a "communism which will free mankind" (1994 and 2001 party statutes). The precise contours of this vision, however, became increasingly fuzzy. The party had already formally disassociated itself from the dogmas of one-party rule (1961), the insurrectional seizure of power (1964) and the dictatorship of the proletariat (1976) during its past *aggiornamento* of the 1960s-1970s, replacing them with the theorisation of a French road to socialism based on gradual reforms and the medium-term acceptance of liberal-democratic institutions, political pluralism and a mixed economy. In the 1990s it repudiated the Soviet model in its entirety but failed to replace it with a clear alternative model of the desired organisation of production, of the state and of society. The references to Marxism, working-class agency and the socialisation of means of production were de-emphasised (at times disappearing) and were replaced by vaguer statements of humanistic and progressive values[175].

The mid-term programme conformed to the typical anti-neoliberal catalogue of the contemporary radical left centring on demands of redistribution, social protection, job-

[175] In the 1994 statute "democracy", "a fairer and freer society", "the human being [...] at the centre"; in the 2001 statute "the emancipation of each man and woman, the social control, the pooling and sharing of knowledge, powers and wealth", the "full autonomy and the full enjoyment of each woman and men" and the overcoming of "every social form of exploitation, domination and alienation".

creation, defence of the welfare state and of the mixed economy and democratic and left-libertarian issues.
The links between the two, finally, were left indefinite.

The modernisation of the LCR was more superficial (Ubbiali, 2008; Bonnemaison, 2012; Johsua, 2013).
The organisation progressively downplayed its references to revolutionary communism, Trotskyism and the Fourth International (which were formally dropped with the 2009 transition to the NPA) and renewed its style and discourse. On the other hand, its traditional long-term goals and strategy remained clearly recognisable behind the various stylistic innovations. The LCR continued to call for a revolutionary rupture with capitalism, the establishment of a future socialist society (albeit with explicit "21th century", "democratic", "ecological" and "feminist" qualifiers), the socialisation of the means of production and workers' power and self-management.
Its mid-term demands, similarly, were much less radical than in the past but with a continued insistence on their transitional value: not so much feasible packages of anti-neoliberal reforms but rather objectives encouraging the extra-parliamentary mobilisations and paving the way for a large-scale clash with the capitalist system.
This evolution was coherent with the defining trait of the organisation dating at least back to 1983: a continuous effort to open up toward different political traditions (other socialist variants, ecologism, pure movementism, alter-globalism) counterbalanced by a strong attachment to the fundamentals of revolutionary Marxism (Turpin, 1997; Rizet, 2007). This attitude enabled it to remain vital and responsive to its external environment. At the same time, it created strong internal tensions: the enthusiastic participation to united fronts and projects of radical left regroupment regularly ended with a withdrawal and the loss of large numbers of its activists.

LO, on the contrary, changed little of its political culture and ideology. While its public profile was predominantly characterised by a radical workerist and populist discourse, the organisation remained openly and proudly attached to its distinctive conception of Trotskyism.

Its long-term goals and language did not deviate from the traditional Marxist-Leninist footprint: proletarian revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, transition toward a communist society through democratic planning, workers' control, the abolishment of wage-labour and the withering away of the state (LO, 2003).
Its mid-term goals, in the same vein, were framed around transitional demands centred on employment, pay, working time and conditions, welfare provisions and control on company accounts and decisions. What differentiated these demands from typical radical left programmes and even from those of other far left organisations was the absolute priority of material and working-class issues over left-libertarian ones.

The Front de Gauche, finally, marked the logical outcome of this long transition (FdG, 2012). Firstly, language and ideological references were refashioned to broaden the electoral appeal of the coalition: communism, socialism, Marxism and the critique of capitalism were replaced by humanistic themes ("Human first!), the opposition to "neo-liberalism" and "financial capital", democratisation ("civic revolution") and left-wing republicanism ("the Sixth Republic"). Secondly, the focus shifted entirely from long-term to short-term goals, i.e. a coherent and detailed programme of anti-neoliberal democratic, social, economic and ecological reforms. Thirdly, as in the case of DIE LINKE in Germany, the oppositional collocation and the belligerent tones and attitudes of the campaigns lent to these proposals a radical allure which the PCF previously lacked.

Sociology

The main change in the sociology of the contemporary French radical left compared to its predecessor of the 1970s is a significant loss in specificity and in particular an over-proportional decline among its traditional core constituency: manual workers, the broader working class and the youth (TABLE 5.5, TABLE 5.6 and TABLE 5.7).

TABLE 5.5 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (composition)

	RL 1978 (legislat.)	RL 1988	RL 1995	RL 2002	RL 2007	MELEN. 2012	AVERAGE 1995-2007
SOURCE	**CDSP**	**SOFRES**	**CDSP**	**CDSP**	**CDSP**	**CSA**	
N.	6,712,265	3,417,919	4,248,012	3,933,773	3,300,254	4,598,832	3,827,346
GENDER							
Male	52.8%		54.2%	42.9%	50.6%		49.2%
Female	47.2%		45.8%	57.1%	49.4%		50.8%
AGE							
18-24	35.8%		29.9%	20.4%	21.3%		23.9%
25-64	50.3%		63.5%	66.3%	61.2%		63.7%
>64	13.9%		6.6%	13.3%	17.5%		12.5%
EDUCATION							
5 years			14.0%	4.9%	30.8%		16.6%
8 years			55.3%	52.4%	41.9%		49.9%
13 years			12.3%	17.4%	12.9%		14.2%
15 years			7.7%	12.9%	8.0%		9.5%
15+			10.6%	12.3%	6.4%		9.8%
PROFESSION							
Employer and self-employed	3.7%		2.1%	0.8%	1.5%		1.5%
Upper profession	3.8%		6.8%	6.5%	4.9%		6.1%
Employed wage worker	49.9%		44.9%	56.9%	50.2%		50.7%
Intermediate prof.	11.7%		12.7%	17.2%	11.6%		13.8%
White-collar	13.4%		15.7%	20.9%	20.1%		18.9%
Blue-collar	24.9%		16.5%	18.8%	18.5%		17.9%
Unemployed	7.3%		8.9%	6.5%	7.5%		7.6%
Inactive	35.2%		37.3%	29.4%	36.1%		34.3%
Student	3.3%		6.4%	7.4%	8.5%		7.4%
Pensioner	12.6%		22.0%	14.1%	20.1%		18.7%
Other	19.3%		8.9%	7.8%	7.5%		8.1%
"WORKING CLASS"	57.3%		53.8%	63.4%	57.7%		58.3%
RELIGION							
Practicing Catholic	3.0%		3.0%	5.1%	3.6%		3.9%
Semi-practicing Catholic	8.1%		6.8%	10.6%	-		-
Non-practicing Catholic	54.6%		46.6%	36.9%	*42.1%*		-
Other religion	2.0%		2.1%	4.3%	5.4%		3.9%
Non-believer	32.3%		41.5%	43.0%	48.8%		44.5%

Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995, 2002, 2007), SOFRES (1988), CSA (2012)
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.

TABLE 5.6 SOCIOLOGY OF VOTERS (penetration)

	RL 1978 (legislat.)	RL 1988	RL 1995	RL 2002	RL 2007	MELEN. 2012	AVERAGE 1995-2012
SOURCE	**CDSP**	**SOFRES**	**CDSP**	**CDSP**	**CDSP**	**PSA**	
N.	**23.9%**	**11.2%**	**13.9%**	**13.8%**	**9.0%**	**11.1%**	**12.0%**
GENDER							
Male	25.8%		15.4%	12.7%	9.5%	12.1%	12.4%
Female	22.0%		12.6%	14.8%	8.5%	10.1%	11.5%
AGE							
18-24	39.4%	13.6%	12.5%	16.8%	15.0%	16.1%	15.1%
25-34	29.0%	11.7%	16.3%	15.8%	7.0%	10.1%	12.3%
35-44	23.6%	13.6%	16.3%	14.8%	10.0%	12.1%	13.3%
45-64	20.9%	8.8%	10.5%	13.8%	12.0%	12.1%	12.1%
65+	12.5%	8.8%	9.6%	11.8%	6.0%	8.1%	8.9%
EDUCATION							
5 years			14.7%	11.9%	9.2%	10.1%	11.5%
8 years			14.0%	15.5%	10.0%	11.1%	12.6%
13 years			16.1%	14.5%	8.6%	13.1%	13.1%
15 years			11.0%	12.9%	8.1%	10.1%	10.5%
15+			13.3%	9.9%	5.7%	9.1%	9.5%
PROFESSION							
Employer and self-employed	8.1%	-	4.7%	4.2%	3.5%	-	4.1%
Upper profession	18.2%	5.8%	16.1%	11.0%	7.2%	7.1%	11.4%
Employed wage worker	33.0%	-	19.2%	19.1%	10.9%	-	16.4%
Intermediate prof.	27.8%	15.6%	17.3%	16.0%	8.6%	14.1%	14.0%
White-collar	26.0%	13.6%	18.0%	19.4%	10.7%	12.1%	16.0%
Blue-collar	43.2%	16.6%	22.6%	22.7%	13.3%	14.1%	19.5%
Unemployed	38.2%	-	18.0%	17.2%	16.0%	-	17.1%
Inactive	19.4%	-	10.5%	9.4%	7.3%	-	9.1%
Student	32.2%	-	13.9%	15.4%	9.2%	-	12.8%
Pensioner	16.2%	-	9.3%	6.9%	6.9%	-	7.7%
Other	20.8%	-	11.0%	13.5%	6.7%	-	10.4%
"WORKING CLASS"	33.6%	-	19.0%	18.9%	11.3%	-	16.4%
RELIGION							
Practicing Catholic	2.5%		3.9%	6.2%	4.0%		4.7%
Semi-practicing Catholic	10.4%		7.3%	8.2%	-		-
Non-practicing Catholic	23.4%		14.5%	13.2%	*6.8%*		-
Other religion	13.5%		9.7%	10.3%	7.9%		9.3%
Non-believer	47.0%		26.9%	22.5%	14.7%		21.3%

Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995, 2002, 2007), SOFRES (1988), CSA (2012)
Notes: "WORKING CLASS": employed wage worker plus unemployed.

If we compare the legislative vote of 1978 with the average presidential scores of the last two decades, the results are eloquent The radical vote across the French population halved from 23.9% to 12.0% (-11.9 points, -50.0%). The decline was however significantly stronger among blue-collar workers (from 43.2% to 19.5%; -23.6 points; -54.7%), the entirety of the active working-class[176] (from 33.6% to 16..4%; -17.2 points; -51.2%), students (from 32.2% to 12.8%; -19.4 points; -60.2%), people aged 18-

[176] Here defined as blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, intermediate professions and the unemployed, excluding upper professions.

24 (from 39.4% to 15.1%; -24.3 points; -61.7%) and people aged 25-34 (from 29.0% to 12.3%; -16.7 points; -57.6%). Indeed, the radical left cut its losses only among the categories where it had historically been weak (people over 65 year old, professionals, self-employed) and among white-collar workers (from 26.0% to 16.0%; -9.9 points; -38.3%)[177].

Most of this transformation was already achieved by 1988, before the beginning of the period of my study: this clearly derived from the incapacity of the PCF to offer a coherent perspective to its traditional electorate and prevent its dispersion in all directions (the rising socialist party, political disengagement and the far right).[178] The period 1995-2002 pushed against the tide and led to a partial "re-proletarisation". After 2002 however, scores among the employed wage workers have dropped again below the levels of 1988: in 2012 Mélenchon fared 14.1% among intermediate professions, 12.1% of white-collar workers and only 14.1% among blue-collar workers – barely above his average results.

The trend was even more evident at the levels of radical left members and elected representatives (TABLE 5.7).

The 1979 and 1997 surveys of the PCF membership (Platone, 1985; Platone & Ranger, 2000) enable a fairly reliable comparison. If the total members of the party more than halved in the period, from 540,565 to 225,394 (-58.3%), blue-collar workers suffered a veritable collapse (-78.8%) and their weight declined from 32.1% to 16.3% of the total membership. The social categories which had reduced losses were those farthest from the historic working-class identity of the party: professionals (-27.6%), pensioners (-34.1%) and other inactives (-36.4%). The subsequent period, when the due-paying membership (*cotisants*) of the party liquefied reaching an all time low of 64,184 in 2012 (-71.5%), is likely to have deepened on this tendency.

[177] The latter exception was entirely determined by the 1995 and 2002 elections, a reflection of the ability of the Trotskyist candidates to capture the sympathies of the "highly feminised [...] lower end of the service sector", both public and private (Sperber, 2010). All other elections (1988, 2007 and 2012) presented much lower scores.

[178] A question of the 1988 French electoral panel (CDSP, 1998) is extremely interesting in this regard. Of the 20.8% of French voters who declared to have voted for the PCF in the past now 42.5% chose Mitterrand, 9% the abstention, 5.8% the centre-right and 5.7% the far right. Shifts toward abstentions and the FN are however likely to be strongly underestimated by the methodology of the survey.

TABLE 5.7 SOCIOLOGY OF THE PARTY-ORGANISATION, PCF (composition)

	Valid votes (1978)	Members (1979)	MPs (1978)
N.	28,098,115	540,565	86
GENDER			
Male	48.8%	65.0%	86.0%
Female	51.2%	35.0%	14.0%
AGE			
18-30	23.9%	24.5%	0.0%
30-59	52.9%	59.9%	79.1%
60+	23.2%	15.6%	20.9%
Average age	*44.8 years*	*42.6 years*	*51.4 years*
PROFESSION			
Employer and self-employed	11.0%	5.9%	2.3%
Upper profession	5.0%	3.4%	12.8%
Employed wage worker	36.2%	59.8%	63.9%
Intermediate prof.	10.1%	10.2%	23.3%
White-collar	12.3%	17.6%	8.1%
Blue-collar	13.8%	32.1%	32.6%
Inactive and unemployed	47.8%	30.9%	21.0%
Retired	18.6%	15.5%	*19.8%*
Other	29.2%	15.4%	1.2%
	Valid votes (1995)	**Members (1997)**	**MPs (1997)**
N.	30,462,633	225,394	34
GENDER			
Male	47.6%	60.0%	88.2%
Female	52.4%	40.0%	11.8%
AGE			
18-30	22.8%	10.5%	0.0%
30-59	49.9%	65.1%	76.5%
60+	27.3%	24.4%	23.5%
Average age	*45.9 years*	*48.7 years*	*55.4 years*
PROFESSION			
Employer and self-employed	7.3%	2.5%	0.0%
Upper profession	5.8%	5.9%	14.7%
Employed wage worker	33.7%	43.6%	70.6%
Intermediate prof.	10.4%	10.3%	47.1%
White-collar	12.9%	17.1%	8.8%
Blue-collar	10.4%	16.3%	14.7%
Inactive and unemployed	53.2%	48.0%	14.7%
Retired	26.4%	24.5%	14.7%
Other	26.8%	23.5%	0.0%

Source: my elaborations from CDSP (1978, 1995), Platone (1985), Platone & Ranger (2000), www.assemblee-nationale.fr

The membership of the other radical left organisations always remained numerically quite limited and thus exerts little impact on the overall picture; statistical details are also scarce and imprecise. Excellent studies are nevertheless available for LO (Choffat, 1990 and 2012) and the LCR/NPA (Johsua, 2004 and 2013). A common feature of both organisations was the very low level of inactives and the converse preponderance of employed wage workers; the precise composition of the latter, however, differed. LO

made constant efforts to entrench itself not in the student and intellectual milieus typical of post-1968 *gauchisme* but among the core sectors of the working-class. The resulting membership composition has been largely dominated by blue- and white-collar workers up to the early 1990s; during the last two decades the weight of these categories has remained comparatively high but, due to quantitative and qualitative difficulties, seems to have lost some ground to teachers and pensioners.[179] The social profile of the LCR, on the other hand, remained similar to an inverted pyramid, with an overwhelming concentration of members belonging to the intermediate and upper strata of the work-force, of intellectuals, of students and of professionals.[180]

A similar evolution interested the social composition of the top layers of the party-organisations. The example of the PCF deputies at the National Assembly, for instance, confirms the rapid disappearance of elected representative with a background as industrial or agricultural workers (32.6% in 1979, 14.7% in 1997, 0.0% in 2012) to the benefit of intermediate and upper professions (36.1% in 1979, 71.8% in 1997, 71.4% in 2010) and pensioners, and a marked aging of the parliamentary group (in average 51.4 years old in 1979, 55.4 in 1997 and 61.7 in 2012).

To sum up, the roots of the radical left in the workers' movement gradually tended to loosen their grip. The middle-lower strata of the working class[181] continued to represent a stable majority of the radical left electorate (58.3%) but not of their declining membership (43.6%), where they lost ground to pensioners, the economically inactive and professionals. They remained more present within the radical left than among the general population (with an index of 133.0% for their electorate and 129.4% for their membership), but to a much lower extent than in the

[179] The estimates of Choffat (2012) indicate for the late 1980s an almost complete predominance of blue-collar workers (44%) and white-collar employees (45%), mostly of the lower-central age cohorts and with a not weak share of women (38%); by 2009 the proportions would have changed to 26% blue-collar workers, 38% employees, 24% teachers and 9% pensioners, increasingly belonging to upper-central age cohorts.

[180] The figures of Johsua (2004) indicate in 2002 very few manual workers (7.1%), more white-collar employees (15.3%) and many intermediate professions (19.9%), teachers/professors (23.0%), students (11.8%) and professionals (11.6%).

[181] Electoral figures encompass the categories of blue-collar, white-collar, intermediate professions and the unemployed (excluding a section of upper-level managerial or intellectual wage-workers). Membership figures cover the same categories with the exclusion of the unemployed and are therefore lower.

past. Their internal barycentre shifted upwards from manual workers to white-collar and intermediate professions (32.7% of the electorate and 27.4% of the membership). Finally, the radical left support among the industrial working-class and wage-workers in general dropped from large to medium levels.

Organisation

The transition from mass working-class parties (a large and disciplined membership, a tight network of collateral extra-parliamentary organisations, deep roots in a well-defined social subculture, a significant workplace organisation and intervention) to light electoralist organisations was slower and less pronounced in France than in Germany and Italy but had nevertheless important consequences.

Between 1994 and 2002 the PCF discarded the Stalinist element which had characterised most of its history (bureaucratic centralism, monolithism, strict discipline) and embraced internal pluralism and democracy; at the same time, it wittingly or unwittingly lost most of the traditional silver linings of that type of organisation. Workplace cells were progressively abandoned; collateral organisations asserted their autonomy and slowly de-politicised their activities; internal power groups (e.g. the elected representatives), tendencies and individual members lost their discipline and stopped following uniform central directives; the voluntarist policy of schooling and promotion of members with a humble social background to positions of responsibility and leadership, perhaps the single most defining characteristic of French communism, ceased to function altogether (Pudal, 2002 and 2009; Ethuin, 2003 and 2006; Mischi, 2003, 2003b, 2007 and 2010).

These reforms completely failed to delineate a viable alternative to the old model and to stop the organisational decline of the party, probably ending up accelerating its decay. Throughout the last two decades the PCF maintained a remarkably high M/V ratio, a sign of the persistence of the old legacies and of a close-knit subculture: 10.1% of communist voters in legislative elections (and 12.0% in presidential elections) were

also due-paying members of the party.[182] It was however an inexorably shrinking constituency, which evaporated at a roughly similar speed in all dimensions (members, voters, organisational linkages).

The two far left organisations came from a different story: on the one hand, parties of activists (Lenin's "cadre party") rather than of passive members; on the other hand, unlike their Bolshevik model, largely isolated from the masses due to the stronghold of the traditional workers' parties and distinctive defects of the Trotskyist movement. The conspiratorial and hyper-activist *modus operandi* required by the LCR (pseudonyms, probation membership, ideological formation and discussion, round-the-clock commitment, supervision of changes of residence and work) was strongly relaxed in 1998 and 2009 (Salles, 2003; Johsua, 2004 and 2013; Rizet, 2007). LO continued to cling to all the above-mentioned trappings, including a long process of training and probation to move from sympathiser to full member with voting rights and a semi-clandestine leadership and operation (Ubbiali, 2002).

This kind of avant-garde organisation had traditionally proven quite effective in ensuring the survival and reproduction of the groups, in conducting extra-parliamentary and electoral campaigns and in intervening within fronts and external bodies. It was however incapable to pass the test of the period 1993-2009, failing to exploit the unprecedented levels of sympathy and electoral support as a springboard for the crucial transition from small group to solid national force. The forays into mass organisations did not turn into institutionalised linkages. The electoral upsurges were accompanied by bouts of membership growth but their magnitude remained altogether limited – at best 2,640 members for the LCR (2007), around 7-8,000 for LO[183], 9,123 for the NPA (2009). M/V ratios became very low: 0.4% (LCR) and 0.6% (LO) in presidential and 1.2% (LCR) and 2.2% (LO) in legislative elections. And electoral results themselves remained unstable and highly dependent on the personal appeal of their presidential figurehead.

[182] As a reference, the respective figures for the PS are just 2.3% (legislative) and 1.9% (presidential).
[183] The figure refers to total members; full members were only one or two thousands.

Strategy

As in Italy, the organisational fragmentation of the French radical left was largely driven by strategic differences.

The PCF pained to adapt to the supremacy conquered during the 1980s by Mitterrand's PS and by the moderate drift of the latter since 1982-1983. It thus oscillated from periods of rapprochement (1981-1984), hostility (1977-1981, 1984-1988) and uncertainty (1988-1993). In the mid-1990s, however, Robert Hue's renewal was accompanied by a decisive turn toward a policy of organic centre-left alliances: the party became an organic component of the *gauche plurielle* and a governmental force at the national level (Jospin cabinet, 1997-2002) and in most regional and local administrations. Here it led a *conciliatory strategy of left-ward pressure*, hoping to influence the coalition from the inside with dialogue and bargaining. The participation was a political and organisational failure; the PCF failed to obtain many policy results and was paid dearly its choice with a collapse of both its electoral support and its membership (Bell, 1998; Boyd *et al.,* 2003; Bergounioux & Grunberg, 2005; Becker, 2005).

LO coherently defended a strategy of *anti-capitalist alternative* coupled with an extremely intransigent attitude toward the moderate left, refusing any support to the "bourgeois" PS and presenting itself as the only representative of wage-workers against the two poles of the bourgeois alternation. Uniquely for the French far left, since the mid-1970s it also generally refused to appeal to a left vote in the second round of elections.[184]

The line of the LCR/NPA was similar but more flexible. The organisation's main goal was the creation of an anti-capitalist pole breaking with the "social-liberalism" of the PS but its boundaries were left fluid (depending on the moment they could refer to an enlarged far left, the far left and dissident tendencies of the PCF or the whole radical

[184] The only exception since 1981 was the period 2007-2008, when the party called for a support for Ségolène Royal in the second round and later decided to build joint centre-left lists in several small communes.

left) and tactical alliances to defeat the right were not entirely ruled out. On the contrary, the organisation generally called to vote for the left in the second round.[185]

The aftermath of 2002 remained marked by the legacy of the Jospin government. The PCF sought to regain credibility by radicalising its discourse and electoral tactics but never fully questioned the need of establishing a new "*union populaire*" of all centre-left forces (Buffet, 2006) and its strategy of widespread governmental involvement at the sub-national level. LO remained firm on its principles, but the intransigent strategy which had worked so well in the previous period suddenly lost all appeal when faced with a realisation of its possible short-term consequence, i.e. the success of the right and of the far right over a divided left. The LCR/NPA oscillated between the desire of a broad anti-neoliberal regroupment and the critique to the PCF.

A temporary solution to these dilemmas was finally offered after 2009 by the rise of the Left Front. This alliance did not resolve the inherent contradictions of the contemporary radical left: anti-neoliberal coherence vs. centre-left unity against the right; concrete anti-neoliberal programmatic vs. vague anti-capitalist aspirations. It managed however to paper them over with a powerful radical discourse and an intelligent strategy of mixed left-ward pull, which marked its distance from the PS and from governmental participation while supporting it against the right.

[185] The limited exceptions were mainly due to the pressure of LO.

5.3 Filling the vacuum: potential and limits of radical left mobilisation

5.3.1 The (obstructed?) neo-liberal transition

The "neo-liberal" transition which developed across Europe during the 1980s and 1990s affected France as well, but in a much less pronounced way than most of its counterparts.

The shift away from the traditional *dirigiste* state, for example, was gradual and incomplete (Smith, 1990; MacLean, 1997; Berne & Pogorel, 2005). When the neo-liberal counter-revolution of Thatcher and Reagan was in full swing, the French socialist government actually embarked on a programme of large-scale nationalisations (1981-1982) which consolidated the French state-owned sector as one of the largest in Europe. With the socialist electoral defeat of 1986 the tide changed and in the following decades a wide-spread process of total and partial privatisations reversed the situation.[186] The bulk of it was conducted by centre-right cabinets; centre-left ones initially positioned themselves on a defence of the status quo (1988-1993) but later enthusiastically adapted to the trend (1997-2002).[187] This notwithstanding, the French state-owned sector remained proportionally quite large and bigger than in most other advanced industrial countries.[188]

Similarly, restructuring and retrenchment of the welfare state was much less effective than in Italy or Germany and sometimes counter-balanced by an actual expansion of welfare provisions (Cole, 1999; Michel, 2008; Vail, 2010). Aggressive projects of

[186] Singling out the most important privatisations, the state progressively sold all or a majority of its shares in most of its banking and financial (Paribas, Crédit commercial de France, Société générale, BNP, AGF, CIC, CNP, Crédit Lyonnais), industrial (Saint Gobain, CGE, Suez, ELF, TOTAL, Pechiney, Renault, Bull, Thomson, EADS) and commercial (Air France, France Télécom, the highway network) companies. Minority shares of the energy companies GDF and EDF were sold in 2005-2007.

[187] The Jospin cabinet, in fact, privatised proportionally more than any other government before or afterwards.

[188] See Christiansen (2011) and Kowalsky *et al.* (2013). According to the former in 2009 majority-owned public companies still employed 838,574 workers (against 1,856,000 in 1985); minority-owned companied had another 924,625 employees. According to the latter the sales of the top five French public companies in 2011 were equivalent to 7.9% of the French GDP.

counter-reform by right-wing cabinets were regularly confronted by massive workplace and street mobilisations (1994, 1995, 2003, 2006, 2010), which often led to their partial or total withdrawal and in general slowed down the pace of change. The socialist cabinets, in turn, generally avoided a direct clash with their traditional constituency and failed to introduce any notable neo-liberal counter-reform; instead, they sought to accompany and compensate the negative development emerging from the economic structure (unemployment, de-industrialisation, rise of job precarity and poverty) with an expansion of the social safety net (e.g. the 1988 introduction of a guaranteed minimum revenue) and some progressive counter-measures (e.g. 1998-2000 reduction of the working week to 35 hours)[189].

Total governmental expenditure rose, hovering for the whole period 1994-2009 around the very high level of 53.4% of GDP. Declines in 1985-1989 (from 51.9% to 48.9%) and 1996-2000 (from 54.5% to 51.7%) were promptly reversed afterwards and were due not so much to political choice but rather to mere economic fluctuations.

Employment within the civil service, finally, remained one of the highest in Europe and continuously expanded in absolute term from 4,257,700 (1990) to 5,364,300 (2007), when the centre-right government proceeded for the first time to a small and gradual reduction (5,358,800 in 2011). In relative terms, this expressed a rise from 18.3% (1990) to 20.3% (2007) of total employment, followed by a decrease to 19.9% (2011).

The macro-economic situation of the country was also somewhat better than that of Italy and Germany (see TABLE 5.8). The French share of the global GDP declined but real GDP growth, although much slower than during the golden age and the 1970s, remained at acceptable levels (+1.7%). Large French corporations were altogether fairly successful within the global competition and maintained or improved their international position. The current account balance was also (until 2005) positive.

[189] On the former (RMI) see Cytermann and Dindar (2008); on the latter see *Économie et Statistique,* 376-377. The 35-hour reform helped to increase free time, reduce unemployment and raise hourly wages; however, it also broadened the possibility by companies to introduce irregular working times.

TABLE 5.8 MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

	REF 1982-1993	1993-2003	2003-2009	1993-2009
Real GDP annual growth (CAGR)	2.0%	2.2%	1.0%	1.7%
Real wages annual growth (CAGR)	0.7%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%
Wage share of GDP (average)	59.1%	58.0%	57.9%	58.0%
Unemployment rate (average)	8.6%	9.5%	8.5%	9.1%
Poverty rate (average)	-	7.3%	7.1%	7.2%
Atypical contracts rate (average)	6.6%	10.4%	11.6%	10.8%
Current account balance/GDP (average)	-0.2%	1.6%	-0.8%	0.7%
		1993	**2003**	**2009**
France's share of global GDP		5.2%	4.8%	4.5%
Gross public debt/GDP		46.3%	63.2%	79.0%

Sources: my elaborations from WEO (2013 April), INSEE, KLEMS.
Notes: Periodisation according to the economic cycles (trough to through). CAGR: compound annual growth rate.

From the point of view of the working-class the situation was less favourable but not clearly negative. The growth of real net annual wages was very slow (+0.6%) but positive and expressed a lower number of working hours; the wage share of GDP and income inequality remained broadly stable; legal minimum revenue (RMI) and minimum wage (SMIC) regulations kept poverty at bay.[190]

The key problem of the period was mass unemployment. Rapidly growing since 1981, the rate of unemployment peaked at 10.7% in 1997 and remained fairly high throughout the period (1994-2009: 9.1%). Another negative development was the growth of atypical work contracts: despite the lack of legislative innovations on this front, their weight on total employment roughly doubled (1994-2009: 11.5%).[191]

In this context, the position of the radical left was difficult. The public image of the socialist party was heavily marked by its "*tournant de la rigueur*" of 1983 and its failures to seriously tackle mass unemployment (Vail, 2010). The party also slowly but consistently drifted to the right on socio-economic themes, moving from a discourse of "rupture with capitalism" in 1981 to a moderate course of adaptation to the changed international climate afterwards (Cole, 1999). However there is no doubt that the most

[190] Official poverty rate (50% of median income) between 1996 and 2009 was 7.2%, quite low by international standards and with a tendency to decrease.

[191] Attempts of the centre-right governments to introduce new precarious contracts for the youth (the CIP in 1993, the CNE in 2005, the CPE in 2006) were all withdrawn or shelved after a few years under the pressure of large social mobilisations. Nevertheless, existing non-standard contracts (fixed-term, agency, apprenticeship) boomed.

consistent attacks to the Keynesian-welfarist post-war settlement came from the centre-right. Since 1986 the latter gradually re-asserted its domination over the executive power (1986-1988, 1993-1997, 2002-2012) and deployed an aggressive, although not always successful, programme of neo-liberal reforms. Moreover, the communist party was largely jointly liable for the faults of the socialist-led cabinets of Mauroy (1981-1984) and Fabius (1984-1986), participating to the former and supporting externally the latter.

The "vacuum" of political representation of working-class and welfarist interests thus appears at first sight less pronounced in France than in most other Western European countries, and the radical left seems less well positioned to profit from it. The rest of the section will discuss these problems in more detail.

5.3.2 Contours of the vacuum

In fact, as FIGURE 5.9 clearly shows, the consent and legitimacy of the main "establishment" parties RPR/UMP, UDF and PS[192] was problematic. These three parties have been dominating the political system since the late 1970s, occupying in average 86.2% of the lower chamber of parliament (due to the effects of the two-round majoritarian electoral system) and all offices of president and prime minister. Their level of electoral support, however, has fallen dramatically in the period 1986-2002 – not accidentally, the time frame of the harshest implementation and contestation of neo-liberal reforms.

In presidential elections their results fell from 72.2% of valid votes (57.6% of the total electorate) in 1981 to 48.0% (33.2%) in 2002. In legislative elections they declined from 76.1% of valid votes (52.8% of the total electorate) in 1981 to 53.4% (34.5%) in 1997. The main beneficiaries were abstentionism and the right-wing anti-establishment National Front (FN)[193]. The anti-establishment far left (LO, LCR, PT) also grew but was significant in presidential elections only. Other parties (e.g. communists, ecologists, radicals, independent centre-right) had ups and downs, decreasing until 1988 and growing afterwards.

Establishment parties recovered part of their electoral lost ground after the shock of the 2002 presidential elections. The political trauma provoked by the accession of Jean-Marie Le Pen to the second round led to a massive rise of political interest and participation[194], a centralisation of voting behaviour from minor parties to the two main ones (PS and UMP) and a fall of the extremes (far left and far right). The previous tendencies, however, slowly reasserted themselves after 2007.

---

[192] *Rassemblement pour la République,* gaullist right; in 2002 it enlarged and renamed *Union pour un mouvement populaire*. *Union pour la démocratie française,* centre-right; in 1998-2008 it progressively recentred, lost pieces to the UMP and in 2007 morphed in the centrist party *Mouvement démocrate* (MoDem). Due to its marginalisation from power, the MoDem results of 2007-2012 are accounted for in the "other parties" category. *Parti socialiste,* left.

[193] *Front national.*

[194] Valid votes in presidential elections increased from 69.2% in 2002 to 82.6% in 2007 (the highest level since 1974) and remained high at 77.9% in 2012. In absolute terms this was even more impressive (from 28.5 million to 36.7 million valid votes, +28.8%). The movement of re-politicisation interested not only abstentionists but also citizens who for some reason were not registered in the electoral lists: the total number of registered citizens grew by 8% (whereas the "natural" increase due to the coming of age of adolescents and new naturalisations accounted for less than half of it, 2.0%-3.5%).

FIGURE 5.9 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF FRENCH PARTIES BY TYPE



Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur.
Notes: Above presidential, below legislative elections. Share of total electorate. Main establishment parties: RPR/UMP, PS, UDF (without MoDem). Anti-establishment parties: far right and far left.

The data at the level of broad political blocs show a similar picture. Since 1981 every single French government, with one exception, was voted out of office at the subsequent legislative election after heavy electoral losses. The big exception is represented by 2007, when the seating centre-right coalition managed to compensate the losses on its left (toward the centrist MoDem, which had in the meantime moved to the opposition) by draining the far right electorate.

Finally, the efforts of the centre-right governments to push forward a neo-liberal agenda of reforms, far from demoralising the left-wing opinion, have invariably revitalised it and given rise to mass movements of resistance (Wolfreys, 2006; Kouvelakis, 2007; Ancelovici, 2012). Altogether, the level of left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisation was of a magnitude and persistence unmatched in any other European country, with the possible exception of Greece.

The labour movement demonstrated an unexpected militancy. Despite the misleading indications of official statistics, overall strike activity has remained vibrant since 1986, with peaks in 1989, 1995, 2003 and 2010 equal or superior to the levels of the 1970s (FIGURE 5.10).[195] Strikes have declined dramatically in the private sector but have exploded in the civil service and the rest of the public sector.

Between 1986 and 1989 a series of generally successful sectorial movements were launched by transport and industrial workers, nurses, teachers and employees of the Ministry of Finances, with a prominent role played by grassroots coordinations (Narritsens, 1991; Kergoat *et al.*, 1992; Denis, 1996; Leschi, 1996 and 1997; Chevandier, 2007). In 1995 an enormous mobilisation of public sector workers led to the withdrawal of the pension reform of the Juppé government (Trat, 1997; Béroud & Mouriaux, 1998). Other massive but unsuccessful mobilisations of the public sector against further pension reforms were launched in 2003 (Khalfa, 2003) and 2010 (Andolfatto, 2011; Ancelovici, 2011; Béroud & Yon, 2012). In 2009, finally, large movements around the themes of purchasing power and employment developed in the French Antilles (Monza, 2009; Desse, 2010, Rey, 2010) and on mainland France (Béroud & Yon, 2012): the first successful, the second unsuccessful.

[195] The often-cited series of the DARES excludes political strikes, the whole public sector and, since 1995, the transport sector [in the figure: "official"]. Following the lead of Kouvelakis (2007), I integrate it with administrative data from other official sources (DARES, DTT-IGTT, SOeS, DGAFP and DGOS) [in the figure: "all sectors"]. While administrative data are fairly reliable for the public sector, Carlier (2008) has convincingly shown that they systematically and increasingly underestimate the level of industrial conflict in the private sector and has estimated their coverage at 48% in 1992 and at 23% in 2004. After 2005 it is possible to reconstruct a series which largely compensates this gap by combining the usual administrative data for the public sector and the new survey data of ACEMO for the private sector [in the figure: "all sectors (b)"]; the two series are of course not comparable. Some sectors still escape completely (agriculture, local government, companies below 10 employees) or intermittently (some transport and nationalised companies, the health sector, political conflicts in the private sector between 1996 and 2004) from the computation.

FIGURE 5.10 LABOUR CONFLICT



Source: my elaboration from DARES, DTT-IGTT, SOeS, DGAFP, DGOS.
Notes: Thousands of working days lost on strikes. 2005: new methodology and series break.

All movements combined industrial action, mainly by public sector workers, with very large and protracted cycles of demonstrations (Filleule & Tartakowsky, 2008); regardless of their eventual success, they also seemed to enjoy a the sympathy and support of the majority of the population.

The youth was the other main protagonist of the period. The student movement repeatedly initiated large and successful cycles of demonstrations and occupations: in particular, the 1986 movement against the Devaquet university reform (Dray, 1987), the 1994 movement against the CIP job contract (Borredon, 1996) and the 2006 movement against the CPE job contract (Obono, 2008). High school students were the dominant actors behind the rise of the anti-fascist movement, which flared from a relative marginality to several hundred thousand demonstrators in April-May 2002 (Monzat, 2003; Gemie, 2003). Second generation immigrant youth, finally, headed several important moments of contentious politics, from the Marches for Equality in 1983-1984 to the urban riots of 2005 (Hargreaves, 1991; Le Goaziou & Mucchielli, 2006; Béaud & Masclet, 2008).

Beside public sector workers and the youth, other social actors created a backdrop of continuous effervescence with activities which were quantitatively weaker but qualitatively interesting and very prominent in the public debate (Waters, 2006; Ancelovici, 2008; Mathieu, 2012). Three relatively coherent cycles stand out: the mobilisations of the "*sans*" – undocumented migrants, homeless, unemployed – of the period 1991-1998 (Siméant, 1993; Royall, 1997 and 2004; Mouchard, 2002 and 2009; Lahusen & Baumgarten, 2006; McNevin, 2006; Garcia, 2013); the alter-globalist movement of the period 1999-2004 (Agrikoliansky *et. al.,* 2005; Agrikoliansky, 2007); and the 2004-2005 grass-roots campaign for a "left no" to the EU constitution referendum (Crespy, 2006).

This context of disaffection toward the traditional parties of government, wide-spread rejection of neo-liberal policies and very large extra-parliamentary mobilisations on traditional "old left" and "new left" themes fuelled expectations of vibrant growth for the radical left. The following sub-sections will show that these were only marginally fulfilled.

5.3.3 Electoral mobilisation

As already remarked in section 5.2.1, the electoral mobilisation of the French radical left had mixed results.

At an aggregate level, the radical left failed to recover the losses of the period 1978-1986 and, notably, the long-term shift of the French electorate toward the socialist party. Since 1986 its results have been oscillating around an average of 10.8% of valid votes, less than half of the pre-crisis values of 1978 (23.9%). The post-1986 trend was neither downward nor upward. This overall long-term stability was the product of an alternation of middling or strong showings (1986-1988, 1995-2002, 2009-2012) with weak ones (1989-1994, 2002-2007). While some sizeable electoral victories (13.9% in 1995; 12.6% in 2009) seemed at first to contain the promise of a bright future of growth, retrospectively they represented maximum ceilings which were followed by periods of stagnation and drops to unprecedentedly weak troughs (the legislative elections of 2002, 7.6%, and 2012, 7.9%).

At the level of individual parties, the landscape was very dynamic. The overall growth of the far left was unstable but remarkable: from 1.3% in 1992 to 6.1% in 2009, with an incredible peak of 10.4% in the 2002 presidential elections. LO dominated this space up to 2002, the LCR/NPA afterwards. The communist party suffered periodical drops (1981-1986, 1989, 1997-2002) followed by periods of stagnation or hollow recovery. In legislative elections, the most stable indicator of its weight, it fell from 11.3% in 1988 to 9.6% in 1997, 4.8% in 2002 and 4.3% in 2007. The Left Front, finally, came to entirely hegemonise this scene after 2009; its results, however, wildly oscillated between 11.1% (2012 presidential) and 6.9% (2012 legislative), depending on its campaigning profile and the specific stakes and characteristics of the election.

The underlying reasons of this behaviour can be illuminated by looking at the broader trends of the left-of-the-centre electorate (FIGURE 5.11).

FIGURE 5.11 ELECTORAL RESULTS OF RADICAL AND MODERATE LEFT



Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur.
Notes: shares of valid votes. Numbers: legislative elections.
.

The figure shows very clearly that the total left vote rose during periods of seating centre-right governments and large extra-parliamentary mobilisations against neo-liberalism (1986-1988; 1993-1997; 2002-2007; 2007-2012) and collapsed while the left was in power (1988-1993; 1997-2002). The only exception was the period 2004-2007, when the left vote fell despite the effervescence of the preceding years. The reason for this deviation is likely to lie partly in the lack of credibility of the Socialist Party, which had been deeply lacerated by the controversy over the 2005 European constitution referendum, and partly by a law and order reflex provoked by the riots in the *banlieues*.

The radical left had thus to navigate a very narrow path.

During periods of left-ward swing of the public opinion, the way to go was to present itself as a unitary force which would contribute to the defeat of the right-wing while exerting a radicalising pressure on the socialist party. The parties who failed to do this, adopting a more intransigent attitude, could have brief spikes in support but were ultimately severely punished and marginalised (LO after 2002; the NPA in 2010-2012). Indeed, after April 2002 the whole radical left paid dearly the consequences of the botched presidential election, with its overall results plunging at an all-time low.

During periods of centre-left cabinets, on the other hand, the association of the radical left with the seating governments was clearly poisonous and had to be avoided at all costs. Most of the electoral collapse of the PCF stemmed precisely from its periods of governmental participation (1981-1984; 1997-2002). A more uncertain collocation, such as the one adopted toward the socialist cabinets of 1984-1986, 1988-1993 and 2012-present[196], was less damaging but hardly positive.

The attempts to exploit the changing political mood with a flexible and appropriate strategy, however, were by no means always guaranteed a successful outcome. A powerful push to the left of public opinion benefitted significantly the PCF in 1993-

[196] The lines between support and opposition were here blurred. In the first and third period the socialist cabinets did not need the communist support to have a parliamentary majority; concretely, the PCF voted yes (1984) or abstained (2012) at the initial confidence vote and then decided on a case-by-case basis. In the second case, the socialist cabinets did not have an autonomous parliamentary majority and relied sometimes on the PCF but mostly on centrist dissidents, often with the help of the peculiar procedure of the article 49.3 of the Constitution (Ferretti, 2003). Posed in front of no-confidence motions, the party voted them twice (1990 and 1992) but enabled the survival of the cabinet the remaining times.

1997 and the FdG in 2010-2012 but only marginally or uncertainly the PCF in 1986-1988 and the whole radical left in 2002-2004. Conversely, a clear oppositional stance against socialist governments by the far left led to extraordinary results in 1997-2002 but had been of little benefit beforehand (1981-1986, 1988-1993), when the fruits of the disillusionment toward the left in power were rather reaped by abstentions and the far right.

To sum up, the French radical left was often among the beneficiaries – together with the moderate left – of left-ward swings of the public opinion but ultimately failed to profit from periods of weakening of the socialist party and came nowhere near to challenge its central position within the left-of-the-centre camp.

The CDSP survey data on political proximity offer a further confirmation of the limits of this success (see FIGURE 5.11). Between 1988 and 2007 people identifying with the PS dropped from 41.9% to 24.9%. People identifying with PCF, LO and LCR/NPA did increase from 6.0% to 9.7%. This improvement, however, represented a very small portion of the socialist losses (which were mainly lost to the right) and did not necessarily translate in an electoral growth.

FIGURE 5.11 INDICATORS OF LEFT-WING OPINION



Source: my elaboration from CDSP (1978, 1988, 1995, 2007).
Notes: share of valid votes. Vote: real results. Proximity: poll data, people declaring their proximity to a party. Self-positioning: poll data, position on the left-right continuum.

5.3.4 Organisational mobilisation

If the electoral mobilisation of the French radical left was at least able to ensure an overall stability around comparatively high levels, its organisational mobilisation failed to stop a ruinous decline. Unlike in Germany and Italy, the issue here was not the capture of disillusioned social-democrats or post-communists: the French socialist party has historically had comparatively social roots and a minority position within the left spectrum. The problem was the re-capture of the traditional communist subculture which had been dissolving since the late 1970s. Ultimately, neither the PCF nor other radical left forces managed to make progresses on this task.

The collapse of the radical left membership continued relentlessly all along our time-frame (see FIGURE 5.12).

FIGURE 5.12 RADICAL LEFT MEMBERSHIP



Source: my elaboration from Martelli (2010b), Videt (2011) and various estimates.

The PCF had already fallen from its all-time high of 566,492 in 1978 to 368,609 in 1986, stabilising until 1988 (375,187). The end of the Soviet bloc, the effects or failures of internal reforms, internal dissidences, the 1997-2002 period of governmental participation and demographic replacement led to a new precipitous haemorrhage which reduced due-paying members to 92,772 (2003) and again 64,184 (2012).[197]

The large majority of former communist members, especially those with a middle-lower class background, abandoned any direct political engagement and often even failed to retain a link of electoral loyalty toward the party, shifting to a socialist or far left vote.

The remaining radical left organisations missed the opportunity to profit from the communist decline. Lutte Ouvrière indeed strengthened its network of activists and sympathisers in the period 1980-2002[198] but remained numerically insignificant compared both to the PCF and to its own electoral influence. The same assessment applies to other far left traditions in the 2000s: the LCR rose from 1,041 members in 1997 to 2,640 in 2007, in a period when its electorate soared from practically nil to one and a half million votes;[199] the NPA had a brief initial spike (9,123 members in early 2009) but soon plunged back to the levels of its predecessor. Even Mélenchon's own PG, despite the very successful presidential campaign of its leader, saw its (declared) members double in 2009-2012 (to 12,000) but came nowhere near the membership of the PCF.

The dense network of collateral organisations which enveloped the PCF up to the 1980s suffered the same fate. As already remarked, the leadership of party-near mass organisations often retained a personal proximity with and even the membership of the PCF; however, they ceased to act as relays of party ideas and influence and adapted to a context dominated by de-politicisation and a shift toward the socialist party and the right. The more openly political organisations which emerged from the

[197] Formal members (an institute introduced in 2002 to mask the decline) stabilised at 130,063 in 2003 and 133,476 in 2009.

[198] Estimates are not very precise. Activists might have risen from 650 to 2,000 and formal members from less than 1,000 to 7,000-8,000.

[199] More precisely, from 71,304 votes in the 1997 legislative election to 1,498,581 in the 2007 presidential election.

struggles of the 1990s and 2000s, in turn, chose not to affiliate explicitly with any of the existing radical left parties.

Finally, the radical left lost much of its traditional presence within workplaces. The official number of workplace cells of the PCF declined from 9,494 (1978) to 5,499 (1988) and 2,800 (2000); they were de facto scrapped as a central organisational form at the 2000 congress and now survive almost exclusively within PCF-controlled local administrations and big state-owned companies (postal office, transports, EDF). Despite their efforts, other radical left organisations (especially LO and parts of the LCR/NPA) also saw their workplace presence stagnate or decline.

5.3.5 Conclusions

The detailed analysis of this section has sought to address the key question of whether the French radical left has been able, and to what extent, to fill the vacuum of political representation produced by the right-ward drift of the political system in the neo-liberal age.

The answer is that it generally has not. The mobilisation of the radical left in the period 1988-2012 produced at best slightly increasing, in general declining outcomes (see FIGURE 5.13).

FIGURE 5.13 INDICATORS OF influence



Notes: share of total electorate (above), share of valid votes (below).

Expressed in absolute terms, the membership collapsed from 371,809 to 86,184 members (-76.8%), legislative votes decreased from 2,845,826 to 2,046,578 (-28.3%) and presidential votes grew (+34.5%). Expressed in terms of percentages of the total electorate, membership density (M/E) has continuously declined from 0.99% to 0.19% of the electorate. The share of votes in legislative elections has also collapsed from 7.52% to 4.44%, almost entirely as a result of the 2002 drop. The share of votes in presidential elections went through a small but significant increase from 8.96% to 9.99%: results have oscillated widely but are in average superior to those of the late 1980s. Expressed in terms of percentages of valid votes, results were similar: an unstable but rather growing presidential vote, a strongly declining legislative one.

The electoral level (particularly presidential elections) proved to be the most favourable terrain for the radical left, but even here successes were limited, uncertain and unstable. Large left-ward shifts of the electorate, sparked by unpopular right-wing governments and mass extra-parliamentary mobilisations (1986-1988; 1993-1997; 2002-2004; 2007-2012), generally benefitted the radical left; however, rather less than other left parties (e.g. the PS and the Greens). Periods of direct participation or external support of the PCF to socialist governments (1981-1986; 1997-2002) almost annihilated its electoral support. Vocal opposition to socialist governments by the far left (1981-1986; 1988-1993; 1997-2002; 2012-present) gave fruits only in the third case; in all other instances disaffected left voters dispersed toward abstention and in other political directions, while the indirect but ultimate beneficiary was the far right (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

The level of extra-parliamentary organisation, on the contrary, represented a heavy failure. Membership levels, networks of collateral organisations, influence within civil society and social movement organisations: all sub-dimensions were dragged down by the decay of the PCF to the levels of the 1920s, before the 1935 surge. The other radical left organisations completely failed to intercept these disaffected ex-communists and to provide them a new political home. More crucially, even when some party did manage to expand its electorate (the PCF in 1994-1997, LO in 1993-2002, the LCR/NPA in 2002-2009, the FdG in 2008-2012), its organisational growth lagged well behind the electoral surge: that is, it only marginally translated its improved popular sympathy into tighter forms of organisational linkages. This worrying

development means that the French radical left has been willingly or unwillingly conforming to the general long-term shift of political parties from organisations solidly anchored within civil society to mere receptors of a fleeting electoral consent (Mair, 1994).

How can we explain this failure to exploit the high level of dissatisfaction and resistance against neo-liberalism as a springboard for a durable organisational and electoral strengthening?

Various interesting explanatory factors have been advanced in the French literature.
The first factor refers to organisational shortcomings of the PCF. Mischi (2003b), for instance, has pointed out that "the actual rupture occurs when the party loses its primacy within the communist universe". The loss of the sense of a historic mission, of clear identitarian references and of internal discipline leads to a crisis of the communist institution, the progressive autonomisation of its components and an avalanche effect on its organisational strength. This process, however, seems rather more a consequence of unavoidable external pressures – the defeat of the Western labour movement since the late 1970s, the general shift toward what Jacques Ion (1997) has defined as "distanced activism", the crisis and fall of the Soviet bloc – than the fruit of precise subjective responsibilities. The party leadership put up much resistance against these trends up to the 1990s and progressively embraced them only when it felt that there was no alternative to them. If the reforms of Robert Hue are likely to have accelerated the loss of members and cohesion, they initially succeeded in stalling the loss of electoral and institutional influence.
The second factor has been identified in the fragmentation of the radical left. The failure of the various parties to agree on a common candidate in the 2007 presidential election has been particularly criticised (Khalfa, 2007; Artous & Kouvelakis, 2007; Kouvelakis, 2007). The hypothesis is suggestive and has been lent some confirmation by the outcome of the 2012 presidential election, when unity produced a dynamic campaign and good results. The context of 2007 however, marked as it was by a powerful centripetal realignment of the left electorate toward the moderate candidate most likely to defeat the right (the socialist Ségolène Royal or even the centrist François Bayrou), was unlikely to reward a joint radical left candidature more than it

did several smaller ones. More generally, across the period 1990-2012 organisational fragmentation has of course reduced the societal weight of each individual party but has instead rather tended to increase their total weight, catering for partially different constituencies and complementing their strengths and weaknesses. The existence of an anti-systemic far left in the period 1993-2002, for instance, compensated for the decline of the PCF which would have otherwise dragged down the voting results of the whole area. On the contrary, a regroupment of the radical left on intransigent bases would have largely wiped out its local and perhaps national parliamentary representation, which was instead safeguarded by the politics of alliances of the PCF.[200]

The third factor refers to the incapacity of the parties to rapidly and adequately adapt to the changes in the political conjuncture. Kouvelakis (2007: 229-252), for instance, correctly reproaches the far left for its rigidity, arguing that its relative decline in 2002-2007 (compared with 1998-2000) was partially due to its failure to adapt to the shift from an "anti-political" to a "political" sequence and its insistence on a rather sectarian posture which ignored the wide-spread desire to defeat the right. At another level, the continuous zigzags of the PCF from conciliatory to intransigent attitudes toward the socialist party proved to be too flexible: the choice of direct governmental participation (1981-1984, 1997-2002) left it exposed to the full brunt of the disillusionment of its electorate while the constant shifts played an important role in the above-mentioned crisis of the communist identity, sowing a deep confusion among its ranks; the party thus ended up losing support both on its right and on its left.

My analysis has put forward a partially different explanation.

On the one hand, the loss of cohesion, organisational fragmentation and tactical troubles appear as intrinsic and largely unavoidable consequences of the objectively contradictory position of the radical left in the neo-liberal era. Radical leaders, activists, voters and potential supporters all grapple with the tensions produced by a dilemma of difficult resolution: that between anti-neoliberal coherence and desire for

[200] The regional elections are a good example of this. Since 2003 non-aligned lists can pass to the second round and obtain parliamentary representation only if they overcome a 10%-threshold: this was a realistic possibility for the radical left in less than half of the metropolitan regions. On the contrary, in 2004 the alliance with the PS guaranteed to the PCF an over-proportional number of seas (10.7%).

left unity. Aggressive right-wing governments tend to revitalise and mobilise the left-wing opinion but at the same time reactivate strong pressures toward an alliance; subsequent periods of left-wing alternation prove politically deceiving and thoroughly discredit the radical left forces which enabled them. Striking a rewarding balance between the two sides of the dilemma is extremely difficult, especially in contexts when the radical left support becomes crucial for the formation of a centre-left electoral or parliamentary majority. In these cases, a very likely outcome is thus cyclical electoral oscillations and a fragmentation in rival sensibilities and organisations.

On the other hand, the disarray caused by the exhaustion of the models of the 20th century workers' movement has not yet been superseded by viable new ones. Soviet-style state socialism was thoroughly discredited; the traditional state-based reformism of Western social-democratic and communist parties gradually morphed into a counter-reformism fully at ease with free-market financialised capitalism; the kind of workplace radicalism typical of the 1960s and 1970s was less and less capable to win material improvements and to counteract the fragmentation, precarisation and disorganisation of the workforce. In this context, the parties of the radical left were to some extent successful in repositioning themselves as champions of the welfare state but failed to develop a convincing long-term political vision and effective modalities of extra-parliamentary intervention.

France did not deviate significantly from the Western European norm. Anti-neoliberal dissatisfaction and extra-parliamentary mobilisation did at times fuel significant electoral surges (1992-1995, 2007-2009), but these proved to be short-lived; electoral sympathy, in turn, failed to translate into tighter forms of activism and commitment.

5.4 Explaining fragmentation and regroupment

The progressive organisational fragmentation described in section 5.2.2 can be traced back to the interplay of three main factors: (i) a strategic differentiation along intransigent or conciliatory lines; (ii) the institutional impact of the political system; (iii) a question of political and organisational identities.

The first point relates to the key dilemma of the contemporary French radical left: the difficult relation with the Socialist Party, electorally weak but absolutely predominant within the left spectrum (second rounds of elections, parliamentary weight and governmental weight).

From the 1970s to the early 1990s the whole radical left lost very large sections of its constituency to the PS which, despite its increasingly moderate course, continued to exert an incredible pull on the former.[201] Overall fragmentation did not increase much as a result, as the successive splits of dissident communist tendencies were short-lived and generally ended up merging with the PS or other moderate left parties (Greens, MDC).

From 1997 to 2002, on the contrary, the experience of the Jospin government (1997-2002) led to a collapse of its reputation among radical left circles and progressively hardened the differentiation between intransigent and conciliatory tendencies. The ensuing collapse of the PCF did not benefit the far left in terms of membership but fuelled its unexpected and powerful electoral surge and was the main reason behind the sinking of Hue's project of an enlarged "new communist party" (1999-2002).

After 2002, finally, the appeal of the socialist party on the left remained low; not so the pressure toward some form of collaboration, either simply to defeat the right or in the hope of exerting a more long-term pull on its policy course. As a consequence, the differences between the various radical left forces (PCF, LO, LCR) remained

[201] Among the many prominent leaders and cadres who left for the PS the following must be mentioned: from the PCF Henri Fiszbin (1986) and Charles Fiterman (1998); from the LCR Julien Dray (1981), Henri Weber (1986) and Gérard Filoche (1994); from the OCI Lionel Jospin (1970s), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (1976) and Jean-Christophe Cambadélis (1986).

irreconcilable and led to the failure of both the LO-LCR alliance (2003-2004) and the debates on a common presidential candidature in 2006-2007.

The second point relates to the role of the (electoral, financial, etc.) rules and regulations of the political system in providing positive and negative incentives to fragmentation or in artificially neutralising it. The effects have not been uniform.

The permissive 1993 reform of party financing has helped the proliferation of organisations alternative to the PCF, providing them with a reasonably accessible influx of resources.[202]

The working of electoral legislation has on the contrary made very difficult to the same organisations the access to parliamentary representation.[203]

Finally, the impact of electoral legislation on candidatures and electoral results varied according to the specific rules of each kind of election. The extraordinary tribune offered by the presidential election has encouraged a proliferation of competing radical left candidates, despite the high formal barriers.[204] The medium-level electoral thresholds of European and regional elections have on the contrary tended to promote the establishment of alliances.[205] Finally, the two-round majoritarian system of both presidential and legislative elections has generally not discouraged electoral fragmentation, as it enabled the electoral shift of socialist voters toward the radical left and of communist voters toward the far left in the first round (e.g. Tiberj, 2004). This was an effective means to nudge their parties to change their policies ("*vote d'influence*") without running the risk of compromising the overall result of the second

[202] Between 1993 and 2008 four groups have managed to regularly access state financing: LO, LCR/NPA, PT and SEGA (a technical regroupment of the eco-socialist milieu).

[203] Access to national parliament has been virtually precluded to any minor radical left organisation, with the exception of dissident MPs seeking to retain their seat. Successful examples of the latter are provided by the former communists Jean-Pierre Brard (CAP), Maxime Gremetz (orthodox), François Asensi (FASE) and Jacqueline Fraysse (FASE), by the former socialist Marc Dolez (PG) and by the former MDC Jacques Desallangre (ind. then PG). Access to sub-national and supra-national assemblies was rare but not impossible (e.g. LO and LCR between 1998 and 2004).

[204] Candidates need to gather signatures of support (*parrainages*) by existing elected representatives: 50 (1958), 100 (1965), 500 (1981). The bar seems to be a high one for extra-parliamentary organisations (the total number of possible signatories is about 42,000) but has been *de facto* lowered by the willingness of local politicians to offer their signature to parties they do not belong to out of democratic or strategic reasons. The number of radical left presidential candidates has thus oscillated from a minimum of 2-3 (1981, 1995, 2012) to four (1988 and 2002) and five (2007).

[205] E.g. between LO and LCR (1999, 2004) or the FdG lists (2009, 2010).

round; as soon as it produced the unintended consequence of the April 2002 presidential election, however, this pattern swiftly and permanently reversed.

The third point, finally, relates to the attainment of a common identity or at least a mutually acceptable compromise between the various political cultures and organised tendencies of the radical left.

Although the project of a regroupment of the radical left on pluralist and anti-neoliberal bases was implemented with some success only after 2009, many of its preconditions were present since the mid-1990s. In particular, the turn of Robert Hue's PCF away from monolithism and hegemonic predilections and toward a practice of external collaborations offered a promised path for a recomposition of the radical left. A series of obstacles, however, persistently prevented its realisation. Firstly, as I have shown above, the fundamental disagreements on the relationship with the moderate left could not be easily wished away in a period when the PCF resolutely turned toward a strategy of generalised electoral and governmental alliances with the socialist party. Secondly, the long-standing contrasts between different political cultures (Trotksyism, anti-capitalism, communism, socialism, ecologism) could in principle coexist under a common roof, as the experiences of other countries and of the Left Front prove, but were a source of friction. Thirdly, organisational jealousies on the sharing of power and resources remained difficult to assuage. In particular, the question of who was to embody the radical left in presidential elections was the single most important factor behind the failure of the 2005-2007 talks, and the regroupment operated by the Left Front in 2009-2012 became possible only when an enfeebled PCF became ready to hand over the position of presidential candidate to a non-communist.

The post-2009 regroupment process had its objective bases in the obvious overlapping of the anti-neoliberal programmatic of the different parties and in the unprecedented weakness of PCF and of the French radical left in its entirety during the period 2003-2007. Its partial success lies in the ability of the FdG to make the best out of the three above-mentioned factors.

On the first level, the Mélenchon presidential candidature was effective in neutralising centrifugal pressures on strategic issues by simultaneously insisting on a clear political differentiation *vis-à-vis* the socialists and on left unity against the right. On the second

level, the rival project of the New Anticapitalist Party was out-manoeuvred in 2009-2010 at the crucial level of the achievement of parliamentary representation.[206] On the third level, the form of a pluralist front headed by a non-communist and giving equal footing to all member-organisations quickly downplayed the concerns of ideological and organisational identity and emphasised the benefits of cooperation.

Both the strategic and the identitarian dilemmas are however merely assuaged and not resolved: unity thus remains fragile and exposed to dangers of disintegration.

[206] The NPA narrowly missed access to the European Parliament in 2009 (4.88%). The 2010 regional elections further confirmed that far left currents could hope to gain representation only through alliances with the PCF. These led to 7 GU and 2 NPA councillors; independent NPA and LO lists, on the contrary, obtained no representation.

5.5 The strategy of left-ward pull

The analysis of section 5.3 has shown how the French radical left failed to significantly expand on the back of widespread dissatisfaction and resistance against neo-liberalism. However, its extra-parliamentary and electoral support (legislative elections excepted) remained significant and in a high range for Western European standards. What were the results of its efforts to exert a left-ward pull on the political system?

The record was altogether poor.

The policy course of the Socialist Party seems to have been only marginally affected by the pressure coming from its left. The PS progressively adopted a neo-liberal economic policy centred on privatisations and liberalisations, an open economy and EU (trade, fiscal, legal) constraints but sought to accompany it with a preservation or expansion of public employment, state expenditures, basic welfare provisions and safety nets (e.g. minimum wage, minimum income, 35-hour working week); until recently, it also refrained from major pension and employment reforms. Lionel Jospin (1999) famously synthesised this approach as an embrace of the "market economy" but a rejection of the "market society" – a distinction more rhetorical than practical (Bergounioux & Grunberg, 2007; Grunberg, 2011) but not entirely devoid of empirical validity. The radical left can certainly claim no credit for obstructing the conversion of the socialist party toward the free market: its turn to privatisations happened precisely in the years when the communist party was its allied in power (1997-2002). The "progressive" measures of socialist governments, on the other hand, seem to have been autonomously conceived to lubricate and accompany the neo-liberal transition (Vail, 2010) rather than as a response of any left-wing mobilisation.

The effects on governmental policies were clearer to see. The contribution of the radical left to the successive waves of mass extra-parliamentary struggles which rocked the country since 1986 was generally minoritarian but nevertheless important. These mobilisations were often successful in forcing right-wing governments to retreat unpopular policies (the general movements of 1994, 1996 and 2006) or in obtaining specific material concessions for specific professional or social categories (civil

servants, students, the unemployed, the population of the French Antilles). They had however very precise limitations. Firstly, left-wing contentious politics flared up in periods of centre-right domination but tended to evaporate when the left was in power. Secondly, the failures became more and more frequent, despite the very large size of supporting strikes and demonstrations (2003, 2009 and 2010). Thirdly, they retained a generally defensive character, largely bypassed private sector workers and had little impact on organisational consolidation (i.e. the institutionalisation of social movement networks or membership growth of trade unions and other organisations).

The radical left also played an important role in the outcome of referendums on EU matters: the no option lost by a hair's breadth on the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht treaty (49.0%) and actually won on the 2005 referendum on the proposed European constitution (54.7%). These manifestations of dissent, however, did not affect the overall process of European integration in any noticeable way.

The effects on non-governmental actors, finally, were also rather modest. The balance of power within private sector workplaces, in particular, solidly in the hands of owners and managers and organising and mobilising efforts failed to put a brake to ongoing negative tendencies (wage stagnation, precarisation, industrial dismissals and union density).

This failure to exert a left-ward pull on French politics and society was common to all parties (PCF and the far left) and strategies (conciliatory and intransigent). Three explanations are possible.

Firstly, the outcome may simply derive from an insufficient level of electoral, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressures. As I have shown in section 5.2.1, the societal weight of the French radical left was fairly high by Western European standards but always remained of a middling size. Despite short-lived spikes, it followed a long-term constant or declining trend and it never came close to threaten the dominant position of the socialist party within the left-of-the-centre political spectrum. Moreover, it was increasingly divided between competing organisations which not always reached some form of unity in action.

Secondly, the problem may instead lie in the wrong kind of tactics. At the electoral level, support to socialist candidates in the second round has rarely been explicitly linked to clear policy conditionalities. Since the disaster of the 1958 legislative

elections left parties, including the far left, have generally stuck to the deeply-ingrained precepts of "republican discipline" (*discipline républicaine*), providing for stand-down agreements (*désistements*) and the convergence of all votes on the best-placed left candidate; in some cases, especially at the sub-national level, this basic form of cooperation has been upgraded to more solid agreements on common left candidates from the first round. Only Lutte Ouvrière (after 1981) has normally turned away from this custom and refused to call for a left vote in the second round. Both tactics, however, left the socialist candidates free from the need to commit to policy concessions to their left.[207] At the parliamentary level, the PCF was wary to push its bargaining with seating socialist governments to the point of threatening to topple them. The communists were decisive for the survival of the centre-left on two occasions: 1988-1993 and 1997-2002; the party threatened to support a no-confidence motion twice, in 1990 and 1992, but failed both to win significant concessions and to force a cabinet reshuffle or new elections. The key problem in adopting this set of more aggressive tactics was the fact that they risked to prove double-edged swords, running against the wide-spread desire of left unity against the right and leading to a punishment in the ballot box.

Thirdly, the incapacity of the radical left to assume a leading role within workplaces and civil society organisations and to devise effective methods of mobilisation may also be one of the culprits. The radical left enjoyed more credit among sympathisers of the left-leaning trade unions than that among the general population, at times higher than that of the PS;[208] this notwithstanding, it was generally isolated within the unions' top decision-making instances and unable to carry on the fight against their will (2003 and 2010) or initiate significant mobilisations against centre-left governments.

[207] Conditional agreements were on the other hand sometimes offered by the far left to the PCF, for instance, by LO for the 1988 and 1997 legislative elections (LO, 1988 and 1996c) and by the LCR in the framework of possible processes of radical left regroupment; they were usually ignored.

[208] In the period 1995-2012, voting intentions for radical left candidates were 37.0% within Solidaires, 33.4% within the CGT, 19.3% within FO and 18.2% within the FSU.

5.6 Conclusions

The French national context was to a large extent not dissimilar to the German and Italian ones. Common features were: the downturn of the militancy, organisation and effectiveness of the labour movement begun in the late 1970s and its consequences in terms of the socio-economic and political-ideological balance of forces; the moves toward a neo-liberal restructuring of state and society such as the privatisation of the state-owned sector and reforms of welfare provisions and labour protection; the progressive right-ward shift of social democratic parties; the crisis and final collapse of the Eastern bloc and the need to redefine a credible and appealing vision of a post-capitalist future.

Some key differences were however evident. Firstly, in France left-wing extra-parliamentary mobilisation has remained since the late 1980s at fairly high levels, with a constant background of localised movements by wage-workers, the youth and other social subjects and cyclical eruptions of mass conflicts (1994-1995, 2003, 2005-2006, 2009-2010). Secondly, a strong popular suspicion and resistance to neo-liberalism has determined a much slower and incomplete pace of the process of neo-liberalisation: if the state-owned sector has been largely (but not completely) dismantled, pension and labour reforms have been less incisive than elsewhere and welfare provisions, state expenditure and state employment have remained stable or even expanded. Thirdly, a comparatively successful record in macro- and micro-economic terms has favoured a feeble but not negligible growth of real wages (contrary to the wage stagnation in Italy and Germany), although unemployment rates have remained high.

Although the shock of the years 1989-1992 did not represent the sudden organisational break experienced in other countries, it accelerated a process of progressive change of the radical left away from the 20th century models to new features and characteristics. The main trend directions, consistent with the general Western European trends, can be schematised as follows.

Ideologically, the parties moved from traditional communist references to a vaguer "left" identity and from long-term anti-capitalist goals to a more concrete anti-

neoliberal programmatic. Sociologically, the barycentre of their constituency shifted from the lower-middle strata of the salaried population (e.g. industrial and agricultural workers) to a more composite mix of ordinary wage-workers, highly educated strata and inactives. Organisationally, the mass party (PCF) and avant-garde party (LO, LCR) models morphed into light organisation with a predominantly electoral focus. Strategically, the dilemma of the relationship with the moderate left became the centre of the inter- and intra-party debate and led to periodic oscillations, lacerations and an overall growth of fragmentation.

The transition remains to this day incomplete and open-ended: stark discontinuities are counterbalanced by the legacies of the past; the old ways are increasingly sidelined but their replacements are unstable and incoherent.

This turbulence was largely the symptom and attempted response to two key challenges: (i) arresting or compensating for the collapse of the communist subculture; (ii) exploiting the political vacuum created by the accommodation of mainstream parties to neo-liberalism as a springboard for a recovery of societal weight and political influence.

The balance sheet of more than two decades of activity is mixed. On the one hand, the radical left managed to remain a vital and medium-sized political area and preserved an important role at all levels of French politics and society. On the other hand, it failed to embark on a stable path of electoral and organisational growth and to dent the supremacy of the socialist party within the left-of-the-centre spectrum. Instead, the bouts of expansion ignited by mass dissatisfaction and resistance against the proposed neo-liberal reforms of the right (1993-1997 and 2009-2012) remained of limited magnitude and were followed by periods of stagnation (1997-2002) or relative weakness (2002-2008). As it was, the vacuum to the left of the socialist party proved much more difficult to fill than expected.

The inability to overcome certain maximum ceilings (13.8% of valid votes; the interruption of membership decline; a consolidation of the presence within civil society and social movement organisations) may be attributed to subjective mistakes: the overly conciliatory course of the PCF during the term of the Jospin government (1997-2002); the overly sectarian attitude of the far left organisations at the peak of

their electoral influence (LO-LCR in 2002-2004; NPA in 2009-2012); the failure to carry out an early process of regroupment (2005-2007). From my perspective, however, these problems are largely a reflection of objective constraints.

Firstly, the radical left space occupies a structurally contradictory position, torn as it is between the necessities of anti-neoliberal coherence and those of anti-right unity. The former undermines any conciliatory strategy of long-term left alliances while the latter frustrated the formation of a fully autonomous pole.[209] This is the material foundation of most predicaments of the contemporary radical left, from its cyclical electoral development to its growing organisational fragmentation.

Secondly, the socialist party shows a continued ability to neutralise the threat on its left through a variety of political and technical mechanisms: a periodic renewal through opposition; the exploitation of its pivotal position within the left camp and of the two-round electoral system; the cooptation of junior partners of moderate left or radical left origin and of extra-parliamentary social movements; the attraction of non-attached voters on grounds of enabling the success and stability of movements of political alternation.

Like its German and Italian counterparts, the French radical left has so far failed to find a way out of these conundrums. It has thus become a thermometer of the dissatisfaction toward the moderate left but no credible alternative to it.

[209] Grunberg and Schweisguth (2003) are thus correct in describing the French political system as fundamentally tripartite: left, centre-right and far right.

CHAPTER SIX. CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS.

This concluding chapter will draw together the findings and implications of my analysis. In section 6.1 I will show how this thesis contributes to illuminate the questions on the *meaning* of the Western European radical left emerging from the existing scholarly literature. In section 6.2 I will expand on the *political nature* of the contemporary radical left. Sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 will be devoted to charting the evolution of the various *dimensions of societal weight* (electoral, institutional and organisational) of this political area and to a discussion of their reasons and consequences. In section 6.6 I will explain the contradictory tendencies toward regroupment and fragmentation. In section 6.7 I will assess the failure of the radical left to exert a significant influence on Western European politics and society. In section 6.8, finally, I will provide some concluding remarks on the overall trajectory of the contemporary radical left.

6.1 The meaning of the contemporary radical left. Incoherent adaptation, revival of left reformism or a socialism for the 21st century?

In the initial literature review and throughout the three national chapters I have shown that no consensus has so far emerged within the scholarly community on the fundamental nature of the contemporary radical left. Three main questions have proven particularly divisive.

The first question refers to the coherence or lack thereof of the contemporary radical left and the possibility to understand it as a party family.

On the one hand, many early analyses have tended to emphasise the predominance of an incoherent process of disintegration of the Western European communist party family, as each party transformed at a different pace and in a different direction. Bell (1992) and Bull (1994 and 1995) proclaimed the end of the 20th century communist movement: after 1989 the parties followed divergent paths of adaptation (traditionalism, reform or rupture with the communist tradition) and what was left was too inhomogeneous to be encompassed by a single analytical category. Botella and Ramiro (2003b) and Marantzidis (2003) substantially concurred with this analysis and insisted on the fragmentation of the radical left landscape and on the partial or total reconversion of former communist parties to other political traditions. The former pointed to four outcomes: a more or less orthodox preservation of a communist identity; the transformation into social democratic, green or non-communist leftist parties. The latter identified four slightly different groupings: Marxists-Leninists, "disillusioned social-democrats", social-democratised and post-materialists.

On the other hand, most recent surveys have insisted that the contemporary radical left, once the dust of abandonments (e.g. the Italian PCI and the Dutch CPN) or extinctions (e.g. the British CPGB) settled down, has retained a minimal level of coherence: the rejection of capitalism and neo-liberalism; an effort to offer a political representation to the working-class and the workers' movement; an anti-neoliberal

programmatic merging the defence of the welfare state with left-libertarian themes. Nevertheless, the tendency toward convergence was seen as uneven and not preventing the existence of a great diversity and fragmentation. March and Mudde (2005) identified four sub-groupings: communist, green and new politics, democratic socialist and social-populist parties. March (2011) further refined the distinction in ten sub-categories: conservative communists, reform communists, democratic socialists, populist socialists and social populist parties, each of them split into "radical left" and "extreme left" parties. De Waele and Vieira (2012) and Ducange *et al.* (2013) focused on the differences between communist, red-green and left social democratic parties. Hildebrandt (2010), finally, singled out two main currents: democratic socialists and communists.

My analysis has demonstrated that, contrary to the first group of authors, the contemporary radical left can indeed be understood as a unitary party family. All parties, whatever their historical tradition and present sensibilities, share largely similar fundamental features: some form of critique of capitalism; an anti-neoliberal mid-term programme; the fusion of "old left" and "new left" themes and social constituencies; an ideal and concrete link with the workers' movement and other left-libertarian social movements; an unresolved relationship with the moderate left; an electoral behaviour intimately connected with disaffection toward social democracy and the political system. Contrary to the second group of authors, however, I have shown that the attempts to devise stable ideological sub-groupings are misguided. Common tendencies affect all parties while the main lines of differentiation operate not between but across parties. Under favourable conditions all radical left sensibilities can coexist under a common organisational framework, be it a unitary party (e.g. the Italian PRC or the German PDS/DIE LINKE) or a looser alliance (e.g. the French FdG). Under unfavourable conditions, instead, the radical left tends to explode into rival fragments. Neither broad left parties nor competing organisations, however, can ever fully escape the overall tendencies and tensions of the *radical left space,* thus continuously oscillating between anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism and between conciliatory and intransigent postures.

The second question refers to the deeper meaning of the radical left project. At least three basic positions can be identified here.

The first possibility is to understand the post-1989 evolution of the radical left as a transition from anti-capitalism to social democracy ("social democratisation") based on a fundamental discontinuity with the past. Most scholars recognise an element of truth in this argument, although they rarely push it to its extreme consequences. The concept has been applied with reference to both the overall Western European context (Marantzidis, 2004; March, 2008)[210] and to specific national parties (Arter, 2002; Fülberth, 2008)[211].

The second option is to identify the radical left as "left reformist" while insisting that it was already so in the past (Callinicos, 1999, 2008 and 2012; Rees, 2001; Blackledge, 2013). "Reformist consciousness" always had more and less radical variants and incarnated in a variety of parties: the crisis of Stalinism and the disaffection toward social democracy led in part to the growth of revolutionary forces but predominantly to a revival of new kinds of reformism, sometimes within traditional working-class parties but increasingly outside of them.

The third choice is to claim that the radical left has retained a fundamental continuity in its "anti-capitalist" goals, although the contours of the socialist project and the conditions of its action were rethought and adapted to a changed external environment. For some authors we deal here with a case of a wolf in sheep's clothing (Backes & Moreau, 2008). Others insist on the fact that the long-term vision, albeit generally vague, remains one of an alternative to capitalism (Hudson, 2000 and 2012; March & Mudde, 2005; Seiler, 2012; Marlière, 2013). Finally, Kouvelakis (2007: 289-294) has argued that while tensions between anti-neoliberalism and anti-capitalism do exist, the general adoption of the former by radical left parties does not necessarily involve a reformist outcome: in the present conjuncture, any coherent anti-neoliberal

[210] Marantzidis (2004:172) states that "despite the appearance of a grand variety of choices at the end of the 1980s, the communist and post-communist parties seem to orient themselves toward social democracy". March (2008: 1) claims that "the far left is becoming the principal challenge to mainstream social democratic parties, in large part because its main parties are no longer extreme, but present themselves as defending the values and policies that social democrats have allegedly abandoned".

[211] Arter (2002:233) suggests that "the first decade [after 1989] has witnessed an attempted *social-democratisation of the post-communist parties in Finland and Sweden* [...] the potential in this appeal lay in the fact [...] of a *neo-liberalisation of the ruling Social Democrats* [...]". Fülberth (2008: 162) argues that "[DIE LINKE] is the second (neo-)socialdemocratic party of a capitalist German society".

approach inevitably leads to large-scale class confrontations and to the actuality of a break with capitalism.

My analysis shows that the use of the term "social democratisation" is doubly misleading. On the one hand, the assimilation of the programmatic vision of the radical left to a mere take-over of social democratic themes ignores the fact that its socio-economic demands are often the legacy of a specifically communist form of reformism and that its non-economic demands rather derive from the "new left" and movementist thinking of the post-1968 period. On the other hand, the ideological rapprochement of the radical left with traditional social democratic policies was not matched by a recreation of the key organisational features of the "narrow" definition of social democracy (Moschonas, 2002: 15-22): in particular, an interpenetration of parties with the workers' movement and with a mass working-class sub-culture. The gains of the contemporary radical left, when they occurred, were exclusively electoral in nature and never managed to revert the tendency to a steep decline of the (communist or social democratic) mass party model.

The controversy between reformist and anti-capitalist characterisations, on the contrary, remains somewhat open and conditioned by the specific interplay of historical traditions, environmental constraints and subjective developments in each country and period. Firstly, while a growing number of radical left forces indeed lack any reference to Marxism and to a post-capitalist future, in many cases this was actually the outcome of a radicalisation of traditional social democratic tendencies (e.g. the German WASG, the French PG) or of newly-politicised layers (e.g. the youth of the alter-globalist and anti-crisis movements); the demands and attitudes of these currents were generally to the left of those of traditional communist parties and an actual implementation of their vision might have led to a kind of dynamic similar to the one suggested above by Kouvelakis. Secondly, forces which explicitly call for an overcoming of capitalism remain strong both outside and within the pragmatic radical left parties (e.g. DIE LINKE, PRC and PCF) and moves to completely abandon any anti-capitalist perspective are rare and tend to lead to a quick exit from the party family (e.g. the experience of the Dutch GL or the Italian PDS and more recently SEL). Thirdly, however, the fact that none of the contemporary radical left parties has so far developed a credible vision of a post-capitalist society and of the path toward it does not bode well for their future development. Renewed (non-Stalinist) Leninist

blueprints (Bensaïd, 2007; Post, 2013) remain marginal and controversial even among the most radical currents. "Movementist" strategies based on the linear growth of extra-parliamentary mobilisations and counter-powers (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Holloway, 2003) have failed to devise effective new methods to consolidate the movements and win significant reforms, let alone to point to a transcendence of capitalism: all major mobilisation cycles of the period (the workers' struggles of 1992-1995, the alter-globalist movement of 1999-2004 and the anti-crisis protests of 2009-2012) were of an eminently defensive character, failed to institutionalise themselves in permanent counter-hegemonic organisations and ultimately reverted to electoral politics and centre-left alliances as a "lesser-evil" trench helping to weather the storm. The *partisan* radical left, finally, has attempted to play the role of a left-wing counter-weight and correction to the mainstream moderate left – depending on the circumstances, institutional or movementist and conciliatory or intransigent – but has not succeeded in designing a successful way to either political power or policy attainment.

Altogether, the case for the contemporary radical left as a vehicle of the "socialism for the 21st century" (Hudson, 2012) seems at present not supported by the German, Italian and French experiences. On the contrary, this political area certainly appears to be an *electoral thermometer* of the dissatisfaction toward neo-liberalism and of the crisis of the 20th century workers' movement in its social democratic, communist and far left variants; it has however not (yet?) found a solution either to the renewal of working-class politics or to the emergence of new forms of democratic radicalism.

The third question refers to the entity of the electoral success of the contemporary radical left. Initial accounts (Bell, 1993; Bull & Heywood, 1994) certified a swift decline of Western European communism and tended to forecast its inevitable extinction. Subsequent analyses (Moreau *et al.*, 1998; Botella & Ramiro, 2003b; March & Mudde, 2005; Backes & Moreau, 2008) underlined contradictory tendencies toward both decline *and* recovery and remained cautious on the overall direction of change. The most recent contributions (March, 2008 and 2011; De Waele & Vieira, 2012; Marlière, 2013), on the contrary, stressed an uneven but significant recovery since the low point of the early 1990s.

The analysis I carried out in chapter two demonstrates that from 1993 to 1999 a strong recovery of the radical has indeed taken place across Western Europe; after that date, however, little progress has been made on the whole. Average results have steered a stagnating course between sudden surges and falls; national trajectories have become asynchronous; a stable or slightly growing electoral weight has often translated into a lower political influence (due to the growth of organisational fragmentation).

The following figure (FIGURE 6.1) summarises the evolution of radical left parties in national legislative and European parliament elections in fifteen Western European countries.

FIGURE 6.1 ELECTORAL EVOLUTION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT



Source: my elaborations from official electoral data.
Notes: 15 countries (EU15), rolling averages. Total shares of valid votes, unweighted national averages. National: legislative elections. EP: European Parliament elections.

Three further important elements emerge from the analysis of the curves.

Firstly, the extent of the recovery of the contemporary radical left tends to be over-estimated by the tendency to look at simple averages (red lines and columns) instead of at total results (blue lines and columns). The growing gap between the two sets of results is due to the fact that the radical left has rather improved in medium-small countries (e.g. Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Portugal) and, with the exception of Germany, rather declined or stagnated in the big ones (Italy, France, Spain, UK).

Secondly, the strong link between the contemporary radical left and the alter-globalisation movement asserted by many scholars (e.g. Callinicos, 2008 and 2012) appears largely imaginary from a global electoral perspective; on the contrary, the international mobilisations of the period 1999-2003 come across as ininfluent or negative diversions from the task of building solid national parties.

Thirdly, the swings seem instead to be strongly correlated with social and political events at the national level. In particular, large-scale labour and anti-governmental mobilisations almost always result in gains while governmental participation unfailingly produces heavy losses.

6.2 Political nature: anti-neoliberal parties and troubled relationship with the moderate left

The German, French and Italian case studies point to three key features that all the radical left parties share at least in part: a *mid-term anti-neoliberal programme* mixing working-class, welfarist and left-libertarian themes; a *composite social constituency*; a *strategy of left-ward pull* on the political system and more specifically on the moderate left parties.

The first feature provided a common ideological framework to overcome the shock of the failures of the 20th century communist movement, to by-pass old debates, to regroup different organisations and sensibilities and to appeal to the discontents of the neo-liberal transition and of the right-ward shift of moderate left parties.

The mid-term programmatic of the radical left tended to cover three types of issues: socio-economic demands (working and living conditions of the majority of wage-workers, employment, welfare provisions and public services, inequality and redistribution between classes and geographical regions); a questioning of the existing model of economic development (formal ownership and effective control of the means of production, quantity and quality of economic growth, and its overall purpose and direction) and so-called left-libertarian issues (solidarity, peace, civil and democratic rights, minority rights, secularism and environmental protection).

The area where the radical left was more effective was the defence of the social advances of the 1960s and 1970s which were being progressively abandoned by their original authors (social democratic, Christian democratic and left-liberal parties). Activity on the other two fronts was less rewarding, as the terrain of left-libertarian issues was already selectively covered by green and other mainstream parties while the appeal of a deeper critique of capitalism was dampened by a lack of clarity on the proposed alternatives. [212]

[212] Both at a strictly political and at a broader intellectual level, the radical left was vocal in criticising the consequences of unbridled capitalism but remained more cautious and vague on the specific features of its proposed alternative: the role of nationalisations, the mechanisms of democratic and workers' control, participation to the Eurozone and to the European Union, growth vs. de-growth, the promotion

Important differences in the outlook of each radical left group lingered but their saliency steadily decreased over time. The fractures caused by diverging international allegiances lost much of their relevance with the collapse or adaptation of the regimes of really-existing state socialism. The obstacles provoked by authoritarian modes of organisations were removed by the adoption by of a democratic, pluralist and "broad party" approach by all communist parties. The tension between the pursuit of reforms within the boundaries of capitalism and the advocacy of an anti-capitalist rupture appeared largely academic at a time where class struggles had an entirely defensive character and the daily activity of all tendencies was focused on the mere defence of the existing regimes of social protection. Finally, the debates on the precise features of a post-capitalist transformation suffered the same fate, as the feasibility of such a transition seemed to be put off to a very distant and uncertain future. All these reasons concurred to favour the collaboration and mixing of forces of different origin (orthodox and dissident communists, left-wing socialists, social movement activists, newly-politicised strata, Marxists and non-Marxists) in a new kind of anti-neoliberal radical left.

A symptom of this shift was the progressive downplaying of traditional identitarian references and the adoption of broader and inclusive ones[213].

The evolution of the class composition of the German, French and Italian radical left is summarised in the following table (TABLE 6.2).

Their *electorate* retained a significant working-class class bias. Employed and unemployed wage workers – in particular blue-collar workers and the unemployed – were somewhat over-represented (with an index of 133 in France, 126 in Italy and 113 in Germany); employers and self-employers strongly under-represented. The total share of the working class (Germany, 62.4%; France, 57.3%; Italy, 48.4%) remained virtually unchanged compared to the pre-1989 figures; what changed was the relative

---

of large vs. small enterprises, the identification of strategic sectors and products, the repudiation of public debt, and so on. This ambiguity ensured that in the early 1990s, despite their veto power as vital partners of centre-left governmental majorities, both the Italian PRC/PdCI and the French PCF actually enabled the adoption of the common European currency and the dismantlement of the state-owned sector in exchange for small redistributive concessions.

[213] For instance, through the rebranding with a non-communist and generic "left" label: Left Party (2005) and The Left (2007) in Germany; Left Front (2008) in France; Rainbow Left (2008), Left Ecology Freedom (2008) and Federation of the Left (2009) in Italy.

weight of each component, with a decline of blue-collar workers and a growth of white-collar and unemployed ones.

Their *membership,* on the contrary, testifies to a significant loosening of the historic links of the parties with the history of the socialist workers' movement. The German SED, the French PCF and the Italian PCI, despite profound differences, had unquestionable working-class roots: wage-workers and specifically (industrial and agricultural) blue-collar workers made up a majority of their membership; part of their organisation was structured along the workplace principle (workplace cells); cadres with a working-class background were schooled and promoted to significant leadership positions. Within their contemporary heirs, instead, active workers have become a sometimes small minority while the weight of groups with an ambiguous class position (pensioners, professionals, students and other inactives) has soared.

TABLE 6.2 CLASS COMPOSITION

	GERMANY		FRANCE		ITALY	
VOTERS	**-**	**RL 1998-2009**	**RL 1978**	**RL 1995-2007**	**RL 1987**	**RL 1996-2008**
Average on...		**4 elections**		**3 elections**		**4 elections**
WORKING-CLASS	**-**	**62.4% (113)**	**57.3% (140)**	**58.3% (133)**	**48.4% (122)**	**48.8% (126)**
EMPLOYED	-	50.4% (101)	49.9% (138)	50.7% (132)	44.7% (122)	39.7% (126)
White-collar	-	29.6% (93)	25.1% (112)	32.8% (121)	10.7% (71)	20.1% (108)
Blue-collar	-	20.8% (116)	24.9% (180)	17.9% (158)	34.0% (158)	19.6% (153)
UNEMPLOYED	-	11.9% (256)	7.3% (159)	7.6% (144)	3.7% (126)	9.1% (127)
MEMBERS	**SED 1988**	**RL 1998-2009**	**PCF 1979**	**PCF 1997**	**PCI 1987**	**PRC 1999-2006**
Average on...		**2 surveys**				**3 surveys**
WORKING-CLASS	**-**	**31.6%**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**48.2%**
EMPLOYED	*78.5%*	25.1%	59.9%	43.7%	52.4%	40.3%
White-collar	-	19.9%	27.8%	27.4%	11.1%	20.0%
Blue-collar	-	5.2%	32.1%	16.3%	41.3%	20.3%
UNEMPLOYED	-	6.5%	-	-	-	7.8%

Source: my elaboration from FGW, CDSP and ITANES survey data.
Notes: share of each category over radical left totals; in brackets: index of over-representation compared to valid votes.

Altogether, the social constituency of the radical left appears composite and little homogeneous. The lingering over-representation of the working-class thus seems to have changed its deeper meaning: not the heart of the parties' identity but one of the many components of a broader left-wing coalition based on a variety of political appeals (class, welfarism, secularism, left-libertarianism, regional political cultures).

Finally, with the exception of the most extreme currents which expounded a strategy of anti-capitalist alternative, all major parties broadly agreed on a strategy of left-ward

pull aimed at gradually influencing the course of the moderate left through a combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, friendly and hostile pressures.

The traditional differentiations of radical left parties over ideology, long-term goals, means, class composition and political culture were overshadowed by a different kind of problem, which became the veritable bone of contention of the period: the *degree of intransigence* to be adopted vis-à-vis the moderate left. Conciliatory voices declared the unavoidability of strategies of organic centre-left alliances, hoping to prevent even worse outcomes (a right-wing government) and to influence policies from the inside. Intransigent voices, on the contrary, tended to reject electoral and above all governmental coalitions on grounds of anti-neoliberal coherence. Most of the parties constantly oscillated between the two poles.

6.3. Electoral mobilisation: discordant trends, underlying reasons and the "vacuum thesis"

6.3.1 Overall support

The evolution of electoral weight of the German, French and Italian radical left is summarised below (TABLE 6.3 and FIGURE 6.4).

Average levels were medium-small in Germany (6.32% of valid votes) and Italy (6.55%), medium in France (9.62% in legislative and 12.47% in presidential elections).

TABLE 6.3 ELECTORAL WEIGHT

	GERMANY legislative	ITALY legislative	FRANCE legislative	FRANCE presidential	GERMANY east	GERMANY west
PERIOD	1990-2013	1992-2013	1993-2012	1995-2012	1990-2013	1990-2013
VOTES (n.)						
Average	2,916,005	2,451,164	2,465,564	3,916,947	1,851,846	1,064,159
First	1,138,174	2,201,428	2,788,058	4,248,012	1,026,739	111,435
Last	3,784,482	1,949,768	2,046,578	4,598,832	1,877,897	1,906,585
Change	2,646,308	-251,660	-741,480	350,820	851,158	1,795,150
Change %	232.50%	-11.43%	-26.59%	8.26%	82.90%	1610.94%
% on valid votes						
Average	6.32	6.55	9.62	12.47	19.04	2.95
First	2.45	5.61	10.96	13.94	9.95	0.31
Last	8.65	5.73	7.89	12.82	21.37	5.46
Change	6.20	0.12	-3.07	-1.12	11.42	5.15
Change %	253.06%	2.14%	-28.01%	-8.03%	114.77%	1661.29%
% on electorate						
Average	4.74	5.09	6.06	9.40	13.65	2.20
First	1.88	4.64	7.15	10.62	7.40	0.24
Last	6.11	4.16	4.44	9.99	14.34	3.90
Change	4.23	-0.48	-2.71	-0.63	6.94	3.66
Change %	225.00%	-10.34%	-37.90%	-5.93%	93.78%	1525.00%

Source: my elaborations from official national data.
Notes: rolling averages; Italian data are slightly inflated by the 2008 and 2013 results. Germany east includes Berlin.

FIGURE 6.4 ELECTORAL WEIGHT



Source: my elaborations from official national data.
Notes: legislative elections, shares of valid votes.

The trends broadly conform to the general development of the West European radical left: collapse in the early Nineties, recovery in the mid-Nineties, nation-specific trajectories afterwards. Interestingly, values show a certain convergence toward central levels up to 2005-2007 but diverge again hereafter. The development is unquestionably positive only in Germany; in France and Italy is rather declining.

In all three countries the radical left suffered a heavy initial blow from the dissolution of the international communist movement in 1989-1991. In Italy the *Partito Comunista Italiano*, which in 1987 still gathered 26.58% of valid votes, in 1991 decided to transform itself into a moderate social democratic organisation and defected from the party family, leaving behind a medium neo-communist party (PRC) formed by disparate communist dissidents and other leftists. In France the *Parti communiste français* experienced an early decline, plunging from 20.62% in 1978 to 9.50% in 1986. By that time further communist losses were generally compensated by the gains of other (far left and alternative) organisations. In Germany the landscape was marked by the 1990 re-unification: in the West the radical left had been and remained virtually non-existent, while in the East the collapse of the authoritarian socialist regime shattered the influence of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* but nevertheless enabled its reformed successor party (PDS) to preserve a not negligible electoral appeal.

The period 1992-1998, on the contrary, led to a strong recovery in all three countries. The radical left was among the beneficiaries of the growing dissatisfaction and resistance toward neo-liberalism encapsulated by large strikes by public and private sector workers and massive anti-governmental demonstrations (1992-1993 and 1996-1997 in Germany; 1995 in France; 1994 in Italy).

Since 1998, finally, the evolution of the radical left was characterised by oscillating and highly nation-specific paths. In Germany it followed an altogether upward trajectory punctuated by temporary setbacks (2002 and 2013); its results grew from 5.12% (1998) to 8.65% (2013) and, crucially, included the unprecedented achievement of establishing a mid-sized electoral foothold in the Western regions of the country (from 1.13% to 5.41%). In France, it declined strongly in legislative elections (average: 7.85%) and slightly in presidential ones (average: 11.87%). In Italy, a cyclical fluctuation until 2006 was followed by a serious collapse afterwards. In all three cases the crucial obstacle which broke the previous upward movement was that of the relationship with the moderate left, with radical left parties paying dearly for both their governmental participation (France in 1997-2002; Italy in 1996-2001 and 2006-2008) and the pressure of tactical anti-right voting (Italy in 1999-2001 and 2008; France since 2002; Germany in 2002 and 2013).

6.3.2 Radical left voters

Who were the voters of the radical left? The following table (TABLE 6.5) summarises the socio-demographic characteristics influencing positively or negatively a vote for the radical left.

TABLE 6.5 SELECTED SOCIOLOGICAL FEATURES OF VOTERS

	GERMANY 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 (legislative)	ITALY 1996, 2001, 2006 (legislative)	FRANCE 1995, 2002, 2007 (presidential)
GEOGRAPHY			
Positive	Eastern regions Valid 20.8% - RL 65.6% - index 314	Red area Valid 18.4% - RL 22.7% - index 123	-
Negative	Western regions Valid 79.2% - RL 34.4% - index 43	North-East Valid 12.1% - RL 8.3% - index 69	-
GENDER			
Positive	-	-	-
Negative	-	-	-
AGE			
Positive	-	<25 years old Valid 12.2% - RL 16.9% - index 138	-
Negative	-	>64 years old Valid 16.1% - RL 10.2% - index 63	>59 years old Valid 27.2% - RL 15.6% - index 57
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE			
Positive	Non religious Valid 27.0% - RL 61.2% - index 228	Non-believers Valid 5.5% - RL 16.3% - index 295 Non-practicing Catholics Valid 11.9% - RL 18.1% - index 152	Non-believers Valid 24.9% - RL 42.4% - index 170
Negative	Catholics Valid 34.7% – RL 13.0% - index 37 Protestants Valid 38.3% - RL 25.8% - index 68	Practicing Catholics Valid 52.1% - RL 31.4% - index 60	Practicing Catholics Valid 10.9% - RL 4.2% - index 38 Other religion Valid 5.4% - RL 4.2% - index 78 Semi/non-practicing Catholics Valid 58.8% - RL 49.2% - index 83
EDUCATION			
Positive	-	University degree Valid 7.7% - RL 9.8% - index 128	-
Negative	-	-	University degree Valid 24.4% - RL 20.0% - index 82
PROFESSION			
Positive	Unemployed Valid 4.7% - RL 11.9% - index 258	Students Valid 7.9% - RL 12.0% - index 151 Blue-collar workers Valid 13.6% - RL 19.8% - index 146	Blue-collar workers Valid 11.4% - RL 18.1% - index 158 Unemployed Valid 5.9% - RL 8.2% - index 140 White-collar workers Valid 14.9% - RL 19.2% - index 129
Negative	Civil servant Valid 4.5% - RL 2.8% - index 61 Self-employed Valid 7.2% - RL 4.8% - index 68	Self-employed Valid 13.5% - RL 8.0% - index 59	Self-employed Valid 4.6% - RL 1.6% - index 35 Retired Valid 26.9% - RL 17.3% - index 64
SELF-POSITIONING			
Positive	n.a.	Left (1+2) Valid 20.3% - RL 73.7% - index 364	Far left Valid 4.3% - RL 18.5% - index 426 Left Valid 33.9% - RL 52.4% - index 155
Negative	n.a.	Centre (5+6) Valid 17.8% - RL 4.6% - index 26 Centre-right (7+8) Valid 23.2% - RL 1.6% - index 7 Right (9+10) Valid 12.4% - RL 0.6% - index 5	Centre Valid 22.0% - RL 13.8% - index 63 Right Valid 29.9% - RL 4.9% - index 16 Far right Valid 3.2% - RL 0.2% - index 7

Source: my elaborations from ITANES (1996, 2001, 2006), CDSP (1995, 2002, 2007) and FGW (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009).
Notes: Valid: average weight of the category among valid votes. RL: average weight of the category among radical left voters. Index: average ratio of overrepresentation of the radical left in the said category. Only categories showing at least +/- 9% variation from the average in all elections are included.

Only two factors had a strong and unambiguous effect in all three countries: ideology and religious affiliation/practice. Little surprisingly, the spatial self-positioning of voters on the left-right axis was the most important factor favouring a vote for the radical left: parties drew the overwhelming majority of their support among voters on the "far

left" or "left" end of the spectrum and rapidly lost support among those on the centre, right and far right.[214] The religious factor also showed a very strong effect, with non-believers being much more likely and practicing Christians (especially Catholics) much less likely to support the radical left than the average voter.

Other key sociological factors, on the other hand, had a more selective and uneven effect.

Deep-seated geographical subcultures were very relevant but their persistence seems to be slowly eroding. The support for the PDS was largely concentrated in the small territory of the former German Democratic Republic (more than 75% of its votes) but this share dropped to around 50% with the creation of the Left Party and DIE LINKE; over-representation of Eastern voters thus steadily declined from 406.5% (1990) to 235.1% (2013). The support for the Italian radical left was geographically better distributed. The PRC and its various splinter groups generally enjoyed strong results in the "red" central regions (former PCI strongholds) and weak ones in the "white" North-East (former DC and current right-wing strongholds), but the over-representation of the red area almost completely disappeared over time (from 149.8% in 1992 to 106.2% in 2013). In France, finally, traditional communist strongholds were spatially very fragmented: roughly speaking, one area in the North, one in the Centre and one on the Mediterranean coast. Here as well the differences seem to have gradually decreased over time (Martelli, 2009; Brechon, 2009).

The radical left electorate was in average slightly masculine, but counter-examples abounded. A substantial gender balance was achieved in Italy in 1996 and in Eastern Germany throughout the period. In France the 2002 elections even saw a small over-representation of female voters.[215]

As far as age is concerned, over-60 tended to be strongly reluctant toward the radical left in Italy, France and Western Germany but not in Eastern Germany. Supportive groups also varied from country to country and from election to election. The youth

[214] The data on Italy and France thus support the German findings of Doerschler and Banaszak (2007), who found that "the most consistent and powerful explanation of PDS support across time is ideology [;] unlike other explanations [...] whose relative import is either negligible or waxes and wanes over time, ideological beliefs appear consistently significant through the first 14 years after unification".

[215] Sperber (2010) has emphasised the strong showing of the far left among the female electorate in this election, due to its success among the highly feminised "service proletariat". The outcome was however partially counter-balanced by the (masculine) communist electorate and was not replicated in 2007 and 2012.

(under-24) was consistently favourable in Italy, generally favourable in France (except in 1995) but generally hostile in Germany. The working-age population (25-59), finally, gave inconclusive results, although there seems to be a tendency toward a weakening of the younger age brackets and a strengthening of the older ones.

As far as educational levels were concerned, holders of a university degree were more likely than the average voter to support the radical left in Italy and less likely in France; in Germany, the strongly favourable attitude of graduates toward the PDS was reversed with DIE LINKE.

Finally, the influence of class on the radical left vote was moderately strong and somewhat consistent, but not completely uniform. In all three countries employers and self-employed were very unlikely to vote for the radical left. The success among the different sectors of employed wage workers, however, varied: largely limited to blue-collar workers in Italy; broader (blue-collar and white-collar) in France; evolving in Germany, where the hostility of blue-collar workers toward the PDS turned to a strong attraction toward DIE LINKE. The unemployed were strongly favourable in Germany and France but not in Italy. Students were very supportive in Italy but inconsistent in the other two countries. Finally, the remaining sections of the economically inactive population (e.g. pensioners, housewives, discouraged unemployed) tended to be quite hostile in France and Italy but not necessarily so in Germany.

To sum up, the political profile of the radical left in the three countries found a uniformly strong support among the ideologically left-wing and non-religious sectors of the population but had a fluctuating success among other socio-demographic groups and categories. The French radical left was the most characterised from the point of view of class, obtaining good results among the lower and middle strata of the (employed and unemployed) salaried population and bad ones among the self-employed, the economically non-active population and the professionals. The Italian and German radical left, on the other hand, were only partially successful among their "natural" target constituency. In the first case the sociological profile was incoherent, with consistently good results only among manual workers and students. In the second case the PDS started out as the mouthpiece for very peculiar social stratum (the downwardly-mobile former bureaucracy of the GDR) and progressively expanded its

constituency to other social strata: success was immediate and extraordinary among the unemployed but had to wait until 2005 among blue-collar workers.

6.3.3 The vacuum on the left and its limitations

The social and political environment of post-cold war Western Europe provided for a contradictory mix of opportunities and obstacles to the electoral recovery of the radical left.

The nation-specific chapters of this thesis (chapter three, four and five) have analysed at length the contours of an *emerging vacuum* on the left of the political spectrum. Three main elements are crucial to the understanding of this issue.

Firstly, the declining and overall poor macro-economic performance of the "neo-liberal era" compared to the "golden age" of welfare capitalism (Gordon *et al.,* 1987; Harvey, 2005; Harman, 2009; Duménil & Lévy, 2011) provided the material basis for a widespread dissatisfaction toward the social and political system. There is no obvious reason why these trends should benefit the left. On the contrary, the obvious consequence of declining growth rates, high unemployment and stagnating living standards was to sap the organisational capabilities and the confidence of the working-class and to create an adverse political climate which translated in political disengagement and passivity (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2006), diminishing expectations and the drift toward narrow forms of protest and social protection (e.g. xenophobia, ethno-regionalism, law and order conservatism). It is perhaps not accidental that the two main periods of growth of the Western European radical left (1993-1999 and 2004-2007) coincided with upswings of the international economic climate, when the contradiction between increased social wealth and a limited distribution of its benefits appeared more visible and cogent. What this economic predicament *did* do, however, was to undermine the popular support of mainstream (conservative, Christian democratic and social democratic) parties, which went on to govern with less and less consent (electorate, membership, party identification, policy support). For left-wing

anti-establishment parties this represented a conjuncture hard to exploit but with a very large potential, as the recent success of Syriza in Greece seems to suggest.

Secondly, the progressive adaptation of mainstream political parties to an agenda of privatisations, wage and welfare containment and labour market flexibility further eroded their historical legitimacy, which had been largely built on past policies of regulation, redistribution, de-commodification, public employment and social protection. The right-ward shift of moderate left parties such as the German SPD, the French PS and the Italian PDS/DS/PD from "traditional" welfarist social democracy toward the model of a "new", "third-way" or "market" social democracy (Gamble and Wright, 1999; Pierson, 2001; Moschonas, 2002; Bailey, 2009; Callaghan *et al*., 2009; Nachtwey, 2013), in particular, seemed to create important opportunities for the radical left. Scholars have variously defined the problem as a "representation gap" (Abromeit, 1993), as a "vacuum on the left" (Neugebauer & Stöss, 1998), as a "crisis of [working-]class representation" (Nachtwey, 2009) or as a "space" which opened up on the left and only waited to be filled (March & Mudde, 2005; Callinicos, 2008; Marlière, 2013). Certainly, the attempt to win over the traditional core social constituencies (employed wage workers) and themes (welfare state, mixed economy, redistribution, Keynesianism) of "people's" parties has been at the centre of the mobilising efforts of the contemporary radical left.

Thirdly, the direct attempts by right-wing and left-wing governments to implement programmes of neo-liberal counter-reforms (state-owned sector, public services, labour law, pensions, welfare provisions, wage-indexation mechanisms, state budgets) were less liable to be accepted as mere reflections of impersonal market forces and more likely to revitalise left-wing dissent and resistance.[216] Strike activity in the private sector collapsed to a historically low plateau (Franzosi, 1995; Salucci, 2008) but anti-governmental general strikes actually rose (Kelly & Hamann, 2010). Welfare and labour reforms often became the focal point of wide-ranging extra-parliamentary mobilisations combining strikes, huge demonstrations and other forms of contentious politics (France in 1993-1995, 2003, 2005-2006 and 2009-2010; Germany in 1992-1993

[216] Conversely, as Harmann (2007) has correctly stressed, one fundamental goal of privatisations was to shift the blame for restructuring away from the state. Experience proves that this strategy was effective: while resistance *during* privatisations did emerge (e.g. in Germany in 1992-1993), post-privatised companies have been fairly pacified and calls for re-nationalisations feeble.

and 2003-2004; Italy in 1994 and 2002). Finally, this resistance had mixed material results but generally succeeded in shifting the political climate and leading to the defeat of the seating government in the subsequent electoral cycle.

The cases of Germany, France and Italy tend to support the *empirical existence* of a political vacuum predicated on the above-mentioned historical developments.
They also tend to confirm that, under certain conditions, the radical left could succeed in growing electorally on the back of the popular rejection of neo-liberalism and the defection of social democratic voters. The case of the German radical left is exemplary: between 2002 and 2009 DIE LINKE made a net gain of 3.2 million votes, 64.3% of which were former SPD supporters. On a smaller scale the same was true for the Italian radical left: between 1994 and 1996 the PRC gained 0.9 million votes, 69.4% of which were former PDS supporters. French data on electoral fluxes are imprecise, but here as well it seems that a good section of the growth of the periods 1993-1992 and 2007-2012 derived from the influx of former PS voters.
Such successes, however, were always of a limited magnitude and short lived. Only in Germany we can talk of a consistent upward movement (with two interruptions); in Italy and France the radical left rather tended to stagnate or decline. In a nutshell, the vacuum proved to be much more difficult to fill than expected. Why was it so?

The study of the pre-conditions of radical left electoral success points to three major possible *avenues of growth*.
The first avenue is represented by an overall shift of the political mood to the left, with both moderate and radical left parties benefitting from the swing. More precisely, this could mean either an actual growth of the share of voters identifying themselves on the left of the political spectrum or their over-mobilisation vis-à-vis right-wing voters (a differential abstentionism). Such a conjuncture was generally the result of the attempt of seating right-wing governments to implement neo-liberal reforms and of the consequent development of large extra-parliamentary movements of resistance: good examples are the years 1995-1997 and 2009-2012 in France, the years 1993-1998 in Germany and the years 1994-1996 and 2002-2005 in Italy.
The second avenue is represented by a shift of moderate left voters toward the radical left, with the aim either of punishing more mainstream parties for their governmental

policies or of nudging them to move further to the left. The French politological literature has distinguished these two effects in a "*vote sanction"* and a "*vote d'influence*" (Tiberj, 2004). A favourable environment for this kind of strategy was provided by grand coalition governments suspending the left-right divide, where the moderate left got discredited while the pressure toward anti-right unity lost its saliency, fuelling the rise of anti-establishment parties of all hues. A good example is Germany (2005-2009), to a less extent Italy (1994-1996) and, outside the three countries, Greece (2009-2012). The Italian radical left wasted an extraordinary opportunity to exploit a similar situation which occurred after 2011. Its opposition to the Monti and Letta cabinets was little credible, in view of its past and present links with the centre-left coalition and its unprecedented organisational and parliamentary weakness; the chance was instead seized by Grillo's populist Five Star Movement. Another favourable environment was the one described under the previous point: a critical or potential alliance with the centre-left in a context of unpopular right-wing governments could attract voters wishing to use the radical left as a "corrective" to its moderate partners (Italy in 1994-1996 and 2004-2006; France in 1994-1997 and 2012; Germany in 1994-1999). This tactics, however, was self-defeating in the long term, as it implicated the radical left in the disillusionment elicited by the governmental coalitions they ended up supporting (France in 1997-2002; Italy in 1996-2001 and 2006-2008). A path of head-on confrontation against a seating centre-left government, finally, could also bear fruit (Germany 2002-2005; the French far left in 1997-2002); in absence of a minimum level of confidence among the radical left constituency, however, it could lead instead to demobilisation or adaptation to a "lesser evil" perspective (Italy in 1999-2001 and 2008; Germany in 2002).

The third avenue is represented by a growth of the radical left beyond the confines of the secular and progressive left-wing voters. As already remarked, the strategies employed and the success met varied for each party. The French far left candidates (Laguiller, Besancenot) were the most successful in appealing to *class* and attracting a core constituency of economically active wage workers.[217] The German PDS, on the other hand, saw the predominance of a *regional* (East German interests) over a class

[217] It was this appeal which enabled LO and LCR to obtain much better results than the PCF among non-left voters (identifying as "neither left nor right", "centrist" and even "right-wing") and "semi-practicing Catholics".

appeal, with strong but socially undifferentiated results among the Eastern voters and a nation-wide over-representation only among the unemployed. The Italian radical left, finally, showed a decreasing capability to attract specific social constituencies (except for the youth, among whom it was very successful) and remained predominately characterised by its left-wing ideological positioning.

As it is clear from the above-mentioned discussion, much of the strategies of the radical left were thus *self-moderating*: they could give good results in the short term but inevitably led to a counter-swing in the mid-term.

The key problem was that the very electoral success of the radical left parties tended to make them determinant, in the ballot box and in parliament, for the formation of a centre-left governing coalition – the more so, the more successful they were on contending the typical electorate of mainstream left parties. The choice to exploit this situation as a powerful lever to influence the policies of a victorious centre-left coalition invariably turned out to be a poisoned chalice. Both external support (Italy in 1996-1998) and direct governmental participation (France in 1997-2002, Italy in 1998-2001 and 2006-2008) yielded little visible material results, destroyed the credibility of the parties in the eyes of their electorate and led them to electoral disasters at the subsequent election. The opposite choice of intransigence, on the other hand, risked to expose the parties to accusations of playing into the hands of the enemy and to the consequent squeeze due to anti-right tactical voting. The French radical left experienced this brutal pressure after the 2002 presidential election: the shock of the elimination of Lionel Jospin from the second round led to an immediate loss of almost half of its electorate, mainly in the direction of the socialist party, and its effects appear to be long-lasting. [218] The Italian radical left also suffered heavily from this mechanism in 2008, when it lost at least 0.7 million votes to the Democratic Party;[219] more frequently, the choice of intransigence meant painful splits (the CU in 1995; the PdCI in 1998; SEL in 2008-2009) of the tendencies which were determined to maintain

[218] From 2002 to 2008 its scores in all kinds of elections oscillated between 7.6% and 9.2% of valid votes (against an excellent 13.8% of the 2002 presidential first round). Even the subsequent upswing in 2009-2012 did not completely defuse this danger, as the sharp drop in the 2012 legislative election (7.9%) proved.

[219] The figure refers to the net losses of PRC and PdCI only; the other partners of the Rainbow Left cartel were completely cannibalised by the PD.

a close alliance with the centre-left. The threat was somewhat minimised only in the German case, as it was the SPD which consistently refused a governmental alliance with the radical left.[220]

Crucially, the oppositional stance which might work well at times of centre-left governments became less practical and rewarding at times of strong rejection and mobilisation against right-wing ones; conversely, the unitary posture which yielded fruits against the right became catastrophic as soon as it involved any form of governmental participation.

An additional problem was provided by the fact that the sudden surges of enthusiasm obtained through a convincing electoral or extra-parliamentary campaign, a popular leader or a new partisan project were difficult to sustain for a longer period. As neither conciliatory nor intransigent organisations managed to win immediate, concrete and visible policy concessions for their constituency, the hopes raised by an initial bout of electoral growth tended to wear off quickly, while the newly-won supporters went back to abstentionism or more mainstream political options.

A further obstacle was the response of mainstream centre-left forces to the competition on their left. Veritable shifts to the left were minimal, even at a rhetorical level. However, the mere return to opposition after an electoral defeat generally enabled them to win back a section of their former disaffected supporters (Italy in 2001-2006; France in 1993-1997 and 2002-2012; Germany in 2009-2013), although it was rarely sufficient to entirely recover the past losses. Moreover, the fact that the parties retained declining but strong linkages with the workers' movement (trade unions, cooperatives, associations) and other civil society and social movement organisations enabled them to preserve the loyalty of critical strata which might have otherwise gone over to their more radical competitors. The general point made by Callinicos (2012) and Davidson (2013) on the actual ideological but incomplete organisational break of the "new" social democracy with its traditional constituency is fully supported by the Italian and German cases.

Finally, it seems that the right-ward shift of mainstream political parties was accompanied by a parallel right-ward shift of their constituencies. The proactive role of

[220] Pro-SPD swings were modest (0.3 million votes in 2002, 0.4 million in 2013) and roughly equivalent to those toward abstention.

moderate left leaderships in driving the neo-liberal adaptation of their parties (e.g. the role of Achille Occhetto and Walter Veltroni in Italy and Gerhard Schröder in Germany) tended to run against an often intense initial resistance by their activists, members and voters. However, although these shifts in identity and policies proved to be controversial, over time most of the critics came around to the new course and accepted or resigned to the changes. In other words, political neo-liberalisation did create a short-term window of opportunity but that opening tended to significantly narrow in the mid-term.

6.3.4 Conclusion

The balance sheet of the electoral mobilisation of the radical left in Germany, Italy and France is mixed. Only in the first country was the story one of unquestionable success; in the other two countries the radical left followed an altogether stagnating or declining path.

The environment of the post-cold war period offered important opportunities for its renewal and growth: the lukewarm macro-economic climate, the right-ward shift of mainstream parties on socio-economic issues, the roll-out of neo-liberal reforms and the intense dissatisfaction and resistance against them designed the contours of a vacuum in the political representation of working-class and welfarist constituencies which the radical left could legitimately aspire to fill.

This potential, however, proved difficult to concretise. The choice of an appropriate strategy was hampered by the structurally contradictory nature of this political area, torn between anti-neoliberal intransigence and the pressures of anti-right unity. Electoral upsurges, similarly, were usually dampened and wiped out by structural obstacles, producing cyclical fluctuations without a clear overall direction.

6.4 Institutional weight: a double-edged sword

The previous section has shown that in the three countries the radical left enjoyed a mid-sized electoral support: in average 6.32% of valid votes in Germany, 6.55% in Italy and 9.62% (legislative) and 12.47% (presidential) in France. The translation of these electoral results in forms of institutional weight – such as the presence in representative assemblies and executive bodies, both at the national and regional level –, however, gave rise to strong disproportionalities (see TABLE 6.6).

TABLE 6.6 PARLIAMENTARY WEIGHT AND GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT

	PERIOD	AVERAGE	BEGINNING	END	Change (% points)
1a) NATIONAL PARLIAMENT					
GERMANY	1990-2013	6.04%	2.57%	10.14%	+7.57
ITALY	1991-2013	4.09%	5.56%	5.87%	+3.81
FRANCE	1990-2013	4.06%	4.33%	1.73%	-2.60
1b) REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS					
GERMANY	1990-2013	5.18%	2.80%	5.84%	+3.04
ITALY	1991-2013	5.27%	1.33%	3.69%	+2.35
FRANCE	1990-2013	8.92%	8.74%	7.21%	-1.54
1c) PARLIAMENTS (COMBINED)					
GERMANY	1990-2013	5.61%	2.68%	7.99%	+5.31
ITALY	1991-2013	4.68%	1.70%	4.78%	+3.08
FRANCE	1990-2013	6.49%	6.54%	4.47%	-2.07
2a) NATIONAL GOVERNMENT					
GERMANY	1990-2013	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	-
ITALY	1991-2013	34.78%	0.00%	0.00%	-
FRANCE	1990-2013	20.83%	0.00%	0.00%	-
2b) REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS					
GERMANY	1990-2013	4.28%	0.00%	3.42%	+3.42
ITALY	1991-2013	29.84%	0.00%	37.77%	+37.77
FRANCE	1990-2013	49.65%	8.21%	85.28%	+77.07
2c) GOVERNMENTS (COMBINED)					
GERMANY	1990-2013	2.16%	0.00%	1.71%	+1.71
ITALY	1991-2013	32.31%	0.00%	18.88%	+18.88
FRANCE	1990-2013	35.24%	4.11%	42.64%	+38.53

Source: my elaborations from official national data (Bundestag, Camera dei Deputati, Assemblée Nationale).
Notes: rolling average. 1a) share of MPs (first chamber); 1b) share of regional deputies, weighted by regional population; 1c) average of 1a and 1b; 2a) time in national government; 2b) time in regional government, weighted by regional population; 2c) average of 2a and 2b. The radical left is counted as in government when at least one of its parliamentary parties externally supports or directly participates to it.

The radical left was significantly under-represented in the respective *national parliaments*, commanding in average 4.06% of seats in France, 4.09% in Italy and 6.04% in Germany. This was mainly due to the working of electoral legislation[221] and, in Italy, to organisational fragmentation. The risk of a loss of the parliamentary status was always present: it happened in Italy in the 2008-2012 legislature and was not far from materialising in Germany in the 2002-2005 legislature (2 MPs) and in France in the 2012-2017 legislature (10 MPs). The internal balance was heavily distorted to the detriment of the smaller and more intransigent organisations.

The presence in *regional parliaments*[222] was altogether more favourable: 5.18% of the seats in Germany, 5.27% in Italy; 8.92% in France. Radical left parties were consistently represented in the vast majority of the French and Italian regions, more sporadically in Germany[223]. While the German radical left paid its general inability to overcome the electoral thresholds in the populous Western regions of the country, the representation of the Italian and French radical left was broadly proportional to their actual electoral strengths. However, this was often due more to the choice of the main parties to integrate the framework of centre-left alliances than to the presence of more democratic and accessible electoral systems.

[221] In France the two-round majority system; in Germany the 5% electoral threshold; in Italy various majoritarian elements (a 4% electoral threshold and first-past-the-post seats until 2005; variable thresholds and majority premiums afterwards).

[222] A complete analysis of the institutional weight of political parties should proceed further and include representation in the elective bodies of the local (e.g. provincial/departmental/county and municipal) levels of state administration. This endeavour would be particularly interesting in the case of France, where *communes* and *départements* are often endowed with more powers and resources than the regions. The poor quality and ambiguous nature of the data on local assemblies, however, prevents it.

[223] The six Eastern regions were safe strongholds. The ten Western regions, on the other hand, saw no radical left presence until 2006. In the period up to 2010 DIE LINKE managed to gain access to most of them but subsequently lost ground and is currently represented only in four (the smallest).

Radical left parties, despite their reduced parliamentary weight, were often determinant for the formation of centre-left governmental majorities (see TABLE 6.7 and FIGURE 6.8).

TABLE 6.7 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

GERMANY	ITALY	FRANCE
DETERMINANT FOR A CENTRE-LEFT MAJORITY		
2005-2009	1995-1996	1988-1993
2013-2017	1996-2001	1997-2002
	2006-2008	
EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO A CENTRE-LEFT GOVERNMENT		
None	1995-1996 (CU) – Dini	None *
	1996-1998 (PRC) – Prodi	
DIRECT GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION		
None	1998-2001 (PdCI) – D'Alema, Amato	1997-2002 (PCF) – Jospin
	2006-2008 (PRC, PdCI) – Prodi	

Notes: * both in 1988-1993 and 2012-present the PCF remained halfway between external support and opposition.

FIGURE 6.8 GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT: REGIONAL AND COMBINED



Notes: Involvement of at least one radical left party in regional and national governments. "Regional": weighted by the regional population. "Combined": average between regional and national (either 0.0% or 100.0%).

In the case of Italy and France this translated into a significant level of governmental involvement (external support or direct participation). In Italy, one or the other radical party has supported five national cabinets (34.08% of the total time) and a similar amount of regional cabinets (administering in average 31.20% of the national population, with a peak of 65.49% in 2005). The issue has however proved very controversial, producing frequent shifts of collocation, splits and defections. In France, the PCF has participated to only one national government (21.02% of total time) but to a very large amount of regional ones (in average 47.97% of the population, with a peak of 86.90% in 2004-2009). In Germany, on the contrary, the SPD has been adamant in refusing any collaboration with the PDS/DIE LINKE at the national level, preferring to it the option of a "grand coalition" with the CDU (2005-2009 and, possibly, after 2013). Even at the regional level the experiences of collaboration have been altogether rare (in average 4.32% of the population with a peak of 9.71% in 2001)[224].

These developments had important consequences for the overall evolution of the radical left.

Firstly, the fact that a large number of radical left elected representatives in Italy and France owed their seats not so much to their own organisations but rather to the benefits of a choice of alliance with the centre-left encouraged them to adopt conciliatory attitudes and, in case of conflicts, to engage in right-wing dissidences and splits.

Secondly, the increasing integration of the Italian parties (PRC, PdCI and SEL) and of the French PCF into regional governments – which boomed in the period 1998-2009 to incredibly high levels – had the same effects described above and helped to fundamentally transform the self-understanding and external perception of the radical left from an "anti-system" to an institutional and pragmatic force.

Thirdly, the experiences of national governmental participation (1995-2001 and 2006-2008 in Italy; 1997-2002 in France) proved disastrous for their initiators, shattering

[224] Three cases of direct governmental participation (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1998-2006, Berlin 2001-2011, Brandenburg 2009-present) and two cases of external support (Sachsen-Anhalt 1994-2002, Berlin 2001), all in the East. Recently DIE LINKE has come close to provide an external support in two Western regions, Hessen (2008-09) and Nordrhein-Westfalen (2010-2012) but its contribution has not been accepted by the SPD.

their credibility and leaving a fertile ground to far left (especially in France) or populist (especially in Italy) competitors.

6.5 Organisational mobilisation: the crisis of the communist mass party model continues

While electoral scores of the radical left were oscillating and its governmental involvement soaring (at least in France and Italy), the results of its organisational mobilisation were altogether poor. Neither the internal reforms of the neo-/post-communist parties (the German PDS, the Italian PRC and the French PCF), nor the electoral surge of actors from a far left or social democratic background (the German WASG, the Italian SD, the French LO, LCR and PG), nor the creation of new broad left containers (the German DIE LINKE, the Italian FdS and SEL, the French NPA and FdG) managed to counterbalance the collapse of the old communist mass organisations, networks and sub-cultures. In the present section I will summarise in more detail the evolution of each key sub-dimension (*party membership, collateral networks* and *material resources*) and derive their implications.

6.5.1 Party membership

The veritable collapse of radical left party membership is portrayed below (TABLE 6.9 and FIGURE 6.10). All indicators show a dramatic and unmitigated decline, with reference to both their pre-1989 predecessors and the situation of the early 1990s.

TABLE 6.9 MEMBERSHIP EVOLUTION

	AVER. 1990-2013	PRE-1989	1991	2012	Change 1991-2012	%	Change 1988-2012	%
RAW NUMBERS (M)								
ITALY	116,262	1,559,963	112,835	77,448	-35,387	-31.5%	-1,482,515	-95.0%
FRANCE	182,205	365,533	332,580	86,184	-246,396	-74.1%	-279,349	-76.4%
GERMANY	108,835	2,297,000	186,079	70,461	-115,618	-62.1%	-2,226,539	-97.0%
SOCIETAL PENETRATION (M/E)								
ITALY	0.24	3.41	0.24	0.17	-0.07	-30.6%	-3.25	-95.2%
FRANCE	0.45	0.96	0.81	0.20	-0.62	-75.9%	-0.77	-79.7%
GERMANY	0.20	3.98	0.51	0.11	-0.30	-78.5%	-3.86	-97.1%
SUBCULTURAL ENCAPSULATION (M/V)								
ITALY	4.85	14.32	5.13	3.97	-1.15	-22.5%	-10.35	-72.3%
FRANCE (leg.)	7.27	12.80	11.36	4.41	-6.95	-61.2%	-8.40	-65.6%
GERMANY	6.79	-	26.83	1.86	-24.97	-93.1%	-	-
SHARE OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP (M/M')								
ITALY	6.31	37.32	3.24	3.81	+0.57	+17.7%	-33.5	-89.8%
FRANCE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GERMANY	6.18	-	8.43	5.36	-3.07	-36.4%	-	-

Source: my elaborations from various sources.
Notes: M/E = ratio of radical left members over the total electorate; M/V = ration of radical left membership over the radical left voters; M/M' = ratio of radical left members over total party members. All ratios refer to the membership of the previous year. Pre-1989 data refer to the closest available data (1986 to 1988). German data for 1988 refer to the hypothetical sum of East and West Germany. Italian and French data on total party membership are not very reliable. PCF data after 2002 refer to the "due-paying" category.

FIGURE 6.10 MEMBERSHIP EVOLUTION



Source: my elaborations from various sources.
Notes: absolute values, due-paying members.

A focus on the period 1991-2012 reveals that the German radical left lost 115,618 members (-62.1%), the French radical left 246,396 members (-74.1%) and the Italian radical left, which started from much lower levels, 35,387 members (-31.5%). In terms of their societal penetration (M/E), the parties continued a transition from mass organisations well rooted within their respective national societies to electoralist

forces with a marginal and patchy presence on the ground. In 1991 0.81% of the French, 0.51% of the German and 0.24% of the Italian electorate carried a card of a radical left party; in 2012 this ratio had fallen to 0.20%, 0.11% and 0.17% respectively. Their data for sub-cultural encapsulation (M/E) show results of a similar magnitude: in the early 1990s 26.83% of German, 11.36% of French and 5.13% of Italian radical left voters were also party members; in 2012-2013 this ratio had collapsed to 1.86%, 4.41% and 3.97% respectively. The radical left thus shifted from the very tight kind of encapsulation typical of 20th century mass parties (6-15%) to the medium levels typical of modern cadre parties (3-5%) or to the loose levels typical of purely electoral or new parties (below 2%).

The driving force behind this decline was the progressive evaporation of the legacies of the communist mass party model. This erosion followed a different tempo in each country. In France, the formal organisational continuity of the PCF before and after 1989 led to a steep and continuous decline, which only after 2003 started to be partially compensated by the growth of other organisations (LO, LCR/NPA, PG). In Germany, the mix of continuity and discontinuity of the PDS with its SED past led to a vertical collapse in 1989-1992 followed by a slower decline, briefly reversed in 2005-2009 by the creation of the WASG and the merger in DIE LINKE. In Italy, finally, the PRC was established in 1991 as an effectively new organisation, largely unencumbered by the legacy of the Italian Communist Party. It thus started from quite low initial levels but at the same time by-passed many of the negative tendencies which affected its main post-communist rival (PDS/DS/PDS) – a shrinking, aging and increasingly inactive membership – and remained up to 2006 fairly stable and vital. In all cases, however, the early or late arrival to a stage of relative stabilisation could not reverse the underlying declining trend; by 2012 the radical left of all three countries was at its level of greatest membership weakness since the defeat of Fascism.

The experience of Germany, France and Italy suggests two implications for the future of the contemporary radical left.

The first implication is that the kind of strong and dense membership-based organisations which were characteristic of the 20th century workers' movement – of a communist, social democratic and even Christian democratic type – are a thing of the

past and are unlikely to be reproduced in the near future. The crisis of traditional communist parties is still exerting its effects thirty-five years after its beginning in the late 1970s and almost twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall; no party has so far managed to completely stop, let alone invert the course. Even the French renewal of left-wing activism (since 1986), labour militancy (since 1995) and political participation (since 2002) has had virtually no bearing on this trend.

The second implication is that successful alternative organisational models have yet to emerge. On the one hand, the most dynamic radical left parties from the point of view of electoral and membership growth (the PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE in Western Germany, the far left in France) have remained elite organisations with tiny memberships and absolutely shallow levels of sub-cultural encapsulation. On the other hand non-partisan social movement networks (e.g. the French "*movement social*" of the early 1990s, the alter-globalist and anti-war movement of 1999-2005 or the anti-crisis movements of 2011-2012), despite their capacity to mobilise large numbers of participants for well-delimited contentious events, failed to consolidate in new mass associations, unions, political parties or other organisations. The only counter-examples *in the world* are provided by left-wing parties of the Global South having led significant revolutionary processes: the Venezuelan PSUV and perhaps (reliable figures are not available) the Nepali CPN-M and the Bolivian MAS.

Thus, for the foreseeable future the Western European radical left will tend be dominated by increasingly small political organisations, often capable of significant electoral exploits but unable to translate this superficial sympathy into more solid and stable relations of adhesion and activism.

Does all this matter?

The decline of party membership in Western political systems has been widely attested empirically (Katz & Mair, 1992b; Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen *et al.*, 2012) and discussed theoretically (Mair, 1994; Ignazi, 1996 and 2004). Its consequences are not necessarily negative for the health of political parties. Firstly, the importance of the membership as a resource for propaganda and financial support has steadily declined vis-à-vis the role played by traditional and web-based mass media, external PR consultants and public financing. Secondly, the decreasing encapsulation of the electorate by parties (of which phenomena such as the mass party and

pillarisation were an expression) has certainly increased the volatility of their support, but this situation presents both dangers and opportunities. Thirdly, the ideal of a membership-based democracy has always rested uneasily beside that of an election-based democracy, as the political preferences of committed party members and activists are likely to diverge significantly from those of the electorate at large. It has thus been argued that the shift might be a welcome development for the ordinary citizen, who will be allowed to express her political preferences through old (elections) and new (opinion polls, focus groups, open primaries, internet-based voting) mechanisms without the distortions introduced by the primacy of the party member. Moreover, the deliquescence of traditional forms of large, dense and intense linkages goes far beyond that of the mass party model, including most allegiances (class, religion) and organisations (parties, trade unions, churches, cooperatives, civic associations), and does not seem to be reversible in the medium-term.[225]

As far as the radical left parties are concerned, membership decline has been clearly irrelevant to their short-term electoral fortunes. However, it poses two essential long-term problems. From a practical point of view, the dwindling numbers, cohesion and quality of party members have undermined the attempts of the radical left to exert a serious extra-parliamentary influence on the political scene. For instance, the radical left has generally been incapable to improve its positions within the apparatuses of labour unions and significantly influence their politics; as a consequence, it has been deprived of a powerful tool of resistance and social transformation. From a theoretical point of view, the whole doctrinal elaboration of the post-Berlin Wall radical left has stressed the essential and necessary role of democratic participation and mobilisation in the attainment of short-term goals (resisting neo-liberalism, winning elementary reforms), in a possible mid-term shift of the political climate and in the long-term process of building a democratic socialist or communist society. Its inability to foster viable outlets and institutions where grassroots democracy can live and thrive, thus, represents a veritable challenge to its *raison d'être* and entire political vision.

[225] See Robert Putnam (2000) on the USA (the "erosion of civic engagement") and Jacques Ion (1997) on France (an emerging model of *"engagement distancié"* or "*à la carte*").

6.5.2 Sub-cultural linkages

The membership crisis of the parties of the radical left parties was paralleled by a similar erosion of their networks of party-near sub-cultural mass organisations.

A precise operationalisation of this variable is at present impossible. This would involve calculating the total number of members of ancillary, affiliated, collateral and friendly organisations of a party (excluding double membership) and weighing each linkage by its intensity. Unfortunately, political research is still far from reaching a satisfactory solution to these problems.[226] Nevertheless, it is absolutely evident that not much remains of the world of strong, dense and tightly-knit subcultures and organisational networks which marked much of the history of 19th and 20th century Western Europe, of which mass political parties were both an expression and a central point of reference and organising agency.

Radical left parties have been fully affected by this shift. Its consequences, however, have perhaps been more serious than for other party families, which were either little interested in the organisation of the masses in the first place (e.g. the parties of the social elites) or could replace it with other forms of party-society linkages (e.g. direct contacts through the parliamentary institutions, the state machine, the mass media and "top-level" bargaining with civil society organisations).

As I have shown in the previous chapters, this process was characterised by three overlapping dimensions: (i) a *quantitative decline* of the constituency of party-near mass organisations; (ii) the *autonomisation* of civil society organisations from their traditional partisan referents and the *de-politicisation* of their reciprocal links; (iii) the *de-ideologisation* of civil society organisations themselves, which tended to drop strong systemic goals, values and pedagogical pretensions and emphasised instead their role as more prosaic providers of individual/group services. The outcome was a new model of looser, more punctual and constantly renegotiated relations between

[226] Poguntke (2008), for instance, offers a measure of the average strength of the party organisational linkages but does not quantify their number and social relevance. The latter task, in turn, presents various theoretical and empirical problems: the poor quality of data on membership of civil society organisations; the issue of overlapping memberships; the different qualitative nature of different kinds of membership; the problem of attributing the party-near status to organisations without formal ties with a party.

increasingly autonomous organisations and social spheres, couched in terms of a celebration of the a-partitical or a-political character of civil society activity and in the rhetoric of the autonomy of social movements.

In the case of Italy, the PRC was deprived from the start of any influence within the imposing network of collateral or friendly mass organisations of the Italian Communist Party (CGIL, Legacoop, ARCI, UDI, SUNIA, ANPI and so on) which was entirely inherited by the rival post-communist party (PDS). Over the subsequent decades PRC, PdCI, SEL and other smaller groups had a hard time rebuilding solid relations with old or new civil society and social movement organisations. Relations of affinity and collaboration were indeed established with a variety of societal milieus: the left-wing minorities of the CGIL trade union; sections of the old left associationism; the galaxy of alternative trade unions and *centri sociali*; alter-globalist, pacifist and other left-libertarian social movement networks. The quantitative importance of these groups was however smallish and the qualitative nature of the linkages never went beyond a weak and informal connection. Key obstacles to a progress on this front were the continued (albeit sometimes critical) allegiance of the leaders and cadres of veritable mass organisations to the PDS/DS/PD and the absence of a coherent strategy of intervention.

In the case of Germany, the organisational linkages of the SED were completely shattered in 1989-1990 by the joint effects of the East German revolution and of the unification of the two German states. The PDS managed to retain tight links with a small network of organisations representing the interests of the former bureaucracy (OKV) and with the largest Eastern charity (Volkssolidarität) but lost all influence among the organised labour movement and other societal milieus. As in Italy, in the following decades PDS, WASG and DIE LINKE made some progress in establishing good working relations with large sections of the Eastern civil society and smaller sections of the Western one (alternative, alter-globalist and pacifist groups; few thin layers of trade unionists; some small professional and minority organisations). Here as well, however, the bulk of mass organisations continued to retain looser versions of their traditional political allegiances (SPD, CDU/CSU and Greens).

France, finally, was the only country where the old network of collateral mass organisations of the PCF (CGT, FSGT, SPF, UFF, FNMT, CNL, ARAC and so forth) was not

suddenly destroyed by the implosion of the Soviet system. Instead, it suffered a slow long-term erosion due to the electoral decline of the Communist Party, the rising appeal of the Socialist Party and generic disengagement. Thus, while these organisations remained until the early 1980s part of a large and compact subculture closely connected to the PCF, during the 1980s and 1990s the network lost coherence and loosened or entirely severed its links with the party. The outcome was often paradoxical: many leaders and cadres remained communist members or sympathisers but their wider membership switched to different political proclivities and the organisations effectively ceased to act as relays of communist influence. More than in the other two countries, the various radical left parties managed to preserve and strengthen important relations of collaboration with significant intellectual, trade union, associative and movementist milieus. The intensity of these links remained however somewhat loose and the mutual benefits limited.

The general argument is well exemplified by the case of the trade union movement. Although the radical left parties had better voting intentions among union members than among the general population (in average, around 10% in Italy and Germany and around 20% in France), their actual presence within the top echelons of the union apparatuses was quite weak and their influence on union policies almost absent.

6.5.3 Material resources

Finally, it is not clear if the crisis of the communist mass party model (membership and networks of collateral organisations) had a similar impact on the material resources available to contemporary radical left parties for carrying out their political activities. The data available are sketchy and incoherent but seem to indicate large national variations, with a general tendency to decline in the 1990s and to stabilisation afterwards.

The evolution of *party finances* (real yearly incomes) is depicted in the following figure (FIGURE 6.11).

FIGURE 6.11 FINANCES

YEAR	GERMANY	FRANCE	ITALY
PARTIES:	PDS, L.PDS, WASG, DIE LINKE	PCF, LO, LCR/NPA, PG	PRC, PdCI, SEL (central level only)
1990	*€ 683,452,336*		
1991	€ 44,213,489		
1992	€ 15,607,860		
1993	€ 18,154,349		
1994	€ 22,172,487		
1995	€ 25,923,268		
1996	€ 22,717,181		
1997	€ 22,639,143		€ 11,249,662
1998	€ 23,507,303		€ 8,481,060
1999	€ 24,655,574		€ 11,984,138
2000	€ 23,475,788		€ 13,088,379
2001	€ 23,461,848		€ 11,023,873
2002	€ 24,725,204		€ 11,232,111
2003	€ 24,743,284	€ 42,987,689	€ 11,829,939
2004	€ 23,122,915	€ 46,527,470	€ 15,629,235
2005	€ 25,513,726	€ 41,257,639	€ 19,966,689
2006	€ 25,903,149	€ 40,687,450	€ 25,941,671
2007	€ 23,362,157	€ 44,761,594	€ 28,896,959
2008	€ 25,562,946	€ 38,538,933	€ 20,890,468
2009	€ 27,566,111	€ 38,782,152	€ 12,179,536
2010	€ 27,851,633	€ 38,294,617	€ 12,008,729
2011			€ 3,640,874
AVERAGE 2003-2010	**€ 25,453,240**	**€ 41,479,693**	**€ 18,417,903**
share	**5.50%**	**19.40%**	**-**

Source: my elaborations from party accounts (Deutscher Bundestag, 1992-2011; CNCCFP, 2005-2011; G.U., 2000-2012).
Notes: yearly incomes, real 2010 euro. Share: average share of the total yearly incomes of all registered (France) or parliamentary (Germany) political parties. Italian accounts refer to the central level only (excluding intermediate and primary articulations).

Germany is the only country where coherent data for the whole period are available. Revenues collapsed in the period 1989-1992, when the PDS was stripped of almost all

the resources inherited from the SED. In the following decades the party strongly recovered, growing from 15.6 million euro (1992) to 27.8 million euro (2010); their overall amount remained however smallish when compared with the total incomes of German political parties (around 5.4%).

In France, the incomes of the radical left are likely to have declined during the 1980s and 1990s, as a consequence of the membership and institutional decline of the PCF, but precise data are available only since 2003. Despite a slight erosion, their overall amount remains astoundingly high: in average, 41.9 million euro and 19.6% of total party incomes.

In Italy, finally, resources follow a parabolic path: from extremely weak initial levels, to a veritable boom in 2004-2008, to a rapid collapse after the 2008 electoral defeat. Unlike in the other two countries, where self-financing and state financing were fairly balanced, in Italy the dynamic was almost entirely determined by levels of the latter.

A quantification of the *human resources* of radical left parties is even harder to come by.

In the 2000s the official staff of the parties amounted to about 100 people in Italy, 200 in Germany[227] and more than 300 in France. This figure, however, represents only a fraction of the total number of people directly or indirectly reporting to the parties. Professional staff includes politicians (paid members of representative assemblies and state executive bodies), their assistants, employees of party-owned companies (e.g. newspapers and publishing houses) and party-near foundations, hired external consultants and some officials of collateral organisations. Semi-professional and non-professional staff includes much of the active party membership and, in particular, local elected representatives (e.g. councillors) and members holding internal party offices (e.g. branch secretary).

Most components seem to have accompanied the decline of party membership, sub-cultural networks and financial resources; however, semi-professional elected representatives have probably suffered a weaker retrenchment and cadres indirectly made available by the state have perhaps even increased.

[227] Before 1989 the SED directly employed more than 44,000 people.

6.5.4 Conclusions

The study of the electoral evolution of the parties of the contemporary radical left offers the image of limited and contradictory, yet real, recovery since the shock of the fall of the Eastern bloc. This picture, however, contrasts strongly with that provided by their organisational evolution, where the long-term crisis which has enveloped the labour movement – in both its partisan and non-partisan forms – in Western Europe since the late 1970s seems to be still ongoing.

Even in a context characterised by large waves of left-leaning contentious politics and/or electoral growth (France in 1993-2002, 2005-2006 and 2009-2012; Italy in 1994-1996 and 2001-2004; Germany in 1992-1997 and 2003-2009), radical left parties have failed to play the roles of effective outlets for a renewal of political engagement and activism and of catalysts for an organisational structuration of the anti-neoliberal discontent and resistance. On the one hand, the legacies of the communist past (a mass membership, a tightly-knit network of collateral mass organisations) have followed a trajectory of sudden collapse (1989-1991 in Germany and Italy) or slower but relentless erosion (France). On the other hand, the (re)politicisation and (re)activation of left-wing social layers has rarely moved past the point of a generic sympathy toward the parties of the radical left and toward more stable and intense forms of collaboration. The apparatuses of traditional mass civil society organisations have tended to confirm a loose allegiance to the mainstream social democratic or Christian democratic parties of government. Figureheads and activists of the so-called "new" social movements (e.g. alter-globalism) have either hidden behind a theorisation of their autonomy and distinctiveness or, when they have sought to bridge the gap with party politics, they have turned out to be generals without an army, having little or no effect on radical left membership and electoral results. Ordinary citizens, finally, have not overcome a difficult and intermittent relation with politics, where participation remained punctual (the act of voting, marching in a demonstration) and engagement short-lived.

Contemporary radical left parties, thus, tend to be characterised by a small membership, shallow linkages with a little-homogenous constituency and little or no retinue of collateral or sympathising civil society and social movement organisations.

This state of affairs does not necessarily constitute a problem from the point of view of their electoral performance, as the loss of ideological voters can be compensated or over-compensated by the conquest of mobile ones. However, it represents a fundamental obstacle to their potential for extra-parliamentary mobilisation, the conquest of concrete reforms and the implementation of their ambitious projects of social transformation.

6.6 The case for regroupment and the reasons behind fragmentation

While the internal conflicts and debates of the radical left of all three countries have been broadly similar, their outcomes have produced strikingly different national trajectories.

The following table summarises the evolution of radical left fragmentation at the level of votes, members and MPs in electoral years (TABLE 6.12).

France belongs to the group of Western European countries (together with Greece, Portugal and Denmark) where the radical left has been firmly and stably divided in a plurality of significant organisations. The competition between the PCF and other far left (LO, LCR/NPA, PT) or radical left actors became entrenched during the 1980s and grew larger in the following decades. A serious effort of regroupment in 2005-2007 failed and the landscape remained unstable until 2012, when the successful electoral campaign of the Front de Gauche led to a partial but significant move toward unification.

Italy started out with the establishment of an uncontested broad left party (PRC) but went down a course of progressive fragmentation in competing parties and micro-parties. Subsequent attempts of regroupment have all failed to yield results.

In Germany, finally, the PDS was able to avoid the recurring danger of fragmentation (1989-1990 and 2002-2005) and has on the contrary become the cornerstone of a larger broad left party, DIE LINKE.

How can these divergent trajectories be explained?

TABLE 6.12 FRAGMENTATION

GERMANY								
Votes	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**2013**	**AVER.**
PDS	99.2%	99.4%	99.5%	99.9%	-	-	-	56.9%
L.PDS/DIE LINKE	-	-	-	-	98.5%	99.3%	99.2%	42.5%
Others	0.8%	0.6%	0.4%	0.1%	1.5%	0.7%	0.8%	0.7%
Members	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**(2012)**	**AVER.**
PDS/L.PDS	96.1%	92.5%	90.4%	90.2%	74.9%	-	-	63.5%
WASG	-	-	-	-	15.6%	-	-	2.3%
DIE LINKE	-	-	-	-	-	91.8%	89.5%	26.0%
Others	3.9%	7.5%	9.6%	9.8%	9.5%	8.2%	9.5%	8.3%
MPs	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**2013**	**AVER.**
PDS/L.PDS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	77.8%	-		68.3%
WASG	-	-	-	-	22.2%	-		3.2%
DIE LINKE	-	-	-	-	-	100.0%	100.0%	28.6%
Fragmentation index	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2005**	**2009**	**2013**	**AVER.**
Votes	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.03	1.01	1.02	1.01
Members	1.08	1.16	1.21	1.21	1.68	1.18	1.21	1.25
MPs	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.53	1.00	1.00	1.08
ITALY								
Votes	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**	**AVER.**
PRC	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	74.9%	71.6%	-	-	63.8%
PdCI	-	-	-	24.9%	28.4%	-	-	7.6%
SA/RC	-	-	-	-	-	69.3%	39.2%	15.5%
SEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	55.9%	8.0%
Others	-	-	-	0.2%	-	30.7%	4.9%	5.1%
Members	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**(2011)**	**AVER.**
PRC	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	77.8%	68.4%	69.5%	38.8%	79.2%
PdCI	-	-	-	22.2%	31.6%	28.6%	21.0%	14.8%
SEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	38.1%	5.4%
Others	-	-	-	-	-	2.0%	2.1%	0.6%
MPs	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**	**AVER.**
PRC	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	55.0%	71.9%	-	-	65.4%
PdCI	-	-	-	45.0%	28.1%	-	-	14.6%
SEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0%	20.0%
Fragmentation index	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**2001**	**2006**	**2008**	**2013**	**AVER.**
Votes	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.61	1.69	1.95	2.14	1.48
Members	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.53	1.76	1.77	2.94	1.57
MPs	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.98	1.68	-	1.00	1.28
FRANCE								
Votes (legislative)	**1993**	**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**			**AVER.**
PCF	80.8%	77.2%	62.7%	53.4%	-			54.8%
FdG	-	-	-	-	87.6%			17.5%
LO	8.1%	13.4%	15.4%	10.4%	6.2%			10.7%
LCR/NPA	1.2%	2.3%	16.2%	25.6%	-			9.1%
Others	9.9%	7.2%	5.7%	10.6%	6.2%			7.9%
Votes (presidential)		**(1995)**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**			**AVER.**
PCF		61.0%	24.4%	21.4%	-			27.0%
FdG		-	-	-	86.7%			21.7%
LO		38.0%	41.4%	14.8%	4.4%			24.7%
LCR/NPA		0.0%	30.8%	45.4%	8.9%			21.3%
Others		0.0%	3.4%	18.4%	0.0%			5.44%
Members	**1993**	**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**			**AVER.**
PCF	99.0%	96.7%	92.3%	88.1%	74.5%			90.1%
LO	0.7%	3.0%	5.7%	7.7%	8.1%			5.1%
LCR/NPA	0.2%	0.3%	2.0%	4.1%	3.5%			2.0%
PG	-	-	-	-	13.9%			2.8%
MPs	**1993**	**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**			**AVER.**
PCF	95.7%	94.3%	90.9%	83.3%	70.0%			86.8%
Others	4.4%	5.7%	9.1%	16.7%	30.0%			13.2%
Fragmentation index	**1993**	**1997**	**2002**	**2007**	**2012**			**AVER.**
Votes (legislative)	1.50	1.62	2.25	2.69	1.29			1.73
Votes (presidential)		1.89	3.06	3.37	1.31			2.41
Members	1.02	1.02	1.07	1.27	1.72			1.21
MPs	1.09	1.12	1.20	1.38	1.72			1.30

Source: my elaborations various sources (see statistical appendix).

The case for a regroupment of forces of different origin and sensibility under a common organisational framework – either a *broad party* (e.g. the German DIE LINKE) or a *semi-permanent front* (e.g. the French FdG) should be clear from the discussion of section 6.2. A broad anti-neoliberal programme based on the grievances that the mainstream left and its sympathetic trade unions confederations were proving unable or unwilling to address provided the rational basis for the unity of radical left forces of different origin and sensibility. Although a host of political and material questions produced tensions and fostered vocal debates, there was no good reason why compromise solutions could not be found. And, indeed, contemporary radical left parties were often successful in initiating and carrying out modest movements of regroupment.

The establishment and preservation of radical left unity was overwhelmingly dependent from three factors: (i) the ability of the main radical left party to find a reasonable political and material balance between the potential partners; (ii) the incentives provided by the political system, in particular the access to party financing and parliamentary representation; (iii) the climate of political competition.

The behaviour of the biggest radical left party in each country (PDS, PRC and PCF) was of crucial importance. A willingness to modernise its ideology, open up to pluralism and ensure political viability and equal dignity to potential partners helped to bring about unity among forces of different origin and sensibility; excessive pride, inflexibility and poor choices fostered the crystallisation of the disagreements into separate organisations.

In Italy, the open and flexible attitude of the PRC did manage for a short period (1991-1997) to bring together orthodox and neo-communists, far left groups and sections of the PDS left, before fragmenting under the pressure of bipolarism. In France the PCF had many opportunities to become the centre of processes of larger regroupment (1993-1997; 2004-2007) but regularly wasted them; a belated unification occurred (2009-2012) when the party came around the idea of giving up its symbolic and material primacy within the alliance by selecting non-communists as prominent candidates. In Germany, finally, the PDS managed to survive two potentially lethal threats of fragmentation (1989-1992 and 2002-2005) and to aggregate around its core

Eastern constituency successive layers of external partners: at first only smallish far and radical left forces; later much larger sections of the Western population. To a great extent, this was due to the willingness of its leadership to grant generous political compromises and to share with largesse its considerable resources (e.g. finances, internal offices, public offices) with potential partners.

The presence of institutional incentives was also very important in ensuring the cohesion (or lack thereof) of radical left forces.

In Germany, the 5% electoral threshold discouraged potential competitors to the PDS and was one of the key drivers of the alliances of 1990 (with Western leftists) and 2005-2007 (with the WASG). In Italy, the 4% electoral threshold had a similar effect of deterrence on far left organisations but was undermined by the selective incentives offered to right-wing splits of the PRC (CU in 1995, PdCI in 1998, SEL in 2009), which were guaranteed a significant parliamentary representation even with a very limited electoral support by an alliance with the centre-left. Later on, the post-2007 drive toward very heterogeneous electoral coalitions (SA, SeL, FdS and RC) was also motivated by the determination of a weakened radical left to overcome the threshold and to gain parliamentary representation. In France, finally, the extremely high barriers to representation provided no disincentive to the proliferation of competing candidatures, as fielding common candidates did not increase the chances of election but reduced the media exposure and financial prospects of each individual organisation.[228]

Finally, the saliency of the central political fault line of the radical left, the question of the (conciliatory or intransigent) attitude toward the moderate left, varied sharply according to the external political climate. The dilemma could be temporarily defused or fudged in periods of opposition to right-wing or grand coalition governments and, to a less extent, when the moderate left had the numbers to govern alone (or refused a dialogue). Whenever the contribution of the radical left became determinant for the formation or survival of a centre-left government, however, powerful centrifugal

[228] Indeed, the only electoral alliances between LO and LCR (1999 and 2004 European, 2004 regional elections) occurred precisely in cases when unity was likely to ensure such benefits, i.e. parliamentary representation.

pressures were set in motion. The hard choice between granting the survival or determining the fall of a centre-left parliamentary majority drastically reduced the scope for ambiguity and compromises and undermined the internal cohesion and external appeal of radical left parties, and leading to a proliferation of right-wing and left-wing splinter groups and electoral losses in all directions. In Germany the PDS had the luck of being considered as *nicht koalitionsfähig* (not a viable coalition partner) by the SPD, which involved it only in a few experiments at the regional level; this greatly alleviated the pressures on the cohesion of the party. In the other two countries, on the contrary, the choice of the PS and PDS/DS/PD to pursue a course of broad centre-left coalitions including the radical left was the key factor in encouraging a progressive fragmentation in the form of right-wing splits (Italy) or the emergence of more radical competitors (France).

On the basis of the afore-mentioned considerations, the trajectory of the three countries becomes easy to understand. The unity of the Italian radical left was progressively destroyed by the salience of the issue of governmental participation and by the selective incentives offered by the electoral system to right-wing splits. That of the German radical left was preserved by the absence of the first pressure, by the positive effects of the electoral system and by the willingness of the PDS to reward potential allies with material resources and a political role well above their effective contribution. In the case of France, finally, the many chances of regroupment of the *gauche de la gauche* between 1993 and 2007 were scuppered partly by the issue of governmental participation and partly by the incapacity of the various potential partners to reach a balanced compromise; the latter element, in turn, largely derived from disproportions in their respective societal influence.[229] It was only when the bad memories of the Jospin period waned and when a weakened PCF was ready to agree to important material concessions that the partial regroupment of the Left Front could take place (2009-2012).

[229] The PCF, a giant from the point of view of membership, resources and institutional presence, could not envisage an equal partnership with groups which could score well electorally (in presidential and European elections) but were dwarves in all other respects. The far left, on the other hand, hoped to use the lever of its electoral popularity to split the communist constituency and pave the way for a deeper reconfiguration.

6.7 Systemic influence: much ado about nothing?

Was the radical left *effective* in pushing forward its political programme and shaping Western European politics and society?

At the level of extra-parliamentary mobilisation, the radical left parties were very active in their support of and participation to a broad range of struggles and social movements.

This involvement was generally regarded as constructive by the participants, tended to win them new allies and often significantly increased their electoral audience. The link between electoral gains and broad left-wing social mobilisations emerges very clearly in all three countries. In France the two electoral peaks of the radical left (1995-2002 and 2009-2012) are tightly correlated to massive anti-right mobilisations led by the labour movement (1995 and 2009-2010). In Italy the two peaks (1995-96 and 2004-2006) neatly followed large anti-Berlusconi mobilisations by the trade unions (1994 and 2002) and pacifist networks (2002-2004). In Germany, finally, the two largest increases of the vote for the PDS/DIE LINKE (1994 and 2005) were direct consequences of the 1992-1993 anti-*Treuhand,* of the 2003 pacifist and of the 2003-2004 anti-*Hartz* mobilisations.[230]

The organisational and strategic benefits of such an involvement, however, remained limited. First of all, the parties largely failed to translate the gains of sympathy into more stable linkages such as new members and activists, the establishment of collateral and friendly organisations or the conquest of leadership positions within the key social movement organisations. The trade union movement, in particular, tended to remain closely aligned with the moderate left and the influence of radical left activists was stagnating (Germany, France) or even declining (Italy). Secondly, all but one major mobilisation were directed against seating right-wing governments; as a consequence, they tended to primarily benefit the main opposition party (SPD, PS, PD)

[230] A significant exception to this trend is provided by the important French mobilisations of the period 2003-2006 (2003 labour and 2006 anti-CPE mobilisations), which failed to produce a positive impact on the radical left vote. The reason for this was probably the 2002 presidential election, which led to a mid-term shift of many former radical left voters toward the Socialist Party.

and to increase the pressures on the radical left to agree on a united front policy including the electoral and parliamentary level. Thirdly, despite their mass character, many of the union-based movements were ultimately either unsuccessful (France in 2003 and 2009-2010, Germany in 1993 and 2004) or were circumvented by subsequent trade union negotiations (Italy). In short, the radical left was altogether unable to make use of extra-parliamentary mobilisations to improve its long-term ability to achieve its aims; the benefits, therefore, remained generally limited to short-term electoral gains which disappeared as the general mood turned from optimism to pessimism and resignation.

At the level of electoral and parliamentary mobilisation, the radical left parties were similarly unable to alter the "direction of competition" (Sartori, 1976; Evans, 2002) and to put a halt to the main trends of the neo-liberal era. In all three countries the ruling elite was altogether able to push forward a major reconfiguration of class power, reversing the post-war balance between state-led and privately-led enterprises, making labour cheaper, more flexible and less influential and shifting the burden of taxation away from capital and managerial incomes (Duménil & Lévi, 2011). The legacies of the post-WWII embedded liberalism are far from having been obliterated (Harman, 2007) but the overall direction of change remains highly unfavourable to the radical left project.

How can this insufficient record be explained?

On the one hand, the failures of the radical left have of course depended on the altogether limited levels of its social weight. As a medium-small political family representing between 4% and 13% of the electorate, often fragmented in competing organisations and lacking important resources of independent social mobilisation (e.g. a mass membership, collateral trade union confederations, a large-scale system of communication), the pressures it could exert on the social and political system were modest. In particular, its ability of exerting a left-ward pull on the moderate left was hampered by a long series of factors: the lack of vitality of social democratic internal left-wing tendencies; the hostility of the leadership of key civil society organisations, in particular the trade union movement; the general weakness (with the exception of France) and ineffectiveness of labour conflict; the weakened but still effective capacity

of the moderate left to compensate the loss of traditionalist supporters with the gain of more moderate ones (e.g. Mitterrand, Schröder, Prodi) or with a successful appeal to tactical voting against the right (e.g. the German SPD in 2002, the French PS after 2002, Veltroni's PD in 2008); finally, the continuous strategic oscillations of radical left parties between conciliatory and intransigent strategies.

On the other hand, the insensibility of the political system (and, in particular, of the moderate left) to the pressures toward increased protection and redistribution could have deeper roots. One possible explanation might derive from the entrenchment of neo-liberalism into complex institutional architectures (the European Union and the Eurozone; the WTO; the role played by global financial markets in the financing of public debt, corporate and private debt and pension funds) which "locks in" the changes and, falling short of a head-on confrontation with multiple national and international power centres, bars the implementation of even modestly heterodox economic policies. A second explanation might be found in the slow growth rates of advanced European economies and the increased pressure of international competition, both of which curtail the space for direct and indirect redistributive policies.

Further research is needed on the topic. What seems clear is that in absence of drastic theoretical and organisational improvements the radical left seems condemned to stagnation and overall ineffectiveness.

6.8 Concluding remarks

This thesis has endeavoured to offer an original contribution to the existing scholarship on the partisan radical left and on political parties.

From an empirical point of view, the detailed comparative analysis of the German, French and Italian radical lefts based on a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data has painted a nuanced picture of more than two decades of evolution, has revealed important and often surprising findings and has laid the foundations for a solid attempt to provide a convincing theorisation and interpretation of the overall trajectory of the Western European radical left.

From a methodological point of view, the adoption of an comparative (three countries), aggregate (the radical left as a complex political space), multi-dimensional (political nature; societal weight and influence; electoral, institutional and organisational mobilisation; strategies and tactics) and multi-level (party-organisation, party-constituency, external actors and structural environment) approach has proven its power in avoiding the pitfalls of one-sided generalisations from circumscribed experiences and in advancing our general understanding of the multi-faceted relations between political parties and contemporary societies.

Finally, the unusual vantage point of non-mainstream political actors has provided an interesting perspective into the socio-political transformations of the neo-liberal age and broadened conventional conceptions of politics, democracy and historical agency.

The Western European radical left has emerged from the analysis as a genuine political actor, endowed with important resources of societal weight and capable of playing a not decisive but nevertheless significant role in all sectors of political and social life: elections; intellectual production and public debate; extra-parliamentary mobilisation; governmental formation; law- and decision-making.

At the same time, the parties of the German, French and Italian radical left have not succeeded in making decisive progresses toward their main proclaimed goals: to fill the vacuum left by the neo-liberal transformation of mainstream political parties; to embark on a long-lasting path of recovery of their societal weight and influence; to

devise a credible vision of an alternative project of society, of a transition beyond neo-liberalism and capitalism and of a renewal of working-class politics and democratic radicalism. In other words, they have failed to chart a way out of the long-term crisis of the 20th century workers' movement and its various revolutionary, Stalinist and social democratic variants.

Their experience, both in their successes and in their shortcomings, represents a vital piece of contemporary political history and shines a revealing light on the key challenges and possibilities of Europe's present – and Europe's future.

A. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES AND SECONDARY LITERATURE

Aben, Maurits (2011) Overview of the Italian pension system. [report] Available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/2077/1/Aben_%282011%29__Overview_of_the_Italian_pension_system.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Abromeit, Heidrun (1993) "Die 'Vertretungslücke'. Probleme in neuen deutschen Bundesstaat", *Gegenwartskunde,* 3: 281-292.

Abromeit, Heidrun (1992) "Zum Für und Wider einer Ost-Partei", *Gegenwartskunde,* 41.4: 437-448.

Abse, Tobias (2004) Continuity or Rifondazione? The persistence of Italian Communism, 1991-2004. Paper presented at the 2004 Association for the Study of Modern Italy (ASMI) annual conference, London, 26-27 November.

Accornero, Aris (2006) *San Precario lavora per noi.* Milano: Rizzoli.

Agosti, Aldo (2000) *Storia del Partito comunista italiano,* 1921-1991. Bari: Laterza.

Agrikoliansky, Eric (2007) "L'altermondialisme en temps de crise", *Mouvements,* 50.

Agrikoliansky, Eric, Olivier Filleule and Nonna Mayer (eds.) (2005) *L'altermondialisme en France. La longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause.* Paris: Flammarion.

Agulhon, Maurice (1990) *La République: de Jules Ferry à François Mitterrand: 1880 à nos jours*. Paris: Hachette.

Albertazzi, Daniele, Duncan McDonnell and James Newell (2011) "Di lotta e di governo: the Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista in office", *Party Politics,* 17: 471.

Alemagna, Lilian and Stéphane Alliès (2012) *Mélenchon le plébéien.* Paris: Robert Laffont.

Amyot, Grant (2003) *Business, the state and economic policy: the case of Italy.* London: Routledge.

Ancelovici, Marcos (2011) "In search of lost radicalism. The hot autumn of 2010 and the transformation of labor contention in France", *French Politics, Culture & Society,* 29:3.

Ancelovici, Marcos (2008) "Social movements and protest politics" in Alistair Cole, Patrick Le Galès and Jonah D. Levy (eds.) *Developments in French Politics 4.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ancelovici, Marcos (2002) "Organising against globalisation: the case of ATTAC in France", *Politics & Society,* 30:3.

Andolfatto, Dominique (2011) "Explorer la planète rouge. La toile, lieu d'identité et de mémoire communiste" in Fabienne Greffet (ed.) *Continuerlalutte.com. Les partis politiques sur le web.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Andolfatto, Dominique (2009) "Chronique de la vie communiste 2005-2009", *Communisme,* 97-98.

Andolfatto, Dominique (2008) "Trade unions and communism in Spain, France and Italy" in Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau (eds.) *Communist and post-communist parties in Europe.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

Andolfatto, Dominique (2005c) PC-CGT: la courroie cassée? [online] Available at: http://istravail.com/article261.html?var_recherche=courroie [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Andolfatto, Dominique (2005b) "Chronique du PCF. Mars 2003 – 31 décembre 2004", *Communisme,* 80-82.

Andolfatto, Dominique (2005) *PCF: de la mutation à la liquidation.* Paris: Editions du Rocher.

Andolfatto, Dominique (2003b) L'évolution des relations CGT-PCF 1996-2003. [online] Available at: http://istravail.com/article125.html?var_recherche=courroie [accessed on 8.10.2013].

Andolfatto, Dominique (2003) " 'L'Année terrible', chronologie du PCF 2002-2003", *Communisme,* 72-73.

Andolfatto, Dominique (2001) "Le parti de Robert Hue. Chronique du PCF 1994-2001", *Communisme,* 67-68.

Andolfatto, Dominique (1997) "Les doubles dirigeants de la CGT et du Parti communiste", *Communisme,* 51-52.

Andolfatto, Dominique and Fabienne Greffet (2011) "Le Parti communiste français: une reconversion sous contraintes" in Jean-Michel De Waele and Daniel-Louis Seiler (eds.) *Les partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe.* Paris: Economica.

Andolfatto, Dominique and Fabienne Greffet (2009) "Le Parti de Marie-George Buffet, la survie a quel prix?", *Communisme,* 97-98.

Andolfatto, Dominique and Fabienne Greffet (2008) "La 'semi-cartellisation' du Parti communiste français" in Yohann Aucante and Alexandre Dézé (eds.) *Les systèmes de partis dans les démocraties occidentales. Le modèle du parti-cartel en question.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Andolfatto, Dominique and Dominique Labbé (2011b) "Retraites: les faux-semblants d'un mouvement social", *Le Débat,* 163.

Andolfatto, Dominique and Dominique Labbé (2011) *Histoire des syndicats (1906-2010).* Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Andolfatto, Dominique and Dominique Labbé (2010) "Syndicats des mythes aux réalités", *Commentaire,* 33:130.

Andolfatto, Dominique and Dominique Labbé (2006) "La transformation des syndicats français", *Revue française de science politique,* 56.

Andreani, Tony (2006) "Comment marcher sur les deux jambes", *Nouvelles FondationS,* 3:3-4.

Andruccioli, Paolo (2008) *Spine rosse. Breve storia della minoranza congressuale della CGIL (1978-2006).* Roma: Ediesse.

Anheier, Helmut K., Eckhard Priller and Annette Zimmer (2000) "Civil society in transition: the East German third sector ten years after unification"*, East European Politics and Societies*, 15.1: 139-156.

Antonian, Armen and Irwin Wall (1985) "The French communists under François Mitterrand", *Political Studies,* 33.

Appell zur Gründung von Komitees für Gerechtigkeit. 11 July 1992. [document] Available at: http://www.dearchiv.de/php/dok.php?archiv=bla&brett=B92_08&fn=APPELL.892&menu=b1992 [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Arndt, Uwe, Werner Mackenbach, Willi Pohl and Bertold Scheller (1990) *Die Demokratischen Sozialisten. Von der Schwierigkeit der Bildung einer linkssozialistischen Partei.* Frankfurt am Main: dipa-Verlag

Arrow, Kenneth J. (1950) "A difficulty in the concept of social welfare", *The Journal of Political Economy,* 58.4.

Arter, David (2002) "Communists we are no longer, Social Democrats we can never be: the evolution of the leftist parties in Finland and Sweden", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 3.1.

Arthaud, Nathalie (2012) Profession de foi. [official document]

Artous, Antoine, Didier Epsztajn and Patrick Silberstein (eds.) (2008) *La France des années 68.* Paris: Syllepse.

Artous, Antoine and Stathis Kouvelakis (2007) France: les leçons d'une défaite. [online] Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article6460 [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Asor Rosa, Alberto (2004) "Sinistra radicale, che fare di quel 15%", *il Manifesto,* 11 November.

Asor Rosa, Alberto (2009) "Gli smemorati di sinistra", *il Manifesto,* 17 June.

Avanza, Martina (2007) *Les "purs et durs de Padanie". Ethnographie du militantisme nationaliste à la Ligue du Nord (Italie), 1999-2002.* [PhD thesis] Paris: EHESS.

Azam, Nicolas (2009) Légitimité élective contre légitimité partisane Les communistes de Saint-Denis des années 1980 à la campagne du "Front de gauche" en 2009. Paper presented at the conference "Les territories du communisme", Université Paris 1, 1-2 December. Available at: http://chs.univ-paris1.fr/Collo/Azam.pdf [accessed on 8.10.2013].

Azéma, Jean-Pierre and Michel Winock (1986) *La Troisième République*. Paris: Hachette.

Azmanova, Albena (2004) "The Mobilisation of the European Left in the early 21st Century", *European Journal of Sociology*, 45, 2: 273-306.

Baccaro, Lucio (2007) "*Political economy* della concertazione sociale", *Stato e mercato,* 1.

Baccaro, Lucio (2006) Union democracy and the Italian labour movement. Paper presented at the conference "Union democracy re-examined", University of Washington, 24-25 February. Available at: http://web.mit.edu/baccaro/www/papers/union-democ-2-06.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Baccaro, Lucio (2003) "What is alive and what is dead in the theory of corporatism", *British Journal of Industrial Relations,* 41.4.

Baccaro, Lucio and Marco Simoni (2003) Il referendum sull'articolo 18 e gli interventi per la flessibilità del mercato del lavoro. [online] Available at: http://web.mit.edu/baccaro/www/papers/ital-articolo18.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Baccetti, Carlo (2003) "After PCI: post-communist and neo-communist parties of the Italian left after 1989" in Joan Botella and Louis Ramiro Fernandez (eds.) *The crisis of Communism and party change: the evolution of Western European Communist and post-Communist parties.* Barcelona: ICPS.

Backes, Uwe and Patrick Moreau (eds.) (2008) *Communist and post-communist parties in Europe.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht

Bailey, David J. (2009) *The political economy of European social democracy. A critical realist approach.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Bale, Tim and Richard Dunphy (2011) "In from the cold? Left parties and government involvement since 1989", *Comparative European Politics* 9: 269-291.

Balestrini, Nanni e Primo Moroni (1997) *L'orda d'oro 1968-1977. La grande ondata rivoluzionaria e creativa, politica ed esistenziale.* Milano: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore.

Barbet, Denis (1991) "Retour sur la loi de 1884. La production des frontières du syndical et du politique", *Genèses,* 3.

Barca, Fabrizio (ed.) (1997) *Storia del capitalismo italiano.* Roma: Donzelli Editore.

Barcia, Robert (Hardy) (2003) *La véritable histoire de Lutte Ouvrière.* Paris: Denoel.

Bardi, Luciano (ed.) (2006) *Partiti e sistemi di partito.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Bardi, Luciano (2002) "Italian parties: change and functionality" in Paul Webb (ed.) (2002) *Political parties in advanced industrial democracies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bardi, Luciano, Piero Ignazi and Oreste Massari (2007) *I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti.* Milano: Università Bocconi.

Bartolini, Stefano (2012) *La mobilisation politique de la gauche européenne (1860-1980). Le clivage de classe.* Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles [original English edition: (2000) *The political mobilization of the European left, 1860-1980: The class cleavage.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]

Bartolini, Stefano and Roberto D'Alimonte (eds.) (1997) *Maggioritario per caso. Le elezioni politiche 1996.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Bartolini, Stefano and Roberto D'Alimonte (eds.) (1995) *Maggioritario ma non troppo. Le elezioni politiche del 1994.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Barker, Peter (ed.) (1998) *The party of democratic socialism in Germany. Modern post-Communism or nostalgic populism?* Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi.

Barucci, Emilio and Federico Pierobon (2007) "Privatizations in Italy: planning or improvisation? Efficiency gains or rents?", *Review of economic conditions in Italy,* 3.

Bazin, Laurent (2004) "Relégation, marché et désactivation du militantisme communiste", *Journal des anthropologues,* 96-97.

BdI – Bundesministerium des Innern (2012) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2011) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2010.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2010) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2009) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2008.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2008) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2007) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2006) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2005) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2004) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2003.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2003) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2002.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2002) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2001) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (2000) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999.* Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1999) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1998) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1997.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1997) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1996.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1996) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1995.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1995) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1994.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1994) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1993.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1993) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1992.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1992) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

BdI (1991) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1990.* Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern.

Béaud, Stéphane and Olivier Masclet (2006) "Des 'marcheurs' de 1983 aux 'émeutieurs' de 2005. Deux générations sociales d'enfants d'immigrés", *Annales,* 61.4

Becker, Jean-Jacques (2005) "La gauche plurielle (1995-2002)" in Jean-Jacques Becker and Gilles Candar (eds.) *Histoire des gauches en France.* Paris: La Decouverte.

Becker, Jean-Jacques and Gilles Candar (eds.) (2005) *Histoire des gauches en France.* Paris: La Découverte.

Beck, Stefan and Christoph Scherrer (2005) "Der rot-grüne Einstieg in den Abschied vom 'Modell Deutschland'. Ein Erklärungsversuch", *PROKLA,* 35.1: 111-130.

Behrend, Manfred (2006). *Eine Geschichte der PDS. Von der zerbröckelnden Staatspartei zur Linkspartei.* Köln: Neuer ISP Verlag.

Behrend, Manfred and Helmut Maier (1991) *Der schwere Weg der Erneuerung. Von der SED zur PDS. Eine Dokumentation.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Bell, David Scott (2010) "The French extreme left and its suspicion of power" in Jonathan Olsen, Michael Koß and Dan Hough. *Left parties in national governments.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bell, David Scott (2004) "The French communist party within the left and alternative movements", *Modern and Contemporary France,* 12:1.

Bell, David Scott (1998) "The French communist party in the 1990s", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 14:3.

Bell, David Scott (ed.) (1993) *Western European communists and the collapse of Communism.* Oxford: Berg.

Bellanger, Emmanuel and Julian Mischi (eds.) (2013) *Les territoires du communisme. Élus locaux, politiques publiques et sociabilités militantes.* Paris: Armand Colin.

Bellocchi, Paola (2011) "Rappresentanza e diritti sindacali in azienda", *Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali,* 132.

Bellofiore, Riccardo (2013) " 'Two or three things I know about her': Europe in the global crisis and heterodox economics", *Cambridge Journal of Economics,* 37.

Bellucci, Paolo and Paolo Segatti (eds.) (2010) *Votare in Italia: 1968-2008. Dall'appartenenza alla scelta.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Bellucci, Paolo, Marco Maraffi and Paolo Segatti (2000) *PCI, PDS, DS. La trasformazione dell'identità politica della sinistra di governo.* Roma: Donzelli.

Bensaïd, Daniel *et al.* (2011) *New parties of the Left: experiences from Europe.* London: Resistance Books.

Bensaïd, Daniel (2007) "The return of strategy", *International Socialism Journal,* 113.

Bensaid, Daniel (2002) *Les trotskismes*. Paris : PUF.

Bensaid, Daniel and Pierre Rousset (2007) Un étrange bilan. [online] Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article6460 [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Bergounioux, Alain (1989) "Générations socialistes?", *Vingtième Siècle,* 22.

Bergounioux, Alain and Gérard Grunberg (2007) *L'ambition et le remords: les socialistes français et le pouvoir (1905-2005)*. Paris: Hachette Littératures.

Bergounioux, Alain and Gérard Grunberg (2005) "L'Union de la gauche et l'ère Mitterrand (1965-1995)" in Jean-Jacques Becker and Gilles Candar (eds.) *Histoire des gauches en France.* Paris: La Découverte.

Berne, Michel and Gérard Pogorel (2005) Privatization experiences in France. CESifo Working Paper, 1195. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=553962 [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Béroud, Sophie (2008) "La décennie des 'victoires défaites' (1995-2007) ou les effets du découplage entre mobilisations sociales et dynamiques syndicales" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant.

Béroud, Sophie and René Mouriaux (eds.) (1998) *Le souffle de décembre.* Paris: Syllepse.

Béroud, Sophie and Karel Yon (2012) "Face à la crise, la mobilisation sociale et ses limites. Une analyse des contradictions syndicales", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 20.2.

Béroud, Sophie, Jean-Michel Denis, Guillaume Desage, Baptiste Giraud and Jérôme Pélisse (2008) *La lutte continue? Les conflits du travail dans la France contemporaine.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant.

Bertinotti, Fausto (2011) "Far saltare il recinto neoautoritatio. La rivolta come opportunità", *alternative per il socialismo,* 18.

Bertinotti, Fausto (2009) *Devi augurarti che la strada sia lunga.* Milano: Ponte alle Grazie.

Bertinotti, Fausto (1998) Relazione al CPN del 3-4 ottobre 1998. [speech]

Bertolino, Simone (2008) "The PRC: emergence and crisis of the antagonistic left" in Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau (eds.) *Communist and post-Communist parties in Europe.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Bertolino, Simone (2004) *Rifondazione Comunista. Storia e organizzazione.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Besancenot, Olivier and Daniel Bensaïd (2009) *Prenons parti. Pour un socialisme du XXIe siècle.* Paris: Mille et une Nuit.

Besancenot, Olivier (2007) Profession de foi. [official document]

Besancenot, Olivier (2003) *Révolution! 100 mots pour changer le monde.* Paris: Flammarion.

Besancenot, Olivier (2002) Profession de foi. [official document]

Beuvain, Christian and Jean-Paul Salles (2011) "Trotskysmes en France: chronologie (1929-2009)", *Revue électronique dissidences,* 2. Available at: http://www.dissidences.net/documents/complement_vol6_chrono.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Beyer, Jürgen and Martin Höpner (2003) "The disintegration of organised capitalism: German corporate governance in the 1990s", *West European Politics,* 26.4.

Bianchi, Sergio and Lanfranco Caminiti (eds.) (2007-8) *Gli autonomi: le storie, le lotte, le teorie*. 3 vol. Roma: DeriveApprodi.

Bidet, Jacques and Eustache Kouvélakis (eds.) (2001) *Dictionnaire Marx contemporain.* Paris: PUF.

Billi, Fabrizio (ed.) (2001) *Gli anni della rivolta, 1960-1980.* Milano: Edizioni Punto Rosso.

Billi, Fabrizio *et al.* (1996) *Camminare eretti: democrazia proletaria e comunismo, da DP a Rifondazione Comunista.* Milano: Punto Rosso.

Birchall, Ian (2006) "Book review", *Historical Materialism,* 13.4.

Birnbaum, Jean (2008) "Transmission révolutionnaire et pédagogie de la jeunesse. L'exemple des trotskismes français", *Historie@Politique,* 4.

Blackledge, Paul (2013) "Left reformism, the state and the problem of socialist politics today", *International Socialism Journal,* 139.

Blondel, Jean (1968) "Party systems and patterns of government in Western democracies", *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* 1.2.

Bobbio, Norberto (2004) *Destra e sinistra. Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica* 4th ed. Roma: Donzelli.

Bock, Hans Manfred (1993) *Syndicalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918 bis 1923. Ein Beitrag zur Sozial- und Ideengeschichte der frühen Weimarer Republik.* Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Bock, Hans Manfred (1976) *Geschichte des "linken Radikalismus" in Deutschland. Ein Versuch*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Böll, Bernhard (2000) “Die Mitglieder der PDS: Motive für den Parteibeitritt – Empirische Ergebnisse einer Mitgliederbefragung in Sachsen-Anhalt” in Michael Brie (ed.) *Die PDS im Parteiensystem.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Bologna, Sergio (ed.) (1978) *La tribù delle talpe.* Milano: Feltrinelli.

Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello (2005) "The new spirit of capitalism", *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society,* 18.3: 161-188.

Bonnemaison, Didier (2012) "De la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire au Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste" in Jean-Michel De Waele and Daniel-Louis Seiler (eds.) *Les partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe*. Paris: Economica.

Bonoli, Giuliano (1997) "Pension politics in France: patterns of co-operation and conflict in two recent reforms", *West European Politics,* 20.4.

Bordandini, Paola (2013b) "Renewal and tradition: comparing Italian radical left parties through their middle-level elites", *South European Society and Politics,* 18.1.

Bordandini, Paola (2013) *La spada di Vendola. Una risorsa o un problema per il centrosinistra?* Roma: Donzelli.

Bordandini, Paola and Aldo Di Virgilio (2009) *Delegati di partito. Pdci e Prc.* Bologna: Clueb.

Bordandini, Paola and Aldo Di Virgilio (2007) "Comunisti italiani: ritratto di un partito di nicchia", *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica,* 38.2.

Bordandini, Paola and Aldo Di Virgilio (2005) Partito dei Comunisti italiani. Ritratto di un partito che non avrebbe dovuto esserci. Paper presented at the annual convention of the Società Italiana di Scienza Politica (SISP), Cagliari, 21-23 September.

Bordandini, Paola, Aldo Di Virgilio and Rosa Mulé (eds.) (2011) "Delegati di partito", *Polis,* 2.

Bordandini, Paola, Aldo Di Virgilio and Francesco Raniolo (2008) "The birth of a party: the case of the Italian Partito Democratico", *South European Society and Politics,* 13: 3.

Bordignon, Fabio and Luigi Ceccarini (2013) "Five stars and a cricket. Beppe Grillo shakes Italian politics", *South European Society and Politics,* forthcoming.

Borredon, Alain (1996) "Les nouveaux acteurs lycéens: critique sociale et critique scolaire", *Revue française de pédagogie,* 116.

Borrel, Marianne (1999) *Sociologie d'une métamorphose: la Fédération Sportive et Gymnique du travail entre société communiste et mouvement sportif (1964-1992).* [PhD thesis] Paris: IEP.

Bortfeldt, Heinrich (2003) "Die PDS am Ende?", *Deutschland Archiv,* 5: 737-751.

Bortfeldt, Heinrich (1992) *Von der SED zur PDS. Wandlung zur Demokratie?* Bonn: Bouvier Verlag.

Bosco, Anna (2000) *Comunisti. Trasformazioni di partito in Italia, Spagna e Portogallo.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Boswell, Laird (2005) "L'historiographie du communisme français est-elle dans une impasse?", *Revue française de science politique,* 55.5.

Botella, Joan and Louis Ramiro Fernandez (2003b) "The crisis of West European Communist parties and their change trajectories: communists, post-communists, ex-communists" in Joan Botella and Louis Ramiro Fernandez (eds.) *The crisis of Communism and party change: the evolution of Western European Communist and post-Communist parties.* Barcelona: ICPS.

Botella, Joan and Louis Ramiro Fernandez (eds.) (2003) *The crisis of Communism and party change: the evolution of Western European Communist and post-Communist parties.* Barcelona: ICPS.

Boumaza, Magali and Philippe Hamman (2007) *Sociologie des mouvements de précaires. Espaces mobilisès et répertoires d'action.* Paris: L'harmattan.

Boussel, Pierre (1988) Profession de foi. [official document]

Bové, José (2007) Profession de foi. [official document]

Boy, Daniel, Henri Rey, François Platone, Françoise Subilieau and Colette Ysmal (2003) *C'était la gauche plurielle.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Brandt, Georg (ed.) (1998) *"Lucky Streik" – ein Kampf um Bildung: Gießener Studierende berichten*. Gießen: Focus-Verlag.

Braunthal, Gerard (1990) *Political loyalty and public service in West Germany, The 1972 decree against radicals and its consequences.* Amherst: the University of Massachusetts Press.

Bräutigam, Hansgeorg (2010) "Die Verschleierung von SED-Vermögen", *Deutschland Archiv,* 4: 628-634.

Brechon, Pierre (2009) *La France aux urnes.* Paris: la Documentation française.

Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore (2010) "Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, modelities, pathways", *Global Networks,* 10.2.

Brenner, Robert (2006) *The economics of global turbulence.* London: Verso.

Brettschneider, Frank and Wolfgang Schuster (eds.) (2013) *Stuttgart 21. Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz.* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.

Brie, André *et al.* (1997) *Zur Programmatik der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus. Ein Kommentar.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Brie, Michael (ed.) (2005) *The left party in Germany: origins, aims, expectations.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. [English edition: Brie, Michael (ed.) (2005) *Die Linkspartei. Ursprünge, Ziele, Erwartungen.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung].

Brie, Michael (2003) *Ist die PDS noch zu retten? Analyse und Perspektiven*. [working paper] Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Brie, Michael (2000) "Die PDS – Strategiebildung im Spannungsfeld von gesellschaftlichen Konfliktlinien und politischer Identität" in Michael Brie and Rudolf Woderich (ed.) (2000) *Die PDS im Parteiensystem*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Brie, Michael and Cornelia Hildebrandt (eds.) (2006) *Parteien und Bewegungen. Die Linke im Aufbruch.* Bruxelles: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Brie, Michael and Cornelia Hildebrandt (eds.) (2005) *Für ein anderes Europa. Linke Parteien im Aufbruch.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Brie, Michael and Rudolf Woderich (eds.) (2000) *Die PDS im Parteiensystem*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Brie, Michael, Martin Herzig and Thomas Koch (eds.) (1995) *Die PDS. Postkommunistische Kaderorganisation, ostdeutscher Traditionsverein oder linke Volkspartei? Empirische Befunde und kontroverse Analysen.* Köln: PapyRossa.

Brie, Michael, Cornelia Hildebrandt and Meinhard Meuche-Mäker (eds.) (2007) *Die Linke. Wohin verändert sie die Republik ?* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Brechon, Pierre (2009) *La France aux urnes.* Paris: la Documentation française.

Brodiez, Axelle (2006) *Le Secours populaire français, 1945-2000. Du communisme à l'humanitaire.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Broué, Pierre (1997) *Histoire de l'Internationale communiste (1919-43).* Paris: Fayard.

Broué, Pierre (1971) *Révolution en Allemagne (1917-1923).* Paris: Editions de Minuit.

Budge, Ian (ed.) (2001) *Mapping policy preferences. Estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945-1998.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buffet, Marie-George (2007) Profession de foi. [official document]

Buffer, Marie-George (2006) Rapport au 33° congrès [speech], *Communistes*, 217, 30 March.

Bull, Martin J. (2002) "Italy: the crisis of the Left", *Parliamentary Affairs,* 56, 58-74.

Bull Martin J. (1995) "The West European Communist movement in the late twentieth century", *West European Politics*, 18:1.

Bull, Martin J. (1994) "The West European Communist movement: past, present, future" in Martin J. Bull and Paul Heywood (eds.) *West European Communist parties after the revolutions of 1989*. London: Macmillian.

Bull, Martin J. and Paul Heywood (eds.) (1994). *West European Communist parties after the revolutions of 1989*. London: Macmillian.

Burda, Michael C. (2013) "The East German economy in the twenty-first century" in Hartmut Berghoff and Uta A. Balbier (eds.) *The East German economy, 1945-2010. Falling behind or catching up?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burger, Susanne (2008) *Montagsdemos – Ausdruck einer neuen Wut?* [self-published] München: GRIN Verlag.

Bürklin, Wilhelm und Hilke Rebenstorf (1997) *Eliten in Deutschland. Rekrutierung und Integration.* Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

BVerfGE 82, 322, 29 September 1990. [legal sentence] Available at: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv082322.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

BVerfGE 5, 85, 17 August 1956. [legal sentence] Available at: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv005085.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

BWG – Bundeswahlgesetz, 23 July 1993. [law] Available at: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/downloads/rechtsgrundlagen/bundeswahlgesetz.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Caciagli, Mario (1993) "Fra internazionalismo e localismo: l'area rossa", *Meridiana,* 16.

Caciagli, Mario and Piergiorgio Corbetta (eds.) (2002) *Le regioni dell'elettore. Perché ha vinto il centro-destra nelle elezioni italiane del 2001.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Cadiou, Stéphane (2004) "Les tentatives de coordination au sein de la 'nouvelle gauche': le cas de dirigeants du syndicat Sud-PTT", *Politique et Sociétés,* 23.1.

Cahiers Leon Trotsky, 79/2002. Special issue: "L'histoire de l'extrême gauche française: le cas du 'trotskysme'. Une histoire impossible?"

Cahill, Damien, Lindy Edwards and Frank Stilwell (eds.) (2012) *Neoliberalism. Beyond the free market.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Callaghan, John (2003) "Social democracy in transition", *Parliamentary Affairs,* 56.

Callaghan, John, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson and Martin McIvor (eds.) (2009) *In search of social democracy: responses to crisis and modernisation.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Callinicos, Alex (2012) "The second coming of the radical left", *International Socialism Journal*, 135.

Callinicos, Alex (2008) "Where is the radical left going?", *International Socialism Journal*, 120.

Callinicos, Alex (2004) "The European radical left tested electorally", *IST International Discussion Bulletin,* 5.

Callinicos, Alex (1999) "Reformism and class polarisation in Europe", *International Socialism Journal,* 85.

Calise, Mauro (2006) "Personal party", *Equilibri,* 2.

Calossi, Enrico (2007) "Rifondazione Comunista e Comunisti Italiani" in Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi and Oreste Massari. *I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti.* Milano: Università Bocconi.

Canepa, Eric (1994) "Germany's party of democratic socialism", *Socialist Register,* 30.

Cannavò, Salvatore (2009) *La Rifondazione mancata. 1991-2008, una storia del PRC.* Roma: Edizioni Alegre.

Capoccia, Giovanni (2002) “Anti-system parties. A conceptual reassessment”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 14.1.

Caponi, Leonardo (2003) *Rifondazione comunista: la scommessa perduta.* Roma: Editori Riuniti.

Carlier, Alexandre (2008) *Mesurer les grèves dans les entreprises: des données administratives aux données d'enquêtes.* [working paper] Documents d'études DARES, 139. Available at: http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/DE139_mesurer_les_greves_vf_280808.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Carr, Edward H. (2001) *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Castellina, Luciana (2004) "L'autonomia in congresso", *la rivista del Manifesto,* 55.

Carty, R. Kenneth (2004) “Parties as franchise systems. The stratarchical organizational imperative”, *Party Politics,* 10.1.

Cayrol, Roland (1975) "L'univers politique des militants socialistes: une enquête sur les orientations, courants et tendances du Parti socialiste", *Revue française de science politique,* 25.1.

CENSIS (2006) *Dopo il voto. Elezioni 2006. La comunicazione politica e le motivazioni degli italiani.* Roma: CENSIS.

CENSIS (2001) *Le motivazioni dell'alternanza. Indagine sugli elettori del 13 maggio.* Roma: CENSIS.

Ceri, Paolo (2009) "Challenging from the grass roots: the *girotondi* and the no global movement", in Albertazzi, Daniele, Clodagh Brook, Charlotte Ross and Nina Rothenberg (eds.) *Resisting the tide. Cultures of opposition under Berlusconi (2001-2006).* New York: Continuum Books.

CDSP – Centre de données socio-politiques (2007) *Enquête post-électorale française, 2007*. (Version 2, jan 2010). Production: CEVIPOF. Distribution: CDSP. [cdsp_post-elec2007]

CDSP (2007) *Panel électoral français, 2007 - Panel 1, 2, 3, 4.* (Version 2, jan 2010). Production: CEVIPOF. Distribution: CDSP. [cdsp_pef2007]

CDSP (2002) *Panel électoral français, 2002 - Vague 1, 2, 3.* (Version 2, jan 2010). Production: CEVIPOF/CIDSP. Distribution: CDSP. [cdsp_pef2002v1, cdsp_pef2002v2, cdsp_pef2002v3]

CDSP (1997) *Enquête post-électorale française, 1997.* (Version 2, jan 2010). Production: CEVIPOF. Distribution: CDSP. [cdsp_post-elec1997]

CDSP (1995) *Enquête post-électorale française, 1995.* (Version 2, jan 2010). Production: CEVIPOF. Distribution: CDSP. [cdsp_post-elec1995]

CDSP (1988) *Enquête post-électorale française 1988.* (Version 2, jan 2010). Production: CEVIPOF. Distribution: CDSP. [cdsp_post-elec1988]

CDSP (1978) *Enquête post-électorale française, 1978.* (Version 2, jan 2010). Production: CEVIPOF. Distribution: CDSP. [cdsp_post-elec1978]

Chabod, Federico (2002) *L'Italia contemporanea (1918-1948).* Torino: Einaudi.

Charalambous, Giorgios (2011) "Realignment and entrenchment: the Europeanisation of Rifondazione Comunista", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society,* 12.1.

Chatriot, Alain and Claire Lemercier (2002) "Les corps intermédiaires", in Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson (eds.) *Dictionnaire critique de la République.* Paris: Flammarion.

Chevandier, Christian (2007) 'Uni(e)s dans l'action': les infirmières coordonnées. [online] Available at: http://www.ihs.cgt.fr/IMG/pdf_Christian_CHEVANDIER.pdf [accessed on 8.10.2013].

Chiocchetti, Paolo (2013) Nostalgics and seasoned factionalists? The changing face of the Italian radical left membership, 1991-2011. Paper presented at the 63th Political Studies Association (PSA) annual international conference, Cardiff, 25-27 March.

Chiocchetti, Paolo (2010) The French far left in the 2010 regional elections: an early analysis. [online] Available at: http://www.paolochiocchetti.it/french%20far%20left.doc [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Choffat, Thierry (2012) "Lutte Ouvrière, entre continuité et renouvellement" in Jean-Michel De Waele and Daniel-Louis Seiler (eds.) *Les partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe*. Paris: Economica.

Choffat, Thierry (1991) *Lutte Ouvrière.* [unpublished D.E.A. thesis]. Nancy: Université de Nancy II.

Choi, Hae-Lin and Alice Mattoni (2010) "The contentious field of precarious work in Italy: political actors, strategies and coalitions", *WorkingUSA,* 13: 213-243.

Chrapa, Michael (2003) "Parteireform als Aufbruch?", *UTOPIE kreativ,* 153-154: 603-608.

Chrapa Michael (2000) "Interne Konfliktpotentiale und Modernisierungschancen der PDS: Situation, Anforderungen, Optionen", *UTOPIE kreativ,* 113: 276-283.

Chrapa, Michael and Dietmar Wittich (2001) Die Mitgliedschaft: der große Lümmel... Studie zur Mitgliederbefragung 2000 der PDS. [manuscript] Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Chrapa, Michael and Dietmar Wittich (2000) Analyse der Mitgliedschaft der PDS und ihrer Alters- und Geschlechterstruktur. Pilotstudie. [manuscript] Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Christiansen, Hans (2011) The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries. [working paper] *OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers*, 5. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cwps0s3-en [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Circolo Prc Fiat Auto-Avio di Pomigliano D'Arco (ed.) (2011) *Pomigliano non si piega. Storia di una lotta raccontata dai lavoratori.* Milano: A.C. Editoriale Coop.

Clift, Ben and Justin Fisher (2004) "Comparative party finance reform. The cases of France and Britain", *Party Politics,* 10.6.

Colli, Andrea (2002) *Il quarto capitalismo.* Venezia: Marsilio.

Cole, Alistair (1999) "French socialists in office: lessons from Mitterrand and Jospin", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 7.1.

Colombo, Yurii (1995) *Il trotskismo internazionale: il caso italiano (1968-1980).* [unpublished PhD thesis]. Milano: Università degli Studi di Milano. Available at: http://www.giovanetalpa.net/movtrot.htm [accessed on 8.10.2013].

CNCCFP - Commission nationale des comptes de champagne et des financements politiques (2011) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2010", *JORF,* 299 (annexe), 27.12.2010.

CNCCFP (2010) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2009", *JORF,* 301 (annexe), 29.12.2010.

CNCCFP (2009) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2008", *JORF,* 294 (annexe), 19.12.2009.

CNCCFP (2008) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2007", *JORF,* 297 (annexe), 17.12.2008.

CNCCFP (2007b) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2006", *JORF,* 300 (annexe), 27.12.2007.

CNCCFP (2007) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2005", *JORF,* 21 (annexe), 25.1.2007.

CNCCFP (2006) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2004", *JORF,* 149 (annexe), 29.6.2006.

CNCCFP (2005b) "Avis relatif à la publication générale des comptes partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2003", *JORF,* 229, 1.10.2005.

CNCCFP (2005) "Publication générale des comptes des partis et groupements politiques au titre de l'exercice 2003", *JORF,* 209 (annexe), 8.9.2005.

Conord, Fabien (2009) Les communistes et les élections sénatoriales. Entre scrutin prétexte et ressource politique (1920-2008). Paper presented at the conference "Les territories du communisme", Université Paris 1, 1-2 December. Available at: http://chs.univ-paris1.fr/spip.php?article192 [accessed on 8.10.2013].

Contamin, Jean-Gabriel (2005) "Les grèves de décembre 1995: un moment fondateur?" in Eric Agrikoliansky, Olivier Filleule and Nonna Mayer (eds) *L'altermondialisme en France. La longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause.* Paris: Flammarion.

Corbetta, Piergiorgio and Maria Serena Piretti (2009) *Atlante storico-elettorale d'Italia (1861-2008).* Bologna: Zanichelli.

Corbetta, Piergiorgio and Rinaldo Vignati (2013) "The primaries of the centre-left: only a temporary success?", *Contemporary Italian Politics,* 5.1.

Corcuff, Philippe (2008) "Galaxie altermondialiste et émancipation au XXIème siècle: l'hypothèse d'une social-démocratie libertaire", *Mediapart,* 20 August. Available at: http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/philippe-corcuff [accessed 15.10.2013].

Corradi, Cristina (2005) *Storia dei marxismi in Italia.* Roma: Manifestolibri.

Cossu, Andrea (2004) " 'Tenetela cara questa bandiera!'. Simbolismo politico e ricorso al rituale nella scissione del Partito dei Comunisti Italiani", *Polis,* 18.

Courtois, Stéphane and Marc Lazar (2000) *Histoire du Parti communiste français.* 2nd edition. Paris: PUF.

Coustal, François (2009) *L'incroyable histoire du Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste.* Paris: Demopolis.

Cremaschi, Giorgio (2010) *Il regime dei padroni. Da Berlusconi a Marchionne.* Roma: Editori Riuniti.

Cremaschi, Giorgio (2000) "Riflusso e possibile ripresa", *la rivista del Manifesto,* 3.

Crespy, Amandine (2010) "When 'Bolkenstein' is trapped by the French anti-liberal discourse: a discoursive-institutionalist account of preference formation in the realm of European Union multi-level politics", *Journal of European Public Policy,* 17.8.

Crespy, Amandine (2008) "La cristallisation des résistances de gauche à l'intégration européenne: les logiques de mobilisation dans la campagne référendaire française de 2005", *Revue internationale de politique comparée,* 15.4.

Crettiez, Xavier and Isabelle Sommier (2006) *La France rebelle. Tous les mouvements et acteurs de la contestation.* Paris: Michalon.

Crossley-Frolick, Katy (2007) "Sifting through the past: lustration in reunified Germany" in Vladimira Dvořáková and Anđelko Milardović (eds.) *Lustration and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in central and eastern Europe.* Zagreb: CPI.

Crouch, Colin (2004) *Post-democracy.* Cambridge: The Polity Press.

CSA (2012c) Sondage – les Français et le Front de Gauche. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

CSA (2012b) Sondage – l'électorat de Jean-Luc Mélenchon. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

CSA (2012) Sondage – élection présidentielle 2012. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

CSA (2009) Sondage – élections européennes 2009. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

CSA (2007b) Sondage - élection présidentielle 2007. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

CSA (2007) "Les votes au scrutin présidentiel selon la proximité syndicale", *Liaisons sociales,* 14859.

CSA (2004) Sondage – élections régionales 2004. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

CSA (2004) Vote d'extrême-gauche ou vote pour l'extrême-gauche? Retour sur le cycle électoral 1995-2004, composition des électorats, explication du vote. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

CSA (2002) Sondage - élection présidentielle 2002. [opinion poll] Paris: CSA.

Curcio, Renato (ed.) (2006) *La mappa perduta.* Carrù: Sensibili alle Foglie.

Current Sociology (forthcoming). Special issue on "Occupy social movements: a new wave of global mobilization"

Cytermann, Laurent and Cécile Dindar (2008) "Les grandes étapes de l'histoire du RMI" in Michèle Lelièvre and Emmanuelle Nauze-Fichet (eds.) *RMI, l'état des lieux, 1988-2008.* Paris: La Découverte.

Dahn, Daniela (ed.) (1997) *Eigentum verpflichtet - die Erfurter Erklärung*. Heilbronn: Distel Verlag.

Daiber, Birgit (ed.) (2010) *The left in government: Latin America and Europe compared.* Brussels: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.

Daiber, Birgit, Cornelia Hildebrandt and Anna Striethorst (eds.) (2010) *Von Revolution bis Koalition. Linke Parteien in Europa.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Dale, Gareth (2010) "Who were 'the people'? Classes and movements in East Germany, 1989", *Capital and Class*, 32.2.

Dale, Gareth (2006b) " 'A very orderly retreat': democratic transition in East Germany, 1989-1990", *Debatte,* 14.1.

Dale, Gareth (2006) *The East German revolution of 1989.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dale, Gareth (2004) *Between state capitalism and globalisation. The collapse of the East German economy.* Bern: Peter Lang.

Dalmasso, Sergio (2002) *Rifondare è difficile. Dallo scioglimento del PCI al "movimento dei movimenti".* Boves (CN): CIPEC.

Damiani, Marco (2013) "Vendola, la forma partito e il modello di leadership. Una sinistra 'in movimento' tra partecipazione e personalizzazione politica", *SocietàMutamentoPolitica*, 4.7.

Damiani, Marco (2011) "Nichi Vendola: for the new 'laboratory' of the Italian Left", *Bulletin of Italian Politics,* 3.2.

Davidson, Neil (2013) "The neoliberal era in Britain: historical developments and current perspectives", *International Socialism Journal,* 139.

De Cecco, Marcello (2007) "Italy's dysfunctional political economy", *West European Politics,* 30.4.

De Cindio, Fiorella and Cristian Peraboni (2010) "Internet as a platform for political engagement: from protests to proposals" in *Journal of Community Informatics,* 6.3.

De Fiores, Claudio (2003) "L'art. 11 non si può 'convertire' alla guerra", *Critica Marxista,* 1.

De Grazia, Olga (2007) Dass du dich wehren musst, wenn du nicht untergehen willst. [manuscript] Berlin: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Available at: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/miscellanies/menschenrechte-27763/53/PDF/53.pdf [accessed on 7.7.2013].

de Nardis, Fabio (2011) "The failure of the radical left project in Italy: the case of the Refoundation Communist Party (PRC)", *Journal of Politics and Law,* 4.2.

de Nardis, Fabio (2009) *La Rifondazione Comunista. Asimmetrie di potere e strategie politiche di un partito in movimento.* Milano: FrancoAngeli.

De Sio, Lorenzo, Matteo Cataldi and Federico De Lucia (eds.) (2013) *Le elezioni politiche del 2013.* Roma: CISE.

De Waele, Jean-Michel and Daniel-Louis Seiler (eds.) (2012) *Le partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe.* Paris: Economica.

De Waele, Jean-Michel and Mathieu Vieira (2012) "La famille de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe occidentale" in Jean-Michel De Waele and Daniel-Louis Seiler (eds.) *Le partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe.* Paris: Economica.

Della Porta, Donatella (2006) *Globalization from below.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Della Porta, Donatella (1995) *Social movements, political violence and the state. A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany.* Cambrigde: Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, Donatella and Gianni Piazza (2008) *Le ragioni del no. Le campagne contro la Tav in Val di Susa e il Ponte sullo Stretto.* Milano: Feltrinelli.

Della Porta, Donatella, Massimo Andretta and Lorenzo Mosca (2003) "Movimenti sociali e sfide globali: politica, antipolitica e nuova politica dopo l'11 settembre", *Rassegna italiana di sociologia,* 1.

Della Porta, Donatella, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca and Herbert Reiter (2006) *Globalization from below. Transnational activism and protest networks.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Denis, Jean-Michel (1996) *Les coordinations. Recherche désespérée d'une citoyenneté.* Paris: Syllepse.

Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (2002) "Öffentlicher Dienst im Wandel" in Klaus König (ed.) *Deutsche Verwaltung an der Wende zum 21. Jahrhundert.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Desbos, Clèment and Frédéric Royall (2011) "Globalization and political posturing on the left in France in the 1990s", *French Politics,* 9.

Desse, Michel (2010) "Guadeloupe, Martinique, LKP, crise de 2009, crise économique, déclin économique: de crises en crises: la Guadeloupe et la Martinique", *Études caribéennes,* 17.

DESTATIS (2013) Personal des öffentlichen Dienstes. Fachserie 14 Reihe 6. [unpublished raw data] Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

DESTATIS (2002) Personal des öffentlichen Dienstes. Fachserie 14 Reihe 6. [raw data] Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

Detterbeck, Klaus (2005) "Cartel parties in Western Europe?", *Party Politics,* 11:2.

Deutscher Bundestag (2011) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2009 (1. Teil – Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 17/4800.

Deutscher Bundestag (2010) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2008 (1. Teil – Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache17/630.

Deutscher Bundestag (2009) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2007 (1. Teil – Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 16/12550.

Deutscher Bundestag (2008) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Jahr 2006 (1. Teil – Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 16/8400.

Deutscher Bundestag (2007) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Jahr 2005 (2. Teil – Übrige anspruchtsberechtigte Parteien). Drucksache 16/5230.

Deutscher Bundestag (2006b) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Jahr 2005 (1. Teil – Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 16/5090.

Deutscher Bundestag (2006a) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2004 (1. Teil – Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 16/1270.

Deutscher Bundestag (2005) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2003 (1. Teil – CDU, SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, CSU, FDP und PDS). Drucksache 15/5550.

Deutscher Bundestag (2004) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2002 (1. Teil - Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 15/2800.

Deutscher Bundestag (2003) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2001 (1. Teil - Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 15/700.

Deutscher Bundestag (2002) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2000 (1. Teil - Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 14/8022.

Deutscher Bundestag (2000b) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1999 (1. Teil - Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 14/5050.

Deutscher Bundestag (2000a) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1998 (1. Teil - Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 14/2508.

Deutscher Bundestag (1998) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1997 (1. Teil - Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 14/246.

Deutscher Bundestag (1997) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1996 (1. Teil - Bundestagsparteien). Drucksache 13/8923.

Deutscher Bundestag (1996) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1995 (1. Teil). Drucksache 13/6472.

Deutscher Bundestag (1995) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1994 (1. Teil). Drucksache 13/3390.

Deutscher Bundestag (1994) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1993 (1. Teil). Drucksache 13/145.

Deutscher Bundestag (1993b) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1992 (1. Teil). Drucksache 12/6140.

Deutscher Bundestag (1993a) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1991 (2. Teil). Drucksache 12/4475.

Deutscher Bundestag (1992) Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten der politischen Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 1990. Drucksache 12/2165.

Diamanti, Ilvo (2007) "The Italian centre-right and centre-left: between parties and 'the party'", *West European Politics,* 30.4.

DIE LINKE. (2013) 100 Prozent sozial. Wahlprogramm zur Bundestagswahl 2013. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

DIE LINKE. (2011) Programm der Partei DIE LINKE. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

DIE LINKE. (2009b) Wahlprogramm. Konsequent sozial. Für Demokratie und Frieden. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

DIE LINKE. (2009) Bundessatzung. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

DIE LINKE. (2007) Programmatische Eckpunkte. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

DIE LINKE.PDS (2006) Statut. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

DIE LINKE.PDS (2005) Wahlprogramm. Für eine neue soziale Idee. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Diedrich, Torsten, Hans Ehlert and Rüdiger Wenzke (1998). *Im Dienste der Partei. Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR.* Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag.

Dietzel, Horst, Jana Hoffmann and Gerry Woop (2005) *Studie zum Vergleich der Parteiprogramme von PDS und WASG.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Diliberto, Oliviero, Vladimiro Giacchè, Fausto Sorini (2011) *Ricostruire il partito comunista. Appunti per una discussione.* Macerata: Edizioni Simple.

Diliberto, Oliviero (2007) Relazione al IV Congresso PdCI. [speech]

Diliberto, Oliviero (2004) Relazione al III Congresso PdCI. [speech]

Diliberto, Oliviero (2001) Relazione al II Congresso PdCI. [speech]

Diliberto, Oliviero (1999) Relazione al I Congresso PdCI. [speech]

Diliberto, Oliviero and Alessio Diliberto (1998) *La fenice rossa.* Roma: Robin Edizioni.

Dissidences, 6/2009. Special issue "Trotskysmes en France".

Doerschler, Peter and Lee Ann Banaszak (2007) “Voter support for the German PDS over time: dissatisfaction, ideology, losers and east identity”, *Electoral Studies,* 26.

Dolez, Bernard e Annie Laurent (2003) “Marches et marges de la gauche” in Pascal Perrineau and Colette Ysmal (eds.) *Le vote de tous le refus. Les élections présidentielle et législatives de 2002.* Paris : Presses de Science Po.

Dormagen, Jean-Yves (1998) "Parcours, culture et opinions des cadres du Parti de la refondation communiste", *Communisme,* 51-52.

Dormagen, Jean-Yves (1996) *I comunisti. Dal PCI alla nascita di Rifondazione comunista.* Roma: Koinè.

Dostal, Jörg Michael (2000) "From 'moderniser' to 'traditionalist': Oskar Lafontaine and German Social Democracy in the 1990s", *Debatte,* 8.1..

Downs, Anthony (1957) *An economic theory of democracy.* New York: Harper.

Dray, Julien (1987) *SOS génération: histoire de l'intérieur du mouvement des jeunes de novembre-décembre 1986*. Paris: Ramsay.

Dreyfus, Michel (1990) *PCF: crises et dissidences: de 1920 à nos jours.* Paris: Éditions Complexe.

Dufour, Pascale (2010) "The mobilisation against the 2005 treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: a *French* mobilization for another Europe", *Social Movement Studies,* 9.4.

Drummond, Andrew J. (2006) "Electoral volatility and party decline in Western democracies: 1970-1995", *Political Studies,* 54.

Ducange, Jean-Numa, Philippe Marlière and Louis Weber (2013) *La gauche radicale en Europe.* Paris: Éditions du Croquant.

Duménil, Gérard and Dominique Lévy (2011) *The crisis of neoliberalism.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Dunphy, Richard (2005) *Contesting Capitalism: Left Parties and European Integration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dunphy, Richard and Tim Bale (2011) "The radical left in coalition government: toward a comparative measurement of success and failure", *Party Politics,* 17.4: 488-504.

Dunphy, Richard and Luke March (2013) "Seven year itch? The European Left Party: struggling to transform the EU", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society,* forthcoming,

Duverger, Maurice (1951). *Les partis politiques.* Paris : Armand Colin.

Économie et Statistique, 376-377. Special issue "La réduction du temps de travail".

Eckhoff, Heinrich (2005) “Was war die Linke Liste/PDS?” *Disput,* July.

Edwards, Phil (2011) "'Alternation? What alternation?' The second republic and the challenge of democratic consolidation", *Bulletin of Italian Politics,* 3.2.

Edwards, Phil (2009) "Veniamo da lontano e andiamo lontano": the Italian left and the problem of transition", *Bulletin of Italian Politics,* 1.2.

Ehegötz, Timmy (2011) *Demonstrationen im Zeichen des Wandels. Die Anti-Atomkraft-Bewegung und Stuttgart21 als Teil einer neuen sozialen (Protest)Bewegung in Deutschland?* [unpublished MA thesis] Leipzig: Universität Leipzig .

Eichhorst, Werner and Paul Marx (2009) Reforming German labor market institutions: a dual path to flexibility. [Working paper] Available at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090403134 [accessed on 7.7.2013].

Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik (1998) "Contentious politics in new democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 1989-1993", *World Politics,* 50.4. 547-581.

Eley, Geoff (2002) *Forging democracy. The history of the left in Europe, 1850-2000.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elia, Leopoldo (1970) "Governo (forme di)" in *Enciclopedia del Diritto,* vol. XIX, p. 634-675. Milano: Giuffrè.

Erfurter Erklärung. 09 January 1997. [document] Available at: http://www.ddr89.de/ddr89/d/erfurt.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Ernst, Klaus, Thomas Händel and Katja Zimmermann (eds.) (2012) *Was war? Was bleibt? Wege in die WASG, Wege in DIE LINKE.* Hamburg: VSA Verlag.

Escalona, Fabien and Mathieu Vieira (2012) Le sens et le rôle de la résistance a l'UE pour le Parti de Gauche et le Front de Gauche. Paper presented at the seminar of the Association française de science politique (AFSP), Paris, 31 May - 1 June. Available at: http://www.afsp.msh-paris.fr/activite/2012/je310512/010612escalonaviera.pdf [accessed 8.10.2013].

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990) *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity press.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1985) *Politics against markets: The social democratic road to power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ethuin, Nathalie (2006) "Formation des militants et identité communiste", *Nouvelles FondationS,* 2.2.

Ethuin, Nathalie (2003) "De l'idéologisation de l'engagement communiste. Fragments d'une enquête sur les écoles du PCF", *Politix,* 16.63.

EuWG – Europawahlgesetz, 21 June 1978. [law] Available at: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/europawahlen/downloads/rechtsgrundlagen/europawahlgesetz.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Evans, Jocelyn (ed.) (2003) *The French party system.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Evans, Jocelyn (2002) "In defence of Sartori. Party system change, voter preference distributions and other competitive incentives", *Party Politics,* 8.2.

Favilli, Paolo (2011) *In direzione ostinata e contraria. Per una storia di Rifondazione Comunista.* Roma: DeriveApprodi.

Fayolle, Sandra (2005) *L'Union des Femmes Françaises: une organisation féminine de masse du parti communiste français (1945-1965).* [unpublished PhD thesis]. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Université Lille III.

FdG – Front de Gauche (2012) L'humain d'abord. [official programme]

FdS – Federazione della Sinistra (2010b) Manifesto. [internal document] Rome: PRC.

FdS (2010) Statuto. [internal document] Rome: PRC.

Ferchland, Rainer (2007) “Befunde einer Mitgliederbefragung im Berliner Stadtbezirk Marzahn-Hellersdorf” in Michael Brie, Cornelia Hildebrandt and Meinhard Meuche-Mäker (eds.) (2007) *Die Linke. Wohin verändert sie die Republik?* Berlin : Dietz Verlag.

Ferrera, Maurizio and Matteo Jessoula (2007) "Italy: a narrow gate for path-shift" in Ellen M. Immergut, Karen M. Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds) *Handbook of West European Pension Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferrero, Paolo (2010) *Quel che il futuro dirà di noi. Idee per uscire dal capitalismo in crisi e dalla seconda Repubblica.* Roma: DeriveApprodi.

Ferretti, Raymond (2003) "Le retour du 49.3" [online] Available at: http://www.rajf.org/article.php3?id_article=1518 [accessed on 8.10.2013].

FGW - Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2009) Bundestagswahl 2009. Eine Analyse der Wahl vom 27. September 2009. [report] Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. (Berichte der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V, 138)

FGW (2005) Bundestagswahl 2005. Eine Analyse der Wahl vom 18. September 2005. [report] Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. (Berichte der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V, 122)

FGW (2002) Bundestagswahl 2002. Eine Analyse der Wahl vom 22. September 2002. [report] Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. (Berichte der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V, 100)

FGW (1998) Bundestagswahl 1998. Eine Analyse der Wahl vom 27. September 1998. [report] Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. (Berichte der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V, 91)

FGW (1994) Bundestagswahl 1994. Eine Analyse der Wahl zum 13. Deutschen Bundestag am 16. Oktober 1994. [report] Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. (Berichte der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V, 76)

FGW (1990) Bundestagswahl 1990. Eine Analyse der ersten Gesamtdeutschen Bundestagswahl am 2. Dezember 1990. [report] Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. (Berichte der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V, 38).

Fichter, Tilman and Siegward Lönnendonker (1977) *Kleine Geschichte des SDS. Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund von 1946 bis zur Selbstauflösung*. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag.

Fieber, Hans-Joachim and Johannes Reichmann (1995) *"Komitees für Gerechtigkeit": Erwartungen, Meinungen, Dokumente.* Frankfurt am Main: IKO.

Filleule, Olivier and Danielle Tartakowsky (2008) *La manifestation.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Filoche, Gérard (2007) *Mai 68, histoire sans fin (Tome 1).* Dijon: Jean-Claude Gawsewitch Editeur.

Fiorini, Asia and Fulvio Venturino (2011) Scegliere il sindaco. Le primarie comunali del centrosinistra. [Working paper] CLS. Available at: http://www.candidateandleaderselection.eu/sites/default/files/WorkingPaper_CLS_2_2011.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Flora, Peter (ed.) (1999) *State formation, nation-building and mass politics in Europe: the theory of Stein Rokkan.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Förster, Peter and Günter Roski (1990) *DDR zwischen Wende und Wahl.* Berlin: LinksDruck.

Franzosi, Roberto (1995) *The puzzle of strikes.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fuchs, Dieter (1999) "The democratic culture of unified Germany" in Norris, Pippa (ed.) *Critical citizens. Global support for democratic governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis (1989) "The end of history?", *The National Interest,* Summer.

Fülberth, Georg (2008) *Die Linke. "Doch wenn sich die Dinge ändern".* Köln: PapyRossa Verlag.

Fülberth, Georg (2007) *Finis Germaniae. Deutsche Geschichte seit 1945.* Köln: PapyRossa Verlag.

Fülberth, Georg (1990) *KPD und DKP 1945-1990. Zwei kommunistische Parteien in der vierten Periode kapitalistischer Entwicklung.* Heilbronn: Distel-Verlag.

Fusaro, Lorenzo and Bue Rübner Hansen (2010) "Converging currents: the 'anomalous wave' of Italy and the return of European student radicalism. Prologue to the times ahead?", *pros*,* Pocket Issue One. Available at: http://pros.ucsd.edu/issue_pocket_1.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Fysh, Peter and Jim Wolfreys (2003) *The politics of racism in France.* 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gabriel, Oscar W., Bernhard Weßels and Jürgen W. Falter (2009) *Wahlen und Wähler. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2005.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Gaddis, John Lewis (2005) *The Cold War. A new history.* New York: Penguin Press.

Galante, Severino (2011) Memoria/archivio/racconto. [manuscript] Available at: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100001882147216&sk=notes [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Galli, Giorgio (2007) *Storia del socialismo italiano: da Turati a Craxi*. Milano: Baldini Castoldi Dalai.

Gallino, Luciano (2007) *Il lavoro non è una merce. Contro la flessibilità.* Bari: Laterza.

Gallino, Luciano (2006) *L'Italia in frantumi.* Bari: Laterza.

Gallot, Fanny (2006) *L'intervention de Lutte Ouvrière et de la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire à Renault Clèon de 1968 a 1991*. [unpublished MA thesis] Rouen: Université de Rouen.

Gambetta, William (2010) *Democrazia Proletaria. La nuova sinistra tra piazze e palazzi.* Milano: Edizioni Punto Rosso.

Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Wright (eds.) (1999) *The new social democracy.* Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Garavini, Sergio (1999) *Ripensare l'illusione. Una prospettiva dalla fine del secolo.* Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino.

Garcia, Guillaume (2013) *La cause des 'sans'. Sans-papiers, sans-logis, sans-emploi à l'épreuve de médias.* Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Garms, Heinrich (1994) "Die Ostdeutsche und Berliner Initiative der Betriebs- und Personalräte – Ein Beispiel sozialer Interessenvertretung im Transformationsprozess", *Umbruch,* 8.

Garraud, Philippe (1978) "Discours, pratiques et idéologie dans l'évolution du Parti socialiste", *Revue française de science politique,* 28.2.

Gauvin, Gilles (2000) "Le parti communiste de la Réunion (1946-2000)", *Vingtième Siècle,* 68.

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 248/2012, 23.10.2012, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2011".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 254/20011, 31.10.2011, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2010".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 264/2010, 11.11.2010, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2009".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 269/2009, 18.11.2009, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2008".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 267/2008, 14.11.2008, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2007".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 281/2007, 3.12.2007, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2006".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 268/2006, 17.11.2006, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2005".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 247/2005, 22.10.2005, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2004".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 256/2003, 30.10.2004, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2003".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 268/2003, 18.11.2003, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2002".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 292/2002, 13.12.2002, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2001".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 287/2001, 11.12.2001, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 2000".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 295/2000, 19.12.2000, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 1999".

Gazzetta Ufficiale, 165/2000, 17.12.2000, "Rendiconti dei partiti e movimenti politici per l'esercizio 1998".

Geay, Bertrand and Laurent Willemez (eds.) (2008) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant.

Gehrke, Bernd (2001b) "Die 'Wende'-Streiks. Eine erste Skizze" in Gehrke, Bernd and Renate Hürtgen (eds.) *Der betriebliche Aufbruch im Herbst 1989: die unbekannte Seite der DDR-Revolution.* Berlin: Bildungswerk Berlin der Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

Gehrke, Bernd (2001) "Demokratiebewegung und Betriebe in der 'Wende' 1989. Plädoyer für einen längst fälligen Perspektivwechsel" in Gehrke, Bernd and Renate Hürtgen (eds.) *Der betriebliche Aufbruch im Herbst 1989: die unbekannte Seite der DDR-Revolution.* Berlin: Bildungswerk Berlin der Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

Gehrke, Bernd (1997) "Arbeitskämpfe und eigenständige Interessenvertretungen nach 1989", *Sklaven,* 32-33.

Gehrke, Bernd and Renate Hürtgen (eds.) (2001) *Der betriebliche Aufbruch im Herbst 1989: die unbekannte Seite der DDR-Revolution.* Berlin: Bildungswerk Berlin der Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

Gemie, Sharif (2003) "Anti-Le Pen protests: France, April-May 2002", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies,* 11.2.

Gerbaudo, Paolo (2011) "Berlusconi of the left? Nichi Vendola and the "narration" of the new Italian Left", *Soundings,* 48.11.

Gerner, Manfred (1994) *Partei ohne Zukunft? Von der SED zur PDS.* München: Tilsner Verlag.

Gerth, Michael (2002) *Die PDS und die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft im Transformationsprozess: Wahlerfolge und politisch-kulturelle Kontinuitäten.* Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac.

GESIS (2013e) Politbarometer 2011 Ost. Variablen Report. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA5632].

GESIS (2013d) Politbarometer 2010 Ost. Variablen Report. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA5556].

GESIS (2013c) Politbarometer 2009 Ost. Variablen Report. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA5431].

GESIS (2013b) Politbarometer 2008 Ost. Variablen Report. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA5200].

GESIS (2013) Politbarometer Partielle Kumulation (1977 – 2011). Variablen Report.. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA2391].

GESIS (2012) ALLBUS 1980-2010. Variable Report. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA4574].

GESIS (2009) Politbarometer Ost 2007. Variablendokumentation. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA4802].

GESIS (2007) Politbarometer Ost 2006. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA4550].

GESIS (2006) Politbarometer Ost 2005. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA4256].

GESIS (2005) Politbarometer Ost 2004. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA4221].

GESIS (2004) Politbarometer Ost 2003. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA4001].

GESIS (2003) Politbarometer Ost 2002. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA3850].

GESIS (2002) Politbarometer Ost 2001. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA3555].

GESIS (2001) Politbarometer Ost 2000. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA3426].

GESIS (2000) Politbarometer Ost 1999. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA3262].

GESIS (1996) Politbarometer Ost 1995. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA2777].

GESIS (1995) Politbarometer Ost 1994. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA2559].

GESIS (1994) Politbarometer Ost 1993. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA2390].

GESIS (1993) Politbarometer Ost 1992. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA2287].

GESIS (1992) Politbarometer Ost 1991. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA2114].

GESIS (1991) Politbarometer Ost 1990. Maschinenlesbares Codebuch. Köln: GESIS. [Number ZA1987].

Ghezzi, Carlo and Marica Guiducci (2007) *La strada del lavoro. Fatti e persone nella CGIL da piazza Fontana all'articolo 18.* Milano: Baldini Castoldi Dalai.

Gianinazzi, Willy (2006) "Le syndicalisme révolutionnaire en Italie (1904-1925). Les hommes et les luttes", *Mil neuf cent,* 24.1.

Gildea, Robert (1996) *France since 1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ginsborg, Paul (2001) *Italy and its discontents, 1980-2001.* London: Penguin Books.

Ginsborg, Paul (1989) *Storia d'Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi. Società e politica 1943-1988.* Torino: Giulio Einaudi.

Giordano, Franco (2009) *Nessun Dio ci salverà. Riflessioni sulla sinistra italiana tra sconfitta e speranza.* Roma: Donzelli.

Giraud, Baptiste (2008) "L'affrontement au pouvoir politique transfiguré par les logiques de l'action syndicale. Le cas de la CGT" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant.

Girault, Jacques (ed.) (2001). *L'implantation du socialisme en France au XXe siècle. Partis réseaux, mobilisation.* Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.

Glatzer, Wolfgang (2009) "Gefühlte (Un)Gerechtigkeit", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* 47.

Gluckstein, Daniel (2002) Profession de foi. [official document]

Goedicke, Anne (2003) "Fachexperten und Leitungskader: Karrieren von Angehörigen der oberen Dienstklasse der DDR nach der Wende", *Historical Social Research,* 28.1-2.

Gohde, Claudia (ed.) (2005) *Roter Ordner.* Berlin: PDS.

Gordon, David M., Thomas E. Weisskopf and Samuel Bowles (1987) "Power, accumulation and crisis: the rise and demise of the postwar social structure of accumulation" in Robert Cherry (ed.) *The imperiled economy.* New York: URPE.

Gosse, Van (2005) *Rethinking the new left: an interpretative history*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Graham, Bruce Desmond (2006) *Choice and democratic order: the French Socialist Party, 1937-1950.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Greffet, Fabienne (2001) "L'évolution électorale du PCF de Robert Hue, 1994-2001", *Communisme*, 67/68.

Grilli di Cortona, Pietro (2007) *Il cambiamento politico in Italia. Dalla Prima alla Seconda Repubblica.* Roma: Carocci.

Grond, Pierre-François (2012) Comprendre l'échec du NPA ou plutôt pourquoi la LCR a disparu si subitement [online]. Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article24562 [accessed on 20.10.2010]

Groppo, Bruno (2013) "Historiens et historiographie du communisme en Italie", *Izquierdas,* 15.

Grunberg, Gérard (2011) "Le parti d'Épinay: d'une rupture fantasmée à un réformisme mal assumé", *Histoire@Politique,* 13.

Grunberg, Gérard and Étienne Schweisguth (2003) “La tripartition de l’espace politique” in Pascal Perrineau and Colette Ysmal (eds.) *Le vote de tous le refus. Les élections présidentielle et législatives de 2002.* Paris : Presses de Sciences Po.

Gundle, Stephen and Simon Parker (1996) *The new Italian republic.* London: Routledge.

Gunther, Richard and Larry Diamond (2003) "Species of political parties: a new typology", *Party Politics,* 9.2.

Gysi, Gregor and Thomas Falkner (1990) *Sturm aufs Große Haus.* Berlin: Edition Fischerinsel.

Gysi, Gregor (1989b) Referat. 17 December 1989. [speech] Available at: http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de/partei/parteitag/sonderparteitag1989/ [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Gysi, Gregor (1989) Referat. 8 December 1989. [speech] Available at: http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de/partei/parteitag/sonderparteitag1989/ [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Hanley, David (2007) "Party, personality and institutional constraint: the French presidential election of 2007", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 15.4.

Hansen, Mareike, Hannah Schimd and Helmut Scherer (2010) "Erstens: ignorieren, zweitens: diffamieren, drittens: umarmen? Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung der Kommentierung der Linkspartei von 2005 bis 2009", *Publizistik,* 55.

Hardouin, Patrick (1978) "Les caractéristiques sociologiques du Parti socialiste", *Revue française de science politique,* 28.2.

Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2000) *Empire.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hardy, Jane and Joseph Choonara (2013) "Neoliberalism and the British working class: a reply to Neil Davidson", *International Socialism Journal,* 140.

Hargreaves, Alec G. (1991) "The political mobilization of the North African immigrant community in France", *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 14.3.

Harman, Chris (2009) *Zombie capitalism: global crisis and the relevance of Marx.* London: Bookmarks.

Harman, Chris (2007) "Theorising neoliberalism", *International Socialism Journal,* 117.

Harman, Chris and Tim Potter (1977) "The 'workers' government", *International Discussion Bulletin.* Available on http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=295 [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Hatzfeld, Nicolas and Jean-Louis Loubet (2004) "Les conflits Talbot, du printemps syndical au tournant de la rigueur (1982-1984)", *Vingtième Siècle,* 4.

Harvey, David (2005) *A brief history of neoliberalism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heidar, Knut e Jo Saglie (2003) "Predestined parties? Organizational change in Norwegian political parties", *Party politics,* 9.2.

Heran, François (1988) "Un monde sélectif: les associations", *Économie et statistique,* 208.

Herbst, Andreas, Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan and Jürgen Winkler (1997) *Die SED. Geschichte – Organisation – Politik. Ein Handbuch.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Heske, Gerhard (2005) "Die gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Ostdeutschland 1970 bis 2000 – neue Ergebnisse einer volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung", *Historical Social Research,* 30.2.

Heunemann, Falk (2006) *Die Kooperation der PDS und der WASG zur Bundestagswahl 2005.* [unpublished MA thesis]. Jena: Friedrich-Schiller-Universität.

Hildebrandt, Cornelia (2010) "Fragmentierung und Pluralismus von Linksparteien in Europa" in Birgit Daiber, Cornelia Hildebrandt and Anna Striethorst (eds.) *Von Revolution bis Koalition. Linke Parteien in Europa.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Hildebrandt, Cornelia (2009) "DIE LINKE in Germany" in Cornelia Hildebrandt and Birgit Daiber (2009), *The Left in Europe. Political Parties and Party Alliances between Norway and Turkey.* Bruxelles: RLS Office.

Hildebrandt, Cornelia and Michael Brie (eds.) (2006) *Die Linke in Regierungsverantwortung. Analysen, Erfahrungen, Kontroversen.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Hildebrandt, Cornelia and Birgit Daiber (eds.) (2009) *The left in Europe. Political parties and party alliances between Norway and Turkey.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Hildebrandt, Cornelia and Nelli Tügel (2010) *Der Herbst der "Wutbürger". Soziale Kämpfe in Zeiten der Krise.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Himpele, Klemens (2009) "Vom Bildungsstreik zur Bildungsbewegung?", *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik,* 8.

Hirscher, Gerhard (2001) Jenseits der "Neuen Mitte": die Annäherung der PDS an die SPD seit der Bundestagswahl 1998. [Working paper] München: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

Hobsbawm, Eric (ed.) (1978-1982) *Storia del marxismo.* 4 vol. Torino: Einaudi.

Hobsbawm, Eric (1995) *The age of extremes: the short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991.* London: Abacus.

Hodgin, Nick and Caroline Pearce (2011) *The GDR remembered: representations of the East German State since 1989.* New York: Camden House.

Hoff, Benjamin-Immanuel (2006) Zur Bewertung des Ergebnisses der WASG Rheinland-Pfalz bei der Landtagswahl vom 28. März 2006. [online] Available at: http://www.benjamin-hoff.de/article/2621.zur-bewertung-des-ergebnisses-der-wasg-rheinland-pfalz-bei-der-landtagswahl-vom-28-maerz-2006.html [accessed 7.7.2013].

Hoff, Benjamin-Immanuel (2002) Die PDS und die Bundestagswahl vom 22. September 2002. [online] Available at: http://www.benjamin-hoff.de/serveDocument.php?id=116&file=2/3/0d6.pdf[accessed 7.7.2013].

Hoff, Benjamin-Immanuel and Host Kahrs (2009) Die Ergebnisse der Bundestagswahl am 27. September 2009 – Wahlnachtbericht und erste Analyse. [online] Available at: http://www.benjamin-hoff.de/serveDocument.php?id=616&file=6/b/614.pdf [accessed 7.7.2013].

Hoff, Benjamin-Immanuel and Steffen Twardowski (2005) Schwarz-gelb und rot-grün verlieren die Wahl – Sieg der Linkspartei.PDS. [online] Available at: http://www.benjamin-hoff.de/serveDocument.php?id=98&file=6/e/f80.pdf [accessed 7.7.2013].

Hopkin, Jonathan and Caterina Paolucci (1999) "The business firm model of party organisation: cases from Spain and Italy", *European Journal of Political Research,* 35.

Holloway, John (2003) *Change the world without taking power.* London: Pluto Press.

Hornbogen, Lothar (2011) Literaturliste zur Geschichte der PDS und der LINKEN. Stand: 2011. [manuscript]. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Themen/GK_Geschichte/Literaturlisten/Literaturliste_zur_GeschichtederPDSLINKEN.pdf [accessed on 10.10.2013].

Hornbogen, Lothar, Detlef Nekath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan (1999) *Außerordentlicher Parteitag der SED/PDS. Protokoll der Beratungen am 8./9. und 16./17. Dezember 1989 in Berlin.* Berlin: Dietz.

Hough, Dan (2010) "From pariah to prospective partner: the German Left Party's winding path towards government" in Jonathan Olsen, Michael Koß and Dan Hough (eds.) *Left parties in national governments*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hough, Dan (2005) "The programmatic development of the Eastern German PDS: learning what from whom and under what conditions?", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 21.1.

Hough, Dan (2002) *The fall and rise of the PDS in Eastern Germany.* Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press.

Hough, Dan (2000) " 'Made in Eastern Germany': the PDS and the articulation of Eastern German interests", *German Politics,* 9.2.

Hough, Dan and Michael Koß (2009) "A regional(ist) party in denial? The German PDS and its arrival in unified Germany", *Regional and Federal Studies,* 19.4-5.

Hough, Dan and Tania Verge (2009) "A sheep in wolf's clothing or a gift from heaven? Left-left coalitions in comparative perspective", *Regional and Federal Studies,* 19:1.

Hough, Dan, Michael Koß and Jonathan Olsen (2007) *The Left party in contemporary German politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hübner, Wolfgang and Tom Strohschneider (2007) *Lafontaines Linke. Ein Rettungsboot für den Sozialismus?* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Hudson, Kate (2012) *The new European left. A socialism for the Twenty-First century?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hudson, Kate (2000) *European Communism since 1989: towards a new European left?* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hue, Robert (2002) Profession de foi. [official document]

Hue, Robert (1995) Profession de foi. [official document]

IFOP (2009) Sondage – sociologie et géographie comparées du vote NPA et Front de Gauche aux élections européennes. [opinion poll] Paris: IFOP.

Ignazi, Piero (2008) *Partiti politici in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Ignazi, Piero (2004) "Il puzzle dei partiti: più forti e più aperti ma meno attraenti e meno legittimi", *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica,* 3.

Ignazi, Piero (1996) "The crisis of parties and the rise of new political parties", *Party Politics,* 4.

Ignazi, Piero (1992) *Dal PCI al PDS.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Ignazi, Piero and Colette Ysmal (ed.) (1998) *The organization of political parties in Southern Europe.* Westport, CT: Praeger Greenwood.

Ignazi, Piero, Luciano Bardi and Oreste Massari (2010) "Party organisational change in Italy, 1991-2006", *Modern Italy,* 15.2.

Ignazi, Piero, Giampiero Giacomello, Fabrizio Coticchia (2012) *Italian military operations abroad. Just don't call it war.* Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

INFAS (1994) Report Wahlen. Bundestagswahl 1994. [opinion poll] Bonn: INFAS.

INFAS (1990) Report Wahlen. Bundestagswahl 1990. [opinion poll] Bonn: INFAS.

Infratest dimap (2009) Wahlreport Bundestagswahl 2009. [opinion poll] Berlin: Infratest Dimap.

Infratest dimap (2005) Wahlreport Bundestagswahl 2005. [opinion poll] Berlin: Infratest Dimap.

Infratest dimap (2002) Wahlreport Bundestagswahl 2002. [opinion poll] Berlin: Infratest Dimap.

Infratest dimap (1998) Wahlreport Bundestagswahl 1998. [opinion poll] Berlin: Infratest Dimap.

Inglehart, Ronald (1977) *The silent revolution: changing values and political styles among Western publics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald and René Rabier (1986) “Political re-alignment in advanced industrial society: from class-based politics to quality of life politics”, *Government and Opposition,* 21.

Ion, Jacques (1997) *La fin des militants?* Paris: L'Atelier.

IPSOS (2011) Sondage – élections cantonales 2011. [opinion poll] Paris: IPSOS.

IPSOS (2007) Sondage - élection présidentielle 2007. [opinion poll] Paris: IPSOS.

ISDA (1991) Mitgliederbefragung der PDS 1991. Strukturen, politische Aktivitäten und Motivationen in der PDS. Forschungsbericht. [unpublished survey] Berlin: ISDA.

ISOR e.V. (ed.) (2005) *Werteneutralität des Rentenrechts. Strafrente in Deutschland? (2. Erweiterte Auflage).* Berlin: Kai Homilius Verlag.

ITANES – Italian National Election Studies (2009) *Il ritorno di Berlusconi. Vincitori e vinti nelle elezioni del 2008.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

ITANES (2008) Inchiesta campionaria sulle elezioni politiche del 2008. [electoral survey]. File ITA2008_(itvers2009).sav.

ITANES (2006b) *Dov'è la vittoria? Il voto del 2006 raccontato dagli italiani.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

ITANES (2006) *Inchiesta campionaria sulle elezioni politiche del 2006.* [electoral survey]. File ITA2006_PRE_POST_NEW(vers_dic06).sav.

ITANES (2001) *Perché ha vinto il centro-destra. Oltre la mera conta dei voti: chi, come, dove, perché.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

ITANES (2001) *Inchiesta campionaria sulle elezioni politiche del 2001.* [electoral survey]. File ITA2001_(itvers2007).sav.

ITANES (1996) *Inchiesta campionaria sulle elezioni politiche del 1996.* [electoral survey]. File ITA1996_(itvers2005).sav.

ITANES (1994) *Inchiesta campionaria sulle elezioni politiche del 1994.* [electoral survey]. File ITA1994_(itvers2005).sav.

ITANES (1992) *Inchiesta campionaria sulle elezioni politiche del 1992*. [electoral survey]. File ITA1992_(itvers2005).sav.

Ivaldi, Gilles (2006) "Beyond France's 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: second-order model, anti-establishment attitudes and the end of the alternative European utopia", *West European Politics,* 29.1.

Jacobs, Jörg (2004) "Gegen die bestehende Ordnung? Die Wähler der PDS in vergleichender Perspektive", *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen,* 2.

Jandura, Olaf (2011) "Publizistische Chancengleichheit in der Wahlkampfberichterstattung? Eine Untersuchung zur medialen Repräsentation der im Bundestag vertretenen Parteien", *Publizistik,* 56.

Jesse, Eckhard (1997) "SPD and PDS relationships", *German Politics,* 6.3.

Jesse, Eckhard and Jürgen P. Lang (2008) *Die Linke – der smarte Extremismus einer deutschen Partei.* München: Olzog Verlag.

Johsua, Florence (2013, forthcoming) *Anticapitalistes. Une sociologie historique de l'engagement*. Paris: La Découverte.

Johsua, Florence (2008) " 'Le parti doit changer de bases': la LCR et le 'nouveau parti', transformations militantes et (re)définitions partisanes" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant.

Johsua, Florence (2007) "Les conditions de (re)production de la LCR. L'approche par les trajectoires militantes" in Florence Haegel (ed.) (2007) *Partis politiques et système partisan en France.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Johsua, Florence (2004) La dynamique militante à l'extrême gauche: le cas de la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire. [working paper] Paris: Cahiers du CEVIPOF.

Jospin, Pierre (1999) "Ma social-démocratie", *Libération,* 19 november.

Jung, Matthias (1990) "Parteiensystem und Wahlen in der DDR. Eine Analyse der Volkskammerwahl vom 18. März 1990 und der Kommunalwahlen vom 6. Mai 1990", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* 27.

Jünke, Christoph (2007) "A new formation with potential pitfalls: the new German 'Linkspartei'", *Debatte,* 15.3.

Jünke, Christoph (2001) "Eine kleine Geschichte der linkssozialistischen VSP von 1986 bis 2000", *Trend onlinezeitung,* 4. Available on: http://www.trend.infopartisan.net/trd0401/t130401.html [accessed 7.7.2013].

Juquin, Pierre (1988) Profession de foi. [official document]

Kaasch, Wienand (1928) "Die soziale Struktur der KPD", *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, 9, p. 1050-1067.

Kailitz, Steffen (2004) *Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Einführung.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Kamenitsa, Lynn (1998) "The process of political marginalisation: East German social movements after the Wall", *Comparative politics,* 30.3.

Katz, Richard S. (2006) "Agenti di chi? Principi, committenti e politica dei partiti" in Luciano Bardi (ed.) *Partiti e sistemi di partito.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (2009) "The cartel party thesis: a restatement", *Perspectives on Politics,* 7.4.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (1996) "Cadre, catch-all or cartel? A rejoinder", *Party Politics,* 2.4.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (1995) "Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party", *Party Politics,* 1.1.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (1994) *How parties organize. Change and adaptation in party organizations in Western democracies.* London: Sage.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (1992b) "The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960-1990", *European Journal of Political Research,* 22.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (1992) *Party organisations. A data handbook on party organisations in Western democracies, 1960-90*. London: Sage.

Keith, Daniel James (2010) *Party organisation and party adaptation: Western European Communist and successor parties.* [unpublished PhD thesis] Brighton: University of Sussex.

Keller, Bernd and Fred Henneberger (1992) "Beschäftigung und Arbeitsbeziehungen im öffentlichen Dienst der neuen Bundesländer" in Wolfgang Seibel, Arthur Benz and Heinrich Mäding (eds.) *Verwaltungsreform und Verwaltungspolitik im Prozeß der deutschen Einigung.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Kelly, John and Kerstin Hamann (2010) General strikes in Western Europe, 1980-2008. Paper presented at the European Regional Congress of the International Industrial Relations Association, Copenhagen, 28 June – 1 July 2010.

Kergoat, Danièle, Françoise Imbert, Hélène La Doaré and Danièle Senotier (1992) *Les infirmières et leur coordination, 1988-1989.* Paris: Éditions Lamarre.

Kernalegenn, Tudi, François Prigent, Gilles Richard, Jacqueline Sainclivier (eds.) (2010) *Le PSU vu d'en bas. Réseaux sociaux, mouvement politique, laboratoire d'idées (années 1950- années 1980).* Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Khalfa, Pierre (2007) Quelle situation après l'élection présidentielle. [online]. Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article5917 [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Khalfa, Pierre (2003) Retraites: les promesses d'un échec, *Mouvements*, 4.29.

Kirchheimer, Otto (1966) "The transformation of the Western European party systems" in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.) *Political parties and political development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert (2000) “Citizens, politicians, and party cartelization: political representation and state failure in post-industrial democracies”, *European Journal of Political Research,* 37.

Kitschelt, Herbert (1994) *The transformation of European social democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert (1988) "Left-libertarian parties: explaining innovation in competitive party systems", *World Politics,* 40.2.

Klaus, Manfred (2011) Für LINKS im Amt. [internal document] Berlin: Die Linke.

Klaus, Manfred (2008) Auf dem Chefsessel. Linke Amtsträgerinnen und Amtsträger in kommunalen Verwaltungen. [internal document] Berlin: Die Linke.

Klein, Dieter and Michael Brie (2007) Elementare Fragen neu bedenken. Kapitalismus, Sozialismus, Eigentum und Wege der Veränderung. [working paper] Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Klein, Markus and Jürgen W. Falter (2003) *Der lange Weg der Grünen. Eine Partei zwischen Protest und Regierung.* München: C.H.Beck.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (ed.) (2006) *Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990-2003.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (ed.) (1994) *Parties, policies and democracy.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Knabe, Hubertus (2009) *Honeckers Erben. Die Wahrheit über DIE LINKE.* Berlin: Propyläen.

Koch, Thomas (1995) "Unternehmer als Klientel der PDS" in Michael Brie, Martin Herzig and Thomas Koch (eds.) (1995) *Die PDS. Postkommunistische Kaderorganisation, ostdeutscher Traditionsverein oder linke Volkspartei? Empirische Befunde und kontroverse Analysen.* Köln: PapyRossa.

Köcher, Renate (2012) "Das Unbehagen am Kapitalismus", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 22 February.

Kohl, Helmut (1990) Der entscheidende Schritt auf dem Weg in die gemeinsame Zukunft der Deutschen. 10.06.1990. [speech] Available at: http://www.chronik-der-mauer.de/index.php/de/Start/Detail/id/593879/page/3 [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Koenen, Gerd (2002) *Das rote Jahrzehnt. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967-1977*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag.

Kolisang, Caroline (ed.) (2013) *Bundesweiter Bildungsstreik 2009. Protestbewegung – Aktionismus - Reformen der Reformen.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

König, Jens (2005) *Gregor Gysi. Eine Biographie.* Berlin: Rowohlt Verlag

Koole, Ruud (1996) “Cadre, catch-all or cartel? A comment on the notion of the cartel party”, *Party Politics,* 2:4.

Koole, Ruud (1994) “The vulnerability of the modern cadre party in the Netherlands” in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.) *How parties organize. Change and adaptation in party organizations in Western democracies.* London: Sage.

Kopeček, Lubomír (ed.) (2005) *Trajectories of the Left: Social Democratic and (ex-) Communist Parties in Contemporary Europe: Between Past and Future*. Brno: Institute for Comparative Political Research (ISPO), Masaryk University.

Kopstein, Jeffrey (1996) “Chipping away at the state: workers’ resistance and the demise of East Germany“, *World Politics,* 48.3.

Koß, Michael (2006) “Lose verkoppelte Anarchie: Die Linkspartei im deutschen Föderalismus” in Michael Brie and Cornelia Hildebrandt (ed.) (2006) *Parteien und Bewegungen. Die Linke im Aufbruch.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Koß, Michael and Dan Hough (2006) “Between a rock and many hard places: the PDS and government participation in the eastern German Länder", *German Politics,* 15.1.

Kouvelakis, Stathis (2012) "Échecs et recomposition de la gauche radicale", *Mouvements,* 69.

Kouvelakis, Stathis (2011) "The Greek cauldron", *New Left Review,* 72.

Kouvelakis, Stathis (2007) *La France en révolte. Luttes sociales et cycles politiques.* Paris: textuel.

Kowalski, Przemyslaw, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska and Matias Egeland (2013) State-owned enterprises: trade effects and policy implications. [working paper]. Paris: OECD. (OECD Trade Policy Papers*,* 147).

Krämer, Ralf (2004) Für eine wahlpolitische Alternative 2006 (Version 05.02.2004). [manuscript]

Krause, Hartfrid (1975) *USPD: Geschichte der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands.* Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlags-Anstalt.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Timotheos Frey (2006) "Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: six European countries compared", *European Journal of Political Research,* 45.6.

Krivine, Alain (2006). *Ça te passera avec l'âge.* Mayenne: Flammarion.

Krivine, Alain and Roseline Vachetta (2004) “1999-2004. Bilan d’un mandat. Des révolutionnaires au Parlement Européen”, *Rouge Europe,* 8.

Krouwel, André (2006) "Party models" in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.) *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE.

Krouwel, André (2003) “Otto Kirchheimer and the catch-all party”, *West European Politics,* 26.2.

Kunze, Conrad (2008) Die postsozialistische Transformation der deutschen Elite. [working paper] Halle: Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg (Der Hallesche Graureiher, 2008/4).

L. 270/2005 (*Porcellum*) - Legge 21 dicembre 2005, n° 270, "Modifiche alle norme per l'elezione della Camera dei deputati e del Senato della Repubblica", *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* n° 46 del 24-2-1995.

L. 43/1995 (*Tatarellum*) - Legge 23 febbraio 1995, n° 43, "Nuove norme per la elezione dei consigli delle regioni a statuto ordinario", *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* n° 46 del 24-2-1995.

L. 277/1993 (*Mattarellum*) – Legge 4 agosto 1993, n° 277, "Nuove norme per l'elezione della Camera dei deputati", *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* n° 183 del 6-8-1993.

L. 276/1993 (*Mattarellum*) – Legge 4 agosto 1993, n° 276, "Norme per l'elezione del Senato della Repubblica", *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* n° 183 del 6-8-1993.

L. 81/1993 – Legge 15 marzo 1993, n° 81, "Elezione diretta del sindaco, del presidente della provincia, del consiglio comunale e del consiglio provinciale", *Gazzetta Ufficiale,* n° 72 del 27-3-1993.

Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera (1979) " 'Effective' number of parties. A measure with application to West Europe", *Comparative Political Studies,* 12.1.

Lacoppola, Gianluca (2010) The evolution of the CGIL left. [online] Available at: http://www.s-gs.de/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Lacoppola-Evolution-of-the-CGIL-Left.doc [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Laguiller, Arlette (2007) Profession de foi. [official document]

Laguiller, Arlette (2002) Profession de foi. [official document]

Laguiller, Arlette (1996) *C'est toute ma vie.* Mesnil-sur-l-Estrée: Plon.

Laguiller, Arlette (1995b) "Après le premier tour", *Lutte Ouvrière,* 1399, 28 April.

Laguiller, Arlette (1995) Profession de foi. [official document]

Laguiller, Arlette (1988) Profession de foi. [official document]

Laguiller, Arlette (1981) Profession de foi. [official document]

Lahusen, Christian and Britta Baumgarten (2006) "Die Fragilität kollektiven Handelns: Arbeitslosenproteste in Deutschland und Frankreich", *Zeitschrift für Soziologie,* 35.2.

Lajoinie, André (1988) Profession de foi. [official document]

Land, Rainer (2010) "Eine demokratische DDR? Das Projekt „Moderner Sozialismus“", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* 11.

Land, Rainer and Ralf Possekel (1995b) "On the internal dynamics of the PDS: the Leninist challenge and the challenge to Leninism", *Constellations,* 2.1.

Land, Rainer and Ralf Possekel (1995) "PDS und Moderner Sozialismus" in Michael Brie, Martin Herzig and Thomas Koch (eds.) *Die PDS. Postkommunistische Kaderorganisation, ostdeutscher Traditionsverein oder linke Volkspartei? Empirische Befunde und kontroverse Analysen.* Köln: PapyRossa.

Landais, Karim (2004) *Un parti trotskiste. Éléments pour une socio-histoire des relations de pouvoir: introduction à une étude de l'OCI-PCI.* [unpublished DEA thesis] Dijon: Université de Bourgogne.

Lang, Jürgen (2003) *Ist die PDS eine demokratische Partei? Eine extremismustheoretische Untersuchung.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Lange, Peter and Mario Regini (1989) *State, market, and social regulation. New perspectives on Italy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lanuque, Jean-Guillaume *et al.* (2011) "Bibliographie: les trotskysmes en France", *Dissidences,* 2. Available at: http://revuesshs.u-bourgogne.fr/dissidences/document.php?id=587 [accessed on 8.10.2013].

Lanuque, Jean-Guillaume (2002) "Marges et replis dans le mouvement ouvrier français: le cas de l'extrême gauche" in Claude Pennetier (ed.) *Marges et replis, frontières, cas limites, dans la gauche française: l'apport des itinéraires militants.* Paris: Centre d'histoire sociale du XXe siècle.

Lavabre, Marie-Claire and François Platone (2003) *Que reste-t-il du PCF?* Paris: Autrement.

Lawson, Kay (1980) *Political parties and linkage: a comparative analysis.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lazar, Marc (1999) "La gauche communiste plurielle", *Revue française de science politique,* 49.

Lazar, Marc (1992) *Maisons rouges. Les Partis communistes français et italien de la Libération à nos jours.* Paris: Aubier.

Lazar, Marc (1988) "Communism in Western Europe in the '80s", *Journal of Communist Studies,* 3.

LCR – Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (2008) Adresse pour un nouveau parti anticapitaliste. [internal document] Paris: LCR.

LCR (2006) Le monde doit changer de base. Manifeste de la Ligue Communiste. [internal document] Paris: LCR.

LCR (2005) 10 mesures d'urgence pour une politique anticapitaliste. [internal document] Paris: LCR.

LCR (2003) Statuts de la LCR. [internal document] Paris: LCR.

Le Goaziou, Véronique and Laurent Mucchielli (eds.) (2006) *Quand les banlieues brûlent… Retour sur les émeutes de novembre 2005.* Paris: La Découverte.

Leclercq, Catherine and François Platone (2003) "A painful moulting: the 'mutation' of the French Communist Party" in Joan Botella and Louis Ramiro Fernandez (eds.) *The crisis of Communism and party change: the evolution of Western European Communist and post-Communist parties.* Barcelona: ICPS.

Lees, Charles, Dan Hough and Dan Keith (2010) "Towards an analytical framework for party mergers: operationalising the cases of the German Left Party and the Dutch Green Left", *West European Politics,* 36.6.

Lefebvre, Rémi and Frédéric Sawicki (2006) *La société des socialistes. Le PS aujourd'hui.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant.

Leftwich, Adrian (ed.) (2004) *What is politics?* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lehingue, Patrick (2008) "Les déterminants matériels de l'activité politique. Ce que nous disent les comptes publics des partis" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant.

Lenin, Vladimir (1915) The conference of the R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad. [online] Available at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/feb/19.htm#fwV21P160F01 [accessed 7.7.2013]

Leonardi, Salvo (2013) "Gli anni della concertazione: un excursus storico-politico", *Alternative per il Socialismo,* 25.

Leschi, Didier (1997) "Ordre et désordre dans la grève: analyse comparée des mobilisations de cheminots (1986-1995)" in Jacques Chevallier (ed.) *Désordres.* Paris: PUF.

Leschi, Didier (1996) "Les coordinations, filles années 1968", *CLIO,* 3.

Liguori, Guido (2009) *La morte del PCI.* Roma: Manifestolibri.

Lih, Lars T. (2010) "Lenin Disputed", *Historical Materialism,* 18.

Lindenberg, Daniel (2005) "A gauche de la gauche" in Jean-Jacques Becker and Gilles Candar (eds.) *Histoire des gauches en France.* Paris: La Découverte.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967) "Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: an introduction" in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: cross-national perspectives.* New York: The Free Press.

LO – Lutte Ouvrière (2003) "Les fondements programmatiques de notre politique", *Lutte de Classe,* 77.

LO (1996d) "La situation intérieure", *Lutte de Classe,* 24.

LO (1996c) "Le retour (furtif) de l'Union de la Gauche", *Lutte de Classe,* 21.

LO (1996b) "La grève de la fonction publique", *Lutte de Classe,* 17.

LO (1996) "La campagne des présidentielles et ses suites", *Lutte de Classe,* 17.

LO (1994) "La situation du mouvement ouvrier révolutionnaire", *Lutte de Classe,* 11.

LO (1988) "La situation intérieure", *Lutte de Classe,* 21.

Loeding, Matthias and Uwe Rosenthal (2001) "Ein Jahrzehnt Gewerkschaftseinheit: ein historischer Rückblick auf Rolle und Strategien des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes und zwei seiner Einzelgewerkschaften im Prozeß staatlicher und gewerkschaftlicher Vereinigung", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung,* 43.4.

Lohmann, Suzanne (1994) "The dynamics of informational cascades: the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig", *World Politics,* 41.1.

Loi n° 88-227 du 11 mars 1988 relative à la transparence financière de la vie politique, *JORF* 12.3.1988, 3290 [party financing]

MacLean, Mairi (1997) "Privatisation, *dirigisme* and the global economy: an end to French exceptionalism?", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 5.2.

Magri, Lucio (2009) *Il sarto di Ulm. Una possibile storia del PCI.* Milano: Il Saggiatore [English edition: *id.* (2013) *The tailor of Ulm. Communism in the Twentieth Century.* London: Verso].

Magri, Lucio (2004) "Le ragioni di un commiato", *la rivista del Manifesto,* 56.

Mair, Peter (2006) "Ruling the void? The hollowing of Western Democracy", *New Left Review,* 42.

Mair, Peter (1994) "Party organizations: from civil society to the state" in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.) (1994). *How parties organize. Change and adaptation in party organizations in Western democracies.* London: Sage.

Mair, Peter (1993) "Myths of electoral change and the survival of traditional parties", *European Journal of Political Research,* 24.

Mair, Peter and Cas Mudde (1998) "The party family and its study", *Annual Review of Political Science,* 1:211-229.

Mair, Peter and Ingrid van Biezen (2001) "Party membership in twenty European democracies, 1980-2000", *Party Politics,* 7.5.

Maitan, Livio (2002b) *La strada percorsa. Dalla resistenza ai nuovi movimenti.* Bolsena: Massari.

Maitan, Livio (2002) *Per una storia della IV internazionale. La testimonianza di un comunista controcorrente.* Roma: Alegre.

Malanima, Paolo and Vittorio Daniele (2007) "Il prodotto delle regioni e il divario Nord-Sud in Italia (1861-2004)", *Rivista di Politica Economica*, 3-4.

Mallmann, Klaus-Michael (1996) *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionären Bewegung*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Mallmann, Klaus-Michael (1995) "Milieu, Radikalismus und lokale Gesellschaft. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Kommunismus in der Weimarer Republik", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft,* 21.1.

Mantovani, Ramon (2009) Perché dovremmo dividerci fra settari e governisti? ovvero una lunga dissertazione sul senso delle parole e delle azioni. [manuscript] Available at: http://ramonmantovani.wordpress.com/2010/09/01 [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Marantzidis, Nicolaos (2003) "*Exit, Voice or Loyalty*? Les stratégies des parties communistes d'Europe de l'Ouest après 1989", *Communisme*, 76/77.

March, Luke (2011) *Radical left parties in contemporary Europe.* Basingstoke: Routledge.

March, Luke (2008) Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe: From Marxism to the Mainstream? [report] Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

March, Luke and Cas Mudde (2005) "What's left of the radical left? The European radical left after 1989: decline *and* mutation", *Comparative European Politics,* 3, 23-49.

March, Luke and Charlotte Rommerskirchen (2011) "Explaining electoral success and failure" in March, Luke (2011) *Radical Left Parties in Contemporary Europe.* Basingstoke: Routledge.

Marie, Jean-Jacques (2004) *Le trotskysme et les trotskystes.* Paris: Armand Colin.

Marlière, Philippe (2013) "Convergences et divergences" in Jean-Numa Ducange, Philippe Marlière and Louis Weber, *La gauche radicale en Europe.* Paris: Éditions du Croquant.

Marlière, Philippe (2012b) "Le Front de gauche au miroir de Syriza", *Transform!,* 10.

Marlière, Philippe (2012) "À quoi sert le Parti socialiste?", *Mouvements,* 69.1.

Martelli, Roger (2012) "Front de gauche, aube ou crépuscule?", *Mouvements,* 69.1.

Martelli, Roger (2010b) *Prendre sa carte 1920-2009. Données nouvelles sur les effectifs du PCF.* Seine-Saint-Denis: Fondation Gabriel Péri.

Martelli, Roger (2010) *L'empreinte communiste. PCF et société française (1920-2010).* Paris: Les Éditions sociales.

Martelli, Roger (2009) *L'archipel communiste. Une histoire électorale du PCF.* Paris: La Dispute.

Martelli, Roger (2002) "Pour un pôle de radicalité", *Le Monde,* 14 June.

Martelli, Roger (1996) "Face à Le Pen, la gauche doit être franchement a gauche", *Le Monde,* 22 October.

Martelli, Roger (1991) "Trois sondages sur le fait communiste en France", *Société française,* 40.

Mathieu, Lilian (2012) *L'espace des mouvements sociaux*. Bellecombe-en-Bauges*:* Éditions du Croquant.

Mathieu, Lilian (2007) "Act Up ou la tentation du politique: sur les recompositions de la gauche protestataire de 1997 à 2002", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 15.2.

Mathieu, Lilian et Philippe Corcuff (2009) "Partis et mouvements sociaux: des illusions de 'l'actualité' à une mise en perspective sociologique", *Actuel Marx,* 46.

Mattick, Paul (1969) *Marx and Keynes. The limits of the Mixed Economy.* Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher.

Matuschek, Ingo, Frank Kleemann and Uwe Krähnke (2013) Gelebte Partei-Mitgliedschaft. Die Linke als kollektiver Akteur. [report] Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Matuschek, Ingo, Uwe Krähnke, Frank Kleemann and Frank Ernst (2008) Politische Praxen und Orientierung in linksaffinen Alltagsmilieus. [report] Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Mauger, Gérard (2008) "Un champ de 'la gauche antilibérale'" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges*:* Éditions du Croquant.

Mayer, Florian (2006) *Vom Niedergang des unternehmerisch tätigen Staates. Privatisierungspolitik in Großbritannien, Frankreich, Italien und Deutschland.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Mazzoleni, Martino (2009) "The Italian regionalisation: a story of partisan logics", *Modern Italy,* 14.2.

McAdams, A. James (2001) *Judging the Past in Unified Germany.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McKay, Joanna (2004) "The PDS tests the west: the Party of Democratic Socialism's campaign to become a Pan-German socialist party", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 20.2.

McKay, Joanna (2000) "Keeping the red flag flying: the electoral success of the PDS in East Berlin", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 16.3.

McNevin, Anne (2006) "Political belonging in a neoliberal era: the struggle of the *sans-papiers*", *Citizenship Studies,* 10.2.

Mediobanca (2000) Le privatizzazioni in Italia dal 1992. [report] Milano: Ricerche e Studi S.p.A.

Meiers, Franz-Joseph (2010) "Von der Scheckbuchdiplomatie zur Verteidigung am Hindukusch. Die Rolle der Bundeswehr bei multinationalen Auslandseinsätzen, 1990-2009", *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,* 3.

Melchionda, Enrico (2000) "La sinistra alternativa in Europa. Il gruppo ed i partiti della 'sinistra unita europea', *Democrazia e Diritto,* 1.

Melchior, Eric (1993) *Le PS, du projet au pouvoir. L'impossible concordance.* Paris: Les Éditions de l'Atelier.

Mélenchon, Jean-Luc (2012b) Profession de foi. [official document]

Mélenchon, Jean-Luc (2012) *Qu'il s'en aillent tous! Vite, la révolution citoyenne.* Paris: Flammarion.

Mermat, Djamel (2005) *Les imaginaires du changement dans les discours communistes. Le cas du PCF: 1976-2004.* [PhD thesis]. Lille: Université de Lille.

Meuche-Mäker, Meinhard (2005) *Die PDS im Westen 1990-2005. Schlussfolgerungen für eine neue Linke*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Meves, Helge (2005) "Die Wahlalternative – eine andere Politik ist möglich" in Michael Brie (ed.) (2005) *Die Linkspartei. Ursprünge, Ziele, Erwartungen.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung.

Michel, Johann (2008) "Peut-on parler d'un tournant néo-libéral en France?", *Sens Public* [online].

Micus, Matthias (2007) "Stärkung des Zentrums. Perspektiven, Risiken und Chancen des Fusionsprozesses von PDS und WASG" in Tim Spier *et al.* (2007) *Die Linkspartei. Zeitgemäße Idee oder Bündnis ohne Zukunft?* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Miniati, Silvano (1981) *Psiup, 1964-1972: vita e morte di un partito*. Roma: Edimez.

Mirra, Patrizio (2005) *Il 25 aprile e la 'seconda' Repubblica Italiana: la festa della Liberazione a metà degli anni '90.* [unpublished BA thesis]. Available at: http://www.brianzapopolare.it/sezioni/storia/20051020_25_aprile_seconda_repubblica.htm [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Mischi, Julian (2010) *Servir la classe ouvrière. Sociabilités militantes au PCF.* Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Mischi, Julian (2007) "Pour une histoire sociale du déclin du Parti communiste" in Florence Haegel (ed.) *Partis politiques et système partisan en France.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Mischi, Julian (2003b) "Travail partisan et sociabilités populaires. Observations localisées de la politisation communiste", *Politix,* 63.16.

Mischi, Julian (2003) "La recomposition identitaire du P.C.F.", *Communisme*, 72-73.

Modrow, Hans (1989) Für Deutschland einig Vaterland. 01 December 1989 [speech] Available at: http://www.ddr89.de/ddr89/d/modrow.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Monza, Rosan (2009) "Géopolitique de la crise guadeloupéenne: crise sociale et/ou postcoloniale?", *Herodote,* 135.

Monzat, René (2003) "Ras l'Front, douze années de militantisme atypique", *Outre-terre,* 3.

Mor, Gianfranco (1993) "La disciplina giuridica dei partiti in Italia" in Miguel Lopez Ruiz and Marquez Romero, Raul (eds.) *Tendencia contemporaneas del derecho electoral en el mundo.* Ciudad del Mexico: UNAM.

Moreau, Jacques (2003) *Les socialistes français et le mythe révolutionnaire.* Paris: Hachette.

Moreau, Patrick (2004) "Die kommunistischen und postkommunistischen Parteien Westeuropas: ein unaufhaltsamer Niedergang?"*, Totalitarismus und Demokratie,* 1.

Moreau, Patrick (1998) *Die PDS: Profil einer antidemokratischen Partei.* München: Hans-Seidel-Stiftung.

Moreau, Patrick, Jürgen Lang and Viola Neu (1994) *Was will die PDS?* Berlin: Ullstein.

Moreau, Patrick, Marc Lazar and Gerhard Hirscher (eds.) (1998) *Der Kommunismus in Westeuropa. Niedergang oder Mutation?* Landsberg: Olzborg.

Morena, Edouard (2013) "Constructing a new collective identity of the alterglobalization movement: the French *Confédération paysanne* (CP) as anti-capitalist 'peasant' movement" in Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Laurence Cox (eds.) *Understanding European Movements: New Social Movements, Global Justice Struggles, Anti-Austerity Protest*. London: Routledge

Morlino, Leonardo (2005) *Introduzione alla ricerca comparata.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Moroni, Primo (1993) "Tra post-fordismo e nuova destra sociale" in Aldo Bonomi and Pier Paolo Poggio (1995) *Ethnos e demos: dal leghismo al neopopulismo.* Milano: Mimesis.

Moschonas, Gerassimos (2002) *In the name of social democracy: the great transformation from 1945 to the present.* London: Verso.

Mouchard, Daniel (2009) *Être représenté. Mobilisations d' "exclus" dans la France des années 1990*. Paris: Economica.

Mouchard, Daniel (2002b) " 'Politique délibérative' et logiques de mobilisation. Le cas d'Agir ensemble contre le chômage ", *Politix,* 15.57.

Mouchard, Daniel (2002) "Les mobilisations des 'sans' dans la France contemporaine: l'émergence d'un 'radicalisme autolimité'", *Revue française de science politique,* 52.4.

Mouriaux, René (2008) *Le syndicalisme en France depuis 1945.* Paris: La Découverte.

Mouvements, 69/2012. Special issue "Changer la vie, changer la gauche".

Mucchetti, Massimo (2003) *Licenziare i padroni?* Milano: Feltrinelli Editore.

Mudge, Stephanie Lee (2008) "What is neo-liberalism?", *Socio-Economic Review*, 6.4.

Mudu, Pierpaolo (2012) "I centri sociali italiani: verso tre decadi di occupazioni e di spazi autogestiti", *Partecipazione e Conflitto,* 1.

Mudu, Pierpaolo (2004) "Resisting and challenging neoliberalism: the development of Italian social centers", *Antipode,* 36.5.

Muehlebach, Andrea (2009) "*Complexio oppositorum*: notes on the Left in neoliberal Italy", *Public Culture,* 21.3.

Mulé, Rosa (2009) *Il popolo di Rifondazione comunista.* Roma: Carocci Editore.

Mulé, Rosa (2005) "Cosa pensano gli iscritti della democrazia interna ai partiti? Democratici di sinistra e rifondazione comunista a confronto", *Polis,* 19.3.

Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strom (eds.) (1999) *Policy, office or votes? How political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nachtwey, Oliver (2013) "Market social democracy: the transformation of the SPD up to 2007", *German Politics,* forthcoming.

Nachtwey, Oliver (2009) "Die Linke and the crisis of class representation", *International Socialism Journal,* 124.

Nachtwey, Oliver (2007) “Im Westen was Neues. Die Entstehung der Wahlalternative Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit" in Tim Spier *et al. Die Linkspartei. Zeitgemäße Idee oder Bündnis ohne Zukunft?* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Nachtwey, Oliver and Tim Spier (2007b) “Günstige Gelegenheit? Die sozialen und politischen Entstehungshintergründe der Linkspartei " in Tim Spier *et al. Die Linkspartei. Zeitgemäße Idee oder Bündnis ohne Zukunft?* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Nachtwey, Oliver and Tim Spier (2007) “Political Opportunity Structures and the Success of the German Left Party in 2005”, *Debatte:* 15.2.

Narritsens, André (1991) "Conflit des finances de 1989", *Revue de l'IRES,* 12.

Negrello, Dolores (2004) *Il PCI padovano nell'ultimo '900. Dissensi e antagonismi politici.* Milano: FrancoAngeli.

Nelken, David (1996) "A legal revolution? The judges and *Tangentopoli*" in Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker (1996) *The new Italian republic.* London: Routledge.

Neller, Katja and S. Isabell Thaidigsmann (2002) "Das Vertretenheitsgefühl der Ostdeutschen durch die PDS: DDR-Nostalgie und andere Erklärungsfaktoren im Vergleich", *Politische Vierteljahresschrift,* 43.3.

Neu, Viola (2005) *Landtagswahl in Nordrhein-Westfalen am 22. Mai 2005.* Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_6693-544-1-30.pdf?070605133454 [accessed 7.7.2013].

Neu, Viola (2004) *Das Janusgesicht der PDS. Wähler und Partei zwischen Demokratie und Extremismus.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Neu, Viola (2001) SPD und PDS auf Bundesebene: Koalitionspartner im Wartestand? [working paper] Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Neu, Viola (2000) Am Ende der Hoffnung: die PDS im Westen. [working paper] Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung .

Neugebauer, Gero (2003) "The Party of Democratic Socialism in Germany: post communists with a new socialist identity or as replacement of social democracy?" in Joan Botella and Louis Ramiro Fernandez (eds.) *The crisis of Communism and party change: the evolution of Western European Communist and post-Communist parties.* Barcelona: ICPS.

Neugebauer, Gero and Hugo Reister (1996) *PDS und Gewerkschaften.* Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Neugebauer, Gero and Richard Stöss (1999) "Nach der Bundestagswahl 1998: Die PDS in stabiler Seitenlage?'" in Oskar Niedermayer (ed.) *Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl 1998*. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

Neugebauer, Gero and Richard Stöss (1996) *Die PDS. Geschichte. Organisation. Wähler. Konkurrenten.* Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Neumann, Sigmund (1956) *Modern political parties.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Newell, James L. (2010) Getting personal? The case of Rifondazione Comunista. Paper presented at the 60th annual conference of the UK Political Studies Association (PSA), Edinburgh, 29 March – 1 April.

Newell, James L. (2009) What's left of the Italian left? Paper presented at the 2009 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Toronto, 3-6 September.

Nicoll, Norbert (2005) *Attac Deutschland. Kritik, Stand und Perspektiven.* Marburg: Tectum Verlag.

Niedermayer, Oskar (2013) Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2013. [working paper] Berlin: Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, Freie Universität Berlin (Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, 20).

Niedermayer, Oskar (2012) Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2012. [working paper] Berlin: Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, Freie Universität Berlin (Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, 20).

Niedermayer, Oskar (2006) "Die Veränderung des deutschen Parteiensystems" in Michael Brie and Cornelia Hildebrandt (ed.) *Parteien und Bewegungen. Die Linke im Aufbruch.* Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

NPA – Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (2009b) Principes fondateurs du Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste. [internal document] Paris: NPA.

NPA (2009) Statuts provisoires. [internal document] Paris: NPA.

Obono, Danièle (2008) "Une nouvelle génération politique: les étudiants et le mouvement anti-CPE en France", *JHEA/RESA,* 6.2-3.

Olsen, Jonathan (2007) "The Merger of the PDS and WASG: from Eastern German Regional Party to National Radical Left Party?", *German Politics,* 16.2.

Olsen, Jonathan (2002) "The PDS in Western Germany: an empirical study of PDS local politicians", *German Politics,* 11.1.

Olsen, Jonathan, Michael Koß and Dan Hough (2010) *Left parties in national governments.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Oswald, Franz (2002) *The party that came out of the cold war. The Party of Democratic Socialism in United Germany.* Westport: Greenwood Press.

Overy, Richard J. (2007) *The inter-war crisis.* 2nd edition. Harlow: Pearson Longman.

Pacini, Maria Chiara (2009) "Public funding of political parties in Italy", *Modern Italy,* 14.2.

Pacini, Maria Chiara and Daniela Romée Piccio (2012) Party regulation in Italy and its effects. [working paper] Leiden: Universiteit Leiden (Working Paper Series on the Legal Regulation of Political Parties, No. 26).

Panebianco, Angelo (1988) *Political parties: organisation and power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [original Italian edition: (1982) *Modelli di partito.* Bologna: Il Mulino].

PartG 1994 – Parteiengesetz, 31.01.1994 [law]. Available at: http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/pg_pdf.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Parti socialiste – Parti communiste (1972) Le programme commun de gouvernement (27 JUIN 1972). [official document] Paris: Parti Socialiste (*Bulletin socialiste,* supplement, june 1972).

Patton, David F. (2013) "The Left Party at six: the PDS-WASG merger in comparative perspective", *German Politics,* forthcoming.

Patton, David F. (2011) *Out of the East. From PDS to Left Party in Unified Germany.* New York: State University of New York Press.

Patton, David F. (2006) “Germany’s Left Party.PDS and the ‘Vacuum Thesis’: From regional milieu party to left alternative?”, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 22.2.

Patton, David F. (1998) "Germany's Party of Democratic Socialism in comparative perspective", *East European Politics and Societies,* 12.3.

PCF – Parti Communiste Français (2013) Les statuts du Parti communiste français. [internal document] Paris: PCF.

PCF (2006b) "La visée communiste. 33° congrès", in *Communistes*, 217, 30 March.

PCF (2006) "Quatre engagements pour une politique de gauche qui change vraiment la vie. 33° congrès", in *Communistes*, 217, 30 March.

PCF (2002) Programme du Parti Communiste Français pour les élections législatives de 2002. [official document]

PCF (1997) Programme du Parti Communiste Français pour les élections législatives de 1997. [official document]

PCL – Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori (2011) Statuto. [internal document] Milano: PCL.

PCL (2008b) I Congresso – Documento organizzazione. [internal document] Milano: PCL.

PCL (2008) I Congresso – Manifesto-appello. [internal document] Milano: PCL.

PdCI – Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (2011b) VI Congresso – documento politico. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PdCI (2011) Statuto. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PdCI (2008b) V Congresso – documento alternativo. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PdCI (2008) V Congresso – documento politico. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PdCI (2007) IV Congresso – documento politico. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PdCI (2004) IIII Congresso – documento politico. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PdCI (2001) II Congresso – documento politico. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PdCI (1999) I Congresso – documento politico. [internal document] Roma: PdCI.

PDS (2003) Programm. [internal document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PDS (2002) Wahlprogramm. Es geht auch anders: Nur Gerechtigkeit sichert Zukunft! [official document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PDS (1998b) Wahlprogramm. Für den politischen Richtungswechsel! Sozial und solidarisch – für eine gerechte Republik! [official document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PDS (1998) *Chronik der PDS: 1989 bis 1997*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

PDS (1994) Wahlprogramm. Opposition gegen Sozialabbau und Rechtsruck. [official document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PDS (1993) Programm. [internal document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PDS (1991) Statut. [internal document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

PDS (1990c) Wahlprogramm. Für eine starke, linke Opposition! [official document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PDS (1990b) Programm. [internal document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PDS (1990) Statut. [internal document] Berlin: PDS. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

Pechu, Cecile (2006) *Droit au logement.* Paris: Dalloz.

Perli, Victor (2004) "Ein junges Kapitel PDS-Geschichte... Der bundesweite Jugendverband ['solid] wird fünf Jahre alt", *Disput,* Juni.

Perrineau, Pascal and Colette Ysmal (eds.) (2003) *Le vote de tous le refus. Les élections présidentielle et législatives de 2002.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Petersen, Thomas (2007) "Der Zauberklang des Sozialismus", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 18 July.

PG – Parti de Gauche (2010) Statuts du Parti de Gauche. [internal document] Paris: PG.

PG (2008) La société que nous voulons. [internal document] Paris: PG.

Piazza, Gianni (2011) "'Locally unwanted land use' movements: the role of left-wing parties and groups in trans-territorial conflicts in Italy", *Modern Italy,* 16.3.

Pierson, Christopher (2001) *Hard choices: social democracy in the 21st century.* Cambridge: Polity.

Pina, Chistine (2011) "L'extrême gauche, la vraie gauche?", *Études de la documentation française,* 5342.

Pina, Christine (2005b) "L'extrême gauche en France: entre permanence et évolutions" in Pierre Bréchon (ed.) *Les partis politiques français*. Paris: La Documentation française.

Pina, Christine (2005) *L'extrême gauche en Europe.* Paris : La Documentation Française.

Pinelli, Cesare (2006) "Il dibattito sui partiti: disciplina e qualità della democrazia", *Quaderni costituzionali,* 4.

Platone, François (1985) "Les adhérents de l'apogée. La composition du PCF en 1979", *Communisme,* 7.

Platone, François and Jean Ranger (2000) "Les adhérents du Parti communiste français en 1997: enquête", *Cahiers du CEVIPOF*, 27.

Poguntke, Thomas (2006) "Ci sono prove empiriche a sostegno della tesi del *cartel party*? Partiti e società nell'Europa occidentale" in Luciano Bardi (ed.) *Partiti e sistemi di partito.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Poguntke, Thomas (2002) "Party organisational linkage: parties without firm social roots?" in Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.) *Political parties in the new Europe. Political and analytical challenges.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Poguntke, Thomas (1987) "New politics and party systems: the emergence of a new type of party?". *West European Politics,* 10.1.

Pol, Stefano (2006) *Il socialismo di sinistra e il P.S.I.U.P. fra aspirazioni, sfide e realtà. La storia della federazione provinciale udinese tra il 1964 e 1972.* [MA thesis] Trieste: Università degli Studi di Trieste.

Poliak, Claude (2008) "Attac. Aux frontières du champ politique" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges*:* Éditions du Croquant.

Porcaro, Mimmo (2005) La sinistra radicale e il problema del pluralismo: il caso italiano. Paper presented at the seminar "Actors within change. Processes of transformation of left parties", Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Berlin, 16-18 December. Available at: http://www.puntorosso.it/images/saperi/sinistra-radicale-italia.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Post, Charles (2012) "What is left of Leninism? New European left parties in historical perspective", *Socialist Register 2013,* 49.

Poulet, Bernard (1999) " À gauche de la gauche", *Le Débat,* 103.

Poutou, Philippe (2012) Profession de foi. [official document]

PRC – Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (2011c) VIII congresso. Documento politico conclusivo. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (2011b) VIII congresso . Documento 1. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (2011) Statuto del Partito della Rifondazione Comunista. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (2008b) VII congresso . Documento politico conclusivo. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (2008a) VII congresso . Mozione 1. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC – Dipartimento Inchiesta (2007) L'inchiesta sul partito. Roma: O.GRA.RO. [report] Roma: PRC. Available at: home.rifondazione.it/UserFiles/File/Inchiesta.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

PRC (2005) VI Congresso. Mozione 1. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (2002b) V Congresso . Documento politico conclusivo. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (2002) V Congresso . Tesi congressuali di maggioranza "Per la rifondazione comunista". [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (1999) IV Congresso . Documento congressuale di maggioranza "Una alternativa di società". [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (1996b) III Congresso . Documento politico finale. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (1996) III Congresso . Documento di maggioranza "Radicalità e unità". [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (1994) II Congresso. Documento di maggioranza. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

PRC (1991) I Congresso. Documento unico. [internal document] Roma: PRC.

Prinz, Sebastian (2010) *Die programmatische Entwicklung der PDS. Kontinuität und Wandel der Politik einer sozialistischen Partei.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague (1986) *Paper stones. A history of electoral socialism.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pucciarelli, Matteo (2011) *Gli ultimi Mohicani. Una storia di Democrazia Proletaria.* Roma: Edizioni Alegre.

Pudal, Bernard (2009) *Un monde défait. Les communistes français de 1956 à nos jours.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges*:* Éditions du Croquant.

Pudal, Bernard (2008) "PCF: un parti peut-il en cacher un autre" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges*:* Éditions du Croquant.

Pudal, Bernard (2005) "Les communistes" in Jean-Jacques Becker and Gilles Candar (eds.) *Histoire des gauches en France.* Paris: La Découverte.

Pudal, Bernard (2002) "La beauté de la mort communiste", *Revue française de science politique,* 52.5-6.

Putnam, Robert (2000) *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community.* New York: Simon & Shuster.

Ramiro Fernandez, Luis (2003) The crisis of Western Communist parties: reconsidering socio-structural explanations. [working papar]. Madrid: Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Working Paper 10). Available at: http://www.uam.es/ss/Satellite/Derecho/es/1242658791834/listadoCombo/Working_Papers.htm [accessed on 11.03.2013]

Ranger, Jean (1986) "Le déclin du Parti communiste français", *Revue française de science politique,* 36.1.

Raschke, Joachim and Gudrun Heinrich (1993) *Die Grünen: Wie sie wurden, was sie sind*. Köln: Bund-Verlag.

Raschke, Joachim and Ralf Tils (2010) "Die Qual der Wahl: Das Debakel der SPD und strategische Optionen in der Lagerstruktur des deutschen Parteiensystems", *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen,* 23.1.

Raynaud, Philippe (2006) *L'extrême gauche plurielle. Entre démocratie radicale et révolution.* Paris: CEVIPOF.

Redler, Lucy (2007) *Der politische Streik in Deutschland nach 1945* [unpublished MA thesis]. Hamburg: Hamburger Universität für Wirtschaft und Politik.

Rees, John (2002) "The broad party, the revolutionary party and the united front", *International Socialism Journal,* 97.

Rees, John (2001) "Anti-capitalism, reformism and socialism", *International Socialism Journal,* 90.

Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt (1980) "Nine second-order national elections – a conceptual frame work for the analysis of European election results", *European Journal of Political Research,* 8.

Reißig, Rolf (2005) *Mitregieren in Berlin. Die PDS auf dem Prüfstand.* Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag.

Revelli, Marco (2006) *Oltre il Novecento. La politica, le ideologie e le insidie del lavoro.* Torino: Einaudi.

Revelli, Marco (1996) *Le due destre.* Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.

Rey, Nicolas (2010) "La huelga general de 2009 en las Antillas francesas: una lucha de clase en una situación de tipo colonial", *Cuadernos de Antropología,* 20.

Reynie, Dominique (2007) *L'extrême gauche, moribonde ou renaissante?* Paris: PUF.

Riddell, John (2011) "The origins of the united front policy", *International Socialism Journal,* 130.

Ridolfi, Maurizio (1993) "La parabola del partito di massa. Tradizioni, organizzazioni e identità politiche nella sinistra italiana", *Studi Storici,* 34. 2-3.

Riegel, Klaus-Georg (2002) "Divided commitment: East German socialist intellectuals and their attitudes towards the reunification with West Germany", *Development and society,* 31.1.

Rimbert, Pierre (1955) "Le parti socialiste S.F.I.O." in Maurice Duverger (ed.) *Partis politiques et classes sociales en France.* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Rink, Dieter (2005) "Zivilgesellschaft in Ost-Deutschland: Von der Wende-Utopie zur Not-Lösung? Civil Society in East Germany: From Wende Utopia to Compromise Solution?" in Elisabeth Kremer (ed.) *Die anderen Städte/The other cities*. Berlin: IBA-Stadtumbau 2010 Berlin 2005.

Rink, Dieter and Axel Phillips (2007) "Mobilisierungsframes auf den Anti-Hartz-IV-Demonstrationen 2004", *Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen (FJ SB),* 1.

Rizet, Stéphanie (2007) "Qu'est-ce qui fait courir les militants de la Ligue communiste révolutionnaire?", *Sociologies pratiques,* 15.2.

Roccato, Michele and Angela Fedi (2007) " 'Not in my name?' The Italians and the war in Iraq", *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology,* 17.

Roesler, Jörg (1994) "Privatisation in Eastern Germany. Experience with the Treuhand", *Europe-Asia Studies,* 46.3.

Roesler, Jörg (1992) "The rise and fall of the planned economy in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989", *German History,* 9.1.

Romano, Onofrio (2009) "Le fabbriche di Nichi. Fenomenologia di una comunità politica postdemocratica", *Democrazia e Diritto,* 3-4.

Römmele, Andrea, David M. Farrell and Piero Ignazi (eds.) (2005) *The concept of linkage revisited.* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Ronai, Simon (2001) "Essai d'analyse de l'évolution de l'implantation des municipalités communistes 1977-2001", *Communisme*, 67/68.

Roose, Jochen (2010) "Der endlose Streit um die Atomenergie. Konfliktsoziologische Untersuchung einer dauerhaften Auseinandersetzung" in Peter H. Feindt and Thomas Saretzki (eds.) *Umwelt- und Technikkonflikte.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Rose, Richard and Derek W. Urwin (1970) "Persistence and change in Western party systems since 1945", *Political Studies,* 18.3.

Roth, Roland and Dieter Rucht (eds.) (2008) *Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch.* Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.

Royall, Frédéric (2004) "Politics and unemployment organisations in France", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 12.1.

Royall, Frédéric (1998) "Le mouvement des chômeurs en France de l'hiver 1997-1998", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 6.3.

Rucht, Dieter (2010) Befragung von Demonstranten gegen Stuttgart 21 am 18.10.2010. [report] Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. Available at: http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/projekte/stgt_21_kurzbericht_2010.pdf [accessed 7.7.2013].

Rucht, Dieter (2007) "Zum Profil der Protestierenden in Deutschland", *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen (FJ NSB),* 20.1.

Rucht, Dieter and Roland Roth (2008) "Globalisierungskritische Netzwerke, Kampagnen und Bewegungen" in Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht (eds.) *Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch.* Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.

Rucht, Dieter and Simon Teune (eds.) (2007) *Nur Clowns und Chaoten? Die G8-Proteste in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Massenmedien.* Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.

Rucht, Dieter and Mundo Yang (2004) "Wer demonstrierte gegen Hartz IV?", *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen (FJ NSB),* 4.

Ruggie, John Gerard (1982) "International regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order", *International Organisation,* 36.2.

Rye, Danny (forthcoming) *Political parties and the concept of power.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Saad-Filho, Alfredo and Deborah Johnston (eds.) (2005) *Neoliberalism. A critical reader.* London: Pluto Press.

Sainty, Jessica (2009) Le communisme en banlieue rouge: de la mort du PCF au maintien des villes communistes. Analyse d'un paradoxe électoral à partir du cas de la ville d'Echirolles (1981-2008). Paper presented at the conference "Les territories du communisme", Université Paris 1, 1-2 December. Available at: http://chs.univ-paris1.fr/spip.php?article192 [accessed 8.10.2013].

Salles, Jean-Paul (2012) "Actualités: les élections 2012: Une extrême gauche réduite à l'état gazeux?", *Revue électronique dissidences,* 4. Available at: http://revuesshs.u-bourgogne.fr/dissidences/document.php?id=2457 [accessed 8.10.2013].

Salles, Jean-Paul (2005) *La Ligue communiste révolutionnaire (1968-1981). Instrument du Grand Soir ou lieu d'apprentissage?* Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Salles, Jean-Paul (2002) "La LC/LCR, étude d'un milieu militant", *Cahiers Leon Trotsky,* 79.

Salmon, Frédéric (2001) *Atlas électoral de la France (1848-2001).* Paris: Le Seuil.

Sartori, Giovanni (1997) *Comparative constitutional engineering. An inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes.* 2nd ed. New York: New York University Press.

Sartori, Giovanni (1976) *Parties and party systems. A framework for analysis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sassoon, Donald (2010) *One hundred years of socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century.*2nd ed. London: I.B. Tauris.

Saudon, Marc (1988) "Sociologie des militants et sociologie du parti. Le cas de la SFIO sous Guy Mollet", *Revue française de science politique,* 38.3.

SC – Sinistra Critica (2009) Statuto. [internal document] Roma: SC.

SC (2008) Manifesto programmatico. [internal document] Roma: SC.

Scheunemann, Egbert (2006) Aufstand in der WASG. Unvollständige Chronik einer scheiternden Strategie. [manuscript] Available at: http://www.egbert-scheunemann.de/Aufstand-in-der-WASG-1.pdf [accessed 7.7.2013].

Schivardi, Gérard (2007) Profession de foi. Paris: PT.

Schlager, Alexander (2010) "Die Proteste gegen ‚Stuttgart 21'", *Soziale Geschichte Online,* 4.

Schmidt, Rudi (2003) "Der gescheiterte Streik in der ostdeutschen Metallindustrie", *PROKLA, 132.33.*

Schultze, Thomas and Almut Gross (1997) *Die Autonomen. Ursprünge, Entwicklung und Profil.* Hamburg: Konkret.

Schwarzmeier, Jan (2001) *Die Autonomen zwischen Subkultur und soziale Bewegung.* [unpublished Phd thesis]. Göttingen: Universität Göttingen.

Screpanti, Ernesto (2004) "Freedom and social goods: rethinking Marx's theory of communism", *Rethinking Marxism,* 16.2.

Sebring, Anne (2010) "Die Gewerkschaften im Fünf-Parteien-System der Bundesrepublik" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* 13-14.

Segert, Dieter (2009) "The GDR intelligentsia and its forgotten political role during the *Wende* of 1989", *Debatte,* 17.2.

Segert, Dieter (2008) *Das 41. Jahr. Eine andere Geschichte der DDR.* Wien: Böhlau Verlag.

Segert, Dieter (2006) Le nouveau Parti de gauche en Allemagne: une gauche si extrême? [working paper] Paris: Cerfa (Note du Cerfa, 33).

Segert, Dieter (1995) "The East German CDU: an historical or a post-communist party?", *Party Politics,* 1.

Seiler, Daniel-Louis (2012) "Panorama de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe: essai de typologie" in Jean-Michel De Waele and Daniel-Louis Seiler (eds.) *Le partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe.* Paris: Economica.

SEL – Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (2011) Statuto. [internal document] Roma: SEL.

SEL (2010) Manifesto per Sinistra Ecologia Libertà. [internal document] Roma: SEL

Sergan, Nadja (2009) "Bundesweiter Bildungsstreik 2009. Schüler und Studierende üben demokratische Praxis", *Sozial Extra,* 33.7-8.

Siméant, Johanna (1993) "La violence d'un répertoire: les sans-papiers en grève de la faim", *Cultures & Conflits,* 9-10.

Siméant, Johanna and Frédéric Sawicki (2009) "Décloisonner la sociologie de l'engagement militant. Note critique sur quelques tendances récentes des travaux français", *Sociologie du travail,* 51.1.

Simmons, Harvey G. (2007) "The French Socialist opposition in 1969", *Government and Opposition,* 4.3.

Simoni, Marco (2010) "Labour and welfare reform. The short life of labour unity" in Andrea Mammone and Giuseppe Veltri (eds.) *Italy today. The sick man of Europe.* Abindgon: Routledge.

Smith, Murray (2003) "The broad party, the revolutionary party and the united front: a reply to John Rees", *International Socialism Journal,* 100.

Smith, W. Rand (1990) "Nationalizations for what? Capitalist power and public enterprise in Mitterrand's France", *Politics & Society,* 18.75.

SOFRES (2002) Sondage - élection présidentielle 2002. [opinion poll] Paris: SOFRES.

SOFRES (1995) Sondage - élection présidentielle 1995. [opinion poll] Paris: SOFRES.

SOFRES (1988) Sondage - élection présidentielle 1988. [opinion poll] Paris: SOFRES.

SOFRES (1981) Sondage - élection présidentielle 1981. [opinion poll] Paris: SOFRES.

SOFRES (1974) Sondage - élection présidentielle 1974. [opinion poll] Paris: SOFRES.

Solga, Heike (1995) *Auf dem Weg in eine klassenlose Gesellschaft? Klassenlagen und Mobilität zwischen Generationen in der DDR.* Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Solty, Ingar (2008) “The Historic Significance of the New German Left Party”, *Socialism and Democracy,* 22.1

Sommier, Isabelle (2003) *Le renouveau des mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation.* Paris: Flammarion.

Souillard, Sabine and Pascal Carreau (2011) *État bibliographique sur le communisme français.* Seine-Saint-Denis: Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis.

SPD-Vorstand (ed.) (2002) 30 Jahre Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Frauen (ASF). Eine Zeittafel von den Anfängen der SPD bis heute und die politische Frauenarbeit in der SPD.

[report] Available at: http://cp27.xsadmin.de/download/Zeittafel_30_Jahre_ASF.pdf [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Speranza, Salvatore (2006) *Il PCI: un paese nel paese*. [unpublished Phd dissertation]. Foggia: Università degli Studi di Foggia. Available at: http://partitocomunistaitaliano.blogspot.com [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Sperber, Nathan (2010) "Three million Trotskyists? Explaining extreme left voting in France in the 2002 presidential election", *European Journal of Political Research,* 49.

Speth, Rudolf (2006) Navigieren ohne Kompass. Strategiebildung in Parteien und NGOs. Frankfurt: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. [working paper] Available at: http://www.rudolf-speth.de/images/pdf/strategiestudie.pdf [accessed 7.7.2013].

Spiegel (Der) (28.03.1994) "Die Kader regieren mit" [newspaper article].

Spiegel (Der) (05.10.1992) "Der Kern schmilzt" [newspaper article].

Spiegel (Der) (20.07.1992) "Gelbe Karte für die Politik" [newspaper article].

Spier, Tim (2009) *L'impossible alliance: le SPD face à Die Linke.* Paris: Cerfa (Notes du Cerfa, 64).

Spier, Tim, Felix Butzlaff, Matthias Micus and Franz Walter (eds.) (2007) *Die Linkspartei. Zeitgemäße Idee oder Bündnis ohne Zukunft?* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Spier, Tim, Markus Klein, Ulrich von Alemann, Hanna Hoffmann, Annika Laux, Alexandra Nonnenmacher and Katharina Rohrbach (eds.) (2011) *Parteimitglieder in Deutschland.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Steiner, André (2010) *The Plans that Failed: An Economic History of the GDR*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Steffen, Michael (2002) *Geschichte vom Trüffelschwein – Politik und Organisation des Kommunistischen Bundes 1971 bis 1991.*[unpublished PhD thesis]. Marburg: Philipps-Universitäts Marburg.

Stöss, Richard and Gero Neugebauer (2002) Mit einem blauen Auge davon gekommen. Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl 2002. [working paper]. Berlin: Otto-Stammer-Zentrum (Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, 7).

Stöss, Richard and Gero Neugebauer (1998) Die SPD und die Bundestagswahl 1998. Ursachen und Risiken eines historischen Wahlsiegs unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisse in Ostdeutschland. [working paper]. Berlin: Otto-Stammer-Zentrum (Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, 2).

Strippoli, Giulia (2010) "Le PCF et le PCI face au mouvement étudiant de 1968", *Revue d'histoire critique,* 112-113.

Sturm, Eva (2000) *"Und der Zukunft zugewandt"? Eine Untersuchung zur "Politikfähigkeit" der PDS.* Opladen: Leske + Budrich Verlag.

Subileau, Françoise (1981) "Le militantisme dans les partis politiques sous la Cinquième République: état des travaux de langue française", *Revue française de science politique,* 31.5-6.

Switek, Niko (2010) "Neue Regierungsbündnisse braucht das Land! Die strategische Dimension der Bildung von Koalitionen", *Zeitschrift für Politikberatung,* 3.

Tavernier, Yves and Roland Cayrol (1969) "Sociologie des adhérents du Parti socialiste unifié", *Revue française de science politique,* 19.3.

Thomas, Nick (2003) *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, Oxford: Berg.

Thompson, Peter (2005) *The crisis of the German Left. The PDS, Stalinism and the global economy.* Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Thorsen, Dag Einar (2011) "The neoliberal challenge. What is Neoliberalism", *Contemporary readings in law and social justice,* 2.2.

Tiberj, Vincent (2004) L'extrême gauche et la recomposition de la gauche traditionnelle à la veille des élections régionales. [working paper]. Paris: CEVIPOF.

Tranfaglia, Nicola (1992) "Socialisti e comunisti nell'Italia repubblicana: un dialogo sempre difficile", *Studi Storici,* 33.2-3.

Transform! Italia (2004) Ricerca sull'innovazione nel PRC. [working paper]. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. Available at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/newpol-docs/rifondazione-i.pdf [Accessed on 20.10.2013].

Trat, Josette (1997) "Retour sur l'automne chaud de 1995", *Cahiers du Gedisst*, 18.

Turpin, Pierre (1997) *Les révolutionnaires dans la France social-démocrate, 1981-1995.* Paris: L'Harmattan.

Ubbiali, Georges (2008) "Les usages du trotskisme dans l'extrême gauche française" in Bertrand Geay and Laurent Willemez (eds.) *Pour une gauche de gauche.* Bellecombe-en-Bauges*:* Éditions du Croquant.

Ubbiali, Georges (2004) "Solidaires, unitaires, démocratiques (SUD): renouveau du syndicalisme révolutionnaire?", *Modern & Contemporary France,* 12.1.

Ubbiali, Georges (2002) "Militer à GC-UC-VO-LO, ou les trois états de la matière", *Cahiers Leon Trotsky,* 79.

UNPV - Unabhängige Kommission zur Überprüfung des Vermögens der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (2006) Schlussbericht. [report] Berlin: UNPV. Available at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/151416/publicationFile/17960/UKPV_Abschlussbericht.pdf;jsessionid=64A4FBBA479E099E58CA79AD55F9A9C3 [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Upchurch, Martin, Graham Taylor and Andrew Mathers (2009) *The crisis of social democratic trade unionism in Western Europe: the search for alternatives.* Surrey: Ashgate.

USFI – Fourth International (2003) "Role and tasks of the Fourth International", *VI Online magazine,* summer.

v. Ditfurth, Christian (1998) *Ostalgie oder linke Alternative? Meine Reise durch die PDS.* Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.

Vail, Mark I. (2010) *Recasting welfare capitalism. Economic adjustment in contemporary France and Germany.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Valentini, Alessandro (2011) "Perché ci chiamiamo Rifondazione Comunista", *Essere Comunisti,* June.

Valentini, Alessandro (2000) *La vecchia talpa e l'araba fenice.* Napoli: La città del sole.

Valle, Leonardo (2002) "Club privé. A cosa sono servite le privatizzazioni delle banche italiane", *Proteo,* 1.

Vampa, Davide (2009) "The death of social democracy: the case of the Italian Democratic Party", *Bulletin of Italian Politics,* 1.2.

van Biezen, Ingrid, Peter Mair and Thomas Poguntke (2012) "Going, going... gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe", *European Journal of Political Research,* 51.

van der Linden, Marcel (2004) 'On Council Communism', *Historical Materialism*, 12. 4.

Venturino, Fulvio (2007) "Le primarie nazionale dell'Unione: un'analisi della partecipazione con dati aggregati", *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica,* 37.3.

Verrier, Benôit (2003) *Loyauté militante et fragmentation des partis. Du CERES au MDC.* [unpublished PhD thesis] Strasbourg: Université de Strasbourg III.

Videt, Bertil (2011) "Introduction" in Daniel Bensaïd et al. (eds.) *New parties of the Left: experiences from Europe.* London: Resistance Books.

Visser, Jelle (2013) ICTWSS Database, Version 4.0. Data base on institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage setting, state intervention and social pacts, 1960-2011. [database] Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies. Available at: http://www.uva-aias.net/208 [accessed on 7.7.2013].

Visser, Jelle (2006) "Union membership statistics in 24 countries", *Monthly Labor Review,* January.

Vittoria, Albertina (2006) *Storia del PCI. 1921-1991.* Roma: Carocci Editore.

Vivier, Bernard and Chalmel, Patrick (2008) "Vote politique et sensibilité syndicale", *Histoire et liberté,* 33.

von Winter, Thomas and Ulrich Willems (eds.) (2007) *Interessenverbände in Deutschland.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Wagenknecht, Sahra (1992) "Marxismus und Opportunismus. Kämpfe in der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung gestern und heute", *Weißenseer Blätter,* 4.

Walgrave, Stefaan and Dieter Rucht (2010) *The world says no to war. Demonstrations against the war on Iraq*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Waller, Michael (2012) "Communism as history (Review article)", *East European Politics,* 28.1.

Waller, Michael (1988) "The radical sources of the crisis in West European Communist parties", *Political Studies,* 37.

Waller, Michael and Meindert Fennema (eds.) (1988) *Communist parties in Western Europe. Decline or adaptation?* Oxford: Blackwell.

Walter, Franz (2011) *Die SPD. Biographie einer Partei*. 2nd ed. Hamburg: Rohwolt Taschenbuch.

Walter, Franz (2007) "Eliten oder Unterschichten? Die Wähler der Linken" in Tim Spier *et al.* (2007) *Die Linkspartei. Zeitgemäße Idee oder Bündnis ohne Zukunft?* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

WASG – Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (2006) Satzung. [internal document]. Fürth: WASG. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013]

WASG (2005) Gründungsprogramm der WASG. [internal document]. Fürth: WASG. Available at: http://www.rosalux.de/stiftung/archiv/archiv/download.html [accessed on 20.10.2013].

Waters, Sarah (2006) *Social movements in France: towards a new citizenship.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Waters, Sarah (1994) "Tangentopoli and the emergence of a new political order in Italy", *West European Politics,* 17.1.

Webb, Adrian (2007) *The PDS: a symbol of eastern German identity?* Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Webb, Paul (ed.) (2002) *Political parties in advanced industrial democracies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weck, Felicitas (2009) *Linke Kommunalpolitik. Eine Einführung.* Hamburg: VSA Verlag.

Weitz, Eric D. (ed) (1997) *Creating German communism, 1890-1990. From popular protests to socialist state*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Wiesenthal, Helmut (2003) "German unification and 'model Germany': an adventure in istitutional conservatism", *West European Politics,* 26.4.

Wiesenthal, Helmut (1998) "Post-unification dissatisfaction. Or: why are so many East Germans unhappy with the new political system", *German Politics,* 7.2.

Wilke, Manfred and Hans-Peter Müller (1991) *Zwischen Solidarität und Eigennutz. Die Gewerkschaften des DGB im deutschen Vereinigungsprozeß.* Melle: Verlag Ernst Knoth.

Wilson, Frank L. (2002) "After the deluge: the French Communist Party after the end of communism", *German Policy Studies,* 2.2.

Winkler, Gunnar (2010) *Zur Geschichte der Volkssolidarität 1945 bis 2010.* Berlin: Volkssolidarität Bundesverband e.V.

Winkler, Heinrich August (1998) *Weimar 1918–1933. Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie.* München: Beck.

Wittich, Dietmar (2007) “Wählerinnen und Wähler” in Michael Brie, Cornelia Hildebrandt and Meinhard Meuche-Mäker (eds.) *Die Linke. Wohin verändert sie die Republik?* Berlin: Dietz.

Wittich, Dietmar (2000) "Mitgliedschaft und Wählerschaft der PDS zwischen Kontinuität und Veränderung" in Michael Brie and Rudolf Woderich (eds.) *Die PDS im Parteiensystem*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Wolfreys, Jim (2008) "Regroupment and retrenchment on the Radical Left in France", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies,* 16.1.

Wolfreys, Jim (2006) "France in revolt: 1995-2005", *International Socialism Journal,* 109.

Wolfreys, Jim (2003) "Beyond the mainstream: *la gauche de la gauche*" in Jocelyn Evans (ed.) *The French party system.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Wolinetz, Steven B. (2002) “Beyond the catch-all party: approaches to the study of parties and party organization in contemporary democracies” in Richard Gunther (ed.) *Political parties: old concepts and new challenges.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wollmann, Hellmut (1996) "Institutionenbildung in Ostdeutschland: Neubau, Umbau und 'schöpferische Zerstörung" in Max Kaase *et al.* (eds.) *Politisches System.* Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Zeuner, Bodo (1991) *Arbeitsunrecht. Geschichten über Bürgerrechte im Betrieb.* Hamburg: Rasch und Röhring.

2. REFERENCE WEBSITES

Assemblée Nationale – http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/

BdI (Bundesministerium des Innern) - http://www.bmi.bund.de

BfA (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) – http://ww.arbeitsagentur.de/

BGBL. (Bundesgesetzblatt) - http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl

bpb (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) - http://www.bpb.de

Bundesregierung (Die) - http://www.bundesregierung.de/

BWL (Bundeswahlleiter) - http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de

Camera dei Deputati – Archivio Storico - http://archivio.camera.it

CNCCFP - Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques - http://www.cnccfp.fr/

CDSP - Centre de données socio-politiques, Sciences Po - http://cdsp.sciences-po.fr/

CommunisteS - http://www.pcf.fr/18265

Conseil Constitutionnel – http://ww.conseil-constitutionnel.fr

DARES - http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/etudes-recherche-statistiques-de,76/

DDR 1989/90 - http://www.ddr89.de

DESTATIS (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland) - http://www.destatis.de

Deutscher Bundestag - http://www.bundestag.de

DIE LINKE - http://die-linke.de

DIE LINKE.PDS - http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de

DKP – Deutsche Kommunistische Partei – http://www.dkp.de

ESSF – Europe solidaire sans frontières - http://www.europe-solidaire.org

EU KLEMS database - http://www.euklems.net/

European Parliament - http://www.europarl.europa.eu/

FdG (Front de gauche) - http://www.placeaupeuple.fr/

France politique - http://www.france-politique.fr/

G.U. (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana) - http://www.guritel.it

GESIS (Leibnitz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften) - http://www.gesis.org

Gonschior, Andreas - http://www.gonschior.de/weimar/index.htm

Gouvernement de la République française - http://www.gouvernement.fr/

Governo della Repubblica Italiana - http://www.governo.it/

Hans-Böckler-Stiftung - http://www.boeckler.de

ICTWSS database - http://www.uva-aias.net/207

IMF (International Monetary Fund) - http://www.imf.org/

Initiative "Gewerkschafterinnen und Gewerkschafter wählen links" - http://www.wir-waehlen-links.de

INSEE (Institut National de la statistique et des études économiques) – http://www.insee.fr

ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) - http://www.istat.it

Istituto Cattaneo – http://www.cattaneo.org

IVW (Informationsgemeinschaft zur Festellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträger e.V.) - http://www.ivw.de

J.O.R.F. – Journal officiel de la République française - http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/

Junge Welt - http://www.jungewelt.de/

KAS (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) - http://www.kas.de/

KPD-Sozialgeschichte - http://www.kpd-sozialgeschichte.homepage.t-online.de/statistiken.html

Labournet - http://www.labournet.de

Le Monde - www.lemonde.fr

LO (Lutte ouvrière) - http://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/

Lutte de classe - http://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/documents/archives/la-revue-lutte-de-classe

Ministère de la Fonction Publique - http://www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr/

Ministère de l'Intérieur – http://ww.interieur.gouv.fr

Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi, de la Formation Professionelle et du Dialogue Social - http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/

Ministero dell'Interno - Archivio Storico delle Elezioni - http://elezionistorico.interno.it/

MLPD (Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands) - http://www.mlpd.de

NPA (Nouveau parti anticapitaliste) - http://www.npa2009.org/

PCF (Parti communiste français) - http://www.pcf.fr

PCL (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori) - http://www.pclavoratori.it/

PdAC (Partito di Alternativa Comunista - http://www.partitodialternativacomunista.org/

PdCI (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani) - http://www.comunisti-italiani.it/

PG (Parti de gauche) - http://www.lepartidegauche.fr/

POI (Parti ouvrier indépendant) - http://parti-ouvrier-independant.fr/

PRC (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista) - http://www.rifondazione.it/

PRC – Archivio Manifesti - http://www.rifondazione.it/galleria/

PRC – Archivio Storico - http://web.rifondazione.it/archiviostorico/

Reichstagsprotokolle - http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de

Repubblica (la) – http://www.repubblica.it

RLS (Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung) - http://rosalux.de

Rouge - http://orta.dynalias.org/archivesrouge/recherche-par-numeros.clp

SC (Sinistra Critica) - http://sinistracritica.org/

SEL (Sinistra Ecologia Libertà) - http://www.sinistraecologialiberta.it/

Sénat de la République française – http://ww.senat.fr

Senato della Repubblica - Archivio Storico – http://www.senato.it/storico

Spiegel (Der) - http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print

Süddeutsche Zeitung - http://archiv.sueddeutsche.apa.at/sueddz

Tous est à nous - http://www.npa2009.org/tout-est-a-nous

Wahlen in Deutschland - http://www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de/

Wahlrecht - http://www.wahlrecht.de

WEO (World Economic Outlok) [see IMF] - IMF (International Monetary Fund) - http://www.imf.org/

Wer war wer in der DDR - http://www.stiftung-aufarbeitung.de/wer-war-wer-in-der-ddr-%2363%3B-1424.html

3. INTERVIEWS

Christine Buchholz (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 16.05.2010, Rostock

Annick Coupè (Solidaires), 30.4.2012, Paris.

Daniele D'Ambra (PRC/SC), 6.09.2010, Roma

Judith Dellheim (PDS/DIE LINKE.), 17.05.2011, Berlin

Jean-Philippe Divès (NPA), 27.4.2012, Paris.

Thomas Falkner, 19.05.2011, Berlin

Bernd Gehrke, 24.05.2011, Bautzen

Alessandro Giardiello (PRC), 6.09.2010, Milano

Thies Gleiss (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 16.05.2010, Rostock

Werner Halbauer (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 06.06.2011, Berlin

Ralph Krämer (WASG/DIE LINKE.), 03.06.2011, Berlin

Franziska Lindner (DIE LINKE.SDS), 25.06.2011, Leipzig

Roger Martelli (PCF/FASE), 30.4.2012, Paris.

Cordula Michels (DIE LINKE.), 14.05.2010, Lübeck

Horst Parton (ISOR), 18.05.2011, Berlin

Bernd Preußer (PDS/DIE LINKE.), 17.05.2010, Berlin

Pia P. Probst (DIE LINKE.SDS), 03.07.2011, Leipzig

Danilo Streller (DIE LINKE.SDS), 05.07.2011, Leipzig

Jochen Traut (PDS/DIE LINKE.), 19.06.2011, Suhl

Michel Rodinson (LO), 7.4.2012, Paris.

Simon Zeise (DIE LINKE.SDS), 22.06.2011m Leipzig

B. STATISTICAL APPENDIX

GENERAL

GEN1 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

YEAR	GERMANY	%	FRANCE	%	ITALY	%
1989	€ 1,692.5		€ 1,272.4		€ 1,144.2	
1990	€ 1,789.3	5.7%	€ 1,305.8	2.6%	€ 1,167.7	2.1%
1991	€ 1,879.0	5.0%	€ 1,319.3	1.0%	€ 1,184.5	1.4%
1992	€ 1,907.2	1.5%	€ 1,338.8	1.5%	€ 1,194.3	0.8%
1993	€ 1,887.8	-1.0%	€ 1,329.9	-0.7%	€ 1,184.1	-0.9%
1994	€ 1,935.7	2.5%	€ 1,359.8	2.2%	€ 1,209.6	2.2%
1995	€ 1,970.0	1.8%	€ 1,387.6	2.0%	€ 1,244.5	2.9%
1996	€ 1,986.1	0.8%	€ 1,402.4	1.1%	€ 1,258.7	1.1%
1997	€ 2,021.5	1.8%	€ 1,433.1	2.2%	€ 1,282.1	1.9%
1998	€ 2,055.1	1.7%	€ 1,481.5	3.4%	€ 1,300.7	1.4%
1999	€ 2,090.9	1.7%	€ 1,530.2	3.3%	€ 1,319.6	1.5%
2000	€ 2,159.9	3.3%	€ 1,586.6	3.7%	€ 1,367.8	3.7%
2001	€ 2,195.3	1.6%	€ 1,615.7	1.8%	€ 1,393.3	1.9%
2002	€ 2,195.9	0.0%	€ 1,630.7	0.9%	€ 1,399.6	0.5%
2003	€ 2,187.4	-0.4%	€ 1,645.4	0.9%	€ 1,398.9	0.0%
2004	€ 2,202.6	0.7%	€ 1,687.2	2.5%	€ 1,423.1	1.7%
2005	€ 2,221.2	0.8%	€ 1,718.0	1.8%	€ 1,436.4	0.9%
2006	€ 2,307.6	3.9%	€ 1,760.4	2.5%	€ 1,468.0	2.2%
2007	€ 2,385.8	3.4%	€ 1,800.7	2.3%	€ 1,492.7	1.7%
2008	€ 2,404.9	0.8%	€ 1,799.2	-0.1%	€ 1,475.4	-1.2%
2009	€ 2,282.9	-5.1%	€ 1,742.6	-3.1%	€ 1,394.3	-5.5%
2010	€ 2,374.8	4.0%	€ 1,771.6	1.7%	€ 1,418.4	1.7%
2011	€ 2,448.3	3.1%	€ 1,801.6	1.7%	€ 1,423.7	0.4%
2012	€ 2,469.5	0.9%	€ 1,802.1	0.0%	€ 1,389.9	-2.4%

Source: my elaborations from www.imf.org (WEO, April 2013).
Notes: billions of 2005 chained euro at the end of the year, % change on previous year. Germany: before 1989 West Germany (much of the growth is the result of the incorporation of the GDR).

GEN2 Unemployment rate

YEAR	GERMANY	FRANCE	ITALY
1990	-	7.9	11.0
1991	-	8.1	10.9
1992	7.7	9.0	11.5
1993	8.9	10.0	9.7
1994	9.6	10.6	10.7
1995	9.4	10.0	11.2
1996	10.4	10.6	11.2
1997	11.4	10.7	11.2
1998	11.1	10.3	11.3
1999	10.5	10.0	10.9
2000	9.6	8.5	10.0
2001	9.4	7.7	9.0
2002	9.8	7.9	8.5
2003	10.5	8.5	8.4
2004	10.5	8.9	8.0
2005	11.7	8.9	7.7
2006	10.8	8.8	6.8
2007	9.0	8.0	6.1
2008	7.8	7.4	6.7
2009	8.1	9.1	7.8
2010	7.7	9.3	8.4
2011	7.1	9.2	8.4
2012	6.8	9.8	-

Source: statistik.arbeitsagentur.de, www.insee.fr, seriestoriche.istat.it.
Notes: ratio of unemployed people on the total active population, yearly averages.

GEN3 State budget

YEAR	GERMANY			FRANCE			ITALY		
	Rev.	Exp.	Debt	Rev.	Exp.	Debt	Rev.	Exp.	Debt
1990				47.1	49.6	35.2	41.2	52.6	94.3
1991	43.2	46.1	39.5	47.7	50.7	36.0	42.4	53.7	97.6
1992	44.5	47.0	42.0	47.4	52.0	39.7	44.7	55.0	104.7
1993	45.0	48.0	45.8	48.6	54.8	46.0	46.0	56.0	115.0
1994	45.3	47.7	48.0	48.6	54.1	49.2	44.2	53.2	121.2
1995	45.4	54.9	55.6	48.9	54.4	55.4	44.8	52.2	120.9
1996	45.7	49.1	58.5	50.5	54.5	58.0	45.2	52.2	120.3
1997	45.5	48.2	59.8	50.9	54.2	59.4	47.2	50.0	117.4
1998	45.7	48.0	60.5	50.1	52.8	59.5	46.0	48.9	114.3
1999	46.6	48.2	61.3	50.8	52.6	58.9	45.9	47.9	113.1
2000	46.2	45.1	60.2	50.2	51.7	57.4	45.0	45.9	108.6
2001	44.5	47.6	59.1	50.0	51.7	56.9	44.5	47.7	108.3
2002	44.1	47.9	60.7	49.6	52.9	59.0	44.0	47.1	105.4
2003	44.3	48.5	64.4	49.3	53.4	63.2	44.4	48.1	104.1
2004	43.3	47.1	66.2	49.6	53.3	65.0	44.0	47.5	103.7
2005	43.6	46.9	68.5	50.6	53.6	66.7	43.4	47.9	105.7
2006	43.7	45.3	67.9	50.6	53.0	64.1	45.0	48.5	106.3
2007	43.7	43.5	65.4	49.9	52.6	64.2	46.0	47.6	103.3
2008	44.0	44.1	66.8	49.9	53.3	68.2	45.9	48.6	106.1
2009	45.1	48.2	74.5	49.2	56.8	79.2	46.5	51.9	116.4
2010	43.6	47.7	82.5	49.5	56.6	82.3	46.1	50.4	119.3
2011	44.5	45.3	80.5	50.8	56.0	86.0	46.1	49.8	120.8
2012	45.2	45.0	82.0				47.7	50.7	127.0
AVER.	**44.7**	**47.2**	**62.3**	**49.5**	**53.4**	**59.5**	**45.1**	**50.1**	**111.0**

Source: my elaborations from www.imf.org (WEO, April 2013).
Notes: state revenues over GDP, state expenditures over GDP, gross debt over GDP.

GEN4 State employees

YEAR	GERMANY	%	FRANCE	%	ITALY	%
1990	7,044.6		4,257.7	18.3%		
1991	6,737.8	17.4%				
1992	6,657.2	17.4%				
1993	6,502.7	17.3%				
1994	6,094.3	16.2%				
1995	5,371.0	14.2%				
1996	5,276.5	14.0%	4,598.9	19.9%		
1997	5,163.8	13.7%				
1998	5,068.6	13.3%	4,699.6	19.7%	3,602.4	17.1%
1999	4,969.4	12.9%			3,593.9	16.9%
2000	4,908.9	12.5%	4,831.0	19.2%	3,504.2	16.2%
2001	4,821.1	12.3%	4,839.2	19.1%	3,520.4	16.0%
2002	4,809.1	12.3%	5,046.1	19.8%	3,478.4	15.6%
2003	4,779.4	12.3%	5,157.6	20.2%	3,454.2	15.5%
2004	4,669.9	12.0%	5,219.3	20.4%	3,456.5	15.4%
2005	4,599.4	11.8%	5,274.0	20.4%	3,470.6	15.4%
2006	4,576.0	11.7%	5,316.6	20.3%	3,429.3	14.9%
2007	4,540.6	11.4%	5,364.3	20.3%	3,436.8	14.8%
2008	4,505.1	11.2%	5,363.9	20.4%	3,376.2	14.4%
2009	4,547.6	11.3%	5,386.0	20.6%	3,315.2	14.4%
2010	4,586.1	11.3%	5,379.6	20.5%	3,283.0	14.4%
2011	4,602.9	11.2%	5,358.8	19.9%		
2012	4,617.4	11.1%				
2013						

Source: my elaborations from www.destatis.de, www.insee.fr, www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr, www.contoannuale.tesoro.it, www.istat.it.
Notes: thousands of state employees, shares of total employment.

GERMANY

GER1 Name, shorthand and symbol

Date	Name	Shorthand	Logo
22.4.1946	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands	SED	
16.12.1989	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	SED-PDS	
4.2.1990	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	PDS	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
3-4.07.2004	Wahlalternative Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit e.V.	WASG	
22.01.2005	Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit- Die Wahlalternative	WASG	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
17.7.2005	Die Linkspartei.PDS	Die Linke.	
16.6.2007	DIE LINKE.	DIE LINKE.	

GER2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013

WEIMARER REPUBLIK	KPD	USPD	SPD	OTHERS	TOTAL
1919	-	7.6%	37.9%	0.0%	45.5%
1920	2.1%	17.9%	21.7%	0.0%	41.7%
5.1924	12.6%	-	20.5%	0.0%	33.1%
12.1924	8.9%	-	26.0%	0.0%	34.9%
1928	10.6%	-	29.8%	0.0%	40.4%
1930	13.1%	-	24.5%	0.0%	37.6%
7.1932	14.3%	-	21.6%	0.0%	35.9%
11.1932	16.9%	-	20.4%	0.0%	37.3%
1933	12.3%	-	18.3%	0.0%	30.6%
AVERAGE	11.4%	2.2%	22.9%	0.0%	36.4%
BRD (WEST)	**KPD/DKP**		**SPD**	**OTHERS**	**TOTAL**
1949	5.7%		29.2%	0.0%	35.0%
1953	2.2%		28.8%	0.0%	31.0%
1957	0.0%		31.7%	0.2%	31.9%
1961	1.9%		36.2%	0.0%	38.2%
1965	1.3%		39.3%	0.0%	40.6%
1969	0.6%		42.7%	0.0%	43.3%
1972	0.3%		45.8%	0.0%	46.2%
1976	0.3%		42.6%	0.1%	43.0%
1980	0.2%		42.9%	0.0%	43.1%
1983	0.2%		38.2%	0.0%	38.4%
1987	0.0%		37.0%	0.0%	37.1%
AVERAGE	1.2%		37.7%	0.0%	38.9%
BRD (UNIFIED)	**PDS/DIE LINKE**		**SPD**	**OTHERS**	**TOTAL**
1990	2.4%		33.5%	0.0%	35.9%
1994	4.4%		36.4%	0.0%	40.8%
1998	5.1%		40.9%	0.0%	46.1%
2002	4.0%		38.5%	0.0%	42.5%
2005	8.7%		34.2%	0.1%	43.1%
2009	11.9%		23.0%	0.1%	35.0%
2013	8.6%		25.7%	0.1%	34.4%
AVERAGE	6.4%		33.2%	0.0%	39.7%

Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de; www.gonschior.de/weimar/index.htm; www.reichstagsprotokolle.de.
Notes: shares of valid votes. KPD/DKP after 1956 includes the results of their electoral fronts

GER3 Radical left vote, 1946-1947 regional elections

REGION	DATE	ELECTORATE	VALID VOTES	RADICAL LEFT	%	Party
Württemberg-Baden	6.1946	1,685,371	1,161,185	116,665	10.0%	KPD
Hamburg	10.1946	958,454	701,951	72,925	10.4%	KPD
Bremen	10.1946	243,410	193,547	22,262	11.5%	KPD
Hessen	12.1946	2,380,109	1,609,388	171,592	10.7%	KPD
Bayern	12.1946	4,210,636	3,048,337	185,023	6.1%	KPD
Schleswig-Holstein	4.1947	1,594,794	1,072,715	50,398	4.7%	KPD
Niedersachsen	4.1947	3,956,675	2,459,479	138,977	5.7%	KPD
Nordrhein-Westfalen	4.1947	7,860,608	5,028,892	702,410	14.0%	KPD
Rheinland-Pfalz	5.1947	1,666,547	1,161,052	100,739	8.7%	KPD
Baden	5.1947	694,953	427,824	31,703	7.4%	KPD
Hohenzollern	5.1947	615,812	378,333	27,571	7.3%	KPD
WEST	**1946-1947**	**25,867,369**	**17,242,703**	**1,620,265**	**9.4%**	KPD
SAARLAND	**10.1947**	**520,855**	**449,565**	**37,936**	**8.4%**	KPS
BERLIN	**10.1946**	**2,307,122**	**2,085,338**	**412,582**	**19.8%**	SED (w/o SPD)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	10.1946	1,308,727	1,113,748	551,594	49.5%	SED (incl. SPD)
Brandenburg	10.1946	1,655,980	1,446,819	634,787	43.9%	SED (incl. SPD)
Sachsen-Anhalt	10.1946	2,700,633	2,330,511	1,068,703	45.9%	SED (incl. SPD)
Sachsen	10.1946	3,803,416	3,290,995	1,616,068	49.1%	SED (incl. SPD)
Thüringen	10.1946	1,986,081	1,661,859	818,967	49.3%	SED (incl. SPD)
EAST	**10.1946**	**11,454,837**	**9,843,932**	**4,690,119**	**47.6%**	SED (incl. SPD)
GERMANY	**1946-1947**	**40,150,183**	**29,621,538**	**6,760,902**	**22.8%**	KPD+KPS+SED

Sources: my elaboration from www.wahlen-in-deutschland.de

GER4 SED-PDS vote, 18.03.1990 *Volkskammer* election

District	Votes	%	MPs
GDR (tot)	1,892,329	16.4%	66
Berlin	267,834	30.2%	9
Cottbus	106,733	17.9%	4
Dresden	176,629	14.8%	6
Erfurt	85,764	9.9%	3
Frankfurt	106,412	22.1%	4
Gera	65,072	12.5%	2
Halle	170,756	13.8%	6
Karl-Marx-Stadt	149,176	11.3%	5
Leipzig	135,718	14.5%	5
Magdeburg	124,391	14.2%	4
Neubrandenburg	108,586	25.8%	4
Potsdam	129,627	16.6%	4
Rostock	142,929	23.2%	5
Schwerin	72,464	17.8%	3
Suhl	50,235	12.6%	2

Sources: www.wahlrecht.de

GER5 GDR opinion polls: opinion toward the reunification

	Strongly agrees	Agrees	Disagrees	Strongly disagrees
DDR1 (20-27 Nov 1989)	16%	32%	29%	23%
DDR2 (29 Jan-9 Feb 1990)	40%	39%	15%	6%
DDR3 (26 Feb-6 Mar 1990)	43%	41%	13%	3%
DDR4 (end Apr 1990)	49%	36%	12%	3%

Sources: my elaboration from Förster-Roski (1990).

GER6 GDR opinion polls: voting intentions

	FDP	CDU/ DSU	SPD	SED/ PDS	BB
Poll 1 (20-27 Nov 1989)	0%	10%	6%	31%	17%
Poll 2 (29 Jan-9 Feb 1990)	0%	13%	53%	12%	6%
Poll 3 (26 Feb-6 Mar 1990)	1%	22%	34%	17%	2%
Electoral results (18 Mar 1990)	5.3%	40.9%	21.9%	16.4%	4.9%

Source: my elaboration from Förster-Roski (1990).

Notes: BB = *Bürgerbewegungen* (civic movements): Neues Forum, B90, Grüne Partei, DA, UFV, DFD, VL, AJL, etc.

GER7 Parliamentary elections, 1990-2013 (*Bundestag*)

PARTY	YEAR	GERMANY	EAST	WEST	GDR	BRD
N. VOTES						
DIE LINKE	2013	3,755,699	1,866,669	1,889,030	1,752,785	2,002,914
OTHERS	2013	28,783	11,228	17,555		
DIE LINKE	2009	5,155,933	2,291 555	2,864,378	2,181,132	2,974,801
OTHERS	2009	34,112	18,229	15,883		
DIE LINKE	2005	4,118,194	2,322,277	1,795,917	2,243,797	1,874,397
OTHERS	2005	60,843	30,711	30,132		
PDS	2002	1,916,702	1,504,940	411,762	1,474,566	442,136
OTHERS	2002	1,624	1,624	0		
PDS	1998	2,515,454	2,087,248	428,206	2,054,773	460,681
OTHERS	1998	10,957	3,152	7,805		
PDS	1994	2,066,176	1,728,581	337,595	1,697,224	368,952
OTHERS	1994	11,323	3,189	8,134		
PDS/LL	1990	1,129,578	1,019,965	109,613	1,003,631	125,947
OTHERS	1990	8,596	6,774	1,822		
% electorate						
DIE LINKE	2013	6.06%	14.26%	3.87%	15.07%	3.98%
DIE LINKE	2009	8.29%	17.02%	5.88%	18.13%	5.93%
DIE LINKE	2005	6.66%	17.08%	3.72%	18.44%	3.77%
PDS	2002	3.12%	11.06%	0.86%	12.13%	0.90%
PDS	1998	4.14%	15.34%	0.91%	16.94%	0.95%
PDS	1994	3.42%	12.78%	0.72%	14.16%	0.76%
PDS/LL	1990	1.87%	7.35%	0.24%	8.15%	0.26%
% valid votes						
DIE LINKE	2013	8.59%	21.24%	5.41%	22.66%	5.56%
OTHERS	2013	0.07%	0.13%	0.05%		
DIE LINKE	2009	11.89%	26.45%	8.25%	28.52%	8.33%
OTHERS	2009	0.08%	0.21%	0.05%		
DIE LINKE	2005	8.71%	23.30%	4.81%	25.29%	4.88%
OTHERS	2005	0.13%	0.31%	0.08%		
PDS	2002	3.99%	15.30%	1.08%	16.93%	1.13%
OTHERS	2002	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%		
PDS	1998	5.10%	19.49%	1.11%	21.58%	1.16%
OTHERS	1998	0.02%	0.03%	0.02%		
PDS	1994	4.39%	17.65%	0.90%	19.76%	0.96%
OTHERS	1994	0.02%	0.03%	0.02%		
PDS/LL	1990	2.43%	9.88%	0.30%	11.11%	0.34%
OTHERS	1990	0.02%	0.07%	0.01%		

Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de

Notes: second votes (*Zweitstimmen*). GDR = former GDR territory plus East Berlin. BRD = former BRG territory plus West Berlin.

GER8 European Parliament elections

Date	Votes	%	Seats	%
7.06.2009	1,969,239	7.5%	8	8.1%
13.06.2004	1,579.109	6.1%	7	7.1%
13.06.1999	1,567,745	5.8%	6	6.1%
12.06.1994	1,670,316	4.7%	0	0.0%
18.06.1989	-	-	*	-

Sources: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de

Notes: in the period 1990-1994 the PDS had three observers (without voting rights) nominated by the GDR parliament.

GER9 Radical left members of Parliament, 1990-2013 (Bundestag)

	1990 (11th)	1990 (12th)	1994 (13th)	1998 (14th)	2002 (15th)	2005 (16th)	2009 (17th)	2013 (18th)
Total seats	**663**	**662**	**672**	**669**	**603**	**614**	**622**	**630**
Radical left	**24**	**17**	**30**	**36**	**2**	**54**	**76**	**64**
Direct mandates	-	1	4	4	2	3	16	4
Seating	-	9	8	17	1	13	40	51
New	-	8	22	19	1	41	36	13
Male	13	9	17	15	0	29	36	28
Female	11	8	13	21	2	25	40	36
East	24	16	25	30	2	30	36	31
West	-	1	5	6	0	24	40	33

Source: my elaboration from www.bundestag.de

Notes: MPs elected at the beginning of the legislature. 11th legislature: after reunification the old BRD Bundestag was enlarged to *Volkskammer* representatives. The categories East and West refer to the region of election; it must be noted that some Western-born members were put on Eastern electoral lists in order to facilitate their election. The 1990 numbers refer to the *Volkskammer* representatives sent to the Bundestag after the reunification.

GER10 Radical left members of regional assemblies, 1990-2013

YEAR	TOTAL	RADICAL LEFT	% simple	% Weighted	R.L. WEST
1990	2045	86	4.21%	2.80%	0
1991	2045	86	4.21%	2.79%	0
1992	2045	86	4.21%	2.77%	0
1993	2045	86	4.21%	2.77%	0
1994	1975	118	5.97%	4.35%	0
1995	1967	129	6.56%	4.35%	0
1996	1967	129	6.56%	4.34%	0
1997	1967	129	6.56%	4.34%	0
1998	1984	135	6.80%	4.41%	0
1999	1917	151	7.88%	5.31%	0
2000	1917	151	7.88%	5.31%	0
2001	1917	151	7.88%	5.45%	0
2002	1916	144	7.52%	5.22%	0
2003	1916	144	7.52%	5.18%	0
2004	1840	159	8.64%	5.72%	0
2005	1840	159	8.64%	5.70%	0
2006	1841	150	8.15%	5.53%	0
2007	1848	157	8.50%	5.59%	7
2008	1833	182	9.93%	6.79%	32
2009	1825	193	10.58%	6.92%	49
2010	1875	204	10.88%	8.22%	60
2011	1835	203	11.06%	8.12%	58
2012	1885	184	9.76%	6.54%	39
2013	1870	173	9.25%	5.84%	28
AVERAGE	1921	145	7.64%	5.18%	11

Source: my elaboration from www.bundeswahlleiter.de

Notes: regional assemblies (*Landtage*). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (*Wahlberechtigte*) in each region (to eliminate the distortions deriving from the fact that population size and assembly size vary).

GER11 Governments, 1949-2013

BT	YEARS	CHANCELLOR	COALITION	SEATS
1	1949 – 1953	Konrad Adenauer, CDU	Union + FDP + DP	208/402
2	1953 – 1957	Konrad Adenauer, CDU	UNION + FDP + DP + GB/BHE	285/487
3	1957 – 1961	Konrad Adenauer, CDU	UNION + DP	287/497
4	1961 – 1963	Konrad Adenauer, CDU	UNION + FDP	309/499
	1963 - 1965	Ludwig Erhard, CDU	UNION +FDP	309/499
5	1965 – 1966	Ludwig Erhard, CDU	UNION + FDP	294/496
	1966 - 1969	Kurt Georg Kiesinger, CDU	UNION + SPD	447/496
6	1969 – 1972	Willy Brandt, SPD	SPD + FDP	254/496
7	1972 – 1974	Willy Brandt, SPD	SPD + FDP	271/496
	1974 - 1976	Helmut Schmidt, SPD	SPD + FDP	271/496
8	1976 – 1980	Helmut Schmidt, SPD	SPD + FDP	253/496
9	1980 – 1982	Helmut Schmidt, SPD	SPD + FDP	271/497
	1982 - 1983	Helmut Kohl, CDU	UNION + FDP	279/497
10	1983 – 1987	Helmut Kohl, CDU	CDU + FDP	278/498
11	1987 – 1990	Helmut Kohl, CDU	CDU + FDP	269/497
12	1990 – 1992	Helmut Kohl, CDU	CDU + FDP	398/662
	1992 - 1994	Helmut Kohl, CDU	CDU + FDP	398/662
13	1994 – 1998	Helmut Kohl, CDU	CDU + FDP	341/672
14	1998 – 2002	Gerhard Schröder, SPD	SPD + Grünen	342/669
15	2002 – 2005	Gerhard Schröder, SPD	SPD + Grünen	306/603
16	2005 – 2007	Angela Merkel, CDU	UNION + SPD	448/614
	2007 - 2009	Angela Merkel, CDU	UNION + SPD	448/614
17	2009 – 2013	Angela Merkel, CDU	UNION + FDP	332/622

Source: my elaboration from www.bundesregierung.de and www.bundestag.de
Notes: BT = legislature number. Union = CDU and CSU.

GER12 Governmental involvement of DIE LINKE – federal level

Period	Government	Position
11th Bundestag (1990)	CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl)	Opposition
12th Bundestag (1990-1994)	CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl)	Opposition
13th Bundestag (1994-1998)	CDU-CSU-FDP (Kohl)	Opposition
14th Bundestag (1998-2002)	SPD-Grünen (Schröder)	Opposition
15th Bundestag (2002-2005)	SPD-Grünen (Schröder)	Opposition
16th Bundestag (2005-2009)	CDU-CSU-SPD (Merkel)	Opposition (*)
17th Bundestag (2009-2013)	CDU-CSU-FDP (Merkel)	Opposition

Notes: (*) an alternative SPD-PDS-Grünen majority would have been mathematically possible.

GER13 Governmental involvement of DIE LINKE – regional level

YEAR	REGIONS n.	POPULATION weighted	DETAILS
1990	0	0.00%	
1991	0	0.00%	
1992	0	0.00%	
1993	0	0.00%	
1994	1	3.58%	SA (ext.)
1995	1	3.58%	SA (ext.)
1996	1	3.58%	SA (ext.)
1997	1	3.58%	SA (ext.)
1998	2	5.88%	SA (ext.), MV
1999	2	5.87%	SA (ext.), MV
2000	2	5.87%	SA (ext.), MV
2001	3	9.84%	SA (ext.), MV, BE (ext.) then BE
2002	2	6.31%	MV, BE
2003	2	6.27%	MV, BE
2004	2	6.26%	MV, BE
2005	2	6.24%	MV, BE
2006	1	3.94%	BE
2007	1	3.94%	BE
2008	1	3.92%	BE
2009	2	7.36%	BE, BB
2010	2	7.36%	BE, BB, *
2011	1	3.43%	BB, *
2012	1	3.43%	BB
2013	1	3.43%	BB

Notes: Population weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (*Wahlberechtigte*). Ext. = external support. SA = Sachsen-Anhalt. MV = Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. BB = Brandenburg. BE = Berlin. * = the party also partially supported a minority SPD-Grünen government in the populous Western region of Nordrhein-Westfalen (21.4% of the population).

GER14 Radical left party membership, 1989-2012

YEAR	SED/PDS/ L.PDS	WASG	DIE LINKE	OTHER (estimates)	TOTAL RADICAL LEFT	% on total party members	Western members of DIE LINKE
1988	2,300,000						
1989	1,700,000						
1990	280,882			*24,500*	305,382	12.7%	0.2%
1991	172,579			*13,500*	186,079	8.4%	0.3%
1992	146,742			*10,700*	157,442	7.6%	0.4%
1993	131,406			*10,000*	141,406	7.1%	0.7%
1994	123,751			*9,000*	132,751	6.8%	1.5%
1995	114,940			*9,000*	123,940	6.5%	1.7%
1996	105,029			*9,300*	114,329	6.2%	1.8%
1997	98,624			*9,700*	108,324	6.0%	2.1%
1998	94,627			*10,000*	104,627	5.8%	3.1%
1999	88,594			*8,800*	97,394	5.5%	4.3%
2000	83,478			*8,000*	91,478	5.3%	4.7%
2001	77,845			*7,500*	85,345	5.1%	5.4%
2002	70,805			*7,500*	78,305	4.8%	6.6%
2003	65,753			*7,700*	73,453	4.6%	6.7%
2004	61,385			*7,500*	68,885	4.5%	7.0%
2005	61,270	12,760		*7,800*	81,830	5.4%	9.7%
2006	60,388	8,944		*7,500*	76,832	5.3%	12.0%
2007		(8,563)	71,711	*7,500*	70,648	5.6%	28.8%
2008			75,968	*7,500*	83,468	6.0%	35.1%
2009			78,046	*7,000*	85,046	6.1%	37.9%
2010			73,658	*7,000*	80,658	5.9%	37.3%
2011			69,458	*7,000*	76,458	5.7%	37.5%
2012			63,761	*6,700*	70,461	5.4%	36.7%

Source: my elaboration from Niedermayer (2013), Deutscher Bundestag (2007, 2008, 2009), Bundesministerium des Innern (1991-2011).

Notes: Members at the end of the year (WASG 2007: 15.06.2007). Figures for "OTHERS" are police estimates for DKP and MLPD plus a flat 1,000 figure for minor groups.

GER15 Finances of political parties (nominal, €)

YEAR	MAJOR PARTIES Incomes	DIE LINKE Incomes	%	DIE LINKE net assets	DIE LINKE share of state financing on income
1990		€ 454,792,682			
1991	€ 383,240,067	€ 31,014,823	8.1%	€ 493,012,146	5.7%
1992	€ 325,003,987	€ 11,511,157	3.5%	€ 224,310,925	5.4%
1993	€ 345,738,223	€ 13,976,499	4.0%	€ 223,826,431	21.0%
1994	€ 432,712,992	€ 17,541,265	4.1%	€ 10,239,180	32.3%
1995	€ 353,594,488	€ 20,867,991	5.9%	€ 15,786,929	36.2%
1996	€ 355,343,296	€ 18,539,067	5.2%	€ 19,691,176	32.7%
1997	€ 350,182,312	€ 18,831,080	5.4%	€ 22,478,477	33.4%
1998	€ 386,574,092	€ 19,748,742	5.1%	€ 17,036,499	32.4%
1999	€ 392,168,403	€ 20,827,352	5.3%	€ 15,175,793	35.7%
2000	€ 374,721,082	€ 20,112,806	5.4%	€ 18,337,489	35.1%
2001	€ 395,636,210	€ 20,491,171	5.2%	€ 19,280,566	35.4%
2002	€ 426,604,483	€ 21,914,483	5.1%	€ 16,623,167	32.7%
2003	€ 443,095,189	€ 22,159,189	5.0%	€ 20,704,390	39.4%
2004	€ 437,304,973	€ 21,049,973	4.8%	€ 18,580,425	37.5%
2005	€ 452,445,153	€ 23,580,153	5.2%	€ 17,749,555	36.7%
2006	€ 431,744,105	€ 24,323,105	5.6%	€ 20,585,395	37.4%
2007	€ 423,129,716	€ 22,433,716	5.3%	€ 23,003,682	39.3%
2008	€ 450,491,936	€ 25,184,936	5.6%	€ 25,200,464	37.6%
2009	€ 479,082,930	€ 27,260,387	5.7%	€ 18,700,412	39.3%
2010	€ 413,678,861	€ 27,851,633	6.7%	€ 23,590,664	38.9%

Source: my elaboration from Deutscher Bundestag (1992-2011)
Notes: Major parties: SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP, GRÜNEN, PDS, WASG, DIE LINKE. DIE LINKE: includes PDS and WASG. Before 2002: figures converted into Euros at the official exchange rates (DM: 1.95583; DDR-M: 3.91166).

GER16 Party leaders

YEAR	NAME
PDS	**President (*Vorsitzender*)**
1989-1993	Gregor Gysi
1993-2000	Lothar Bisky
2000-2003	Gabriele (Gabi) Zimmer
2003-2007	Lothar Bisky
WASG	**Executive committee (*Geschäftsführender Vorstand*)**
2004-2007	Collective leadership (4 people)
DIE LINKE.	**President (*Vorsitzender*)**
2007-2010	Lothar Bisky
	Oskar Lafontaine
2010-2012	Gesine Lötzsch
	Klaus Ernst
2012-present	Katja Kipping
	Bernd Riexinger

GER17 Party members, DIE LINKE

Year	Men	Women	>30	30-59	>59
1990	-	-			
1991	56.1%	43.9%			
1992	-	-			
1993	-	-			
1994	54.6%	45.4%			
1995	-	-			
1996	-	-			
1997	53.9%	46.1%			
1998	54.0%	46.0%			
1999	54.7%	45.3%	2.3%	29.4%	68.3%
2000	54.4%	45.6%	1.8%	31.2%	67.0%
2001	54.3%	45.7%	2.3%	29.4%	68.3%
2002	54.2%	45.8%	3.6%	27.7%	68.7%
2003	54.8%	45.2%	3.3%	29.1%	67.6%
2004	54.2%	45.8%	2.7%	27.4%	70.0%
2005	55.1%	44.9%	3.3%	26.3%	70.4%
2006	55.6%	44.4%	3.9%	28.0%	68.1%
2007	60.9%	39.1%	6.1%	38.7%	55.2%
2008	62.4%	37.6%			
2009	62.8%	37.2%			
2010	62.7%	37.3%			
2011	62.7%	37.3%			
2012	62.3%	37.7%			

Source: my elaboration from Niedermayer (2013).
Notes: exact internal data (not survey).

ITALY

ITA1 Name, shorthand and symbol

Date	Name	Shorthand	Logo
21.01.1921 (PCd'I)	Partito Comunista Italiano	PCI	
13.04.1978	Democrazia Proletaria	DP	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
03.02.1991	Movimento per la Rifondazione Comunista	MRC	
15.12.1991	Partito della Rifondazione Comunista	PRC	
27.7.2008	Partito della Rifondazione Comunista – Sinistra Europea	PRC-SE	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
14.06.1995	Movimento dei Comunisti Unitari	MCU	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
11.10.1998	Partito dei Comunisti Italiani	PdCI	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
18.06.2006	Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori	PCL	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
5.05.2007	Sinistra Democratica	SD	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
8.12.2007	Sinistra Critica	SC	

Date	Name	Shorthand	Logo
16.03.2009	Sinistra e Libertà	SeL	
20.12.2009	Sinistra Ecologia Libertà	SEL	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
5.12.2009	Federazione della Sinistra	FdS	

ITA2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013

KINGDOM OF ITALY	PCd'I	PSI (+PSU)	OTHERS	TOTAL
1919	-	32.3%	2.0%	34.3%
1921	4.6%	24.7%	0.6%	29.9%
1924	3.7%	10.9%	0.0%	14.7%
AVERAGE	4.2%	17.8%	0.3%	22.3%
"FIRST" REPUBLIC	**PCI**	**PSI**	**OTHERS**	**TOTAL**
1946	18.9%	20.7%	0.1%	39.7%
1948	*15.5%**	*15.5%**	0.1%	31.1%
1953	22.6%	12.7%	1.5%	36.8%
1958	22.7%	14.2%	0.6%	37.5%
1963	25.3%	13.8%	0.0%	39.1%
1968	26.9%	14.5%	4.5%	45.8%
1972	27.1%	9.6%	3.3%	40.0%
1976	34.4%	9.6%	1.5%	45.5%
1979	30.4%	9.8%	2.2%	42.4%
1983	29.9%	11.4%	1.5%	42.8%
1987	26.6%	14.3%	1.7%	42.5%
AVERAGE	25.5%	13.3%	1.5%	40.3%
"SECOND" REPUBLIC	**RADICAL LEFT**	**PDS-DS-PD**		
1992	5.6%	16.1%		21.7%
1994	6.1%	20.4%		26.4%
1996	8.6%	21.1%		29.6%
2001	6.7%	16.6%		23.3%
2006	8.2%	31.3%		39.4%
2008	4.5%**	33.2%		37.6%
2013	5.7%**	25.4%		31.2%
AVERAGE	6.5%	23.4%		29.9%

Sources: my elaboration from Corbetta & Piretti (2009).

Notes: shares of valid votes. The 1924 election were marred fascist violences and * the two parties ran common lists and their relative weight cannot be determined. ** the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin (2008: Verdi; 2013: Verdi, IdV).

ITA3 Parliamentary elections, 1987-2013 (*Camera dei Deputati*)

Year	Party	Votes	%	Seats	%
25.02.2013	**TOT**	**1,949,768**	**5.73%**	**37**	**5.9%**
	SEL	1,089,442	3.20%	37	
	RC *	765,172	2.25%	0	
	PCL	89,995	0.26%	0	
	PdAC	5,159	0.02%	0	
13.04.2008	**TOT**	**1,623,072**	**4.45%**	**0**	**0.0%**
	SA	1,124,298	3.08%	0	
	PCL	208,296	0.57%	0	
	SC	168,916	0.46%	0	
	PBC	119,569	0.33%	0	
	PdAC	1,993	0.01%	0	
09.04.2006	**TOT**	**3,113,591**	**8.16%**	**57**	**9.1%**
	PRC	2,229,464	5.84%	41	
	PdCI	884,127	2.32%	16	
13.05.2001	**TOT**	**2,494,762**	**6.72%**	**21**	**3.3%**
	PRC	1,868,659	5.03%	11	
	PdCI	620,859	1.67%	10	
	Comunismo	5,224	0.01%	0	
21.04.1996	**TOT**	**3,213,748**	**8.57%**	**35**	**5.6%**
	PRC	3,213,748	8.57%	35	
27.03.1994	**TOT**	**2,343,946**	**6.05%**	**39**	**6.2%**
	PRC	2,343,946	6.05%	39	
05.04.1992	**TOT**	**2,201,428**	**5.61%**	**35**	**5.6%**
	PRC	2,201,428	5.61%	35	
14.06.1987	**TOT**	**10,892,545**	**28.2%**	**185**	**28.1%**
	PCI	10,250,644	26.58%	177	
	DP	641,901	1.66%	8	

Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/

Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige are counted separately and cannot be added), list vote. * the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin (2008: Verdi; 2013: Verdi, IdV).

ITA4 Parliamentary elections, 1987-2013 (*Senato della Repubblica*)

Year	Party	Votes	%	Seats	%
25.02.2013	**TOT**	**1,591,076**	**5.20%**	**7**	**2.2%**
	SEL	912,308	2.98%	7	
	RC *	550,007	1.80%	0	
	PCL	113,923	0.37%	0	
	PCI M-L	9,604	0.03%	0	
	PdAC	5,185	0.02%	0	
13.04.2008	**TOT**	**1,484,270**	**4.53%**	**0**	**0.0%**
	SA *	1,053,228	3.21%	0	
	PCL	180,442	0.55%	0	
	SC	136,679	0.42%	0	
	PBC	105,827	0.32%	0	
	PCI M-L	8,094	0.02%	0	
09.04.2006	**TOT**	**3,967,305**	**11.61%**	**32**	**10.2%**
	PRC	2,518,361	7.37%	27	
	Insieme con l'Unione (PdCI + Verdi) *	1,423,003	4.17%	5	
	PCI M-L	25,941	0.08%		
13.05.2001	**TOT**	**1,708,707**	**5.05%**	**6**	**1.9%**
	PRC	1,708,707	5.04%	4	
	PdCI	-	-	2	
	Comunismo	2,159	0.01%	0	
21.04.1996	**Progressisti (PRC)**	**940,655**	**2.9%**	**11**	**3.5%**
27.03.1994	**Progressisti (PRC)**	**-**	**-**	**18**	**5.7%**
05.04.1992	**PRC**	**2,171,950**	**6.5%**	**20**	**6.4%**
14.06.1987	**TOT**	**9,675,246**	**29.85%**	**102**	**32.3%**
	PCI	9,181,579	28.33%	101	
	DP	493,667	1.52%	1	

Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/

Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies and Valle d'Aosta are counted separately and cannot be added), list vote. * the radical left lists included forces of extraneous origin (2006, 2008, 2013: Verdi; 2013: IdV).

ITA5 European parliament elections

Year	Party	Votes	%	Seats	%
07.06.2009	**TOT**	**2,162,215**	**7.06%**	**0**	**0.0%**
	LCA (PRC + PdCI)	1,037,862	3.39%	0	
	SeL	857,822	3.13%	0	
	PCL	166,531	0.54%	0	
12.06.2004	**TOT**	**2,757,389**	**8.48%**	**7**	**8.97%**
	PRC	1,969,776	6.06%	5	
	PdCI	787,613	2.42%	2	
13.06.1999	**TOT**	**1,955,144**	**6.29%**	**6**	**6.68%**
	PRC	1,328,515	4.28%	4	
	PdCI	622,259	2.00%	2	
	COBAS	4,370	0.01%	0	
12.06.1994	**PRC**	**2,004,716**	**6.09%**	**5**	**5.74%**
18.06.1989	**TOT**	**10,048,008**	**28.86%**	**23**	**28.39%**
	PCI	9,598,369	27.58%	22	
	DP	449,639	1.29%	1	

Source: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/

Notes: National territory (since 2006 foreign constituencies and Valle d'Aosta are counted separately and cannot be added), list vote. LCA = Lista Comunista e Anticapitalista.

ITA6 Members of Parliament, 1990-2013 (*Camera dei Deputati*)

	1990* (10th)	1992 (11th)	1994 (12th)	1996 (13th)	2001 (14th)	2006 (15th)	2008 (16th)	2013 (17th)
Total seats	**630**	**630**	**630**	**630**	**630**	**630**	**630**	**630**
Radical left	**13**	**35**	**39**	**35**	**21**	**57**	**0**	**37**
Dependent	-	0	28	15	9	25	0	37
Seating	13	5	9	18	12	12	0	37
New	-	30	30	17	9	45	0	0
Male	11	30	30	27	14	42	0	27
Female	2	5	9	8	7	15	0	10

Source: my elaboration from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/

Notes: Beginning of the legislature. * PCI and DP members who defected to the PRC. Dependent: seats won because of an alliance with the centre-left (which would not have been lost, *ceteris paribus,* by running alone).

ITA7 Members of regional assemblies, 1990-2013

YEAR	TOTAL	RADICAL LEFT	% simple	% weighted
1991	1,067	12	1.12%	1.33%
1992	1,067	12	1.12%	1.33%
1993	1,065	18	1.69%	1.51%
1994	1,065	22	2.07%	1.64%
1995	1,090	63	5.78%	6.09%
1996	1,090	68	6.24%	6.57%
1997	1,090	68	6.24%	6.57%
1998	1,090	66	6.06%	6.55%
1999	1,090	65	5.96%	6.51%
2000	1,071	62	5.79%	6.23%
2001	1,071	60	5.60%	6.03%
2002	1,071	60	5.60%	6.03%
2003	1,071	61	5.70%	6.03%
2004	1,076	65	6.04%	6.16%
2005	1,120	83	7.41%	7.69%
2006	1,120	79	7.05%	7.29%
2007	1,120	79	7.05%	7.29%
2008	1,117	76	6.80%	7.17%
2009	1,112	73	6.56%	7.07%
2010	1,106	47	4.25%	4.13%
2011	1,106	47	4.25%	4.13%
2012	1,106	47	4.25%	4.17%
2013	1,066	43	4.03%	3.69%
AVERAGE	1,089	55	5.07%	5.27%

Source: my elaboration from http://elezionistorico.interno.it/

Notes: all regional assemblies (ordinary and autonomous regions). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (*aventi diritto*) in each region (to eliminate the distortions deriving from the fact that population size and assembly size vary).

ITA8 Governments and coalitions

Leg.	YEARS	PRIME MINISTER	POLITICAL TREND	COALITION	SEATS
10	1989-1991	Giulio Andreotti(VI), DC	Old centre-left	DC, PSI, PRI, minor	381/630
	1991-1992	Giulio Andreotti(VII), DC	Old centre-left	DC, PSI, minor	360/630
11	1992-1993	Giuliano Amato (I), PSI	Old centre-left	DC, PSI, minor	335/630
	1993-1994	Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, ind.	Technocratic (centre+left)	DC, PDS*, PSI, PRI, minor	485/630
12	1994-1995	Silvio Berlusconi (I), FI	Right-wing	FI, AN, LN, CCD, minor	366/630
	1995-1996	Lamberto Dini, ind. **	Technocratic (centre+right)	PDS*, LN*, PPI*, Segni*, minor*	302/630 (min.)
13	1996-1998	Romano Prodi (I), ind.	Centre-left	PDS, PPI, PRC*, RI, minor	337/630
	1998-2001	Massimo D'Alema (I&II), DS Giuliano Amato (II), ind.	Centre-left	DS, PPI, DEM, UDEUR, minor	337/630
14	2001-2006	Silvio Berlusconi (II&III), FI	Right-wing	FI, AN, LN, CCD-CDU, minor	368/616
15	2006-2008	Romano Prodi (II), FED	Centre-left	FED, PRC, IDV, minor	349/630
16	2008-2011	Silvio Berlusconi (IV), PDL	Right-wing	PDL, LN, minor	344/630
	2011-2013	Mario Monti, ind.	Technocratic (grand coalition)	PDL*, PD*, UDC*, FLI*, minor*	541/630
17	2013-pres.	Enrico Letta, PD	Grand coalition	PD, PDL, SC, minor	457/630

Sources: my elaboration from http://www.governo.it/ and http://legislature.camera.it/
Notes: Leg = legislature number. Seats = notional seats of the governing coalition in the first chamber (real seats change over time as result of shifts of parties and individual deputies). Minor = parties with less than 20 seats. * = external support. ** Dini relied initially on the abstentions of the right-wing and later on that of the PRC and others.

ITA9 Governmental involvement, national level

Leg.	YEARS	GOVERNMENT	RADICAL LEFT PARTY	Position	DEFECTIONS (first chamber)
10	1991-1992	Old centre-left	PRC	Opposition	
11	1992-1994	Old centre-left	PRC	Opposition	
12	1994-1995	Right-wing	PRC	Opposition	
	1995-1996	Technocratic	PRC	Opposition *	16 MPs external support (CU)
13	1996-1998	Centre-left	PRC	External support	1 MP opposition (COBAS)
	1998-2001	Centre-left	PRC	Opposition	
14	2001-2006	Right-wing	PRC, PdCI	Opposition	
15	2006-2008	Centre-left	PRC, PdCI, SD	Government	1 MP external support then opposition (SC)
16	2008-2011	Right-wing	n.p.	n.p.	
	2011-2013	Grand coalition	n.p.	n.p.	
17	2013-pres.	Grand coalition	SEL	Opposition	

Notes: * for three months the PRC abstained to enable the survival of the cabinet.

ITA10 Governmental involvement, regional level

YEAR	REGIONS n.	POPULATION weighted	DETAILS
1991	0	0.00%	
1992	0	0.00%	
1993	0	0.00%	
1994	0	0.00%	
1995	5	16.19%	UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL
1996	5	16.12%	UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL
1997	5	16.12%	UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL
1998	7	27.99%	UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL, SIC, SAR
1999	6	25.16%	UMB, MAR, LAZ, ABR, MOL, SIC,
2000	8	37.54%	ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, MOL, SIC
2001	6	27.92%	ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS
2002	6	27.92%	ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS
2003	7	30.05%	ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, FRI,
2004	8	32.95%	ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, CAM, BAS, FRI, SAR
2005	14	65.49%	PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, ABR, FRI, SAR
2006	14	65.39%	PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, ABR, FRI, SAR
2007	14	65.39%	PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, ABR, FRI, SAR
2008	12	60.71%	PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, SAR
2009	12	57.79%	PIE, LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, MAR, LAZ, CAM, PUG, BAS, CAL, SAR
2010	6	25.19%	LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS
2011	6	25.19%	LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS
2012	6	25.43%	LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, PUG, BAS
2013	9	37.77%	LIG, ER, TOS, UMB, LAZ, PUG, BAS, MOL, FRI

Notes: Regions where at least one radical left party (PRC, PdCI, SEL) participates or provides external support to the regional government. Population weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (*aventi diritto*).

ITA11 Radical left membership

YEAR	PRC	PdCI	SEL	TOT
1991	112,835			112,835
1992	117,511			117,511
1993	120,911			120,911
1994	113,495			113,495
1995	115,984			115,984
1996	127,610			127,610
1997	130,509			130,509
1998	117,137	?		*127,479**
1999	96,195	28,325		124,520
2000	90,422	25,614		116,036
2001	91,933	26,184		118,117
2002	89,124	26,700		115,824
2003	85,770	30,932		116,702
2004	97,629	34,782		132,411
2005	92,752	35,128		127,880
2006	93,196	43,127		136,323
2007	87,826	31,036		118,862
2008	71,203	29,316		100,519
2009	46,449	24,015	?	*104,388**
2010	40,770	*22,000*	45,635	108,405
2011	37,241	20,164	36,589	93,994
2012	37,901	*12,600*	32,947	77,448

Source: my elaboration from internal party data (PRC, PdCI, SEL).

Notes: End of the year. Figures for other left-wing splits (COBAS, CCA, PCL, SC) are not available, but were never above 3,000 members. * hypothetical figure based on a uniform trend between previous and following year (as new parties have been created but their exact size is unknown).

ITA12 Finances (nominal, €)

YEAR	RADICAL LEFT Incomes	PRC incomes	RADICAL LEFT net assets	RADICAL LEFT net assets
1997	€ 8,660,248	€ 8,660,248	€ 7,855,204	€ 7,855,204
1998	€ 6,646,599	€ 6,646,599	€ 9,032,542	€ 9,032,542
1999	€ 9,539,992	€ 5,998,861	€ 11,208,815	€ 9,540,401
2000	€ 10,686,136	€ 7,300,129	€ 11,924,687	€ 11,419,738
2001	€ 9,241,238	€ 6,781,742	€ 12,427,736	€ 12,293,001
2002	€ 9,645,437	€ 7,012,238	€ 14,537,352	€ 13,795,539
2003	€ 10,408,181	€ 7,706,394	€ 15,051,979	€ 13,944,911
2004	€ 14,024,798	€ 10,090,247	€ 15,334,696	€ 14,037,760
2005	€ 18,221,107	€ 13,050,458	€ 16,772,441	€ 15,284,771
2006	€ 24,147,511	€ 18,538,220	€ 18,800,123	€ 17,151,785
2007	€ 27,359,363	€ 21,595,251	€ 19,002,986	€ 17,253,852
2008	€ 20,418,794	€ 15,844,506	€ 16,499,375	€ 16,751,472
2009	€ 11,993,635	€ 9,232,292	€ 15,456,562	€ 15,246,023
2010	€ 12,008,729	€ 7,596,707	€ 18,160,384	€ 17,783,818
2011	€ 3,784,047	€ 1,679,021	€ 14,181,707	€ 14,186,405

Source: my elaboration from *Gazzetta Ufficiale* (2000-2012).
Notes: Includes PRC, PdCI and SEL. Before 2002: figures converted into Euros at the official exchange rates (Lira: 1,936.27).

ITA13 Organisational splits of the PRC

Year	Name	Dir.	M.	MPs	V	Leaders, motive, outcome
June 1995	Movimento dei Comunisti Unitari (CU)	Right-ward	-	14 (1995)	6,070 (1996)	L. Magri, F. Crucianelli Support for the Dini government In 1998 merges with the DS
May 1996	Cobas per l'Autorganizzazione (COBAS)	Left-ward	-	1 (1996)	4,370 (1999)	Mara Malavenda Rejection of the Prodi government No success
Nov 1997	Confederazione Comunisti/e Autorganizzati/e (CCA)	Left-ward	-	-	5,244 (2001)	G. Bacciardi, L. Mazzei Rejection of the Prodi government No success
Oct 1998	Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI)	Right-ward	28,325 (1999)	18 (1998)	622,259 (1999)	A. Cossutta, O. Diliberto Support for the Prodi government Survives as a small party
Apr 2006	Partito di Alternativa Comunista (PdAC)	Left-ward	-	-	1,993 (2008)	F. Ricci Rejection of the Prodi government Survives as a small grouplet
Jun 2006	Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori (PCL)	Left-ward	ca. 2,000	-	208,296 (2008)	M. Ferrando Rejection of the Prodi government Survives as a small grouplet
Dec 2007	Sinistra Critica (SC)	Left-ward	ca. 1,200	1 (2007)	168,916 (2008)	S. Cannavò, F. Turigliatto Rejection of the Prodi government Breaks up in 2013
Jan 2009	Movimento per la Sinistra (MPS)	Right-ward	45,635 (2010)*	-	856,822 (2009)*	Nichi Vendola Alliance with the centre-left, radical left regroupment Creates SEL
Feb 2011	L'Ernesto	-	ca. 1,000	-	-	F. Sorini, F. Giannini Re-unification with the PdCI In 2011 merges with the PdCI

Notes: members (M), deputies (MPs) and votes (V). * = results of SEL (MpS might account for half of the total).

ITA14 Party leaders

YEAR	NAME
PRC	**Secretary (*Segretario*)**
1991-1994	Sergio Garavini
1994-2006	Fausto Bertinotti
2006-2008	Franco Giordano
2008-present	Paolo Ferrero
PdCI	**Secretary (*Segretario*)**
1999-2000	Armando Cossutta – President (*Presidente*)
2000-2013	Oliviero Diliberto
2013-present	Cesare Procaccini
SEL	**President (*Presidente*)**
2009-2010	Fabio Mussi
2010-present	Nicola (Nichi) Vendola

ITA15 Sociology of members

	1946	1954	1959	1966	1977	1988	1999	2006
GENDER	**PCI**	**PCI**	**PCI**	**PCI**	**PCI**	**PCI**	**PRC**	**PRC**
Men	80.5%	73.2%	74.0%	76.3%	75.8%	71.4%	74.5%	70.6%
Women	19.5%	26.8%	26.0%	23.7%	24.2%	28.6%	25.5%	29.4%
AGE								
>26				6.8%	11.2%	3.2%	11.7%	13.7%
26-40				35.0%	32.7%	24.1%		
>40				58.2%	56.1%	72.7%		
PROFESSION								
Unemployed							9.8%	7.6%
Blue-collar worker	64.9%	57.8%	55.2%	51.7%	46.1%	40.0%	22.8%	16.1%
White-collar worker	4.5%	2.7%	2.5%	3.1%	9.2%	10.7%	18.0%	22.4%
Peasant	15.3%	16.1%	17.4%	13.1%	5.5%	2.8%	-	-
Self-employed /professional	5.2%	5.2%	5.7%	6.5%	9.1%	9.6%	8.3%	10.4%
Inactive	10.1%	18.2%	19.2%	25.5%	30.1%	36.9%	41.0%	43.6%
Student							9.4%	14.2%
Retired							30.3%	25.2%
Other							1.3%	4.2%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: my elaboration from Lazar (1992) and Bertolino (2008).

FRANCE

FRA1 Name, shorthand and symbol

Date	Name	Shorthand	Logo
30.12.1920 (SFIC) 1921 (PC) 1943 (PCF)	Parti communiste français	PCF	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
1939 (UC) 1956 (VO) 1968 (LO)	Lutte ouvrière	LO	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
1944 (PCI) 1966 (JCR) 1969 (LC) 1974 (FCR) 1974 (LCR)	Ligue communiste révolutionnaire	LCR	
5.02.2009	Nouveau parti anticapitaliste	NPA	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
1952 (PCI) 1965 (OCI) 1981 (PCI)	Organisation communiste internationaliste	OCI	
1985 (MPPT) 1991 (PT)	Parti des travailleurs	PT	
15.06.2008 -	Parti ouvrier indépendant	POI	
Date	Name	Shorthand	Logo
1960	Parti socialiste unifié	PSU	
1988	Nouvelle Gauche pour le Socialisme, l'Écologie et l'Autogestion	NG	
1989	Alternative rouge et verte	AREV	
1998	Les Alternatifs	Alternatifs	
Date	Name	Shorthand	Logo

2008	Fédération pour une alternative sociale et écologique	FASE	
Date	**Name**	**Shorthand**	**Logo**
12.11.2008 (inf.) 1.02.2009 (official)	Parti de gauche	PG	
Date	Name	Shorthand	Logo
18.11.2008	Front de gauche	FdG	
includes (2012):	PCF, PG, FASE, les Alternatifs, GU (ex-LCR), C&A (ex-NPA), GA (ex-NPA), R&S (ex-MRC), PCOF (Maoist)		

FRA2 Legislative results of "workers' parties", 1919-2013

THIRD REPUBLIC		PC		SFIO	OTHERS	TOTAL
1919		0.0%		21.2%	0.0%	**21.2%**
1924		9.8%		20.1%	0.0%	**29.9%**
1928		11.3%		18.0%	0.0%	**29.3%**
1932		8.3%		20.5%	0.0%	**28.8%**
1936		15.3%		19.9%	0.0%	**35.1%**
AVERAGE		**11.2%**		**19.6%**	**0.0%**	**30.8%**
FOURTH REPUBLIC	**FAR LEFT**	**PCF**		**SFIO**	**OTHERS**	**TOTAL**
1945	0.0%	25.2%		22.5%	0.0%	**47.7%**
6.1946	0.2%	26.0%		21.1%	0.0%	**47.4%**
11.1946	0.3%	28.3%		17.9%	0.0%	**46.4%**
1951	0.8%	25.7%		14.3%	0.0%	**40.8%**
1956	0.4%	25.6%		15.1%	0.0%	**41.1%**
AVERAGE	**0.3%**	**26.1%**		**18.2%**	**0.0%**	**44.7%**
FIFTH REPUBLIC	**FAR LEFT**	**PCF**	**UFD/PSU**	**SFIO/FGDS/PS**	**OTHERS**	**TOTAL**
1958	0.0%	18.9%	0.9%	15.5%	0.0%	**35.2%**
1962	0.0%	21.9%	2.0%	12.5%	0.0%	**36.4%**
1967	0.1%	22.5%	2.1%	18.9%	0.0%	**43.6%**
1968	0.1%	20.0%	3.9%	16.5%	0.0%	**40.5%**
1973	1.4%	21.4%	2.0%	19.1%	0.0%	**43.8%**
1978	2.2%	20.6%	1.1%	22.8%	0.0%	**46.7%**
1981	0.7%	16.1%	0.7%	36.0%	0.0%	**53.5%**
1986	1.5%	9.5%	-	31.0%	0.3%	**42.3%**
1988	0.4%	11.3%	-	34.8%	0.0%	**46.4%**
AVERAGE	**0.7%**	**18.0%**	**1.8%**	**23.0%**	**0.0%**	**43.2%**
FIFTH REPUBLIC	**FAR LEFT**	**PCF/FdG**		**PS**	**OTHERS**	**TOTAL**
1993	1.8%	8.9%		17.6%	0.3%	**28.6%**
1997	2.5%	9.6%		23.5%	0.3%	**36.0%**
2002	2.7%	4.8%		23.8%	0.1%	**31.4%**
2007	3.4%	4.3%		24.7%	0.3%	**32.8%**
2012	1.0%	6.9%		29.4%	0.0%	**37.2%**
AVERAGE	**2.3%**	**6.9%**		**23.8%**	**0.2%**	**33.2%**

Sources: my elaboration from www.interieur.gouv.fr, www.france-politique.fr and cdsp.sciences-po.fr
Notes: share of valid votes.

FRA3 Presidential elections, first round

Year	Candidate	Party	Votes	%
2012	ARTHAUD Nathalie	LO	202,561	0.56%
	POUTOU Philippe	NPA	411,182	1.15%
	MÉLENCHON Jean-Luc	FdG	3,985,089	11.10%
		TOTAL	**4,598,832**	**12.82%**
2007	LAGUILLER Arlette	LO	487,857	1.33%
	BESANCENOT Olivier	LCR	1,498,581	4.08%
	SCHIVARDI Gérard	PT	123,540	0.34%
	BOVÉ José	Indep.	483,008	1.32%
	BUFFET Marie-George	PCF	707,268	1.93%
		TOTAL	**3,300,254**	**8.99%**
2002	LAGUILLER Arlette	LO	1,630,045	5.72%
	BESANCENOT Olivier	LCR	1,210,562	4.25%
	GLUCKSTEIN Daniel	PT	132,686	0.47%
	HUE Robert	PCF	960,480	3.37%
		TOTAL	**3,933,773**	**13.80%**
1995	LAGUILLER Arlette	LO	1,615,552	5.30%
	HUE Robert	PCF	2,632,460	8.64%
		TOTAL	**4,248,012**	**13.94%**
1988	LAGUILLER Arlette	LO	606,017	1.99%
	BOUSSEL Pierre	OCI	116,823	0.38%
	JUQUIN Pierre	Indep. (ex-PCF)	639,084	2.10%
	LAJOINIE André	PCF	2,055,995	6.76%
		TOTAL	**3,417,919**	**11.24%**
1981	LAGUILLER Arlette	LO	668,057	2.30%
	BOUCHARDEAU Huguette	PSU	321,353	1.11%
	MARCHAIS George	PCF	4,456,922	15.35%
		TOTAL	**5,446,332**	**18.76%**

Sources: my elaboration from www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr, www.interieur.gouv.fr, and www.france-politique.fr
Notes: share of valid votes. Whole France (including extra-European territories).

FRA4 Legislative elections, first round

Year	Party	Votes (first round)	%	Seats
10.6.2012	LO	126,552	0.49%	
	Other far left	126,834	0.49%	
	Front de Gauche	1,793,192	6.91%	10
	TOTAL	**2,046,578**	**7.89%**	**10**
10.6.2007	LO	218,264	0.84%	
	LCR	534,666	2.05%	
	Other far left	135,320	0.52%	
	PCF	1,115,663	4.29%	18
	Other radical left	87,171	0.33%	
	TOTAL	**2,091,084**	**8.03%**	**18**
9.6.2002	LO	304,077	1.18%	
	LCR	320,623	1.24%	
	PT	42,532	0.16%	
	Other far left	39,690	0.15%	
	PCF	1,237,588	4.79%	22
	Other radical left	30,201	0.12%	
	TOTAL	**1,974,711**	**7.64%**	**22**
25.5.1997	LO	421,877	1.67%	
	LCR	71,304	0.28%	
	PT	51,696	0.20%	
	Other far left	93,992	0.37%	
	PCF	2,435,451	9.62%	36
	Other radical left	82,378	0.33%	
	TOTAL	**3,156,698**	**12.46%**	**36**
21.3.1993	LO	225,964	0.89%	
	LCR	33,167	0.13%	
	PT	47,656	0.19%	
	Other far left	145,017	0.57%	
	PCF	2,253,818	8.86%	23
	Other radical left	82,436	0.32%	
	TOTAL	**2,788,058**	**10.96%**	**23**
5.6.1988	Other far left	89,065	0.36%	
	PCF	2,765,761	11.32%	25
	TOTAL	**2,854,826**	**11.68%**	**25**
16.3.1986	LO	173,686	0.62%	
	LCR	29,719	0.11%	
	PT	181,490	0.65%	
	Other far left	45,457	0.16%	
	PCF	2,663,259	9.50%	35
	Other radical left	76,666	0.27%	
	TOTAL	**3,170,277**	**11.31%**	**35**
14.6.1981	LO	99,043	0.39%	
	Other far left	67,783	0.27%	
	PCF	4,065,962	16.14%	44
	PSU	177,005	0.70%	
	TOTAL	**4,409,793**	**17.51%**	**44**
12.3.1978	LO	474,226	1.69%	
	Other far left	133,093	0.47%	
	PCF	5,793,139	20.62%	86
	PSU	311,807	1.11%	
	TOTAL	**6,712,265**	**23.89%**	**86**

Sources: my elaboration from www.interieur.gouv.fr, www.france-politique.fr and www.lutte-ouvriere.org/
Notes: share of valid votes. Whole France (including extra-European territories).

FRA5 European Parliament elections

Year	Party	Votes	%	Seats
6.6.2009	LO	205,975	1.20	
	NPA	840,833	4.88	
	Communistes	3,208	0.02	
	FdG	1,041,911	6.05	4
	AOM	73,110	0.42	1
	TOT	**2,165,037**	**12.57**	**5**
13.6.2004	LO-LCR	440,134	2.56	
	PT	131,434	0.77	
	PCF	900,447	5.25	2
	AOM	109,529	0.64	1
	TOT	**1,581,544**	**9.21**	**3**
13.6.1999	LO-LCR	914,811	5.18	5
	PCF	1,196,491	6.78	6
	TOT	**2,111,302**	**11.96**	**11**
12.6.1994	LO	442,723	2.27	
	PT	84,513	0.43	
	PCF	1,342,222	6.89	7
	ROMN	37,041	0.19	
	TOT	**1,906,499**	**9.78**	**7**
15.6.1989	LO	258,663	1.43	
	MPPT	109,523	0.60	
	PCF	1,401,171	7.72	7
	Europe rénovateurs	74,327	0.41	
	TOT	**1,843,684**	**10.16**	**7**
17.6.1984	LO	417,702	2.07	
	PCI	182,320	0.90	
	PCF	2,261,312	11.21	10
	PSU-CDU	146,238	0.72	
	TOT	**3,007,572**	**14.90**	**10**
10.6.1979	LO-LCR	623,663	3.08	
	PCF	4,153,710	20.52	19
	PSU	332	0.00	
	TOT	**4,154,042**	**23.60**	**19**

Sources: my elaboration from www.interieur.gouv.fr and www.france-politique.fr
Notes: share of valid votes. Whole France (including extra-European territories).

FRA6 Complete electoral results, Lutte Ouvrière (1973-2012)

YEAR	VOTES	%	PRESENCE weighted	Average where present	SEATS	FINANC.	NOTES
Presid.							
1974	595,247	2.33%	100.0%	2.33%	-		
1981	668,057	2.30%	100.0%	2.30%	-		
1988	606,017	1.99%	100.0%	1.99%	-		
1995	1,615,552	5.30%	100.0%	5.30%	-	Yes	
2002	1,630,045	5.72%	100.0%	5.72%	-	Yes	
2007	487,857	1.33%	100.0%	1.33%	-	No	
2012	202,561	0.56%	100.0%	0.56%	-	No	
Legisl.							
1973	194,889	0.80%	34.9%	2.29%	0		
1978	474,378	1.69%	95.7%	1.70%	0		
1981	99,185	0.39%	32.4%	1.11%	0		
1986	173,686	0.62%	32.7%	1.21%	0		
1988	0	0.00%	0.0%	0.0%	0		
1993	227,900	0.90%	42.8%	2.15%	0	Yes	
1997	421,877	1.67%	55.6%	3.06%	0	Yes	
2002	304,077	1.18%	97.1%	1.19%	0	Yes	
2007	218,264	0.84%	97.6%	0.86%	0	Yes	
2012	126,522	0.49%	95.7%	0.51%	0	No	
European							
1979	623,663	3.08%	100.0%	3.08%	0		LO-LCR
1984	417,702	2.07%	100.0%	2.07%	0		
1989	258,663	1.43%	100.0%	1.43%	0		
1994	442,723	2.27%	100.0%	2.27%	0	No	
1999	914,811	5.18%	100.0%	5.18%	3 (2)	Yes	LO-LCR
2004	440,134	2.56%	100.0%	2.56%	0	No	LO-LCR
2009	205,975	1.20%	100.0%	1.20%	0	No	
Regional							
1986	226,126	0.81%	33.0%	1.59%	0		
1992	215,162	0.87%	30.0%	1.84%	0		
1998	788,172	3.63%	72.5%	4.52%	20	Yes	
2004	1,077,824	4.37%	88.5%	4.58%	0	No	LO-LCR
2010	213,738	1.10%	92.3%	1.09%	0	No	
Municipal							
1977	91,668	-	-	3.78%	0 (?)	-	LO-LCR-OCT
1983	62,237	-	-	2.16%	0 (2)	-	LO-LCR-LOR
1989	-	-	-	?	2	-	
1995	41,059	-	-	2.80%	7	-	
2001	120,784	-	-	4.37%	34	-	
2008	52,008	-	-	1.91%	79	-	

Sources: my elaboration from www.lutte-ouvriere.org/, www.interieur.gouv.fr, www.france-politique.fr and
Notes: share of valid votes. Whole France (including extra-European territories). In brackets the number of seats won by LO allies on joint lists.

FRA7 Members of Parliament, 1986-2012 (*Assemblée Nationale*)

Legislature	1986 (8th)	1988 (9th)	1993 (10th)	1997 (11th)	2002 (11th)	2007 (12th)	2012 (13th)
Total seats	577	577	577	577	577	577	577
COMMUNIST GROUP	**35**	**25**	**23**	**36**	**22**	**24**	**15**
PCF	32	24	22	34	20	15	7
AFFILIATED	3	1	1	2	2	3	3
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	6	5
PCF DEPUTIES	**32**	**24**	**22**	**34**	**20**	**15**	**7**
Male	29	23	20	30	16	12	6
Female	3	1	2	4	4	3	1
Seating	17	12	13	14	18	10	4
New	15	12	9	20	2	5	3

Source: my elaboration from www.assemblee-nationale.fr

Notes: beginning of the legislature. Affiliated = *apparenté* (close allies). Other = other members of the group (usually "technical" allies).

FRA8 Senators (*Sénat*)

	1986	1989	1992	1995	1998	2001	2004	2008	2011
Total seats	320	322	322	322	322	322	331	343	348
COMMUNIST GROUP	**15**	**16**	**15**	**15**	**16**	**23**	**23**	**23**	**21**
PCF	14	15	14	15	15	20	20	21	20
ALLIES	1	1	1	0	1	3	3	2	1
PCF SENATORS	**14**	**15**	**14**	**15**	**15**	**20**	**20**	**21**	**20**
Male	9	10	8	9	10	10	12	10	10
Female	5	5	6	6	5	10	8	11	10
Old	7	14	13	11	10	10	15	16	14
New	7	1	1	4	5	10	5	5	6

Source: my elaboration www.senat.fr

Notes: composition in the year indicated. The French Senate is elected with an indirect electoral system.

FRA9 Members of regional assemblies, 1990-2012

YEAR	TOTAL	RADICAL LEFT	% simple	% weighted	PCF	% Simple	% weighted	ELECTED ON PS-LED LISTS
1990	1880	157	8.35%	8.74%	155	8.24%	8.74%	1
1991	1880	157	8.35%	8.74%	155	8.24%	8.74%	1
1992	1880	124	6.60%	6.82%	120	6.38%	6.82%	3
1993	1880	124	6.60%	6.82%	120	6.38%	6.82%	3
1994	1880	124	6.60%	6.82%	120	6.38%	6.82%	3
1995	1880	124	6.60%	6.82%	120	6.38%	6.82%	3
1996	1880	124	6.60%	6.82%	120	6.38%	6.82%	3
1997	1880	124	6.60%	6.82%	120	6.38%	6.82%	3
1998	1880	184	9.79%	10.61%	160	8.51%	9.18%	160
1999	1880	184	9.79%	10.61%	160	8.51%	9.18%	160
2000	1880	184	9.79%	10.61%	160	8.51%	9.18%	160
2001	1880	184	9.79%	10.61%	160	8.51%	9.18%	160
2002	1880	184	9.79%	10.61%	160	8.51%	9.18%	160
2003	1880	184	9.79%	10.61%	160	8.51%	9.18%	160
2004	1880	185	9.84%	10.53%	185	9.84%	10.53%	119
2005	1880	185	9.84%	10.53%	185	9.84%	10.53%	119
2006	1880	185	9.84%	10.53%	185	9.84%	10.53%	119
2007	1880	185	9.84%	10.53%	185	9.84%	10.53%	119
2008	1880	185	9.84%	10.53%	185	9.84%	10.53%	119
2009	1880	185	9.84%	10.53%	185	9.84%	10.53%	119
2010	1880	131	6.97%	7.21%	99	5.27%	5.47%	34
2011	1880	131	6.97%	7.21%	99	5.27%	5.47%	34
2012	1880	131	6.97%	7.21%	99	5.27%	5.47%	34
AVERAGE	1880	159	8.48%	8.99%	148	7.86%	8.39%	34

Sources: my elaboration from www.france-politique.fr, cdsp.sciences-po.fr and www.lemonde.fr

Notes: Whole France (including extra-European territories). Mid-term defections are ignored. % weighted = the numbers are weighted for the registered voters (*inscrits*) in each region (to eliminate the distortions deriving from the fact that population size and assembly size vary). Figures include: PCF, PCF allies, PCF dissidents (except MUP), LO, LCR, PSU/AEA, TEAG. Figures exclude: radical left movements of the extra-European territories (due to the uncertainty of the classification). Figures before 1998 might exclude a small number of PCF members elected on PS-led lists. PCF figures before 2009 include a small number of independents and allies (which could not be separated).

FRA10 Governments and coalitions

LEG	Years	Days	PRIME MINISTER	POLITICAL TREND	EXTERNAL SUPPORT	SEATS
VIII	1986-1988	782	Jacques CHIRAC, RPR	Right RPR, UDF		290/577
IX	1988-1991	1100	Michel ROCARD, PS	Left (minority) * PS, MRG	case-by-case: UDF, PCF, other	(212/577) 275/577
IX	1991-1992	292	Édith CRESSON, PS	Left (minority) * PS, MRG	case-by-case: UDF, PCF, other	275/577
IX	1992-1993	392	Pierre BÉRÉGOVOY	Left (minority) * PS, MRG	case-by-case: UDF, PCF, other	275/577
X	1993-1995	780	Pierre BALLADOUR, RPR	Right RPR, UDF		492/577
X	1995-1997	748	Alain JUPPÉ, RPR	Right RPR, UDF		492/577
XI	1997-2002	1798	Lionel JOSPIN, PS	Left PS, PCF, PRG, Verts, MDC		312/577
XII	2002-2005	1120	Jean-Pierre RAFFARIN, UMP	Right UMP		(253/577) 298/577
XII	2005-2007	717	Dominique DE VILLEPIN, UMP	Right UMP		398/577
XIII	2007-2012	1824	François FILLON, UMP	Right UMP, NC		(398/577) 345/577
XIV	2012-pres		Jean-Marc AYRAULT, PS	Left PS, PRG, EELV		(227/577) 328/577

Notes: my elaboration from www.gouvernement.fr/ and www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
Notes: SEATS: governing coalition excluding external support; in parenthesis: seats of the short-lived caretaker cabinets seating between presidential and legislative elections. * The cabinets included "*personnalités d'ouverture*" drawn from centrist parties, but the support of the latter was generally on a case-by-case basis.

FRA11 Governmental involvement of the PCF – national level

Period	Government	Crucial	Position
1981-1984	Socialist	No	Governmental participation
1984-1986	Socialist	No	External support
1986-1988	Gaullist	No	Opposition
1988-1993	Socialist (minority)	Yes	Case-by-case
1993-1997	Gaullist	No	Opposition
1997-2001	Socialist	Yes	Governmental participation
2001-2013	Gaullist	No	Opposition
2013-present	Socialist	No	Case-by-case

Notes: crucial = necessary to guarantee a centre-left parliamentary majority.

FRA12 Governmental involvement of the PCF – regional level

YEAR	REGIONS n.	POPULATION weighted	DETAILS
1990	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1991	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1992	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1993	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1994	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1995	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1996	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1997	2	8.21%	LIM, NPC
1998	7	43.91%	AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA
1999	7	43.91%	AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA
2000	7	43.91%	AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA
2001	7	43.91%	AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA
2002	7	43.91%	AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA
2003	7	43.91%	AQ, HN, IDF, LIM, MP, NPC, PACA
2004	18	86.90%	AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA
2005	18	86.90%	AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA
2006	18	86.90%	AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA
2007	18	86.90%	AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA
2008	18	86.90%	AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA
2009	18	86.90%	AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CH, HN, IDF, LR, LIM, LOR, MP, NPC, PL, PIC, PC, PACA, RA
2010	17	85.28%	AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA
2011	17	85.28%	AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA
2012	17	85.28%	AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA
2013	17	85.28%	AQ, AUV, BN, BOUR, BRE, CEN, CA, COR, HN, IDF, LR*, LOR, MP, NPC, PL*, PACA, RA

Notes: Population weighted = the numbers are weighted for the people entitled to vote (*inscrits*). * = participation by PCF dissidents. Governmental involvement of the MUP is excluded.

FRA13 Radical left party membership

YEAR	PCF	LO	LCR	PG	TOT	PT/POI (outside the total)
1990	351,881	1,900	1,358		355,139	
1991	329,680	2,000	1,324		333,004	
1992	313,719	2,100	1,277		317,096	
1993	298,991	2,200	1,232		302,423	
1994	281,004	2,300	1,070		284,374	
1995	274,449	7,000	1,070		282,519	
1996	248,607	7,000	965		256,572	
1997	225,394	7,000	1,041		233,435	
1998	203,433	7,000	1,070		211,503	
1999	183,173	7,000	1,096		191,269	
2000	164,181	7,000	1,180		172,361	
2001	138,657	7,000	1,345		147,002	5,000
2002	113,417	7,000	1,513		121,930	6,000
2003	92,772	7,500	2,320		102,592	
2004	100,346	7,500	2,620		110,466	6,068
2005	99,227	7,500	2,570		109,297	
2006	92,894	7,500	2,605		102,999	
2007	85,546	7,500	2,640		95,686	6,000
2008	78,779	7,500	3,000		89,279	10,071
2009	75,457	7,500	9,123	6,000	98,080	
2010	72,275	7,000	6,000	8,000	93,275	
2011	69,227	7,000	4,000	10,000	90,227	
2012	64,184	7,000	3,000	12,000	86,184	

Source: my elaboration from Martelli (2010b), Videt (2011), party statements, estimates.
PCF: due-paying members; real data except 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2010 (estimates); after 2002 an alternative series exists which includes non due-paying members and remains stable around 130,000 members. LCR: due-paying members; real data except 1992, 2008, 2010 and 2011 (estimates). LO: estimates, all members (including those without voting rights). PG and PT/POI: declared members; excluded from the computation of the totals.

FRA14 Finances of political parties (nominal, €)

YEAR	ALL PARTIES Incomes	RADICAL LEFT Incomes	PCF Incomes	LO Incomes	LCR Incomes	PG Incomes
2003	€ 194,744,995	€ 38,363,487	€ 33,513,524	€ 2,747,229	€ 2,102,734	
2004	€ 222,255,486	€ 42,405,950	€ 37,397,318	€ 2,596,198	€ 2,412,434	
2005	€ 196,720,055	€ 38,284,146	€ 33,665,967	€ 2,408,237	€ 2,209,942	
2006	€ 202,753,947	€ 38,373,106	€ 32,277,948	€ 3,937,936	€ 2,157,222	
2007	€ 234,180,541	€ 42,843,715	€ 37,482,235	€ 3,069,175	€ 2,292,305	
2008	€ 188,882,160	€ 38,408,937	€ 31,559,485	€ 3,629,050	€ 2,736,346	€ 484,056
2009	€ 198,568,775	€ 39,504,610	€ 31,547,710	€ 3,188,639	€ 3,463,094	€ 1,305,167
2010	€ 187,234,351	€ 39,622,668	€ 32,004,975	€ 3,101,772	€ 3,187,870	€ 1,328,051
YEAR	**%**	**%**	**%**	**%**	**%**	**%**
2003	100.00%	19.70%	17.21%	1.41%	1.08%	0.00%
2004	100.00%	19.08%	16.83%	1.17%	1.09%	0.00%
2005	100.00%	19.46%	17.11%	1.22%	1.12%	0.00%
2006	100.00%	18.93%	15.92%	1.94%	1.06%	0.00%
2007	100.00%	18.30%	16.01%	1.31%	0.98%	0.00%
2008	100.00%	20.33%	16.71%	1.92%	1.45%	0.26%
2009	100.00%	19.89%	15.89%	1.61%	1.74%	0.66%
2010	100.00%	21.16%	17.09%	1.66%	1.70%	0.71%

Source: my elaboration from CNCCFP (2005-2011)

FRA15 Party leaders

YEAR	NAME
PCF	**Secretary (*Secrétaire general,* from 1994 *Secrétaire national*)**
1972-1994	Georges Marchais
1994-2001	Robert Hue
2001-2010	Marie-George Buffet
2010-present	Pierre Laurent
LO	**Collective leadership**
	Spokesperson (*porte-parole*):
1973-2008	Arlette Laguiller
2008-present	Nathalie Arthaud
	Informal leader:
1956-2009	Robert Barcia (Hardy)
LCR	**Collective leadership**
	Main spokesperson (*porte-parole*):
1966-2002	Alain Krivine
2002-2009	Olivier Besancenot
NPA	**Collective leadership**
	Main spokesperson (*porte-parole*):
2009-2011	Olivier Besancenot
2011-2012	Christine Poupin
	Myriam Martin
2011-present	Christine Poupin
PG	
	Informal leader:
2008-2010	Jean-Luc Mélenchon
	President (*Président*)
2010-present	Jean-Luc Mélenchon
	Martine Billard
PT	
	Secretary (*Secrétaire*)
1991-2007	Daniel Gluckstein
	Informal leader:
1953-2008	Pierre Lambert
POI	**Collective leadership**
2008-present	4 national secretaries

FRA16 Sociology of members, PCF

	1954	1959	1966		1979	1997
	PCF	PCF	PCF		PCF	PCF
GENDER				**GENDER**		
Men	79.8%	78.1%	74.5%	Men	65.0%	60.0%
Women	20.2%	21.9%	25.5%	Women	35.0%	40.0%
AGE				**AGE**		
<26	10.2%	5.5%	9.4%	<30	24.5%	10.5%
26-39	35.6%	38.4%	33.1%	30-59	59.9%	65.1%
>40	54.2%	56.1%	57.5%	>59	15.6%	24.4%
PROFESSION				**PROFESSION**		
				Core working-class	59.9%	43.7%
Blue-collar worker	44.9%	45.3%		Blue-collar worker	32.1%	16.3%
White-collar worker	14.5%	14.9%		White-collar worker	17.6%	17.1%
				Intermediate professions	10.2%	10.3%
Peasant	9.4%	8.2%		Upper professions	3.4%	5.9%
Self-employed	5.0%	6.7%		Self-employed	5.9%	2.5%
Inactive	26.2%	24.9%		Inactive & unemployed	30.8%	47.9%
				Retired	15.5%	24.5%

Source: my elaboration from Lazar (1992), Platone (1985) and Platone & Ranger (2000).
Notes: membership surveys.